The reformed Committee on World Food Security and the global governance of food security by Duncan, J.
Duncan, J. (2014). The reformed Committee on World Food Security and the global governance of 
food security. (Unpublished Doctoral thesis, City University London) 
City Research Online
Original citation: Duncan, J. (2014). The reformed Committee on World Food Security and the 
global governance of food security. (Unpublished Doctoral thesis, City University London) 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/3511/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The reformed Committee on World Food Security and the 
global governance of food security 
 
 
 
 
 Jessica Duncan  
Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Food Policy 
Centre for Food Policy 
Department of Sociology, City University London 
February 2014 
 
  
 2 
 
Table of Contents 
Table of Figures..................................................................................................................................... 5 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................ 6 
Abstract .................................................................................................................................................. 8 
Acronyms ............................................................................................................................................... 9 
1. Introduction: Setting up the problem ......................................................................................... 11 
1.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 11 
1.2. The State of Hunger in the World .......................................................................... 11 
1.3. Triggers of the 2007-8 Food Price Spikes............................................................... 15 
1.4. Crisis Repeating: Era of food price volatility ........................................................ 18 
1.5. Multilateral Reaction to the 2007-8 Food Price Crisis .......................................... 20 
1.6. Chronology of Key Events in Global Food Security Governance (October 2007-
October 2012) ........................................................................................................................ 21 
1.7. Structure of the Thesis and Research Questions ................................................... 34 
2. Theorizing Global Food Security Policy Change: Global governance and embedded 
neoliberalism ........................................................................................................................................ 39 
2.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 39 
2.2. Defining Governance ............................................................................................... 39 
2.2.1. Global Governance ................................................................................................ 41 
2.2.2. Observable Phenomena.......................................................................................... 42 
2.2.3. Political Project ...................................................................................................... 46 
2.3. Challenges and Critiques to Global Governance .................................................. 48 
2.3.1. Participation ........................................................................................................... 50 
2.3.2. Accountability ........................................................................................................ 51 
2.3.3. Legitimacy ............................................................................................................. 51 
2.3.4. Categorization ........................................................................................................ 53 
2.3.5. Summary of Global Governance ........................................................................... 54 
2.4. Embedded Neoliberalism......................................................................................... 54 
2.4.1. Neoliberalism ......................................................................................................... 54 
2.4.2. Embedded Neoliberalism ....................................................................................... 58 
2.4.3. The State ................................................................................................................ 64 
2.5. Summary: Articulating a theoretical framework for food security policies ....... 65 
3. Research Design and Methods ................................................................................................... 68 
3.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 68 
3.2. Research Questions .................................................................................................. 68 
3.3. Research Design ....................................................................................................... 68 
3.4. Data Collection ......................................................................................................... 70 
3.4.1. Scope of Research .................................................................................................. 70 
3.4.2. Case Studies ........................................................................................................... 71 
3.4.3. Desk Research ....................................................................................................... 75 
3.5. Field Work ................................................................................................................ 77 
3.5.1. Participant Observation.......................................................................................... 78 
3.5.2. Interviews .............................................................................................................. 80 
3.5.3. Inclusion of Interviews and Field Work in the Thesis ........................................... 81 
3.6. Ethics ......................................................................................................................... 82 
4. Evolution of Global Food Security Policy ................................................................................. 85 
4.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................. 85 
4.2. Shifts in Food Security ............................................................................................. 85 
4.3. Food Security: A summary of policy developments since 1945 ........................... 91 
4.3.1. World Food Security as a Problem of Global Supply ............................................ 95 
4.3.2. Embedding Neoliberalism in Food Security Policy: Food security as access ....... 97 
4.3.3. World Food Summit: Food security as development .......................................... 100 
4.4. Global Food Security in an Era of Food Price Volatility: 2008-2013 ................ 103 
4.4.1. Interconnection of multilateral actors in global food security policy .................. 104 
 3 
 
4.5. Summary ................................................................................................................ 106 
5. The Committee on World Food Security .................................................................................. 107 
5.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 107 
5.2. Leadership and legitimacy in global food security governance ......................... 107 
5.3. History of the Committee on World Food Security ............................................ 111 
5.4. Original Structure and Mandate: Pre-reform (1974-2008) ............................... 112 
5.5. Reforming the CFS ................................................................................................ 114 
5.6. Actors in the CFS ................................................................................................... 116 
5.6.1. Plenary................................................................................................................. 116 
5.6.2. Member States ..................................................................................................... 117 
5.6.3. Secretariat ............................................................................................................ 120 
5.6.4. Chair, Bureau and Advisory Group ..................................................................... 121 
5.6.5. Participants .......................................................................................................... 123 
5.6.6. High-Level Panel of Experts ............................................................................... 127 
5.7. Post-Reform Activities (2009-2013) ..................................................................... 131 
5.8. Summary ................................................................................................................ 133 
6. Case Study 1: International Food Security and Nutrition Civil Society Mechanism ............. 135 
6.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 135 
6.2. Civil Society Organizations in the Committee on World Food Security .......... 135 
6.3. The International Food Security and Nutrition Civil Society Mechanism ....... 137 
6.3.1. Designing the Mechanism ................................................................................... 137 
6.3.2. Organizational Structure of the CSM .................................................................. 140 
6.4. Internal Challenges Facing the CSM ................................................................... 148 
6.5. Engaging with the CFS.......................................................................................... 154 
6.6. External Challenges and Barriers to Effective CSO Engagement .................... 156 
6.7. Successful Strategies for CSO Engagement with the CFS ................................. 158 
6.8. Reflections on Scaling-up the CSM and CFS Models ........................................ 161 
6.9. Summary ................................................................................................................ 165 
7. Case Study 2: Voluntary Guidelines for the Responsible Tenure of Land, Fisheries and 
Forests ................................................................................................................................................ 169 
7.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 169 
7.2. Land Tenure and Food Security .......................................................................... 170 
7.3. Establishing Guidelines for Tenure of Natural Resources ................................ 171 
7.3.1. Bringing the VGGTs into the CFS ...................................................................... 174 
7.4. An overview of the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of 
Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security ....... 180 
7.5. Negotiating the Voluntary Guidelines: Insight into process and participation 182 
7.6. Analysis of the Final Document ............................................................................ 200 
7.7. Implications and Next Steps ................................................................................. 202 
7.8. Summary ................................................................................................................ 205 
8. Case Study 3: Global Strategic Framework ............................................................................. 207 
8.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 207 
8.2. Developing a Global Strategic Framework ......................................................... 207 
8.3. Negotiating the Global Strategic Framework ..................................................... 211 
8.4. Assessing the Global Strategic Framework ......................................................... 213 
8.5. Summary ................................................................................................................ 215 
9. Assessment of and Conclusions on the Reformed CFS: 2010-2013 ....................................... 217 
9.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 217 
9.2. Considering the Results-Based Framework ........................................................ 218 
9.3. Achieving the Reform Mandate ........................................................................... 223 
9.4. Reflections on the CFS .......................................................................................... 226 
10. Conclusions: Implications for food security and global governance .................................. 229 
10.1. Reflections on the research questions .................................................................. 229 
10.2. Implications for Food Security ............................................................................. 232 
10.3. Implications for Global Governance .................................................................... 234 
10.4. Addressing Limitations of Global Governance ................................................... 237 
10.5. Reflections on Methods ......................................................................................... 239 
 4 
 
10.6. Reflections on Broader Application of Methodology .......................................... 241 
10.7. Opportunities for future research ........................................................................ 243 
Appendices ......................................................................................................................................... 245 
Appendix 1: Assessment of key meetings in a post-2008 food crisis architecture of global 
food security governance .................................................................................................... 245 
Appendix 2: Reflections on Participant Observation ...................................................... 248 
Appendix 3: Participant Profiles ....................................................................................... 250 
Summary of interviews by region and role ....................................................................... 250 
Titles attributed to research participants ........................................................................... 250 
Breakdown of positions held by informants used in the thesis (n = 24) ........................... 251 
Regional breakdown of informants used in the thesis (n =24) ......................................... 251 
Gender breakdown of informants used in thesis (n = 24) ................................................. 251 
Appendix 4: Participant Information Form ..................................................................... 252 
Appendix 5: Participant Consent Form ............................................................................ 254 
Appendix 6: Principles and guidelines related to investment in agriculture ................. 255 
References .......................................................................................................................................... 262 
 
 
  
 5 
 
 
 
Table of Figures 
Figure 1: Percentage of undernourished persons in the world (1969-2008) ............................... 13 
Figure 2: Number (in millions) of undernourished persons in the world (1969-2008) ............... 13 
Figure 3: Undernourishment in the world: two very different trends after the crises ................. 14 
Figure 4: Additional number of undernourished in 2007 number of people (million) ............... 15 
Figure 5: Monthly Food Prices (1990- 2012) ............................................................................. 16 
Figure 6: Monthly Food Price Indices (2006- 2012) .................................................................. 16 
Figure 7: Commodity Food Price and Fuel (energy) Index ........................................................ 17 
Figure 8: Summary of causes of international food price spikes by category (2007-8) ............. 18 
Figure 9: Chronology of Key Moments in Transnational Food Security Policy ........................ 22 
Figure 10: Complexity of the Crisis  ........................................................................................... 35 
Figure 11: Organizations and Institutions of Global Governance .............................................. 43 
Figure 12: Research Process ....................................................................................................... 69 
Figure 13: Chronological Summary of Research Process  .......................................................... 71 
Figure 14: List of policy documents that make up the focus of the analysis  ............................. 76 
Figure 15: Record of participant observation ............................................................................. 79 
Figure 16: Constituencies and Regions within the CSM Coordination Committee . ............... 141 
Figure 17: Makeup of the Coordination Committee Advisory Group Members ...................... 144 
Figure 18: How the CSM engages with the CFS ...................................................................... 154 
Figure 19: Outcomes of the Policy Roundtable on Land Tenure and International Investment in 
Agriculture (CFS 36) ................................................................................................................ 176 
Figure 20: Overarching Frameworks identified in the Global Strategic Framework for Food 
Security and Nutrition ............................................................................................................... 214 
 
  
 6 
 
 
Acknowledgements  
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to and appreciation for my primary supervisor, 
David Barling, for his continuous support, patience and motivation. I could not have asked for a 
more dedicated or supportive supervisor and teacher. Sincere appreciation and thanks are also 
extended to my secondary supervisor, Tim Lang, for his energy, encouragement, insightful 
comments, and perspective. Together, my supervisors have inspired me to become a better 
academic and to work harder. I also acknowledge the financial support of City University 
London and the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada. 
 
I am indebted to the participants of the CFS, especially those who engage through the CSM, for 
their trust, openness, analysis and dedication. The Secretariat of the CSM (Ashley, Chris, Luca) 
who secured my access to the CFS, and provided a sounding board for my concerns, questions 
and confusions. To my CFS friends who were endlessly available to talk through the intricacies 
and tensions of the CFS – you know who you are – and I am so grateful for your support and 
friendship.  
 
My deepest love and gratitude go to my family who have always supported me, inspired me, 
and modelled hard work. To my father who actually read every word of this thesis, and to my 
mother for teaching me to be organised, I love you both. To Tom who kept me sane and healthy 
throughout this process. I look forward to so many more adventures. Thanks to Margo and Phil 
for opening up their home to me and to Todd for challenging my ideas. Finally, to Ken Hatt, 
whose friendship, guidance and energy inspired me to jump down this rabbit hole. The world 
has lost a great teacher. He is deeply missed but his ideas live on in the work of his students.  
  
 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DECLARATION  
  
I declare that the work presented in this thesis, except those elements specifically declared, is all 
my own work carried out and finished at City University London.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COPYRIGHT DECLARATION  
  
The author accepts the discretion of the City University Librarian to allow the thesis to be 
copied in whole or in part without the prior written consent of the author. This thesis may be 
made available for consultation within the University library and may be photocopied only in 
single copies or lent to other libraries for the purpose of study.  
  
 8 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This research explores the reformed UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS) as an 
institution addressing a changed world, and as an illustration of evolving global food security 
governance. The research sets out to answer the extent to which the CFS is realising its reform 
objectives and how it is positioning itself within a changing architecture of global food security 
governance. 
Informed by literature on global governance and embedded neoliberalism, the inquiry centres 
around three case studies – Civil Society Mechanism, Voluntary Guidelines for the Responsible 
Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests, and the Global Strategic Framework – 
which serve to highlight the operationalization of key reform objectives while simultaneously 
providing insight into broader policy processes and dynamics. Data was collected through 
document analysis, participant observation, and interviews. The resulting analysis provides clear 
evidence of the impact of enhanced participation on policy outcomes and concludes that the 
policy recommendations emerging from the CFS are amongst the most comprehensive and 
useful in terms of applicability and uptake at the national and regional level. The analysis also 
reveals that despite its methods, outcomes and mandate, the CFS is being systematically 
undermined by other actors seeking to maintain influence and sustain neoliberal hegemony 
across food security policies at the global level.   
The research contributes to global governance theory by describing the functioning of a 
mechanisms that can address democratic deficits in global governance while elucidating related 
opportunities and challenges. The research also contributes to scholarship on global food 
security policy by challenging the application of previous analyses to the contemporary reality.  
The research addresses limitations in global governance literature by mapping the complexity of 
social and political relations across sites of negotiation, contestation and compromise between 
actors. The policy implications derived from this thesis focus on the need to further 
problematize food security and for policies to target structural causes of food insecurity. 
Building on the experiences of the CFS, this thesis concludes that transparent, participatory 
mechanisms need to be created which acknowledge, and seek to rectify, existing imbalances in 
power relations in policy-making processes. 
 
Key Words: Committee on World Food Security; Food Security; Food Policy; Participation; 
Global Governance; Embedded Neoliberalism; Civil Society Organizations 
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1. Introduction: Setting up the problem 
1.1. Introduction 
In 2007-2008 world food prices spiked and global economic crisis set in. The United Nations’ 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) declared that more than one billion people were 
going hungry (FAO 2008d). The international community responded with a swell of activity. 
One important initiative was the reform of the United Nations’ Committee on World Food 
Security (CFS). At the height of the crisis, the Committee’s 123 member countries adopted a 
series of reforms with the aim of becoming the foremost international, inclusive and 
intergovernmental platform for food security. The mandate of the reformed CFS is ambitious: 
understanding how the Committee is achieving its objectives and the position it occupies 
transnationally is the focus of this research.  
This Chapter maps out the crisis that led to a watershed period in the organization of the 
architecture of global food security governance. It opens by reviewing the impact of the food 
price spikes and then examines reasons for these spikes. Given that the crisis is seen to have 
marked a moment of change – the end of the era of cheap food, or the start of increased food 
price volatility, attention is also paid to the impact and reason for recurring food price crises.  
This is followed by a review of the chronology of multilateral action around food security which 
serves to illustrate not only the volume of activity (in turn pointing to the significance of the 
crisis), but also identifies international priorities for addressing the problem. The latter begins to 
map out the architecture of global food security governance. 0F1 This Chapter concludes by 
introducing the structure of the thesis and identifying the research questions.   
1.2. The State of Hunger in the World 
Between 2006 and 2008 international food prices soared and an additional 200 million people 
were estimated to have gone hungry (DEFRA 2010:2)1F2. When prices peaked. one sixth of 
humanity – one billion people – were estimated to be undernourished (Demeke, Pangrazio, and 
Maetz 2009; FAO 2009e, 2011a, 2012f) 2F3.  In addition to malnutrition, an additional 50 million 
                                                     
 
1
 This map is enhanced throughout the thesis, notably in Chapter 4.   
2 The United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (2009b) calculated an additional 115 
million people were pushed into chronic hunger due to rising prices. 
3
 The FAO (2008d) reported that at the height of the food price spikes, 1.2 billion people were chronically 
undernourished. In 2012, upon the request of the Committee on World Food Security, the FAO revised its 
methodology and enhanced its data. With these improvements the estimated number of chronocally 
undernourished was reduced to 870 million in 2010-2012 (FAO 2012h). These are the most legitimate 
figures available with respect to global hunger and therefore large shifts can motivate policy makers to 
act. Unfortunately, these measurements remain limited. First the prevalence of undernourishment 
indicator is defined solely in terms of availability of dietary energy and its distribution in the population. 
It does not consider other aspects of nutrition. Second, the calculations rely on minimum activity levels 
whereas many poor and hungry have livelihoods that involve manual labour. Finally, the method is 
uanble to capture the impact of short term shocks unlesst hey impact longer-term consumption patters 
(FAO 2012h).  
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people were pushed into poverty due to the higher cost of food (FAO 2011a; World Bank 
2011b). Rising food costs resulted in food riots and civil unrest in more than 60 countries, (FAO 
2011a; Zaman et al. 2008), generated appeals for food aid from 36 countries (USA 2011), and 
countries that had long been considered food secure faced the threat of limited food imports as a 
result of export restrictions put in place by some food exporting countries (DEFRA 2010; 
Sharma 2010). Editorialists declared the end to the era of cheap food (Arusa 2011; Cookson 
2011; Elliot 2012), while the international NGO Oxfam (2012:1) accused policy-makers of 
having “taken cheap food for granted for nearly 30 years”, adding “those days are gone.” 
Buttressed amidst a burgeoning global economic crisis and a rapidly expanding environmental 
crisis, the food price crisis of 2007-8 challenged dominant assumptions about food security, 
agriculture and development, prompting many policy makers, analysis and food producers to 
grapple with an increasing number of variables that made up a so-called “perfect storm” 
(Headey, Malaiyandi, and Shenggen 2009). These variables included environmental challenges, 
demographic shifts, rising energy prices, demand for biofuels, depreciation of the U.S. dollar, 
unfavourable weather and trade shocks, panic purchases, and export restrictions (Headey et al. 
2009). This storm illustrated the growing  interconnectedness of agricultural, energy and 
financial markets (Wise and Murphy 2012) but also disrupted the dominant logic food security 
policy, permanently changing the public policy debate on food security (HLPE 2011:17) and 
ushering in an era of food price volatility. 
We are facing a new context: we now live in an environment where supply and demand are 
more closely aligned, natural resource bases are shrinking and agricultural systems are 
increasingly threatened by climate change.  Research indicates that food price volatility is 
expected to remain the norm and the drivers of volatility in international markets (e.g., biofuels, 
speculation and climate change) have yet to be addressed (FAO 2009e; G20 2011a; High Level 
Panel of Experts 2011b; McCreary 2011). This new context demands increased international 
cooperation and coordination. Things are not likely to return to what they were and now the 
human, social and economic costs are higher than the cost of inaction. In short, the world food 
situation is being redefined (Von Braun 2007; Hart 2009). 
The problem has also shifted. As we will see below, when the concept of food security emerged, 
it was very much in the context of availability: how to get enough food supply to meet growing 
demand? The 1980s and 1990s were marked by questions of access as it became clear that 
availability of food does not guarantee access (Sen 1981). However, the post 2007-8 crisis 
reality is grounded where these two challenges intersect. While access remains a problem, the 
question of availability has re-emerged as a new challenge and will be an increasingly pressing 
issue due to impacts of climate change, growing demand for food (e.g., changing diets, 
population growth, biofuels), rising cost of petroleum, restricted availability of water, 
desertification and soil degradation. 
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Figure 1: Percentage of undernourished persons in the world (1969-2008) (FAO 2012b, 
ammended by author) 
  
 
 
Figure 2: Number (in millions) of undernourished persons in the world (1969-2008) (FAO 
2012b, ammended by author) 
 
International actors lined up to express their concern and rallied around renewed calls for 
achieving food security. New initiatives were launched and new players emerged. As a result, 
food security – the notion that all people, at all times, have access to appropriate food to meet 
their daily needs – has regained prominence on the international agenda (Duncan and Barling 
2012; de Schutter 2010, 2012). Many acknowledged the challenges ahead but few 
acknowledged the so-called elephant in the room: since the 1970s, food security policy has 
consistently failed. While the proportion of hungry people in the world has decreased since the 
1970s (Figure 1), the number of people suffering has increased (Figure 2). At the same time, 
2008 figures estimate more than 1.4 billion people to be overweight (WHO 2012).   
Post-crisis analysis suggests that in response to rising food prices, countries adopted different 
net trade positions (e.g., exporter, importer) and different policy responses to the price and 
income shocks, leading to a broad range  of outcomes (FAO 2011:8) . Larger countries were 
able to insulate their markets from the crisis through the implementation of restrictive trade 
policies and safety nets, but these policies had the negative effect of increasing prices and 
volatility on international markets (FAO 2011:8). Countries most vulnerable to food swings on 
the international market are typically poor, net-food importing, lacked capacity to restrict 
exports, and had few food reserves and inadequate funds to procure food at the higher prices 
(FAO 2011:8). In 2008, for example,  the food import bill for low-income food-deficit countries 
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increased by about 35 per cent from 2006 (FAO 2012f). These countries, the majority of which 
are in Africa, bore “the brunt of the crisis, and staple food prices rose substantially in these 
countries” (FAO 2011:8). In Asia, the number of people suffering from undernourishment, 
while higher than the numbers suffering in Africa, has been decreasing and the impact of the 
2007-8 food price spikes was not as significant as it was in Africa (Figure 3).   
 
Figure 3: Undernourishment in the world: two very different trends after the crises (FAO 
2011b:8) 
 
Across the African continent, an additional 28 million people went undernourished as a result of 
the food price spikes (FAO 2011b) (see Figure 3). Food riots broke out in Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Mozambique, and Somalia leading governments to increase 
military presence and to take emergency policies measures (FAO 2008c). In East Africa, more 
than 17 million people faced serious food insecurity as a result of low harvests, high food prices 
and conflict (FAO 2008c). In West Africa, high food prices negatively affected access to food 
as the price of staples such as sorghum, millet, rice and maize increased. The FAO (2008c) 
estimates that in Southern Africa high food prices impacted over 8.7 million people.  
In 2007 alone, forty-one million additional people in Latin America and the Caribbean were 
added to the rapidly growing number of undernourished people worldwide (Figure 4). Prior to 
the food price spikes, Latin America has implemented far-reaching economic reforms geared 
towards trade liberalization and was “considered relatively stable and capable of absorbing 
external shocks, thanks to its higher foreign exchange liquidity; decreased public sector and 
external borrowing needs; exchange rate flexibility; lower exposure to currency, interest rate, 
and rollover risks in public sector debt portfolios; and improved access to local-currency loans” 
(Robles and Torero 2010: 117). Robles and Torero (2010:118) not that prior to the 2007-8 price 
spikes, countries in the region were generally on track to achieve the Millennium Development 
Goal (MDG) of halving the proportion of hungry people by 2015 This success is no longer 
guaranteed. The Latin American case serves to highlight the fragility of “emerging economies” 
and the impact of rising food prices on vulnerable populations, as illustrated by the large 
regression in development targets.  
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Figure 4: Additional number of undernourished in 2007 number of people (million) (FAO 
2008a, ammended by author) 
 
Having examined some of the impacts of the food prices spikes and the resulting crises, 
attention now turns to a review of the main triggers of the price spikes.  
1.3. Triggers of the 2007-8 Food Price Spikes 
After decades of historic lows, the food price rise of 2007-2008 sparked a new era of higher 
food prices and extreme food price volatility (High Level Panel of Experts 2011:9) (Figure 5 
and Figure 6).3F4  While food prices peaked in the summer of 2008, they actually started to rise in 
late 2006 along-side rising oil prices, illustrating the interconnectedness of the two sectors 
(Figure 7). Some claimed that high prices presented an opportunity for producers of agricultural 
commodities, however the cost of agricultural production rose at the same time due to higher 
energy and fertiliser prices (DEFRA 2010:9) often nullifying any potential gains from increased 
market prices.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
 
4 It is important here to note that volatility is the normal state of agricultural markets, but what is new are 
the extremes highs and lows. 
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Figure 5: Monthly Food Prices (1990- 2012) (2002-2004 = 100) (FAO 2012d, ammended by 
author)4F5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Monthly Food Price Indices (2006- 2012) (2002-2004 = 100) (FAO 2012d, ammended 
by author) 
 
                                                     
 
5 The FAO Food Price Index is a measure of the monthly change in international prices of a basket of 
food commodities. It consists of the average of five commodity group price indices (representing 55 
quotations), weighted with the average export shares of each of the groups for 2002-2004.  
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Figure 7: Commodity Food Price and Fuel (energy) Index (Monthly Price January 2007-January 
2012) (IMF 2012, ammended by author).5F6 
 
The food crisis sparked by the food price spikes did not spontaneously appear. For thirty years 
leading up to the current era of extreme food price volatility, agriculture – especially 
smallholder agriculture (McCreary 2011:18) –  had been subject to disjointed agriculture 
policies at the national and international level resulting in distortions in trade and limited policy 
coherence at the national and international level (Ahmad 2011:1). In 2007 and 2008, it was the 
timing and combination of several factors that developed into what some have referred to as a 
“perfect storm” (Headey et al. 2009). 
While several factors contributed to the food price spikes, DEFRA (2010:10) notes:  
Attributing significance to one factor or another in the price spike is very difficult 
(and attributing robust percentages, arguably impossible), given the complex way 
that the various issues combine. Take away one or other of several of these factors 
and it may well be that there would have been no price spike, but that does not 
mean then that each of these was the cause of the event. 
There is general agreement that contributing factors on the supply side included increases in the 
cost of oil, poor harvest – especially of wheat – and decreased production due to drought 
(Abbott, Hurt, and Tyner 2008; Baffes and Haniotis 2010; Collins 2008; DEFRA 2010; FAO 
2008b, 2008d; Gilbert 2008; Trostle 2008; Wiggins, Compton, and Keats 2010a; Zaman et al. 
2008). On the demand side, and from a financial perspective, inflation from world economic 
growth is a commonly accepted factor. Policies, including export bans and restrictions as well 
as the reduction of import tariffs, also played a role. The depreciation of the US Dollar led to an 
increase in prices tied to the US Dollar, resulting in higher costs across the food supply chain 
                                                     
 
6 Commodity Fuel (energy) Index, 2005 = 100, includes crude oil (petroleum), natural gas, and coal price 
indices. Commodity Food Price Index, 2005 = 100, includes cereal, vegetable oils, meat, seafood, sugar, 
bananas, and oranges price indices. 
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(Demeke et al. 2009; OXFAM 2012; Sharma 2010; Wiggins, Compton, and Keats 2010b). 
Speculation on futures markets also played a role in the price spikes (FAO 2008b, 2011a; 
Gilbert 2008; OXFAM 2012; Sharma 2010; Wiggins et al. 2010b). These factors are 
summarized in Figure 8. 
Supply Side Demand Side Policies Economy/Finance 
Poor harvest (esp. 
wheat) 
Rising demands from 
emerging economies 
(esp. India and China) 
Restocking  Depreciation of the 
US dollar 
Low grain stocks Diversion of grains for 
biofuels and animal feed 
Reduction of import 
tariffs 
Speculation on 
futures markets 
Rise in oil price Inflation from rapid 
growth of world 
economy 
Export bans and 
restrictions 
 
2000-2004 
consumption of 
cereals exceeded 
production worldwide 
(Wiggins et al. 2010b) 
 Slowdown in production 
of cereals 
 
 
 Price controls & price 
subsidies on basic foods 
 
Figure 8: Summary of causes of international food price spikes by category (2007-8) (Duncan 
2013) 
 
Changes in supply and demand fundamentals cannot adequately explain the price spikes 
(Robles and Torero 2010:122). As David Barling (2012) notes, trying to categorise challenges 
in these terms can prove problematic in agriculture and food policy and some elements are 
central to both supply and demand. Barling (2012:5) uses the example of land as  
both a demand and supply factor, as demand for good fertile land for production is 
often in heavily populated coasted and estuarial areas and river valleys and plains 
where there are residential demands. Equally, land is a prerequisite for food 
production while competing with a range of other demands, not least other non-
food crops such as large scale production of biofuels to meet the competing 
demand for new energy sources. 
Similarly, ad hoc trade policy interventions and excessive speculation in the commodity futures 
market also fall outside of a simple supply and demand equation (Robles and Torero 2010:122). 
Attempting to understand the reasons for these spikes through such a model inevitably frames 
solutions with the same perspective, reinforcing an approach which may not warrant 
reinforcement. 
1.4. Crisis Repeating: Era of food price volatility 
After the food price spikes of 2007-8, food security, and agriculture more broadly, remained on 
the international agenda as we shifted into the predicted era of food price volatility. And, as the 
name would suggest, food prices spiked again in 2010. Global figures on hunger from 2010 
suggest that the number of hungry people had decreased to 925 million, in part to economic 
growth and a reduction in international food prices from the 2008 highs (FAO 2012h). 
However, between July and September 2010, the price of wheat increased from sixty to eighty 
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per cent, a reaction to crop losses due to a period of drought in Russia and a subsequent export 
ban imposed by the Russian Federation (FAO 2012f). Rice and maize prices also rose during 
this period.  
The food system remains in a state of crisis: food markets remain remarkably volatile. In the 
spring of 2011 international food prices were on the rise for the second time in three years. In 
February 2011, the World Bank Food Price Index reached its 2008 peak, after rising by 47 per 
cent from June 2010 (World Bank 2011:i). 
In 2012, in the United States, a large proportion of agriculture was located in areas affected by 
drought. In July 2012, 88 per cent of US corn, 44 per cent of cattle production and 40 per cent 
of soybean production was being grown in regions affected by drought (OXFAM 2012). Russia 
faced dry weather and severe flooding (in the south) that seriously reduced its grain harvests and 
caused damage to unpicked and stored grain (OXFAM 2012). Ukraine and Kazakhstan were 
also impacted by dry weather which will in turn impact their 2013 harvests. Ukraine was the 
world’s third largest exporter in 2011. India, which relied on monsoon rains as the main source 
of irrigation for 55 per cent of its farmlands, received rainfall 19 per cent below average 
(OXFAM 2012). In July 2012, maize and soybean prices reached all-time peaks, following high 
temperatures and lack of rainfall in the United States and Eastern Europe (World Bank 2012: 1). 
During this time, prices of wheat and rice remained below their historical peaks, but hovered at 
levels comparable to the 2011 spikes (World Bank 2012:1). 
Food price volatility presents significant challenges for food security and has a disproportionate 
impact on the poor and vulnerable. The post-2008 crises had differentiated features when 
compared to the 2007-8 crisis but shared at least four similarities (World Bank 2011b:1). First, 
global grain stocks remained low. Second, the cost of oil remained high and unrest in the 
Middle East and Africa added a new level of uncertainty in oil markets. Third, the US Dollar 
continued to depreciate against other currencies. 6F7 Finally, financial investment in agricultural 
commodities remained high.  
Food price volatility witnessed in 2010 and 2012 showed price increases were more widespread 
across agricultural commodities and production shortfalls due to poor weather were more 
prevalent. Policy responses did impact grain price spikes in 2011, but not to the extent they did 
in 2008 when policy responses to grain shortages came as a surprise and greatly impacted prices 
and shortages (World Bank 2011b:1). The implications of on-going food price volatility remain 
significant for poor and developing economies. High food prices pushed the global food import 
bill for 2011 over a trillion dollars (USD), further illustrating not only the failures of global food 
                                                     
 
7 This is not clear cut.  In 2008 the dollar was trading lower than in the summer of 2012:  in April 2008 it 
was $1.55 against the euro, $1.98 against the pound, while in July 2012 it was $1.23 against the euro and 
$1.56 against the pound (OXFAM 2012: 3). The higher the dollar value meant higher costs for food-
importing countries and many low-income countries are net food importers (Ng and Aksoy 2008).  
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security governance but also that the policies guiding agricultural development and food 
security are deeply flawed. 
1.5. Multilateral Reaction to the 2007-8 Food Price Crisis 
Given the triggers of the 2007-8 food price spikes, food security policy now necessitates the 
introduction of added layers of complexity (e.g., price volatility, commodity speculation, 
investment in agricultural land) to an already complex and multi-faceted concept. Because of 
the causes and reactions to the crisis, there has also been widespread agreement on the need for 
improved coherence and cohesion at the global level. These changes suggest recognition of the 
interconnectedness of food security issues and the need for multilateral action to reduce food 
insecurity, and start building linkages for a strengthened global policy arena, not only around 
food and agriculture, but across sectors and industries.   
However, despite the rekindled interest, scepticism around efficacy and political will remains 
warranted. Twice in the ten years leading up to the food price crisis governments of the world 
had come together to declared their commitment to ending world hunger, First in 1996, with the 
Rome Declaration on World Food Security and the World Food Summit Plan of Action they 
agreed to cut the number of hungry in the world in half by 2015 (paragraph 7). Four years later, 
in the UN Millennium Declaration, States pledged, more modestly, to halve the proportion of 
the hungry by 2015. Yet, 870 million people remain chronically undernourished in 2010–12 
(FAO 2012g). 
This time, actors have steered away from quantifiable commitments and targets, although 
existing commitments were reiterated at various international meetings (e.g., Declaration of the 
High Level Conference on World Food Security: Challenges of Climate Change and Bioenergy 
(June 2008)). Policy makers and development practitioners continue working towards the 
achievement of food security yet few appear to be contemplating whether food security is 
indeed the most appropriate way to be framing the very real challenge of ensuring healthy, 
culturally appropriate, sustainable diets to a growing world population. 
What follows is a chronological overview of multilateral activity sparked or spurred on by the 
sharp rise in food prices in 2007 and 2007, on-going food price volatility or the resulting 
impacts of these. The presentation is not comprehensive and insofar as it is focused primarily on 
global-level, state-led initiatives. It does not consider initiatives undertaken at the regional and 
national levels, as well as those undertaken globally by civil society organizations, the private 
sector or philanthropic bodies. The reasons for this is that this research is particularly interesting 
in understanding how states are working multilaterally to address an issue that has international 
targets and commitments and is acknowledged to be global in scale and yet remains a national-
level responsibility.  
In what follows major multi-lateral, globally-focussed initiatives that that explicitly targeted or 
reacted to the post-crisis food security policy environment are reviewed chronologically. This 
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highlights the high-level interest, the types of reactions and the key actors involved. In doing so, 
this section lays the ground work to be able to answer the research question – Who are the main 
actors and what are the dominant initiatives within the changing architecture of food security 
governance? — and in doing so, maps out the broader transnational policy space within which 
the Committee on World Food Security operates, including not only opportunities but also 
challenges with respect to competition for legitimacy and leadership.  
1.6. Chronology of Key Events in Global Food Security Governance (October 
2007-October 2012) 
As the estimated number of malnourished in the world surpassed one billion and food riots 
broke out around the globe in response to rising food prices, international actors reacted with a 
flurry of declarations, statements, high-level meeting, the creation of new organizations and the 
reformation of old ones. What follows is a chronological review (for a summary see Figure 9) of 
key multilateral meetings designed to address food security at an international level. The aim is 
to provide an overview of the transnational multilateral space within which the architecture of 
global food security governance is being reshaped. While analysis is limited in this first section 
– in favour of establishing a clear chain of events – what becomes clear is an obvious 
contradiction between the large number of meetings and overlapping mandates, all in the name 
of policy cohesion and cooperation.  
 
Who What When 
World Bank Group World Development Report on Agriculture for 
Development 
October 2007 
World Economic Forum Annual Forum January 2008 
International Assessment of 
Agricultural Knowledge, 
Science and Technology for 
Development (IAASTD) 
Results and conclusions ratified during the 
Intergovernmental Plenary Meeting 
April 2008 
UN High-Level Task Force on the Global Food Security 
Crisis 
April 2008 
UN Economic and Social 
Council 
Special Meeting on the Global Food Crisis May 2008 
FAO High-Level Conference on Food Security and the 
Challenges of Bio-energy 
June 2008 
G8 Leaders Statement on Global Food Security July 2008 
World Bank Group Global Food Crisis Response Program May 2008 
UN High Level Meeting on Food Security for All January 2009 
World Bank Group Implementing Agriculture for Development, World 
Bank Group Agriculture Action Plan: FY2010-1 
July 2009 
G8 L’Aquila Joint Statement on Food Security July 2009 
Rome-based Food Agencies Joint Food Security Strategy July 2009 
G20 Pittsburgh Summit: proposal for GAFSP September 2009 
UN + USA Partnering for Food Security  September 2009 
FAO High-Level Expert Forum, How to Feed the World 
in 2050 
October 2009 
Committee on World Food 35th Session: Agreement to reform October 2009 
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Security 
People’s Food Sovereignty 
Forum 
Mobilization around CFS reform and civil society 
mechanism 
November 2009 
 
FAO World Summit on Food Security. November 2009 
WB (Sustainable 
Development Network) 
Framework Document for a Global Agriculture and 
Food Security Program (GAFSP) 
December 2009 
FAO Summit of World’s Regions on Food Security January 2010 
FAO, IFAD, UNCTAD, 
World Bank 
Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment 
that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and Resources 
January 2010 
Global Forum for 
Agricultural Research 
First Global Conference on Agricultural Research 
for Development 
March 2010 
Scaling-Up Nutrition Framework for Action to Scale Up Nutrition April 2010 
Concern Worldwide, High-
Level Task Force and the 
Government of Ireland 
Consultation on the Comprehensive Framework for 
Action 
May 2010 
High Level Plenary Meeting 
of the UN General Assembly  
Outcome Document promoting national food 
security strategies 
September 2010 
Scaling-Up Nutrition (SUN) 
Movement 
A Road Map for Scaling-Up Nutrition (SUN)  September 2010 
CSO Forum for the CSM Approval of the Civil Society Mechanism October 2010 
Committee on World Food 
Security 
36th Session, first of the reformed CFS October 2010 
APEC Ministerial Meeting on Food Security October 2010 
G20 Multi-Year Action Plan on Development November 2010 
Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Food 
Agroecology and the right to food March 2011 
G20 Agriculture Ministers Action Plan on Food Price Volatility June 2011 
Chinese Academy 
of Agricultural Sciences and 
the International Food Policy 
Research Institute  
International Conference on Climate Change and 
Food Security 
July 2011 
 
FAO Regional Conferences March/April 2011 
Committee on World Food 
Security 
Extraordinary 38th Session to endorse the Voluntary 
guidelines on the responsible governance of tenure 
of land, fisheries and forests in the context of 
national food security.  
May 2012 
G8 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition May 2012 
United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs 
UN Conference on Sustainable Development June 2012 
FAO High level forum on food insecurity in protracted 
crisis 
September 2012 
Committee on World Food 
Security 
39th Session, adoption of the First Version of the 
Global Strategic Framework for Food Security and 
Nutrition 
October 2012 
Figure 9: Chronology of Key Moments in Transnational Food Security Policy (Duncan 2013) 
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The review begins in October 2007 when the World Bank Group released its annual World 
Development Report for 2008 which focused on Agriculture for Development. The World Bank 
is an international financial institution tasked with providing loans to developing countries to 
support various programmes. Since the onset of the food price spikes, they have played an 
active role in reshaping food security governance, returning to the role it played in the 1980s as 
a donor and coordinator for agriculture and rural development.  The 2008 report, which one 
World Bank Agricultural Expert called “the most authoritative source on the Bank’s position 
[on agriculture]” (Interview (World Bank Agricultural Expert), March 2012, Rome), marked the 
first time in a quarter century that the World Bank had focused its annual research report on 
agriculture, highlighting an important shift in the Bank’s international focus.  
This focus was mirrored in January 2008 when the World Economic Forum met for its annual 
invitation-only meeting in Davos. At this meeting a Network of Global Agenda Councils 
comprised of Councils on key topics of global economic importance, including one for food 
security, was established. 7F8 The Councils bring together experts on key themes and work to 
integrate outcomes of thematic discussions across the network and beyond to international 
decision-making fora.  
A few months later, in April 2008, in Johannesburg, at the Intergovernmental Plenary Meeting 
of the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for 
Development (IAASTD) the results and conclusions of the project were reviewed and ratified. 
The IAASTD process began in 2005, when the World Bank initiated an international effort to 
evaluate the relevance, quality and effectiveness of agricultural knowledge, science, and 
technology, and the effectiveness of public and private sector policies and institutional 
arrangements. The IAASTD was launched as an intergovernmental process, under the co-
sponsorship of the FAO, Global Environment Facility (GEF), UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, 
the World Bank and WHO. It was composed of one Global Assessment and five Sub-global 
Assessments based on the same frameworks which assess the impacts agricultural knowledge, 
science, and technology on hunger, poverty, nutrition, human health, and environmental and 
social sustainability in the past and the future. The Global and Sub-global assessments were 
peer-reviewed by governments and experts, and approved by the Panel of participating 
governments. The process included a global consultative process involving 900 participants and 
110 countries from all regions of the world. The Executive Summary of the Synthesis Report 
was approved by 58 countries.  
                                                     
 
8 The council is made up of familiar actors such as David Nabarro, Chair of the UN High Level Task 
Force on the Food Crisis; Jane Kakuru, President of the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa; 
Kanayo Nwanze, President of the International Fund for Agricultural Development; Shenggen Fan, 
Director-General of the International Food Policy Research Institute; Kavita Prakash-Mani, Head of Food 
Security, Syngenta. 
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In April 2008, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, in accordance with the UN Chief 
Executives Board, named a High-Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis 
(HLTF), bringing together the twenty-two UN agencies, the World Bank, IMF, WTO, and 
OECD. Civil society is notably absent from the Task Force. Assistant Secretary-General, David 
Nabarro, was charged with leading the task force and soon became the Special Representative 
for Food Security and Nutrition. After some concern about the limited role of the FAO on the 
Task Force, the Director General of the FAO was made vice-chairman of Task Force. The 
HLTF’s main role was to develop a Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA), “designed to 
encourage concerted responses to the food price crisis with actions to respond to the immediate 
needs of vulnerable populations and contribute to longer-term resilience”(High Level Task 
Force on the Global Food Security Crisis 2010:xi). The High Level Task Force aims to achieve 
its objectives through improved coordination at the international and country level without 
creating any bureaucratic structures or inter-governmental layers. Initially, the Rome-based 
Agencies8F9  supported the High Level Task Force as a short term mechanism for raising 
awareness, resources and improving collaboration and efficiency and provided staff and 
material assistance.  
In May, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) hosted a Special Meeting on the 
Global Food Crisis in New York to respond to the growing calls for immediate action. The 
President of ECOSOC released an official statement on the occasion of the special meeting of 
the Council on the global food crisis in June 2008  to the General Assembly of the United 
Nations outlining “the basic elements that constitute the basis for effective and sustained global 
action” (ECOSOC 2008:2).  
In June 2008, the FAO hosted the High-Level Conference on Food Security and the 
Challenges of Bio-energy which resulted in a Declaration on the Challenges of Climate Change 
and Bioenergy. Here a draft of the UN’s High Level Task Force on Global Food Security Crisis’ 
Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA) was also presented for comments with the caveat 
the CFA represents the consensus view of the HLTF but it is not an intergovernmental 
document. The aim of presenting the CFA at the conference was for it to be a catalyst for action 
as well as a synthesis of policies and priorities.  
                                                     
 
9 The Rome-based agencies are the three UN food-related agencies headquartered in Rome: the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO); the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD); and, the 
World Food Programme (WFP). These three organizations have a history of collaborating on projects that 
share their overlapping mandate of working towards eliminating hunger and poverty. Together, the 
Rome-based Agencies coordinate over four hundred activities involving more than seventy countries. 
During serious food emergencies, FAO and the World Food Programme jointly carry out Crop and Food 
Security Assessment Missions (CFSAMs) which aims to distribute reliable information to inform policy 
and action.  When food prices started to rise, the FAO and WFP began collaborating on a global 
information early warning system on food and agriculture (GIEWS) with the intension of ensuring 
continuous review of the world food situation, to share information to this effect, and to provide early 
warning of possible food crises at the country level.  
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In July 2008, at the height of the food crisis, G8 Leaders meeting in Hokkaido Toyako, Japan 
issued a Leaders Statement on Global Food Security. The G8, or Group of 8, is a forum for 
eight of the world’s most industrialized nations. The presidency of the G8 rotates through 
member states in the following order: France, United States, United Kingdom, Russia, 
Germany, Japan, Italy, and Canada. The European Union is represented within the G8 but 
cannot chair or host summits. G8 can refer to collection of these states and the annual summit 
meetings of the heads of government, as well as thematic meetings of G8 ministers.  
The G8 has no headquarters, no budget and no permanent staff. The G8 is often criticized for 
their promotion of neoliberal globalization and for representing the interests of an elite group of 
industrialized nations to the detriment of poorer countries. Fast-growing economies such as 
India, China and Brazil are not represented and there are no African or Latin American 
members. 9F10 Since the financial crisis, the annual summits have tended to focus on stabilizing the 
world economy and stimulating economic growth however they have also addressed food 
security and consequently the G8 is now a key actor in the developing architecture of global 
food security governance. Since 2008, food security has been on the agenda of each annual 
summit and has remained a priority for 2013 under the UK presidency.  
In the Leaders Statement on Global Food Security, G8 leaders expressed their on-going 
commitment to pursue all possible measures to ensure global food security, noting that since 
January 2008, they had committed over $10 USD billion to support food measures to increase 
agricultural outputs in affected countries. The Statement emphasized the urgency of short-term 
needs (e.g., access of small-holder farmers to fertilizers), a commitment to increase food aid and 
investment and recognised the coordinating role of the UN through their support for the High 
Level Task Force on the Global Food Crisis (HLTF). They also encouraged countries with 
surplus to released food stocks and called for the removal of export restrictions (G8 2008). 
The G8 made reference to the development of a global partnership:  
… we will work with the international community in forming a global partnership 
on agriculture and food, involving all relevant actors, including developing country 
governments, the private sector, civil society, donors, and international institutions. 
This partnership, strengthening and building on existing UN and other international 
institutions, could provide efficient and effective support for country-led processes 
and institutions and for local leadership, draw on the expertise in existing 
international organizations and, in particular, ensure monitoring and assessment on 
progress. The UN should facilitate and provide coordination. As part of this 
partnership, a global network of high-level experts on food and agriculture would 
provide science-based analysis, and highlight needs and future risks (G8 2008:para 
4). 
Importantly, the G8 here states that the UN is the appropriate forum for facilitation and 
coordination of such an initiative and that the partnership should build on existing institutions.  
                                                     
 
10 As explained below, this is somewhat addressed with the strengthening of the G20. 
 26 
 
In May 2008, the World Bank established the Global Food Crisis Response Program 
(GFRP) to provide immediate support to countries significantly impacted by rising food prices. 
The GFRP used the World Development Report as its framework and implemented processes to 
expedite the funding of projects up to an initial $1.2 billion, so as to ensure timely a response.  
By April 2009, the World Band had increased the GFRP to $2 billion. When food prices 
continued to rise through the summer of 2011, the Board of the Fund extended accelerated 
processing to June 2012, specifically targeting projects aimed at  feeding children and other 
vulnerable groups,  nutritional supplements to pregnant women, lactating mothers, infants and 
small children, meeting additional expenses of food imports, and buying seeds (World Bank 
2011a). Beyond the GFRP, the WB has made funding available through external-funded trust 
funds. Specifically, a “Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) has received contributions of AUD 50 
million from the Australian government, €80 million from the government of Spain, 7.6 billion 
Korean Won from the Republic of Korea, CAD 30 million from the government of Canada, and 
$0.15 million from International Finance Corporation (IFC)” (World Bank 2011a). As of 
September 2011, the GFRP had approved $1,502.5 million of funding for various projects. 
According to the World Bank, through the GFRP, nearly forty million vulnerable people in 44 
countries have been helped (World Bank 2011a).Yet, far from progressive, the Bank’s proposals 
continue to push for a productionist paradigm based on neoliberal principles of increased market 
access and improved technology, suggesting a lack of critical reflection on not only the causes 
of the 2007-8 food price crisis, but also with respect to integrated solutions for improving food 
security.  
In January 2009, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Spanish Prime Minister Rodriguez 
Zapatero convened the High Level Meeting on Food Security for All in Madrid, Spain, to 
follow up on the FAO High-Level Conference. The aim of this meeting was to assess progress 
made since the High-Level Conference on Food Security and the challenges of bio-energy, as 
well as to establish priorities and commitments for moving forward.  There was also emphasis 
establishing a framework for the global partnership for agriculture and food security. The aim of 
this global partnership for food security was to bring together governments, regional bodies, 
international agencies, civil society, development banks and donors and businesses to develop 
coherent strategies against food insecurity.  
The meeting was well attended, with almost sixty ministers present, the European Community, 
as well as heads of all Rome-based Agencies (FAO, IFAD, WFP), UNICEF, representatives 
from the World Bank, regional banks, donors and bilateral agencies, farmer organizations, civil 
society, the private sector and philanthropic organizations including the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation and the Rockafeller Foundation.  
At the meeting there was agreement on the importance of an inclusive and broad process of 
consultation on options leading to the establishment of a Global Partnership for Agriculture, 
Food Security and Nutrition and that consultations should be open to the full range of 
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stakeholders. It was agreed that states have a primary responsibility to promote the right to 
adequate food, especially for children under five years of age, women and other vulnerable 
groups. There was agreement of the need to identify financing gaps and the additional resources 
needed for existing anti-famine mechanisms, including for food and nutrition assistance and 
social protection programmes, and for supporting smallholder agriculture. There was 
acknowledgement that such programmes would only be effective if led by the countries with 
broad participation of stakeholders, including civil society. Sustainable rural development was 
listed as a policy priority, this focus along the entire agro-value chain and with consideration of 
relevant policy environments, linking to the theme of coherence.   
Expanding on the productionist discourse, the meeting acknowledged that to address food 
security is to go beyond increasing production and to look at the development of social 
protection systems and competition-distorting subsidies so as to promote fair agricultural trade. 
Far from radical, these outcomes do bring forward the more progressive discursive themes such 
as inclusion, cooperation and fair playing field. This is in many ways due to the different forum 
within which discussions were taking place. A UN-led meeting is open to all UN member 
countries, not just the economic elite. There are clear rules around transparency, consultation 
and each country has equal say, meaning that policy objectives of developing countries are 
included in the debate, and are not simply the subject of debate.  
At this meeting, there was widespread support from countries for the CFA’s twin-track 
approach. There was consensus on the immediate need for better coordination of resources and 
agreement around the value of expanded engagement of all stakeholders, including civil society.  
However, as we will see, there is often a division between rhetoric and action.  
The FAO, the Latin America government regional grouping, CSOs were clear that any process 
to establish the Global Partnership must be driven by the newly reformed and strengthened 
Rome-based agencies (FAO, IFAD, WFP). Moreover, these actors demanded commitment to a 
UN principle of “one country, one vote”, as well as broad consultation and participation of 
organizations of small-scale food producers.  
July 2009 was a big month for food security. The World Bank released its Agricultural Action 
Plan: Implementing Agriculture for Development FY2010-1.  At their summit in L’Aquila Italy, 
the G8 issued the L’Aquila Joint Statement on Food Security that expressed on-going 
concern “about global food security, the impact of the global financial and economic crisis and 
last year’s spike in food prices on the countries least able to respond to increased hunger and 
poverty” (G8 2009:para 1). The statement identified the role of “longstanding underinvestment 
in agriculture and food security, price trends and the economic crisis” (G8 2009:para 1) in 
increasing poverty and hunger and noted the urgent need for decisive action.  
That same month, the three UN Rome-based Food Agencies developed a Joint Food Security 
Strategy with four pillars of cooperation so as to better address the outcomes of the food price 
crisis. The pillars are: policy advice, knowledge and monitoring; operations; advocacy and 
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communication; administrative collaboration. Through this plan, they agreed to take joint action 
at the global, regional, national and local levels with a focus on enhanced collaboration to 
support transition from relief to development in selected countries, joint advocacy to support the 
MDGs, and aligning early warning and monitoring information to improve food security 
reporting.  Central to the Joint Food Security Strategy was coordination around the 1 Billion 
Euro E.U. Food Facility and addressing overlaps so as to become more efficient.  
In September 2009, G20 leaders came together at the Pittsburgh Summit and backed the G8’s 
L’Aquila Food Security Initiative. They also called on the World Bank to establish the Global 
Agriculture and Food Security Programme Fund (GAFSP) to facilitate disbursements (G20 
2009). The Group of Twenty, or G20, emerged in 1999 when the finance ministers and central 
bank governors of advanced and emerging countries met in Berlin, Germany, for an informal 
dialogue on key issues for global economic stability. The meeting was in response to the 
financial crises of the 1990s with growing recognition that some key countries were not 
adequately represented in global economic discussion and governance. From 1999 to 2008, the 
G20 Finance Ministers maintained annual meetings. During the 2008 financial crisis, U.S. 
President George W. Bush convened a meeting of G20 Leaders (i.e., heads of states) in 
Washington, D.C. Here, the Leaders agreed to implement an Action Plan with three main 
objectives: restoring global growth; strengthening the international financial system; 
and, reforming international financial institutions.  
Since the first Leaders’ Summit, the G20 has emerged as a forum for international cooperation 
around the international economic and financial agenda and brings together the world’s major 
advanced and emerging economies. The G20 is made up of nineteen member countries and the 
E.U.. Informal and Leader-driven, the G8 is focused on building political consensus between 
nineteen country leaders and the European Union.  
At the 2009 Pittsburgh Summit, G20 leaders agreed that the G20 would be the foremost forum 
for their international economic cooperation, effectively positioning the G20 ahead of the G8 in 
terms of coordinating bodies. However, the G8 has continued to move ahead with new 
initiatives, like the New Alliance, with no link to the G20. There were also concerns related to 
the growing power and influence of informal governance bodies like the G8 and G20 in food 
security.  
The G20 Pittsburgh Summit drew attention to an important trend: the rise in prominence of 
philanthropic and private sector actors in food security, agriculture and development.  The G20 
Statement states that their approach “is to use development assistance to explore synergies with 
private philanthropy and private sector actors”(G20 2009:2). The Gates Foundation, Rockefeller 
Foundation, Hewlett Foundation, Rabobank foundation, World Economic Forum and the 
Initiative for Global Development are listed as key partners.  
That same month (September 2009), at the 64th Session of the UN General Assembly, UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton co-hosted the side-
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event called “Partnering for Food Security” to focus on the five principles of the G8’s 
“L’Aquila” Initiative. 
In October 2009, the High-Level Expert Forum, How to Feed the World in 2050, was held in 
Rome in advance of the World Food Summit. The goal of the Forum was to examine policy 
options that governments should consider adopting to ensure that when (or if) the world 
population reaches the estimated 9.2 billion by 2050, people will be fed. There was agreement 
on the part of participants that there is enough food to feed everyone in the world and yet, in 
line with a seemingly blind commitment to productionism, the debate remained focused on 
issues of production, failing to address key structural issues such as consumption, distribution 
and access. While production is important as the population is set to grow to a number we 
certainly cannot currently feed, such discussions are in vein if issues related to production, 
distribution and ecological capacity were not addressed. It is thus not surprising that there was 
disappointment at the failure of the Forum to address the root causes of the food crisis, 
including the structure of markets and climate change. 
That same month, at its 35th Session, the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) agreed on 
a wide ranging reform to make the CFS the foremost inclusive international and 
intergovernmental platform dealing with food security and nutrition. The reform was a 
deliberate effort to position the CFS as a central actor in the emerging Global Partnership for 
Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition.  
One month later, in November 2009, civil society organizations gathered in Rome for the 
People’s Food Sovereignty Forum. The Forum sought to engage people in new possibilities 
for engagement made possible through the reform of the Committee on World Food Security 
and to coordinate actions around World Summit on Food Security. The following week, world 
leaders gathered in Rome for the World Summit on Food Security.  At the World Summit for 
Food Security, FAO Director-General, Jacques Diouf reflected on the global food system, 
calling it “our tragic achievement in these modern days.” He went on to stress the need to focus 
efforts and production where the poor and hungry live and to increase agricultural investments 
in these regions. At the Summit the international community adopted the Declaration of the 
World Summit on Food Security (FAO 2009a), pledging to “undertake all necessary actions 
required at national, regional and global levels and by all States and Governments to halt 
immediately the increase in – and to significantly reduce – the number of people suffering from 
hunger and food insecurity”. The Declaration also pledged renewed commitment to eradicate 
hunger in a sustainable and timely way. Countries agreed to reverse the downward trend in 
agricultural funding at the domestic and international level and to promote investment in the 
sector. They also agreed to improve global food governance in partnership with relevant actors, 
and to address the challenges of climate change to food security. At this meeting, FAO member 
countries also endorsed the reform of the Committee on World Food Security.  
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In January 2010, the FAO hosted the Summit of World’s Regions on Food Security in Dakar, 
bringing together representatives from local authorities, national governments and international 
organizations to propose innovative solutions to tackle food insecurity. The Summit was 
organized on the basis of a questionnaire sent to the world’s regions to collect information on 
food-related issues. The aim was to identify specific areas where cooperation between regions 
could provide added value to national and international initiatives.  
The same month (January 2010), FAO, IFAD, UNCTAD and the World Bank released a rather 
controversial discussion note: Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that 
Respects Rights, Livelihoods and Resources. The Principles were based on preliminary 
evidence from empirical evidence collected by the World Bank in 2009 through in-depth studies 
– Large-Scale Acquisition of Land Rights for Agricultural or Natural Resource-based Use – in 
twenty countries, as well as the experience of a broad set of experts.  
The seven principles can be summarised as follows: 
Principle 1: Existing rights to land and associated natural resources are recognized 
and respected. 
Principle 2: Investments do not jeopardize food security but rather strengthen it. 
Principle 3: Processes for accessing land and other resources and then making 
associated investments are transparent, monitored, and ensure accountability by all 
stakeholders, within a proper business, legal, and regulatory environment. 
Principle 4: All those materially affected are consulted, and agreements from 
consultations are recorded and enforced. 
Principle 5: Investors ensure that projects respect the rule of law, reflect industry 
best practice, are viable economically, and result in durable shared value. 
Principle 6: Investments generate desirable social and distributional impacts and do 
not increase vulnerability. 
Principle 7: Environmental impacts due to a project are quantified and measures 
taken to encourage sustainable resource use while minimizing the risk/magnitude 
of negative impacts and mitigating them (FAO et al. 2010). 
March 2010 saw the First Global Conference on Agricultural Research for Development 
organized by the Global Forum for Agricultural Research in collaboration with CGIAR among 
others. The Conference sought to provide a global action plan and strategy for improving 
agricultural research in order to maximize the impact on development, especially of the poor. 
This plan and strategy was to be established through consultations with representatives from a 
wide range of agricultural research stakeholders around the world. 
In April 2010, a Framework for Action to Scale-Up Nutrition was released and endorsed by 
more than one hundred entities including national governments, the UN system, civil society 
organizations, development agencies, academia, philanthropic bodies and the private sector. 
Throughout 2009 and 2010, a group of stakeholders from Governments, donor agencies, civil 
society, the research community, the private sector, intergovernmental organizations and 
development banks met at intervals to develop a Framework for Scaling up Nutrition which was 
presented during the 2010 spring meetings of the World Bank and IMF. In June 2010, the 
Mayor of Rome and the World Food Programme, hosted a meeting to endorse the Framework 
for Scaling up Nutrition.  
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In May 2010, Concern Worldwide, the UN’s High-Level Task Force and the Government of 
Ireland co-hosted a two days meeting in Dublin to provide an opportunity to exchange views on 
the changes required to better reflect the current context of food and nutrition insecurity and to 
consult on the Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA).  The result was an Updated 
CFA.  
In September 2010, the High Level Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly produced 
an outcome document which promoted national food security strategies that strengthen support 
for smallholder farmers and contribute to poverty eradication. That same month, the Scaling-Up 
Nutrition (SUN) Road Map Task Team released the first edition of A Road Map for Scaling-
Up Nutrition (SUN).  The Road Map emerged from the May 2010 World Health Assembly 
resolution 63.23 on infant and young child nutrition and based on guiding principles developed 
by the Standing Committee on Nutrition in 2009 in Brussels. Framed as a movement, SUN 
brings together national leaders who prioritizing efforts to address malnutrition. The aim is for 
states, organizations and individuals working to scale up nutrition while recognizing the 
multiple causes of malnutrition.  
In October, in advance of the 36th Session of the Committee on World Food Security, civil 
society organizations met to adopt the autonomous International Civil Society Mechanism for 
Food Security and Nutrition to facilitate engagement in the reformed Committee on World Food 
Security. The following week the 36th Session of the Committee on World Food Security took 
place. It was the Committee’s first session as a reformed body.  
On the last day of the CFS Session, the first Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
Ministerial Meeting on Food Security was hosted and resulted in the Niigata Declaration on 
APEC Food Security. The overlap suggests a disregard for the CFS process. The Declaration 
instructed APEC Senior Officials to monitor the implementation of the APEC Action Plan on 
Food Security, to report progress on its implementation to APEC Ministers on an annual basis, 
and to compile an assessment report on overall achievements following the completion of the 
Action Plan.  
In November, 2010, G20 Leaders met in Seoul, 10F11 where, under the leadership of French 
President Sarkozy, the G20 developed a Multi-Year Action Plan on Development with work 
to be undertaken by the Development Working Group, also charged with monitoring and 
reporting on the progress. Here, the G20’s food security agenda was more clearly fleshed out. 
In March 2011, the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food presented a report “Agro-ecology 
and the right to food” before the UN Human Rights Council. The report demonstrates by way 
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 The Seoul Summit and resulting declaration were discussed in Chapter 2 as marking a shift from the 
Washington Consensus (rolling back) to the Seoul Consensus (rolling out) signalling adaptation and shift 
not unlike Karl Polanyi’s description of a double movement and also illustrative of the nature of 
hegemony to shift in ways that address contestation and critique while maintaining the interests of the 
elite.  
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of an extensive review of recent scientific literature that agroecology, if appropriately supported, 
can double food production in regions within ten years while mitigating climate change and 
alleviating rural poverty. The report called on states to undertake a fundamental shift towards 
agro-ecology and was widely supported by civil society organizations.  
In June 2011, G20 Agriculture Ministers met for the first time and issued an Action Plan on 
Food Price Volatility.  As will be explored in Case Study C, this Action Plan had an important 
influence on the policy processes that took place in October 2011 at the 37th Session of the 
Committee on World Food Security. The following month the Chinese Academy of Agricultural 
Sciences (CAAS) and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) jointly hosted 
the International Conference on Climate Change and Food Security (ICCCFS) in Beijing, 
China. The conference resulted in a series of recommendations from leading scientists in the 
BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), Indonesia and the United 
States for the UNFCCC Delegates meeting in Durban at the end of 2011. Recommendations 
were focused around a need to strengthen agricultural research and increase availability of 
spatial data.  
The FAO Regional Conferences are held every two years and are the highest governing body 
and forum of the FAO in the regions. The round of conferences held in 2012 marked an 
important change in the structure and impact of the conferences insofar as the priorities set by 
the countries at the spring conferences would now be included on the agenda of the technical 
and political governing bodies of FAO at the global level. Regional conferences would no 
longer be technical and advisory in nature, but now their decisions would guide FAO actions as 
part of an effort to decentralize power at the FAO.  
Importantly, the Latin America and Caribbean meeting requested that  the FAO “organize a 
wide-ranging and dynamic debate with the participation of civil society and academia to discuss 
the concept of food sovereignty, whose meaning had not been agreed by FAO Member 
Countries or the United Nations System” (FAO 2012i:para 25). This call to discuss food 
sovereignty within the FAO and the Committee on World Food Security remains controversial 
but suggests the growing awareness and acceptance of a term that emerged from a peasant 
social movement in opposition to neoliberal hegemony.  
In May 2012, the Committee on World Food Security met for an extraordinary session (39th) to 
endorse the Voluntary guidelines on the responsible governance of tenure of land, fisheries 
and forests in the context of national food security. That same month, the G20 announced the 
launch of the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, a partnership programme between 
African governments, members of the G8, and the private sector to work together to accelerate 
investments in agriculture to improve productivity, livelihoods and food security for 
smallholder farmers. This New Alliance aims to raise 50 million people out of poverty over the 
next 10 years through sustained and inclusive agricultural growth. Commitments to 
coordinating through the G20 had evidently been pushed aside along with a commitment of 
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developing a Global Partnership coordinated within the UN and inclusive of a wide range of 
stakeholders. President Barak Obama unveiled plans for the New Alliance for Food Security 
and Nutrition in Africa at a time when only half of the L’Aquila pledges had been disbursed. 
With regards to the L’Aquila commitments, the New Alliance notes that since the L’Aquila 
Summit, they have increased their bilateral and multilateral investments in food security and 
changed the way we do business, consistent with core principles of aid effectiveness.  Based on 
the findings of the 2012 G8 Accountability Report and consistent with the Rome Principles on 
Sustainable Global Food Security, the G8 have agreed to promptly fulfil outstanding L’Aquila 
financial pledges and seek to maintain strong support to address current and future global food 
security challenges, including through bilateral and multilateral assistance (Office of the Press 
Secretary 2012).   
In June 2012, the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Earth Summit or Rio +20) 
was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The conference was organized in pursuance of General 
Assembly Resolution 64/236 (A/RES/64/236). It marked the 20th anniversary of the 1992 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), in Rio de Janeiro, and 
the 10th anniversary of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 
Johannesburg.  The conference was organized around two main themes: a green economy in the 
context of sustainable development poverty eradication; and the institutional framework for 
sustainable development. In preparation for the Conference, seven priority areas were identified: 
decent jobs, energy, sustainable cities, food security and sustainable agriculture, water, oceans, 
and disaster readiness. The Conference produced a report and an outcome document called “The 
future we want”. The document recognised “that farmers, including small-scale farmers and 
fisherfolk, pastoralists and foresters, can make important contributions to sustainable 
development through production activities that are environmentally sound, enhance food 
security and the livelihood of the poor and invigorate production and sustained economic 
growth” (UN General Assembly 2012b:para 52). The right to adequate food as a fundamental 
right was recognised and governments reaffirmed their commitment to enhancing food security 
and access to adequate, safe and nutritious food for present and future generations in line with 
the Five Rome Principles for Sustainable Global Food Security (UN General Assembly 
2012b:para 105).  They also reaffirmed the important work and inclusive nature of the 
Committee on World Food Security, “including through its role in facilitating country-initiated 
assessments on sustainable food production and food security”, and encouraged “countries to 
give due consideration to implementing the Committee on World Food Security Voluntary 
Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the 
Context of National Food Security” (UN General Assembly 2012b:para 115). They took note of 
the discussions on responsible agricultural investment in the framework of the Committee on 
World Food Security, as well as the principles for responsible agricultural investment.  
In September 2012, the FAO held a High level forum on food insecurity in protracted crisis. 
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The Forum provided a space for consultation and policy dialogue to increase understanding and 
strengthen collaborative efforts among stakeholders. A key outcome of the Forum was 
establishing the basic elements of an Agenda for Action for Addressing Food Insecurity in 
Protracted Crises (CFS 2012d). The elements of an Agenda for Action and a plan for 
consultations and negotiations on the Agenda were then presented at the 39th Session of the 
Committee on World Food Security in October 2009. At the 39th Session, the Committee 
considered a presentation on the State of Food Insecurity in the World 2012 (SOFI), entitled 
“Economic growth is necessary but not sufficient to accelerate reduction of hunger and 
malnutrition” and welcomed the new methodology for estimating hunger. The Committee 
considered an in-depth review and discussions of the meaning and different uses of the terms 
"Food Security", "Food Security and Nutrition", "Food and Nutrition Security" and "Nutrition 
Security but came to no conclusions on which terms to use.  Importantly, the CFS adopted the 
First Version of the Global Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutrition, an 
overarching but non-binding framework and a single reference document with practical 
guidance on core recommendations for food security and nutrition strategies, policies and 
actions validated by the wide ownership, participation and consultation of the CFS. 
The number of international meetings dedicated to addressing food security in the wake of the 
food price spikes illustrates the importance governments placed on rising food insecurity. New 
actors and old have been actively reshaping the architecture of global food security governance. 
However, policy discussion and high-level declarations do not necessarily amount to action. As 
the chronology of events illustrates, there is overwhelming overlap both in terms of actors and 
policies. Of central importance is that the CFS was approved by governments as the foremost 
platform for discussions on food security and yet post-reform, actors continue to host 
discussions in alternate fora thereby undermining the CFS. 11F12   
1.7. Structure of the Thesis and Research Questions 
Prior to the 2007-8 food price and financial crises, it was perhaps more easily argued that food 
security and price stability could be assured by way of trade liberalization. However, the price 
spikes illustrated the limited capacity of them market to adapt when challenged. In practice then, 
the 2007-8 food price crisis placed the global food and financial system under-pressure and the 
poor ended up being the release valves. As a result, post-crisis, trade was put back into question. 
Poor countries that were unable to implement defensive policies lost confidence in the 
international markets and many are now implementing or complementing national and regional 
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 Given the large number of actors, meetings, initiatives and policy outcomes to emerge in reaction to the 
food price spikes, a decision was made to focus on multilateral actors. This research thus concentrated on 
the policies of the following actors: The UN High-Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis, 
the World Bank Group, the G8, the G20, the FAO, the Committee on World Food Security.  The rationale 
and method for selecting these organizations is explained in Chapter 3 and illustrated in a table contained 
in Appendix 1.  
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strategies to overt risky international markets. The on-going volatility of markets is not helping 
the situation (Arusa 2011; High Level Panel of Experts 2011b). Moreover, stable international 
markets may provide a preferable policy environment for governments to deal with food 
security but trade requires stocks, which are at record lows.  
 
 
Figure 10: Complexity of the Crisis (Duncan 2013) 
 
The food price crisis, as it is understood and described above (Figure 10), was sparked by 
market fears linked to low world stocks. The declines were the result of several factors, 
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including policies to reduce stock holdings, weather shocks which led to drastically reduced 
yield, increased demand for biofuels, increased demand for energy costs and animal products, 
which created increased demand for oil and animal feed. The global financial crisis shook 
confidence in global markets and a depreciated US dollar left many countries with tied 
currencies unable to afford food. Countries reacted with export restriction policies that sought to 
protect people but inadvertently led to more market stress, and increased food price volatility for 
others. Some speculators saw an opportunity to increase profits and some, as a way of securing 
food or increasing income, began acquiring large parcels of land in what some have called a 
new global land rush (Arezki, Deininger, and Selod 2012). The impact was that millions more 
people were pushed into poverty and hundreds of millions added to the already appallingly high 
number of undernourished people worldwide (FAO 2008d). Lost faith in markets illustrates a 
point of rupture in the common-sense (hegemonic) ordering of the governance of food security 
and arguably the wider economy.  
This thesis starts from this point of rupture: a noted disjuncture in the normal ordering of the 
everyday world (Smith 1993). The food price spikes and ensuing crises represent a point of 
rupture in the logic of the global food system and in global governance more broadly. The 
system failed. Reflecting a profoundly sad and problematic reality of the food system, what 
caused this rupture was not the increase in the number of hungry and poor, but rather the 
significant challenge to the tenets of trade liberalization as countries enacted protectionist 
measures leaving wealthy countries that have spearheaded the global neoliberal project 
scrambling to pick up and glue back together the pieces. Simply put, reactions to the food price 
crisis represent a challenge to the hegemonic global project of neoliberalism (Cerny 2008, 2009, 
2010b; Duncan and Barling 2012; Harvey 2005; Mirowski and Plehwe 2009; Peck 2010).   
This research is interested in how the global architecture of food security governance is re-
arranging itself as actors work out how to recover from the series of integrated world crises. 
Particularly, this research analyses how the UN’s Committee on World Food Security has 
adapted to these shifts and whether or not it can achieve its reform mandate within the new 
architecture.  
To historicise the research, the evolution of food security since its entry into global policy 
processes in 1974 is presented, with particular focus on food security as discourse. The 
emerging architecture of global food security governance is then reviewed with particular focus 
on multilateral initiatives launched in response to the food price spikes or on-going food price 
volatility. In this analysis, key actors and initiatives are identified and their policies analysed so 
as to provide a map of the current architecture of multilateral actors in global food security 
governance. Focus then shifts to the reformed Committee on World Food Security as the 
foremost international and intergovernmental body for the discussion and coordination of food 
security policy at the global level. The reformed Committee on World Food Security is now 
recognised by the international community as the foremost platform for promoting policy 
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coherence and discussion around food security, 12F13 but the process of achieving this consensus 
has been hard fought and is not set in stone. The capacity and authority of the CFS are 
continuously challenged by the reorganization of power. This forms the crux of the research 
problem.  Understanding this, research questions are identified as:  
RQ1: To what extent is the reformed CFS realising its reform objectives? 
RQ2. Who are the main actors and what are the dominant initiatives within the 
changing architecture of food security governance? 
RQ3. How does the CFS relate to the changing architecture of global food security 
governance and what are the impacts? 
RQ4. How do these findings contribute to the literature on, and understandings of, 
global governance and global food security governance? 
This thesis is organised as follows. A theoretical framework that takes predominantly from 
global governance theory is introduced to help make sense of processes underway in the ever 
changing architecture of global food security governance. This is followed by a review of the 
research methods. To answer these questions this research undertook data collection by way of 
desk research, participant observation, and interviews. Data analysis was in turn supported by 
the theoretical framework. Given that the international reaction to the crisis was framed through 
a food security lens, the evolution of food security as a policy discourse in multilateral policy 
processes is examined. From there, the history and reform of the CSM is presented followed by 
three case studies that focus on three key reform objectives: participation; policy outputs; and 
cohesion. These case studies provide empirical insights into how the CFS is achieving its reform 
objectives. They confirm not only the value of enhanced participation of civil society actors in 
policy making processes but also how the CFS is emerging as an effective and innovative model 
to address key limitations that exist in global governance fora. These limitations are discussed in 
Chapter 2. 
However, to examine the CFS as a stand-alone committee is inadequate as the CFS is but one 
part of a changing and contested institutional architecture. Its impact and influence are tied to 
the role it plays in broader transnational processes. Understanding this, attention is paid to the 
way in which other multinational actors are responding to the on-going food security crisis. 
These include policies advanced by: the UN High-Level Task Force on the Global Food 
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 This was recently reaffirmed in the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) negotiated 
outcome document “The Future we Want” where member countries reaffirmed: “the important work and 
inclusive nature of the Committee on World Food Security (CFS), including through its role in facilitating 
country-initiated assessments on sustainable food production and food security” (UN 2012:Para. 115). It 
was also mentioned in the Declaration from the first meeting of G20 Agriculture Ministers which 
expresses a commitment to work closely with the CFS to promote greater policy convergence and 
strengthen policy linkages at the global level (G20 2011). Finally, the Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Food has recently argued that one of the most significant outcomes of the 2007-2008 global food price 
crisis was a new commitment by the international community to improve the governance of global food 
security, in particular through the reform of the Committee on World Food Security (De Schutter 2012). 
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Security Crisis, the World Bank Group, the G8, the G20, and the FAO. This research will show 
that the CFS is producing the most comprehensive policies in a consultative and participatory 
way (i.e. democratically) but that it is also being systematically undermined by other actors. The 
thesis concludes by summarising the outcomes of the research, identifying areas for future 
research and considering implications for global governance and global food security. 
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2. Theorizing Global Food Security Policy Change: Global governance 
and embedded neoliberalism 
2.1. Introduction  
The food price spikes and resulting crisis reinforced the need to reform the architecture of 
governance for agriculture, food and nutrition at the global level to meet the challenges of the 
twenty-first century. The international community recognised this: old institutions were 
reformed and new ones were launched to support policy cohesion and tackle food insecurity 
through improved international cooperation. To begin to make sense of the changes that took 
place across the architecture of global food security governance in response to the food price 
crisis, a theoretical framework has been developed. The framework draws from a wide range of 
academic sources as well as primary materials.  
This chapter begins by reviewing the literature on global governance, reflecting on the term as 
both an observable phenomena and a political project. This is followed by a review of key 
challenges and critiques, including issues of accountability, participation and categorization.  
Understanding global governance as project and phenomena is important but what is needed to 
advance the research is a theoretical framework to provide the tools with which we can begin to 
unpick the complexity that has been observed. Philip Cerny’s (2008, 2009, 2010) work on 
embedded neoliberalism which is used as the overarching theoretical framework for this project. 
To understand how actors respond to and interact within a context of embedded neoliberalism 
and how actors are made objects and subjects of food security policy processes, the concept of 
governmentality is introduced. Governmentality also provides a way of making sense of the 
shift in food security policy outlined above as well tools to deconstruct the use of scientific 
discourse to discredit specific types of knowledge and expertise. The chapter concludes with a 
summary of the theoretical framework.  
2.2. Defining Governance 
In an early edition of the journal Global Governance, Lawrence Finkelstein (1995:368) rather 
boldly stated that “‘Global Governance’ appears to be virtually everything” and that “we say 
‘governance’ because we really don’t know what to call what is going on”. Despite the wealth 
of literature and analysis that has since been dedicated to the topic, there remains little 
consensus as to what is meant by global governance. However, rather than a paucity of 
definitions, we are grappling with too many (Dingwerth and Pattberg 1996; Kersbergen and 
Waarden 2004), leading one scholar to state that global governance is “contested terrain”: a 
term that obscures more than it describes (Woods 2007:28). 
To help make sense of this multifarious concept, it is useful to begin by defining governance.  
According to Thomas Weiss (2000:795) “[m]any academics and international practitioners 
employ ‘governance’ to connote a complex set of structures and processes, both public and 
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private, while more popular writers tend to use it synonymously with ‘government’.” Similarly, 
Brown and Ainley (2009:129) explain that governance, originally synonymous with 
government, “has been pressed into service as a convenient term for the collective impact of the 
various disparate quasi-governmental institutions that have proliferated (internally and 
externally) over the last century or more” (see also Rosenau and Czempial 1992). Yet at a time 
marked by “shifting boundaries, relocated authorities, weakened states, and proliferating 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) at local, provincial, national, transnational, 
international, and global levels of community,” scholars have tended to turn to global 
governance as a way of starting to “confront the insufficiency of our ways of thinking, talking, 
and writing about government”(Rosenau 1999:287). 
Tim Lang et al. (2009:75) contrast governance to government, explaining that “governance 
implies more indirect, softer forms of direction from the state than command and control, and 
reflects collaborative outcomes, involving a wide range of actors often from the private sector, 
as well as from government bureaucracy, as much as deliberate interventions by the state.” They 
(Lang et al. 2009: 81) continue that governance is “an interactive process of state and public 
laws and policy with private interests and actors.”  
In their book Governance and Performance: New Perspectives, Carolyn Heinrich and Laurence 
Lynn (2000:4) state that governance “implies an arrangement of distinct but interrelated 
elements – statues, including policy mandates; organizational, financial, and programmatic 
structures; resource levels; administrative rules and guidelines; and institutionalized rules and 
norms – that constrains and enables the tasks, priorities, and values that are incorporated into 
regulatory, service production, and service delivery processes.” 
To summarise then, governance broadly refers to the management functions of societies – 
formal and informal – that are generally focussed or coordinated around the state or government 
institutions but include diverse actors, including civil society and the private sector. It reflects 
two complementary dimensions: purpose (guiding and directing) and regulating (restraining, 
managing and controlling) while highlighting the “deeper purposes that groups and societies 
pursue” (Dahlberg 2001:136). 
Common characteristics of governance, taken from across the literature (i.e., Cardoso 2003; 
Jessop 1998; Kersbergen and Waarden 2004; Rosenau 1999, 2002; Smouts 1998), suggest that 
governance implies measures of control, orderliness and manageability but at the same time is 
made up of intersubjective norms, rules, and principles. Moreover, governance reflects a process 
more than a system of rule or an activity. It appeals to accommodation over domination and is 
thus dependent on participation, negotiation and coordination. In lieu of a formal institution, or 
perhaps working in tandem with them, governance relies on continual interactions between 
formal and informal networks, partnerships, projects and consensus. Governance is pluricentric 
rather than unicentric but there is emphasis on functioning administrative capacities, 
accountability and responsiveness to those the regime serves and ideally, transparency. 
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Following this, networks play an important role in governance and these networks function to 
organize relations between relatively autonomous but interdependent actors. Finally, within 
contemporary governance systems relations between actors pose risks and uncertainties and 
correspondingly, different sectors have developed institutions 13F14 to support cooperation and 
reduce risk. As will be shown later, these characteristics are all present in the changing global 
food security policy arena. 
2.2.1. Global Governance 
The concept of global governance emerged alongside governance as a way of conceptualising 
the rapid changes to global economics and politics brought about by processes of globalisation. 
Such processes and resulting forces have changed the political, economic and social landscape 
(core principles of the international order) leading to a redistribution of “power within the 
international systems away from the nation-state to new international non-state actors” 
(Muldoon 2004:4).   
The term global governance is often criticized for suggesting that governance is global in scope, 
or that the globe is in some way governed. 14F15 However, the concept is not to be equated with 
global rule but rather with multilevel governance, referring to multiple and interconnected levels 
of governance taking place at national, international, subnational, regional, and local levels 
(Brühl and Rittberger 2001:2). As such, for example, it demands asking how World Trade 
Organization rules impact specific communities and how local initiatives in turn impact national 
or regional or even global initiatives. Given that this project considered global-level governance, 
that food security aims to end hunger, and that hunger is experienced first and foremost at the 
individual level, a global governance approach presents a useful starting point.  
There have been important efforts at developing definitions of global governance. One widely 
used definition was presented by the UN Commission on Global Governance in their report 
“Our Global Neighbourhood” (Commission on Global Governance 1995:7):  
At the global level, governance has been viewed primarily as intergovernmental 
relationships, but it must now be understood as also involving nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), citizens' movements, multinational corporations, and the 
global capital market. Interacting with these are global mass media of dramatically 
enlarged influence. 
This definition, while useful in so far as it introduces new actors and media, remains rather 
limited and inadequate. Yet, as Compagnon (in Overbeek et al. 2010:711) notes, “reflecting on 
global governance should not be a gratuitous and vain search for the ‘right’ definition: rather, it 
                                                     
 
14
 Here, institutions are understood as “the rules of the game that, either formally or informally make up 
the policies, procedures, laws and agreements” that shape a network  (Ishii-Eiteman 2009:219). 
15
 In an attempt to avoid these limitations, scholars have forwarded other terms such as “polyarchy”  
(Brown 1995), “panarchy” (Sewell and Slater 1995), “collibration” (Dunsire 1993), and “fragmentation” 
(Rosenau 1999), but none have been widely adopted in the global context. 
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should become an exploration of the specific historical context – multidimensional globalisation 
– in which it is nested.” 
Klaus Dingwerth and Philipp Pattberg’s (2006) survey of the academic literature has led them to 
conclude that there are two dominant applications of global governance as a concept: global 
governance as observable phenomena; and, global governance as political programme. These 
approaches to global governance are not necessarily applied exclusively and most academic 
applications tend to combine both approaches: analytic-institutionalism (Dingwerth and 
Pattberg 2006:195). However, here, for clarity, an attempt will be made to qualify each 
approach separately, while recognising that there is often overlap between the two.   
2.2.2. Observable Phenomena 
The development of global governance is made visible through the proliferation of international 
organizations and their increasing influence and the increasing interconnectedness of local and 
global events. Seen as an observable phenomenon, global governance tends be understood as 
part of a continuum: an evolution from international relations. Building on this tradition, global 
governance is seen to be the domain of three primary actors: government (political domain), 
markets (economic domain) and civil society (socio-cultural domain) (Muldoon 2004:9; UNDP 
1997:14-18). These can be conceptualised as three pillars of global governance (see Figure 10). 
Each pillar has distinct institutions and organizations that operate on three different levels of 
support (international, national and community) and in turn support the system as a whole. 
Muldoon (2004:9) argues that the interaction between levels results in the integration and 
differentiation within and between organizations and institutions. Yet, with the onward march of 
globalization, and the expansion of global governance, the analytic lines that previously existed 
have been blurred or started to disappear. 
To help make sense of these pillars and changes, Muldoon developed two figures (see Figure 
10) as a way of demonstrating the shift in ordering as we move towards from international 
relations to global governance while highlighting four key aspects of global governance. First is 
the recognition that non-governmental and governmental mechanisms have influence on how 
the global system is governed. Second, there are a diverse range of actors involved in the 
formation of instruments of global governance. Third, global governance infers the increasing 
integration of the three pillars and the fragmentation of the word order as a result of transitory 
and contested spheres of authority (Rosenau 1997). Finally, the architecture of global 
governance operates at multiple levels and is not inherently hierarchical.  
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Figure 11: Organizations and Institutions of Global Governance (Muldoon 2004:10, 273, 
adapted by author)  
 
Moving on from the interactions between the actors and levels of support, Muldoon (2004) 
identifies several common characteristics. First, global governance is multilayered in that it is 
constituted by and through the structural enmeshment of key infrastructures of governance with 
the national government folded in between each of the layers. Muldoon (2004:7-8) refers to this 
as the multipolarity of power and decentralization of authority which he argues is a critical 
aspect of the transformation of the international system to the global system. Second, there is no 
single locus of authority and political authority is fragmented. It is thus often described as 
polyarchic or pluralistic. A third characteristic is that the architecture of global governance has a 
variable geometry, meaning that the political significance and the regulatory capacity of these 
infrastructures vary considerably. Here, Muldoon (2004:8) highlights the role of structures: 
global governance requires institutions, regimes and organizations that work as intermediaries 
to tie together different components of social systems. These social structures are “historical 
realities in that their composition, raison d’être and manifest purposes are derived through social 
experiences and evolve out of earlier structures and forms” (Muldoon 2004:8).  
Muldoon (2004:7-8) argues that through transformation international organizations are likely to 
maintain many of the features that define them and add new features as needed to address 
particular demands of the global system. Part of Muldoon’s rationale for this stems from what 
he sees as a need for stability within the global system: “governance structures only survive if 
they promote stability in the system” (Muldoon 2004:9).  This process of change is addressed in 
more detail below in relation to Antonio Gramsci’s work. A fourth observation is that systems 
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of global governance are structurally complex and composed of diverse agencies and networks 
with overlapping jurisdictions and maintain differential power resources and competencies. 
Finally, within the architecture of global governance national governments have become 
increasingly crucial sites for stitching together the various infrastructures of governance and 
legitimizing regulation beyond the state, an underlying premise of international relations as 
well.   
Beyond common characteristics and established understandings of global governance, the 
literature identifies common shifts within governance structures that happen vertically, 
horizontally and both vertically and horizontally. Vertical shifts refer to changes – be they of 
power, responsibility or coordination – between nation-states and international institutions with 
supranational characteristics (known to as upwards shifts) or to shifting of responsibility and 
power from national or international bodies to sub-national or regional level (referred to as 
downward shifts). A downward shift is related to internationalisation wherein international 
bodies rely on local agencies to implement or enforce their regulations thereby potentially 
strengthening local bodies (Kersbergen and Waarden 2004:153). 
Network governance is a key trait of horizontal shifts in global governance. As Van Kersbergen 
and Van Waarden (2004:149-150) point out, such horizontal shifts are part of a broader 
tendency of increased juridification of social relations, wherein once informal relations are 
becoming increasing formalised via agreements. Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden (2004:155) 
also note that these types of shifts in governance lead to a rise in the popularity and usage of 
information comparison, such as benchmarking and best practices. This process has become 
quite pronounced in the reformed CFS where sessions are now dedicated to case studies and 
sharing of best practices. For example at the 37th Session (October 2011), the CFS considered 
country case studies on mapping initiatives to enhance “global coordination and support for 
national processes”(CFS 2011:7).  
One implication of horizontal shifts is that governance decisions are being made through 
increasingly complicated networks. Network governance has two origins: International 
Relations Theory (Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1997) and Comparative European Public 
Policy Analysis (Bulmer 1998; Moravcsik 1993, 1998; Peterson and Bomberg 1994; Wallace 
and Wallace 1996). A network governance approach sees governance as relating to both power 
relations resulting from rules and substance of policies, whereas multilevel refers to the 
engagement of different levels of government (regional, national and sub-national) as well as 
the involvement of private and public actors at these levels (Kersbergen and Waarden 2004:149-
150).  
Chris Brown and Kristen Ainley (2009:129) suggest that in the absence of a world government, 
due to the unwillingness of states to surrender their juridical status as sovereign, among other 
things, efforts at ruling and the exercise of political sovereignty has led to the creation of 
extensive networks of global governance. The development of these networks effectively 
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changes the location of decision making, policies, regulation, as well as the rules of production 
and enforcement leading to shifts in governance styles (Kersbergen and Waarden 2004:155). 
The result, as Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden (2004:153) point out, is increasingly 
complicated network structures wherein traditional approached of command, control and 
enforcement are no longer efficient or effective.  
In the context of increased globalization and fragmentation, Keohane and Nye (2000:37) note 
that any emerging pattern of governance will have to be networked rather than hierarchical and 
must have minimal rather than highly ambitious objectives. As will be explored in this thesis, 
evidence suggests that in the shifting architecture of global food security governance, networks 
are playing an increasingly important and influential role. For Rhodes (2000:61), networks are 
self-organising, resistant to government intervention, develop their own policies, shape their 
environments, share or exchange resources and rely on trust and shared rules that are negotiated 
and agreed upon by network participants. Rhodes is referring to the national level within the UK 
and the situation at the global level is arguably different. Governance in and by networks, as 
identified by Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden (2004) can be separated into of networks of 
public organizations, private organizations and mixed public and private organizations. Within 
each of these, networks are conceptualised as pluricentric forms of governance, as opposed to 
multicentric (market) and unicentric (state or hierarchy) (Kersbergen and Waarden 2004:148).    
Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden (2004:149) add that the primary mode of interaction 
between networks is negotiation. However, as we will see, from the perspective of social 
movement, civil society and NGO networks, the interactions tend to be based more on 
communication, information sharing and strategic alignments to forward similarly held 
positions or shared objectives. 
Within the Reformed CFS, networks play a fundamental role. Not only can the Reformed CFS 
be seen as a network in and of itself, but it can also be seen to be comprised of various other 
networks. CSO and NGO networks, private networks, networks of philanthropic organizations, 
research networks, state networks and various cross-sectoral and interconnecting networks play 
a key role in the debate, negotiations, development of policies as well as consultation and 
evaluation. Indeed, this increasingly networked structure is in part a reason for the excitement 
and potential of the Reformed CFS to emerge as a political body with the potential to improve 
global food security (as will be explored later). At the CFS, shift in governance can be 
witnessed as CSOs and other actors begin to play a formal role as participants, all while 
maintaining decision making at the state level (one-state-one-vote). At the same time, the 
national delegations are not simply state-representatives. National delegations at the CFS are 
comprised of civil servants but often include non-state actors, including the private sector, 
NGOs and researchers. We thus have networks within networks within networks informing 
global food security governance.  
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Up to this point, the description provided of global governance fails to describe why it has been 
taken up to the degree that it has within academic and beyond. Bob Jessop (1998) identifies four 
possibilities: expansion of the governance discourse; persistence of ‘governance’ mechanisms in 
contract to markets or hierarchy; the cycle of modes of coordination; and a fundamental secular 
shift in state-market-society relations. This final reason, which recalls Muldoon’s pillars of 
global governance, is also most visible in the relations that are of interest to analyses of global 
food security governance: mainly, that there has been a fundamental secular shift in state-
market-society relations which imply new economic and social conditions and address related 
problems which cannot be managed or resolved by top-down state planning or market-mediated 
anarchy. As we will see however, despite the shifts towards governance models, the tendency in 
food security remains state-centric in terms of accountability and policy-making.  
2.2.3. Political Project 
Having reviewed global governance as observable phenomenon, we can now consider the 
implications of this phenomenon by considering global governance as a political project. There 
are several ways that global governance as political project is taken up, including: global 
governance as a way of solving the world’s collective problems; global governance to re-
democratise in the face of globalisation; and, global governance as advancement of a neoliberal 
project. As this suggests, global governance is often referenced in the context of a broader 
vision of how we might begin to address some of the world’s most pressing problems. Here 
language related to the coordination of multiple actors to solve economic, environmental and 
broad social problems is invoked.  A prime example can be seen in throughout the 1990s at the 
series of World Summits. From this perspective, enhanced global governance is needed to begin 
to adequately address global problems. The perspective tends towards long-term projects of 
global integration, often modelled on the United Nations and the European Union (Dingwerth 
and Pattberg 2006; Gordenker and Weiss 1996). The approach enacts language of communal 
efforts often through diplomatic rallying cries. For example, in advance of the 36th Session of 
the Committee on World Food Security, the FAO Media Centre issued a statement proclaiming 
that “as the cornerstone of the global governance of agriculture and food security, the CFS will 
be more effective in facing challenges to food security” (FAO 2010). The sentiment suggests 
that the UN provides the appropriate and necessary space to tackle the pressing problem of food 
insecurity and proclaims its position as the leader in this process: “the CFS has been undergoing 
a major reform with the aim of making the Committee the most inclusive international and 
intergovernmental platform for all relevant stakeholders to work together to ensure food security 
and nutrition for all” (FAO 2010).  Indeed, as we will see, this logic permeates the reform of the 
CFS as well as rationales for why it should be leading policy debates on global food security. 
The rhetoric of coming together to solve problems is also taken up by groups like the Group of 
8 (G8). Their 2012 Camp David Declaration makes use of similar language: 
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 For over a decade, the G-8 has engaged with African partners to address the 
challenges and opportunities afforded by Africa's quest for inclusive and 
sustainable development. Our progress has been measurable, and together we have 
changed the lives of hundreds of millions of people. International assistance alone, 
however, cannot fulfil our shared objectives. As we move forward, and even as we 
recommit to working together to reduce poverty, we recognize that our task is also 
to foster the change that can end it.  
Global governance as political project is also linked to a re-democratization of politics in the 
wake of a wave of globalization defined by increased corporate engagement and a shift in state 
responsibilities towards facilitation (be it through policies or infrastructure). As Dingwerth and 
Pattberg (2006:195) explain, from this perspective, it is argued – perhaps overly optimistically –  
that “the goal of global governance lies in regaining society’s control over market forces which 
[have] been lost in the wake of globalizations.”  Dingwerth and Pattberg (2006:195) provide an 
illustrative example from a German Study “Globalization of the World Economy – Challenges 
and Answers”: 
As the world becomes increasingly globalized and economic activities grow 
beyond national regulatory frameworks, it becomes more necessary to politically 
shape economic, social and environmental processes on a global scale. How the 
global challenges can be democratically managed has recently begun to be 
discussed under the heading of “global governance” (Bundestag 2002:67). 
Similarly, La Via Campesina, the world’s largest peasant movement, forward a food 
sovereignty framework as a direct challenge to neoliberal globalization. From the perspective 
of La Via Campesina (2012),  
The advance of the capitalist system that has reached unprecedented dimensions in 
the past two decades is resulting in crises that are of equally unprecedented 
dimensions. The financial, food, energy and environmental crises are phases of the 
structural crisis of capitalism, which has no limits in its search for more profits. 
And, as in other structural crises, it impacts the peoples of the world and not the 
elites. … [T]o say that capitalism is in crisis does not mean that the system is in 
retreat. On the contrary, it is precisely in this moment that it advances with more 
intensity because the corporations take advantage of the crisis to extend their 
domination over territories that have not yet been conquered. 
La Via Campesina is increasingly engaging in formal and informal processes of global 
governance and moderating their participation through a food sovereignty framework 
(discussed in greater detail below). La Via Campesina are an example of how global networks 
are seeking to redefine global governance by forwarding a framework for the re-
democratization of governance systems. Their challenge to the ordering of global governance 
also serves to illustrate ways in which global governance as political project is also visible as a 
neoliberal project.  
Henk Overbeek (Overbeek et al. 2010:702) cautions that what is often referred to as global 
governance is in fact “neoliberal global governance, serving the freedom of capital to 
accumulate around the planet.” Indeed, the pursuit and maintenance of neoliberal hegemony is 
not absent from global food security governance, and in fact, is often a key motivating and 
rationalizing factor in world food security policy, arguably to the detriment of the eradication 
of hunger (Busch and Bain 2004; Duncan and Barling 2012; Lang et al. 2009; Lawrence, 
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Lyons, and Wallington 2010; McMichael 2000; Pechlaner and Otero 2008; Peine and 
McMichael 2005). Overbeek  (in Overbeek et al. 2010:702), lamenting the loss of its initial 
reference to a radical restructuring of the global economic order, suggests that global 
governance is now applied as a reformist concept to accommodate the interests of neo-liberal 
globalization with only the most necessary reforms to keep the system running (a good 
example of analytic institutionalism: global governance as political project and observable 
phenomenon). He suggests that by presupposing common interests instead of questioning the 
existence of common interests and a willingness to work together, most definitions of global 
governance effectively depoliticize the debate about world order. Furthermore, as Ulrich Brand 
(2005) illustrates, global governance, understood as a discourse, is often articulated in ways 
which legitimize shifts and developments so as to forward and maintain neoliberal 
globalization. This builds on Muldoon’s (2004) concern that transformation of international 
organizations are likely to take place in ways that adapt to particular demands of the global 
system rather than provide structural change.  
From this critical theory perspective, global governance is not so much an answer to state 
failures in the globalization process as it is a hegemonic discourse invoked to disguise the 
negative effects of neoliberal economic development on a global scale. In the words of Ulrich 
Brand (translated and cited in Pattberg 2006), “the discourse of Global Governance . . . serves as 
a means to deal more effectively with the crisis-prone consequences caused by [postfordist-
neoliberal social transformations]”. The prevailing neoliberal logic steering policy processes 
beyond the state are deeply embedded in a broader political trend towards reregulation of the 
world economy in ways that obscure the negative tendencies of late capitalism. Neoliberal 
approaches to global governance and the policies that result are advanced to maintain or reclaim 
political influence in order to stabilise the institutional landscape of world politics. Through 
these processes, neoliberalism becomes so deeply embedded in their logic and rationale that it 
emerges as an ideological companion to globalization. We return to this process later.   
2.3. Challenges and Critiques to Global Governance 
The concept of global governance is not without critique or challenge, both in terms of global 
governance scholarship and processes. For Overbeek (in Overbeek et al. 2010), given the 
multiplicity of uses, definitions and applications, the term global governance is not only not 
useful, it is also misleading. He argues that the three largest weaknesses facing applications of 
global governance are that analysis tends to be ahistorical, necessarily pluralist in so far as they 
tend to take the plurality of actors, interests and structures as essential, and apolitical in so much 
as power is often removed from analyses. Dingwerth and Pattberg (in Overbeek et al. 2010) 
agree with Ovenbeek on the apolitical nature of global governance scholarship and forward two 
other limitations: that global governance assumes globality and, non-governance is ignored.  
However, they argue that global governance studies also present a way of examining diverse 
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power relations at the global level. For example, they argue that despite structural imbalances in 
the distribution of power and resources in the global political economy, countries from the 
South have not lacked influence in transnational politics. Towards this end, Compagnon (in 
Overbeek et al. 2010) argues for more nuanced and fact-based assessments of global governance 
and the inclusion of multiple actors in global governance research.  
Klaus Dingwerth and Philipp Pattberg (in Overbeek et al. 2010:708) note, in most cases, 
researchers evoking global governance do not extend their analysis beyond relevant steering 
mechanisms that exist in relation to the respective issue within the world. Correspondingly, 
efforts to make sense of a specific field of global governance often start by establishing a list of 
relevant regulatory mechanism. However, if this is the way that scholars approach global 
governance, then, according to Dingwerth and Pattberg (in Overbeek et al. 2010) it is important 
to anticipate some potential blind spots. First, avoid the temptation of over estimating the 
amount of rule-based coordination that exists in the political world. Second, it follows that 
global governance research has a tendency to adopt a narrow focus on the rules that can be most 
easily identified (for example, written rules, legal texts and codes of conduct).15F16 Third, global 
governance research is likely to concentrate on issue areas with dense formal rules resulting in a 
paucity of investigation into less institutionalized, but not necessarily less effective, areas of 
global governance. Finally, there is little clarity or consensus on what constitutes a global policy 
problem, how one is recognised and why some issues are constructed as global problems while 
others are left as domestic challenges. With respect to food security, there is general agreement 
on what constitutes food insecurity and that it is indeed a global problem. Definitions and 
methodologies for defining and quantifying the number of food insecure people around the 
world have been intergovernmentally negotiated, scientifically reviewed, and subject to critique 
by civil society and private sector actors. Thus, the challenge with food security and global 
policy processes is less one of defining the problem, but rather solving the problem. Despite 
myriad attempts through a variety of policy programmes, food insecurity remains prevalent and 
there are clear differences and divergences in how to address the issue. Furthermore, as will be 
seen throughout the thesis, more often than not, the proposed solutions comprise part of the 
problem (Holt-Giménez and Altieri 2013). This leads to concerns about global governance 
processes. 
Marie-Claude Smouts (1998:88) argues that global governance processes are based on eirenic 
representations of social life and disregard situations of outright domination as well as questions 
arising from un-governability. An even larger challenge stems from an underlying criteria of 
global governance – effectiveness – and a lack of a world government. Global governance 
                                                     
 
16
 Dingwerth and Pattberg (in Overbeek et al. 2010:708) point out that the method of “inventorizalition” 
runs in opposition to Rosenau’s claim that global governance research is interested in examining the 
“literally millions” of rule systems with tansboundary repercussions  (Rosebay 1995:13). 
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emerges and evolves to effectively manage an issue or a problem to be resolved by way of 
accommodation of mutual interest. At present, the sole regulator acting at the global level that 
cuts across interacting social and sub-systems is the international market. Smouts (1998:88) 
warns that in this respect, global governance could effectively conceal “the most devious type of 
economic liberalism”. Aware of these limitations, efforts have been made to ensure that 
processes of domination are not ignored and that the analysis of how multilateral actors seek out 
effectiveness in global food security policy does not serve to mask efforts to promote economic 
liberalism. Indeed, the theoretical framework developed in this chapter actively serves to 
uncover such processes.  
Before moving on, a review of the dominant challenges and critiques of global governance 
processes and institutions as identified in the literature is presented. These include participation, 
accountability, legitimacy, and categorisation and are introduced so as to flag some of the key 
challenges that are likely to arise within the changing architecture of global food security 
governance.  
2.3.1. Participation 
Middendorf and Busch (1997:45) argue that “a closer approximation of the ‘public good’ can be 
achieved by encouraging the participation of the fullest range of constituents”. The call for 
public participation in policy processes is not new. For example, Carole Pateman (1970) argued 
that the development of the ability and desire of people to participate is crucial to democratic 
societies.   
When it comes to food, meaningful public participation is central and “[w]while creating 
opportunities for participation does not guarantee that the best possible decision will result, at 
least it does appear to increase the possibility of better decisions that are more responsive to the 
needs and desires of the broader public” (Middendorf and Busch 1997:54). Acknowledgment of 
the complexity of agriculture, food and development policy should not be used as a rationale for 
restricting involvement. By arguing that global food security policy is too complex to involve a 
diversity of players, we end up forwarding a system that encourages decision making without 
consideration for broader implications (Middendorf and Busch 1997:48). Furthermore, technical 
decisions have real social implications. 
Middendorf and Busch (1997) provides a rational for public agriculture research, if we accept 
that all technical changes are also social changes. The arguments can be adapted and applied in 
support of public participation in agri-food governance and policy-making processes. First, 
increasing participation in decision-making at the global level is compatible with the democratic 
principles of participating nations. Second, while not guaranteeing it, “broad public involvement 
in decision making will increase the chances of better decision making… because a broader 
range of values is likely to be represented and the probability of error may be reduce” 
(Middendorf and Busch 1997:46).  
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2.3.2. Accountability 
As new forms of governance render traditional mechanisms for checks and balances less 
effective, or even obsolete, new understandings and mechanisms for accountability are 
emerging. Questions related to accountability tend to ask which entities or actors are, or should 
be, accountable, to whom and how. From the perspective of food policy, it is also important to 
consider what the answers to these questions mean for accountability gaps; that is where 
practices differ from the desired outcomes. Furthermore, there is need to consider who is 
accountable not just for policy development, but equally for implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation.  
An immediate challenge is defining what is meant by accountability. Some define 
accountability as a relationship “in which an individual, group or other entity makes demands 
on an agent to report on his or her activities, and has the ability to impose costs on the agent” 
(Keohane 2002:13). For Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden (2004:156) accountability is linked 
to governability – that is, the capacity to solve urgent societal problems and to develop systems 
to control the exercise of power, or to hold power holders accountable – and consequently, 
governability and accountability need to develop together. Others argue that democratic 
accountability in world politics is a hypothetical system wherein the action of agents have to be 
reported to those people whose lives are impacted by them  (Held 2002:27). In a similar vein, 
Keohane (2002) argues that accountability need not be democratic and often, systems of 
accountability – most visible perhaps within constitutional democracies – are democratic, 
hierarchic (subordinates accountable to superiors) and pluralistic (different branches of 
government are accountable to one another).  
For this study, questions of accountability loom large. As the architecture of global governance 
shifts and opens up to include new actors questions of who is accountable in negotiations, 
implementation, follow-up and evaluation, and why emerges as a highly sensitive and political 
question and one that will be addressed later on in discussions of the reform of the CFS.  
2.3.3. Legitimacy  
Governance, in any form, requires legitimacy. Following from James Rosenau (2003), 
legitimacy is understood as a relational concept which implies that the legitimacy of an actor’s 
actions can only be understood in relation to the perception of all relevant stakeholders  (see 
also Boström and Hallström 2010; Hallström and Boström 2010). Achieving and maintaining 
legitimacy requires convincing actors that there is a value-added component of the rules or 
policies established by the organizations (Boström and Hallström 2010:10). New regulatory 
arrangements which are constructed and organized around horizontal non-state relationships are 
subject to structural drawbacks as they cannot rely on the presumed legitimacy of the nation 
state as well as traditional enforcement capacities (Bernstein and Cashore 2000; Boström and 
Hallström 2010). 
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Within multi-stakeholder organizations where non-state actors play an active role, questions of 
legitimacy are inevitable. In these circumstances, non-state actors must achieve active approval 
from a broad group of stakeholders, including state actors  (Boström and Hallström 2010). 
These actors are normally not democratically elected and are, in many instances, self-elected. 
Achieving legitimacy entails working to gain broad support for their activities which often 
involves developing partnerships (Boström and Hallström 2010:10). To further complicate 
things, in these networks, each actor will hold a different view on legitimacy and who and what 
is considered to be legitimate. Furthermore, as Boström and Hallström (2010:15).remind us, 
legitimacy is not a stable condition but something fluid that must be repeatedly created and 
recreated. Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden (2004:158) note that multilevel governance 
theorists often distinguish between input legitimacy and output legitimacy with the former 
relating to political systems and specific policies which are legitimated by established rules and 
processes (Thomassen and Schmitt 1999:255) and the latter referring to political systems and 
policies which are legitimated by their success. 
Without a representative mechanism at the global level (and often even with these), political 
choices are made by unaccountable executive agencies (extra-national and national), including 
powerful lobbies, organizations or private subjects (such as multinational corporations) 
(Benvenisti and Down 2007). As a result, there is a very real risk that opinions which conform to 
dominant ideologies or highly influential interests will prevail over underrepresented interests. 
Within the field of global governance the use of executive powers in a world-wide legal space is 
increasing incrementally, arguably in part to find ways to legitimise global governance systems. 
One way this is being made visible is through global law.  
Sabino Cassese (2008:10) suggests that global law “is generated through a process of accretion 
and accumulation, and the cooperative dialogue between regimes means that the principles of 
each should not be interpreted and applied in a vacuum.” He explains that it “is in this process 
that some have recognised the emergence of a general body of law at the global level.” This 
global public law involves the development of several legal tools (e.g., treaties, general 
principles, rules, standards, institutions, and procedural mechanisms) established beyond national 
borders either by states, or by other bodies (often international), with the aim of delivering 
services, establishing standards and guidelines for national authorities, monitoring compliance, 
or acting as “clearing houses”. At present, there are at least two thousand global legal regimes 
whose administration and judicial bodies (where these exist) are linked to other regimes through 
dialogue, cooperation and division of labour (Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart 2005). This 
process, also defined as “juridical globalization” (see for example Kingsbury et al. 2005), and 
examples of such bodies are prevalent across the architecture of global food security governance  
as illustrated in Chapter 4.  
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The international legal system is still highly fragmented 16F17 and heterogeneous, appearing as the 
“aggregate of the legal norms governing international relations” (Guggenheim 1967:1). There are 
not only problems of conflict between states, but also of conflicts between different interests, 
such as health, environment and trade. Alternative mechanisms of democratic political 
orientation and of popular education and collection of preferences are at too rudimentary stage 
and currently favour strong market-based interests (Beck 2005). In practice this results in a 
tendency to neglect the protection of social interests in favour of economic conditions (Harvey 
2005) which in turn culminates into a ‘race to the bottom’ in the protection of the general 
interest.   
Like accountability, the legitimacy of actors – who has the legitimacy to speak on behalf of 
others – is an increasingly important factor as global governance opens up to new actors and as 
these actors stake their claim to being “legitimate” actors. This research considers what and who 
is considered legitimate in global food security policy negotiations, not only across institutions, 
but also across issues (see for example the case studies on the Civil Society Mechanism and the 
Voluntary Guidelines).  
2.3.4. Categorization 
Multi-stakeholder organizations are, by definition, comprised of different types of actors. 
Within International Relations theory, political strategies are stabilised through established 
categories (notably, national actors). However, at the transnational level, there is a need to 
establish new actor categories so as to distinguish amongst participating stakeholders (Beck 
2005;  Pattberg 2006). To establish these categories is a challenge in and of itself as they cannot 
be negotiated amongst stakeholders because stakeholders must first negotiate who is to be 
recognised as a stakeholder (Boström and Hallström 2010:7). Furthermore, categorisation is an 
exercise in power and a process that’s often invisible. Moreover, categories, once adopted, tend 
to be taken for granted or go uncontested (Boström and Hallström 2010:7).  This is problematic 
as power relations become embedded in organizational arrangements which can make it easier 
for some stakeholders to consolidate power due to their categorization  (Davis et al. 2005). 
There is also the issue of the symbolic implications of how categories influence stakeholders’ 
perception of self and others and how they are in turn perceived (Boström and Hallström 
2010:9). Finally, categories can restrict diversity and by grouping organizations together present 
problems of representation and are subject to simplifications and will inevitably group 
organizations together in ways that some may find problematic. These issues of categorization 
come up most obviously in the analysis of the International Food and Nutrition Civil Society 
Mechanism to the Committee on World Food Security (see chapter 5) where constituencies 
have been developed in an attempt to develop representative categories of global civil society.  
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 Fragmentation has recently been defined by Koskenniemi (2007) as “the breakdown of the substance of 
general international law into allegedly autonomous, functionally oriented, ‘self-contained’ regimes.” 
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This process of categorization across the CFS, and the global architecture of global food 
security governance more broadly, warrants consideration. 
2.3.5. Summary of Global Governance 
Based on the descriptions provided above it is here argued that despite the limitations, global 
governance literature provides a useful starting point from which to begin to frame this inquiry 
insofar as it devises techniques for managing joint affairs (Smouts 1998:86) and accords place 
and space to a multiplicity of rationalities and differing forms of legitimacy. Global governance 
proposes reference points for describing processes and provides a way of viewing power in the 
establishment of international policy and practice. With the application of a global governance 
approach, the aim becomes to identify how the mechanisms of joint regulation develop through 
a permanent scenario of exchanges, negotiations and reciprocal adjustments (Smouts 1998:86). 
This in turn leads to the articulation of issues in terms of strategic interactions with traditional 
questions of public policy: in the case of this research, how international food security policy is 
being constructed. 
2.4. Embedded Neoliberalism 
2.4.1. Neoliberalism 
To suggest that we live in a neoliberal era is both correct and incomplete given the multiplicity 
of definitions attributed to the term. Some have suggested that due to multiple applications more 
precise terms should be used (Clarke 2008; Ferguson 2009). Susan Watkins (2010:7) has 
proclaimed that neoliberalism “is a dismal epithet… imprecise and overused”. Peck (2010:14-
15) warns against “adjectival promiscuity” that surrounds neoliberalism. He warns that 
“neoliberalism seems often to be used as a sort of stand-in term for the political economic 
zeitgeist, as a no-more-than approximate proxy for a specific analysis of mechanisms or 
relations of social power, domination, exploitation, or alienation. Peck (2010:15-16) argues that 
“for all its doctrinal certainty, the neoliberal project is paradoxically defined by the very 
unattainability of its fundamental goal – frictionless market rule”. It follows that clean or 
precise definitions of neoliberalization are simply not possible; instead, Peck argues “concretely 
grounded accounts of the process must be chiselled out of the interstices of state/market 
configurations”. In some respects, this research undertakes such a process in the analysis of the 
CFS and relevant policy recommendations to emerge from multilateral groups and organizations 
in reaction to the 2007-8 food price crisis.  
However, it is here argued that the diversity of meanings reflect the different perspectives of 
actors who have been trying to make sense the world as they see it. Thus, neoliberalism is here 
used as a starting point and consequently will be presented in a number of ways, each one with 
the aim of helping to make sense of global food security policy and governance. This is by no 
means a novel approach. Wendy Larner (2000), for example, engages with neoliberalism as 
ideology, policy and governance.  
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Within this thesis, the “neoliberal” is understood in at least five ways, each of which provides 
unique insights into the functioning and tensions of food security governance at the global level.  
First, it is explored as a discursive formulation with forms of reasoning and discourse enacted as 
neoliberalism. Second, it is reviewed as a project (the extension of liberalism) advanced to 
enhance trade through minimizing barriers as made visible through trade liberalisation. Third, 
neoliberalism is considered as a product that leads to the development, rationalisation and 
maintenance of particular food structures. Fourth, it is examined as a process that is mediated 
primarily through a state complex and plays out as neoliberalization. This process is mapped out 
in Chapter 4 on the evolution of food security. Finally, neoliberal is considered as a strategy 
which is implemented through processes of food governance to maintain status quo. These 
manifestations of the neoliberal are not discreet categories and are in fact densely 
interconnected, full of personal, organizational, social and/or dispersed networks.  
When approached from the perspective of food systems, and food policy more specifically, the 
inherent contradictions of the neoliberal are made obvious. The most blatant contradiction is 
arguably between trade liberalisation which involves reducing barriers to trade (neoliberal as 
project) and food governance (neoliberal as strategy) which involves the regulation of trade. 
This tension is not new. In 1944, Karl Polanyi (2001) wrote about a “double movement” where 
economic forces place demands on the broader social formation in which they are located. This 
double movement refers to the ways in which economic forces come to dominate but are then 
coerced or calmed by resistance from social formations. This should recall Muldoon’s (2004) 
and Brand’s (2005) discussions of change within systems of governance.  
David Harvey (2005:2) explains that neoliberalism is a theory of political economic practice 
that: 
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized 
by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade. The role of the state 
is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices.  
For Cerny (2010:128), the development of neoliberalism since the 1980s has led to a “complex, 
flexible, fungible and increasingly variegated set of discourses that have proved particularly 
useful to a diverse range of actors in a globalizing world”. Neoliberalism reflects the current of 
ideas and formulations developed predominantly from U.S. trade and foreign policy through the 
late twentieth century. However, Jessop (2002) reminds us that neoliberalism is only one of a 
number of orientations accessible to social formations. Others include neostatism, 
neocorporatism, or neocommunitarianism. Indeed, neoliberalism should not be seen as a fully 
comprehensive and self-contained rational doctrine. It is, rather, a social construction that 
reflects political, and above all, economic forces. Neoliberalism arose most recently as an 
expression of a capitalist project promoted by specific corporations and mediated by specific 
state complexes. In the process there has also been criticism and resistance.  
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Neoliberal models of government are characterized by the capacity for direct intervention by 
means of empowered and specialized state apparatuses and indirect techniques for leading and 
controlling citizens without at the same time being responsible for them (Lemke 2001:201). 
More broadly within neoliberal governance, the role of the state remains fundamental, despite 
Liberal rhetoric of minimized state influence and power.  
Philip Cerny (2010:129-30) provides a useful description of neoliberalism in the context of 
increased globalization which deserves to be quoted at length:  
[N]eoliberalism is not a seamless web doctrinally and discursively. It is not only a 
contested concept in theoretical terms but also a highly internally differentiated 
one, made up of a range of politically linked but potentially discrete and 
freestanding subcategories and dimensions. These can be manipulated and 
orchestrated in different ways by political actors, leading to a much larger spectrum 
of strategic options, policy prescriptions, and de facto practices than the original 
conservative version would suggest – including what are here called regulatory, 
managed and social neoliberalism. In this way, a wide variety of interest and value 
groups, as well as political actors, can latch onto specific parts of the package and 
claim them for diverse political projects.  
By extension, neoliberalism, as a political rationality, tries to render the social domain economic 
and to link a reduction in state services to increased calls for personal responsibility. It is 
maintained through tensions inherent to liberal democracy: Totalizing bureaucratization 
competes with the primacy of the individual (Cerny 2010b; Mouffe 2000). Indeed, a central 
feature of neoliberal rationality is the search to achieve congruence between the responsible and 
moral individual and the rational-economic actor (Lemke 2001:201). Here, the aspiration is “to 
construct prudent subjects whose moral quality is based on the fact that they rationally assess 
the costs and benefits of a certain act as opposed to other alternative acts” (Lemke 
2001:201).The choice of action is made based on the free-will of actors (in line with liberal 
logic) and the consequences of the actions are borne by the subject who is solely responsible for 
them. When it comes to CSO engagement in food governance, especially at the global level, we 
see the expectation of liberal democracy support the development of spaces to facilitate their 
engagement. However cynical this may sound, it is not explicitly meant to be so. But it should 
be noted that this tendency to opening up participation could be a double-edged sword. While 
there is the potential for transfer of responsibility, especially of enforcement onto civil society 
actors, there is also a widening of debate and, as discussed above with reference to Middendorf 
and Busch (1997), participation  has important implications for food policy.  
With relevance to food security, an example of neoliberalism as project can be seen through 
various forms of high level “consensus”. In recent years there has been a shift from a broad 
policy commitment to “rolling back” (as evidenced in the retreat from agricultural funding and 
programmes, for example) towards a “rolling out” which is marked by more government 
intervention and private-public partnerships. The term “Washington Consensus”, coined by 
Williamson (1999:2), summarizes this “roll back” perspective. The “Washington Consensus” 
reflected neoclassical economic policy that stressed the importance of economic openness to 
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enhance development through increased mobility of goods, capital and workers. Williamson 
identified ten key features:  
fiscal discipline, redirection of public expenditure, tax reform, interest rate 
liberalisation, competitive exchange rates, trade liberalisation, liberalisation of 
foreign direct investment, privatisation, deregulation of trade barriers, and secure 
property rights.  
This approach is congruent with the IMF and World Bank’s view that development is best 
achieved through market and export-led industrialization. In the 1990’s these views were 
challenged by a number of events including the Asian financial crisis and anti-globalization 
protests such as those against the WTO Ministerial in Seattle in 1999 and later in 2001 with 
protests in Quebec City against the Free Trade Area of the Americas. Cracks in the logic of the 
neoliberal project resulted in attempts to modify and extend neoliberalism by amending state 
institutions, reducing poverty, enhancing social capital and creating more equitable international 
governance, in an effort which can be called the “post-Washington Consensus” (Sheppard & 
Leitner, 2010: 186-188). The food and financial crises of the late 2000s expanded those cracks.  
A framework for the post-Washington Consensus was laid out in a document developed by G20 
Leaders. With the financial crisis of 2008, G20 nations came together with other global actors to 
develop the Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth. From this consensus the “Seoul 
Action Plan”  was developed (G20 2011b). The document focuses on Low Income Countries 
rather than the broader category of developing countries. The Plan notes that Low Income 
Countries should: stress inclusive, sustainable and resilient growth; be treated as equal partners 
who take ownership of their national development; and that the G-20 members should: turn 
their focus to regional issues; avoid duplication of efforts of other members; and focus on 
measures that will lead to outcomes (G20 2011b). The Action Plan focuses on a global financial 
safety net that alludes to a commitment to structural reform of financial institutions that will 
increase flexibility. The plan also includes a commitment to direct negotiators to “promptly 
bring the Doha Development Round to a successful, ambitious, comprehensive, and balanced 
conclusion” (G20 2011:3).  
The Seoul Consensus identifies nine pillars where action is necessary to “resolve the most 
significant bottlenecks to inclusive, sustainable and resilient growth in developing counties, 
LICs [low income countries] in particular”(G20 2011b:12). Food security makes the list after 
infrastructure, human resource development, trade, private investment and job creation.  
One interesting point of note is the shift from Washington (the US hegemon) to Seoul. This 
reflects a changing geopolitical relationship that is influencing contemporary neoliberalism. It 
illustrates the important role of emerging political and economic powers, especially across Asia. 
It is also another example of the neoliberal system of governance adapting to address global 
pressure without pursuing any structural change. What is also important here is the shift from 
the “roll back” mentality that dominated the 1990s and early 2000s and the evolution, still 
within a neoliberal paradigm, to a rollout approach to maintain hegemony within a new 
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economic reality. Neoliberalism, in its current form is thus not only a “political and ideological 
manifestation of economic structural change and public policy innovation at national level” but 
also a shifting “ideational driving force behind the politics of globalization” (Cerny 2010:129). 
The methodological challenge of uncovering neoliberalism in its various moments of 
actualization, failure, normalization and adaptation, is a geographical one, argues Peck 
(2010:33). It is, for Peck (2010:33-4) “a matter of determining the relational location of specific 
events, actors, and claims on the broader terrain of socioregulatory restructuring”. The result of 
this becomes a series of traverses and triangulated readings across shifting landscapes. But what 
does this mean for projects that are focussed at the global level? Cerny’s work on embedded 
neoliberalism addresses this, and will be discussed below.  However, given Peck’s concerns, it 
is useful to reflect on neoliberalism less as a noun and more as a verb- the process of 
neoliberalization. Peck (2010:19) argues that process-focused definitions of neoliberalization 
are preferable to static and taxonomic renderings of neoliberalism, since the latter tend to rely 
too heavily on regime-like conceptions, bracketed in time and space”. “Neoliberalism” he 
continues, “defies explanation in terms of fixed coordinates”. Neoliberalization, in turn, refers to 
a contradictory process of market-like rule, principally negotiated at the boundaries of the state, 
and occupying the ideological space defined by a (broadly) sympathetic critique of nineteenth-
century laissez-faire and deep antipathies to collectivism planned and socialized modes of 
government, especially those associated with Keynesianism and developmentalism (2010:20).  
Neoliberalism has evolved through processes of shape-shifting, and uneven open-ended 
mutations and cross-referential development (Peck 2010:30). As a process, neoliberalization 
encourages individuals to give their lives a specific capitalist form and by extension, policy 
makers to give their policies specific capitalist forms.  Neoliberalism generalizes the scope of 
the economic order and in doing so, successfully generalizes social activity in relation to 
economy and evaluates all activity by way economic analysis or with respect to market concepts 
(Lemke 2001:198). The existing worlds of neoliberalism are “institutionally cluttered places 
marked by experimental-but-flawed systems of governance, cumulative problems of social 
fallout and serial market failure” (Peck 2010:31). Embedded neoliberalism-cum-liberalization 
provides a framework, or outlines the logic, with which these processes of global governance 
take place. This proves useful for starting to frame analysis into global food security 
governance.  
2.4.2. Embedded Neoliberalism  
For Philip Cerny (2010:128), the development of neoliberalism since the 1980s has led to a 
“complex, flexible, fungible and increasingly variegated set of discourses that have proved 
particularly useful to a diverse range of actors in a globalizing world”.   Neoliberalism, in its 
current forms, represented not only a “political and ideological manifestation of economic 
structural change and public policy innovation at national level but also into the ideational 
driving force behind the politics of globalization” (Cerny 2010:129). To reflect the hegemonic 
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nature of neoliberalism, Cerny advances the concept of embedded neoliberalism. Processes of 
neoliberalization have become “embedded in twenty-first century institutional behavior, 
political processes, discourses and understandings of socioeconomic realities” (Cerny 
2010:129). Through this processes of embedding, neoliberalism has become the “shared mental 
model” (Roy, Denzau, and Willett 2007) of the evolving art of governmentality (Burchell, 
Gordon, and Miller 1991; Foucault 2008): the contemporary Gramscian “common sense” notion 
of what is expected and/or taken for granted. 
Writing from a fascist prison between 1925 and 1935, Gramsci was broadly concerned with the 
problem of understanding capitalist societies and the possibility of creating alternative types of 
states or societies based on the working class. Of prime interest to Gramsci were: the state, 
relationships of civil society to the state, and relationships of politics, ethics and ideology 
production. Concerned by the economic determinism of Marx’s model, and informed by his 
own experiences, Gramsci (1971) developed a similar dialect to Marx, in so far as the 
interacting elements create a larger unity. But, Gramsci introduced social relations into the level 
of superstructure and articulated how these relations can reinforce or undermine the material 
basis. At the level of superstructure, key actors (the state and civil society) engage in spheres of 
authority. Gramsci introduces political, ethical and ideological spheres of activity into his 
model. 17F18 The economic structure and coalitions at the level of the superstructure (social and 
political) form organic – implying long term – orders for Gramsci. The caretakers of this order 
are the dominant class who control the economy and permeate the state, thereby maintaining 
hegemony over civil society.  
Hegemony is perhaps most commonly used to refer to the dominance of one group over another 
without the threat of force. However, in the current era of late capitalism, hegemony is 
increasingly understood as “organizing consent to the ruling relations of capitalism” (Carroll 
2006:10). Hegemony, much like neoliberalism is a concept that has suffered from adjectival 
promiscuity. It is here used to describe an intricate and multifaceted process; a process that 
Canadian cultural historian Ian McKay (2005:61) likens to a dance; one in which the lead 
dancer manoeuvres the partner, gently coaxing the partner to glide, turn and dip in response to 
the leader. With practice, the partner’s actions, despite being controlled by the lead, begin to 
feel natural to the extent that they forget they are being led. By way of this process, the actions 
and language of the hegemonic group (the lead) are normalized and society (the partner) learns 
to follow to the extent to where followed actions are also normalized and feel natural and 
autonomous. Robert Cox (Cox 1993:63) uses a less subtle but equally effective metaphor to 
define hegemony: “Hegemony is like a pillow: it absorbs blows and sooner or later, the would 
be assailant will find it comfortable to rest upon.”  The relational nature of hegemony recalls 
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 Gramsci fails to account for environment in his model of spheres of activity. The inclusion of the 
environment into this approach could prove valuable for food policy research.  
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similarly relational nature of power and is fundamental to understanding embedded 
neoliberalism.  
Embedded neoliberalism reflects not only an emerging neoliberal consensus developed  “as 
market forces and transnational interpenetration constrain institutions and actors to behave in 
certain ways,” (Cerny 2010:148) but also a political construction, given shape in the everyday 
world by political actors and interest groups seeking political legitimacy. Central to this idea is 
the understanding that the “scope and significance of neoliberalism has been transformed not 
merely into the political and ideological manifestation of economic structural change and public 
policy innovation at national level, but also into the political driving force behind globalization 
itself” (Cerny 2010:3). 
This is similar to what Emelie Peine and Philip McMichael (2005) have described as market 
rule; the act of states incorporating multilateral or bilateral protocols into national policy. This 
process is ideologically maintained by giving “primacy to increased investment, production and 
trade over social concerns,” and wherein “national and international spheres are represented as 
mutually exclusive categories in an attempt to “encourage domestic policies, such as farm 
subsidies, that artificially cheapen commodity process and ultimately serve agribusiness 
interests” (Peine and McMichael 2005; see also McMichael 2000; Duncan and Barling 2012). 
The introduction of the idea of a “neoliberal era” advanced at the beginning of this section 
reflects the fact that contemporary social formations revolve around the leadership of a power 
structure that operates through the use of coercion and the organization of consent within a 
social formation. This process is by no means stable and is often the site of antagonism and 
resistance, as the example above suggests. A hegemonic arrangement within a population is thus 
in part achieved when a population comes to be dominated partly through its own consent. 
However, hegemony “cuts both ways” since the processes of organizing consent may also create 
opportunities for constructing counter-hegemonic movements and resistance (Carroll 1990:393). 
With respect to food security, many farming and food social movements actively and publically 
challenge the neoliberal logic that informs global institutional direction of national production 
and push localised peasant agricultural systems to compete in volatile global markets that do not 
favour smallholder producers. For example, in response to the G8’s proposal for a New Alliance 
on Food Security and Nutrition, which forwards strengthened partnerships with African 
governments and the private sector with an aim to increase food security, the leader of the West 
African Peasant and Food Producer’s Network, ROPPA (Le Réseau des organizations 
paysannes et de producteurs de l’Afrique de l’Ouest), issued a letter to the leaders of African 
Union countries, which was then co-signed by fifteen farming groups across the continent. He 
wrote: 
At the moment in which the President of the United States, acting in good faith I 
am sure, has decided to organize a Symposium on food security on 18-19 May 
2012 in Washington on the eve of the G8 meeting in Camp David, I address myself 
to you, as President of the African Union, and through you to all of the African 
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Heads of State. I ask you to explain how you could possibly justify thinking that 
the food security and sovereignty of Africa could be secured through international 
cooperation outside of the policy frameworks formulated in an inclusive fashion 
with the peasants and the producers of the continent… I would simply like to recall 
that food security and sovereignty are the basis of our general development, as all 
of the African governments underline. It is a strategic challenge. This is why we 
must build our food policy on our own resources as is done in the other regions of 
the world. The G8 and the G20 can in no way be considered the appropriate fora 
for decisions of this nature (Cissokho 2012). 
This critique builds on theme that has been developing throughout the course of the chapter: 
change. A major challenge of neoliberalism within late capitalism is that by virtue of being 
common-sense, resistance, while omnipresent, is easily thwarted, dismissed or reintegrated into 
the dominant model. An example of this is the shift of the organic food movement from a 
grassroots eco-health movement to a multinational industry now monitored and mediated by the 
agri-business players it originally worked to resist. Another example has already been 
mentioned above: increased engagement of civil society actors in global policy could serve to 
legitimise processes while providing a way for governments and the private sector to pass 
on/along key responsibilities.  
First, it is important to note that within the framework of embedded neoliberalism, 
contemporary neoliberal logic at the global level embodies a structural tension left over from the 
Enlightenment era. Cerny (2010) identifies the two poles of this tension as institutional 
hierarchy and the liberal primacy of the individual. The former – the polity – involves a 
totalitization of modern bureaucratic institutions, and the latter – the economic component – the 
individuation of people via capitalism. This individuation is expressed in part through the 
primacy of the individual and the role of personal consciousness. This tension is visible, for 
example, through liberal democracy which Chantal Mouffe (2000) explains has an inherently 
conflictual nature: the tension of democracy and liberalism. 18F19 This individuation is expressed in 
part through the primacy of the individual and the role of personal consciousness, a process 
evident in the development of food security policy through a shift from global cooperation to 
increase production in the 1970s to a focus on individual and household livelihoods throughout 
the 1980s (Maxwell and Slater 2003; Maxwell 1996; Mechlem 2004; Sen 1981; Shaw 2007).  
This process of authoritative direction and control at the global level is creatively managed by 
through the art of governmentality (Cerny 2010b). Thus, the dynamic process of 
governmentalization, managed through the art of governmentality results in systems of global 
governance which “include systems of rule at all levels of human activity—from the family to 
the international organization—in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has 
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 Mouffe critiques deliberative democratic theory for their attempts to reconcile the liberal tradition with 
the democratic tradition, seeing this as an attempt to erase the tension in a way that leaves them unable to 
address the conflictual reality of democratic politics. 
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transnational repercussions”  (Rosenau 1995:13). In this sense, global governance becomes less 
a process than a reference to the international superstructure of world politics (Cerny 2010:186).  
Finally, it is necessary to reflect on processes of transnational neopluralism. As Cerny 
(2010b:130) explains “[n]eoliberalism is proving to be eminently flexible and politically 
adaptable – a discourse that increasing reflects the process of transnational neopluralism”. 
Correspondingly, an understanding of transnational neopluralism is fundamental to 
understanding how various actors have sought to reconstitute political authority in the wake of 
the 2007/8 food price spikes. This is true in so far as the changing architecture of global food 
security governance represents an increasingly dynamic transnational food security policy space 
wherein actors forward various, sometimes overlapping, perspectives on issues of trade, aid, 
nutrition, development, the right food, food sovereignty, research, aid and biological diversity to 
name but a few.  
It is perhaps most logical to begin by defining neopluralism before returning to transnational. 
Building on Robert Dahl's (1961) model of pluralism which he developed from a study of a 
community power in Connecticut, U.S.A, neopluralism evolved notably through the study of 
American politics, adding new focus on “agenda building, the logic of collective action, special-
interest subgovernments, social movements, advocacy coalitions, and the theory of political 
processes” (McFarland 2007:45). Neopluralism expects complexity in policy systems and as 
described above, this complexity is currently predominantly organized in such as way so as to 
give preferential status to economic interests, in line with understandings of neoliberal 
hegemony described above. As Cerny (2010b:3–4) notes, a neopluralist approach is concerned 
with the outcomes of various political processes involving a range of actors operating at all 
levels.  Importantly, “these actors have very different levels and kinds of power resources, 
understandings of how to use that power, material interests, normative values, political projects 
and, of course, the determination to pursue their interest, values, and projects in a range of 
public and private arenas” (Cerny 2010b:4).  These actors have competing as well as common 
interests and “they engage in processes of conflict, competition, and coalition building to pursue 
those interests”. This becomes a fundamental point for an inquiry into global food security 
policy wherein the actions of actors cannot be reduced to perceived or assumed ideologies but 
rather must be examined as nuanced actions embedded within their negotiations of complex 
political processes. Given that these processes take place within transnational spaces, for 
example across transgovernmental networks or through multilateral fora, for this research 
neopluralism is most appropriately understood to be transnational.  
The concept of transnational relations has existed as long as international relations, yet the 
despite its frequent application, theorizing on the concept remains limited (van Apeldoorn 
2004:142, Nöelke 2003). Within the context of globalizations, attempts to “reconstitute 
authority require states to cooperate with one another in ever increasing ways” (Coleman 
2002:1). The interactions of these actors also contribute to the growth of “densely networked 
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transnational policy spaces” (Coleman 2002:1). ‘Architecture’ and ‘space’ are terms that build 
on the “epistemological position that borders and boundaries are variable and are being created 
and recreated in response to globalizing processes” (Coleman 2002:2). These spaces where the 
processes of global governance take place are transnational insofar as states come to engage and 
act in more coordinated ways where they pool sovereignty to achieve policy objectives. This is 
what Cerny (2010a) describes as a turn towards raison du monde, and corresponds to what 
Grande and Pauly (2005) refer to as the “transnational cooperation state,” and Cox (1987) calls 
the “internationalization of the state”. It is important to remember that within the contours of 
this architecture of global food security policy, understood as a transnational policy space where 
policy institutions are constructed and activation, there are multiple interactions involving 
networks of coalitions of actors (Tsing 2000:330). Neopluralism accepts these multiple 
interactions and seeks to uncover the structure of power and policy making with public policy 
(McFarland 2007).  
A commonly advanced description of transnational relations defines them as “regular 
interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not 
operate on behalf of a national government or of an intergovernmental organization” (Risse-
Kappen 1995:3). However, this definition advances an actor-centred approach, presenting the 
“actor” as an autonomous entity ignoring that the actor is embedded in, and constituted by, 
transnational structures (van Apeldoorn 2004: 148). This is an important point for this research, 
as what is of interest is elucidating the relations between actors: how actors are defined, and 
how they identify their roles and responsibilities, in relations to others.   
Central to understanding transnational relations is recognizing the very multi-levelled nature of 
interactions: transnational actors operate at a level above the state, outside the state, and 
importantly across several national contexts simultaneously (and not, as the literature often 
suggests, outside of the context of territorial borders) (van Apeldoorn 2004: 145). Not unlike the 
term “global”, “transnational” does not constitute a level but is instead to be understood as a 
phenomenon that extends and links across different levels (van Apeldoorn 2004: 144). As such, 
the transnational includes “state, supra-state and sub-state in a multi-level conception which can 
also accommodate non-territorial phenomena” (Anderson 2002:16).  
Applied to the architecture of global food security governance, we can see a transnational policy 
space emerge that is heavily mediated by international relations. Within this space, actors, 
engaged in transnational politics, introduce, define, context and redefine key issues related to 
their understandings of food security.  
Coleman et al. (2004:140), theorizing the changing nature of agriculture amidst processes of 
globalization note that the transnational policy space in agriculture has come to be populated by 
various domestic, regional and global actors, the most important of which remains nation states. 
For Coleman et al. (2004), transnational spaces require the willingness of states to cooperate for 
governance to occur, which further requires that states have the capacity to engage in 
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cooperative policy making with other states (see also, Reinicke 1998). This is a guiding 
assumption of the Committee on World Food Security, as a United Nations committee that 
upholds the principle of one-country-one-vote. Indeed, as one Diplomat noted in an interview: 
“without Governments, the CFS is nothing” (Interview (UK Diplomat), Date withheld to protect 
anonymity, Rome), suggesting that despite the reform, which opened up the CFS to 
transnational actors (exemplified perhaps most obviously through the civil society mechanism), 
the CFS is dependent on the capacity of governments to take decisions and implement them and 
as such the legitimacy of the CFS remains tied to governmental buy-in.  
Philip Cerny (2010) expands the notion of transnationalism by advancing the concept of 
transnational neopluralism. For Cerny (2010:106): “The central hypothesis entailed by the 
transnational neopluralist approach is that those actors who will be most effective at influencing 
and shaping politics and policy outcomes are those who possess the most transnationally 
interconnected resources, power, and influence in a globalizing world.” More specifically, 
Cerny identifies three matrices which lead to actors being influential in transnational processes: 
ideational, political-sociological, and institutional. Within an ideational matrix, actors “perceive 
and define their goals, interests and values in international, transnational, and translocal 
contexts”. The political-sociological matrix suggests the capacity to build cross-border 
networks, coalitions, and power bases among a range of potential allies and adversaries. Finally, 
the institutional matrix focuses on the ability to coordinate and organize “strategic action on a 
range of international, transnational, and translocal scales in such a way as to pursue 
transnational policy agendas and institutional bricolage” (Cerny 2012:106).  
2.4.3. The State 
Within the international superstructure of world politics, the nation-state remains “the central 
and predominant political organization of the modern era (Cerny 2010:167), despite processes 
of “hollowing out” (Jessop 1997) and longer-term efforts to privatize the public sphere (Lake 
1999; Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961). Neoliberalisation advances a more condensed and 
decentralized state and through this process of reorganization of the state a functioning 
contradiction has emerged: on one hand states have taken, on as a primary focus, international 
politicisation to advance a corporate transnational agendas and on the other, states have 
advanced the development of administrative techniques for population control through coercive 
measures and consent management.  
With respect to this research, states play a significant role in so far as within the Committee on 
World Food Security, states are the decision-makers and are held accountable for the decisions 
made by the Committee. It is important to note that a state-centric approach is not being 
advanced herein, even though state-centric theory can be useful as a pragmatic took and insofar 
as it can capture the systemic effects of international relations that may escape domestic theories 
(Lake 2008). Instead, an attempt is made to contextualise the contemporary state within the 
context of embedded neoliberalism.  
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The Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (1933) is widely regarded as the 
classic legal definition of the state, identifying specific qualifications that states must possess, 
including a permanent population, a defined territory and a government capable of maintaining 
effective control over its territory and of conducting international relations with other states. 
Panitch (1977), writing about the role of the state in an industrial capitalist society, identified 
key functions to be: accumulation through the creation of conditions for profitable capital 
accumulation;  legitimation by way of provisions of social harmony through programs such as 
supports that enhance the legitimacy of its activities in relation to accumulation; and coercion 
through programs and policies to reflect the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force to 
impose social order. Above all, and fraught with layers of complexity and the influence of 
multiple actors, the state is the primary site of governance for a territory — in the most inclusive 
sense — involving the provision of purpose, the regulatory agencies and the political processes 
by which various parties pursue their interests in that area (Dahlberg 2001). However, because 
of this role, the state is also a site of contestation between various actors (organized and 
fragmented) within its borders and organizations or power blocs (to borrow from Gramsci) that 
operate in and around it. For example, Busch and Bain (2004) observe that almost every 
government is surrounded by a cluster of agencies created to deal with food safety, animal and 
plant health, the environment and labour standards. These clusters of actors come to form 
arrangements which vary from one country to another but are often referred to as the “state 
complex”.19F20 These arrangements have important implications for food security governance and 
in the way food security policy is negotiated at the global level.  
2.5. Summary: Articulating a theoretical framework for food security policies 
The theoretical framework advanced in this thesis is introduced here not as a hypothesis to be 
tested, nor as a final conclusion, but is instead presented as a way of approaching, making sense 
of, and therefore better understanding, processes encountered during the field work and across 
the literature. The theoretical framework does just as the label would suggest: it frames the 
analysis and provides the parameters and structure within which these processes can be 
elucidated. As such, it makes up the analytic toolbox that helps answer the research questions. 
This toolbox is comprised of component parts that come together around what Philip Cerny 
(2010), drawing heavily from Gramsci and Foucault, calls “embedded neoliberalism”.  
To summarise, global governance literature provides insight into the organization of actors as 
well as a way of grouping the range of actions taken by these actors across different geo-
political contexts. The literature flags issues that are likely to emerge as challenges within the 
                                                     
 
20
 Dahlberg (2001) provides a valuable account of how the evolution of the state complex in  relation to 
the food systems. He argues that this transition has led to a decline in natural and cultural diversity and 
unsustainable growth that require a further transition to post-fossil fuels.  
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changing architecture of global foods security governance, and the reformed Committee on 
World Food Security more specifically. In turn, the literature provides a baseline against which 
the reformed CFS can be assessed.  
The literature also provides insight into an overarching trend pattern in world politics: 
“transnational neopluralism”, which is “driven by the competition of increasingly crosscutting, 
transnational interests” and “internalised through the new governmentality of raison du monde” 
(Cerny 2010b:8). These processes are guided by contested and changing norms of 
neoliberalism. The neoliberal narratives are built around market competition, downsizing, 
corporatization and privatization. Never static, neoliberalism as hegemonic undergoes constant 
reform but remains socially and institutionally embedded and thus continues to define the 
parameters of the political playing field.  
Embedded neoliberalism is thus a framework that defines global governance processes by 
describing how the various formulations and enactments of the “neoliberal” come to form a 
boundary of sorts – rigid but not impermeable – within the context of a neoplural transnational 
space. Embedded neoliberalism makes space for the agency of actors, including those who resist 
and act against neoliberalism and push its boundaries from within and from outside. This is 
important for this research which is particularly concerned about the implications of the 
inclusion of civil society actors into CFS policy negotiations (see in particular Chapter 6).  
However, recognising the importance of agency, especially in an effort to avoid the 
aforementioned tendency of global governance scholarship to de-politicise highly political 
processes, the hegemonic, or deeply embedded nature of neoliberalism restricts the agency of 
those promoting non-hegemonic action. Following Gramsci’s logic it is understood that 
constant contestation of the status quo results in elite actors making concessions that allow them 
to maintain power. Consider for example the rise in discourse about small-holders, gender- and 
nutrition-sensitive approaches, and sustainability, themes taken up in almost every policy 
document released in response to the food price crises. By incorporating these into the dominant 
definitions of food security, much of the resistance and opposition is appeased, effectively 
diffusing efforts to fundamentally shift the trajectory or logic of global food security policy. 20F21 In 
practice, this means that many policy recommendations being advanced are in fact more often 
than not linked to the causes of the crisis (Holt-Giménez & Altieri, 2013:90). This is not 
surprising given that the discussions and negotiations for global food security policies take place 
in elite spaces that have developed in ways that serve to reinforce neoliberal objectives. One 
must then ask: does the CFS exist as an example of the counter-hegemonic action  – the 
hegemony of hegemony –  promoting change that will ultimately serve to reinforce neoliberal 
hegemony?  Or, can the CFS emerge as a non-hegemonic actor, engaged in what Richard Day 
                                                     
 
21
 This is a key example of why Richard Day (2005) claims that “Gramsci is dead”.  
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(2005) calls “affinity for affinity”: “non-universalizing, non-hierarchical, non-coercive 
relationships based on mutual aid and shared ethical commitments”? 
 
  
 68 
 
3. Research Design and Methods 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter introduces the methods used to conduct the research. The Chapter begins by 
reviewing the research questions originally introduced at the end of Chapter 1. Focus them 
moves to a review of the literature on research design, followed by an explanation of the 
specific research design employed for this project. A summary of the data collection process, 
with reflection on the scope of the research project, is then provided.  The case study as a 
method is then reviewed and rationalised as a relevant and useful approach. Here, the three case 
studies into the activities and operations of the CFS (Chapters 6-8) are discussed and a rationale 
is provided for their selection. This is followed by a review of the methods employed for desk 
research, including the way in which documents were identified and selected for in-depth 
analysis. Finally, a description of the ethnographic approach to field work – notably participant 
observation and interviews – is provided followed by a reflection of relevant ethical 
considerations.  
3.2. Research Questions 
This research is concerned with understanding how the Committee on World Food Security is 
reorganising to meet its reform objectives and how it is situated within a changing transnational 
policy space. Given the potential of the CFS and the challenges it faces, the following research 
questions were proposed:  
RQ1: To what extent is the reformed CFS realising its reform objectives? 
RQ2. Who are the main actors and what are the dominant initiatives within the 
changing architecture of food security governance? 
RQ3. How does the CFS relate to the changing architecture of global food security 
governance and what are the impacts? 
RQ4. How do these findings contribute to the literature on, and understandings of, 
global governance and global food security governance? 
In what follows the research design is introduced. From there, methods employed for data 
collection are presented with a description of the research process. 
3.3. Research Design 
Research design is a structure of inquiry that “deals with a logical problem and not a logistical 
problem” (Yin 1989:29). The purpose of the research design is to provide a structure to develop 
and appropriately answer research questions. This research project was designed around 
somewhat chronological but certainly fluid and overlapping phases (see Figure 11).  A summary 
of the process will be provided followed by a more detailed review of each step.  
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Figure 12: Research Process (Duncan 2013)  
 
The first phase in the research design identified the problem. As articulated in Chapter 1, the 
architecture of food security governance was changing rapidly in response to the food price 
spikes of 2007-8. Amidst the restructuring, the reformed Committee on World Food Security 
emerged as a key player engaged in innovative practices and was thus selected as the focus of 
the research. The reformed Committee on World Food Security had been given the mandate of 
being the foremost platform for discussion on food security policy at the global level and the 
reform presented potentially important implications for global food security policy and global 
governance theory more broadly. 
As outlined in Chapter 2, literature on global governance and embedded neoliberalism informed 
the development of the theoretical framework which served to structure the research and 
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provided tools to make sense of what was being observed. Appropriate research methods were 
then identified. The Committee on World Food Security made for a good case study and data 
was collected through ethnographic approaches, notably participant observation and interviews. 
This was supposed by desk research. These methods are described in greater detail below. With 
the problem, scope, and methodologies identified, research questions were finalised (listed 
below, as well as at the end of Chapter 1).  
Given that food security emerged as a dominant policy frame through which the food crisis was 
addressed, it was deemed important to historicise the evolution of global food security policy 
discourse. The review (presented in Chapter 4) examined the trajectory of food security policy, 
understanding that food security policy is complex, discursive and contested.  
Four research questions were eventually identified. It was deemed important not just to 
understand how the CFS was operating and achieving its reform objectives but also how the 
Committee was situated within a broader transnational space. The CFS was positioned within 
the contemporary transnational architecture of global food security governance (Chapter 4) and 
then focus turned to examining the evolution and reform process (Chapter 5). This was followed 
by three case studies (Chapters 6-8) selected to illustrate not only how the reformed CFS works 
in practice, but also to provide insight into how key aspects of the reform – mainly participation, 
policy guidance, and policy cohesion – were being addressed.   
3.4. Data Collection 
Figure 12 provides a chronology of the data collection and research process. It highlights the 
overlapping nature of the phased approach and notes relevant outputs from the various phases of 
the research.  
3.4.1. Scope of Research 
Before starting the process of data collection the scope of the research was defined to ensure 
that the research questions would be addressed, and that the research remained contained and 
focused. Given the research questions, time frame, and resources available, focus was placed on 
collecting data related to Committee on World Food Security, extending to the broader 
transnational space within which the CFS operates. The time period for field work was October 
2010 to October 2012. This period covers the first Session of the reformed CFS (36) through 
two more Sessions (37, 39) and an extra-ordinary Session (38) in May 2012 to endorse the 
Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context 
of National Food Security. The research and resulting analysis provides insight – a snap shot of 
sorts – into a watershed period in the organizing of global food security governance.  
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Phase Time 
Frame 
Desk Research Field Work Output 
 ID Problem  ID Data 
Sources  Data 
Collection  ID Methods 
Oct-Dec 
2010 
 International 
Relations  Global Governance  Development   Reports on Food 
Security (post 
crisis)  CFS 
documentation  Methods 
 Civil Society  
Consultation 
CFS 36  GGWP 
 Peoples’ Food 
Policy  IFAD report  on 
GGWP  ILC- policy 
briefs  VSF- global 
governance and 
food 
sovereignty  ID Problem  ID Theory  Data 
Collection 
 
Jan-Sept 
2011 
 Participation  Deliberative 
Democracy  CFS 
documentation  Food security, 
hunger (history)  Embedded 
neoliberalism 
 GSF Draft 1  Coordination 
Committee 
meeting  Indigenous 
Terra Madre  
 ESRS 
Presentation  Ubuntu Forum 
on GG and Food 
Democracy 
 ID Methods  Data 
Collection   Analysis 
Oct-Dec 
2011 
 Methods  Rights literature  Framework 
Analysis 
 Civil Society 
Forum  CFS 37 
 
 Data 
Collection   Analysis  
 
Jan-Sept 
2012 
 Theory cont.  Methods cont.  CSO WG VG   CFS 
Negotiations on 
VGs  CSO WG GSF  CFS 
Consultation on 
GSF 
 IJSAF Article  Global Studies 
Presentation  RGS 
Presentation  Transfer doc  Questions 
finalized  Data 
Collection   Refine 
methodology   Analysis  
Oct 2012-
Oct 2013 
 Finalise data 
collection  Analysis 
 CSO 
consultation  CFS 39  Relevant 
meetings 
 Multiple public 
presentations  Academic 
papers  Food Chains 
article   Thesis 
Figure 13: Chronological Summary of Research Process (Duncan 2013)  
3.4.2. Case Studies 
Robert K. Yin (1989:23) defines the case study research method as an empirical inquiry that 
uses multiple sources of evidence to investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context where the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not necessarily evident. 
Following from this description, a case study approach was deemed appropriate for organizing 
data collection and analysis while ensuring that the research questions were addressed.  
The case study, originally championed by Sigmund Freud, is commonly used in anthropology, 
economics, psychology, sociology. Broadly defined, a case study is an “in-depth, multifaceted 
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investigation using qualitative research methods of a single phenomenon” (Orum, Feagin, and 
Sjoberg 1991:2). A case study presents data and a description regarding a single event and can 
employ a combination of research methods including literature review, discourse analysis, 
questionnaires, interviews and observation. These studies have the advantage of being drawn 
from, and thus applicable to, contemporary, complex real-world situations and provide insight 
into specific events.  
A wealth of literature provides a strong defence against now antiquated critiques of case studies 
as being unconnected, atheoretical, untranslatable, and ideographic (Flyvbjerg 2006; Orum et al. 
1991; Yin 1989). Case studies “follow an increasingly standardized and rigorous set of 
prescriptions and have, together with statistical and formal work, contributed to cumulatively 
improving understandings of world politics” (Bennett and Elman 2007:170). Flyvbjerg (2006) 
defends the generalizability of  case studies. However, with respect to this research, while there 
may be opportunities to contribute to wider debates on global governance and participation, the 
aim is not to reproduce generalizable results but rather to provide a clear explanation and 
analysis of the reformed Committee on World Food Security in the first three years of post-
reform operation and within the context of a shifting architecture of global food security 
governance. This research cannot be replicated given that the majority of data is collected 
through participant observation, which is by definition subjective. However, the reliability of 
the method can be enhanced through the detailed use of case study protocol (Yin 2004). These 
processes create ways of making as many steps in the research process as operational as 
possible.   
In his authoritative book on case study research Robert Yin (1994) identifies four major types of 
designs for case studies. The four types are presented in pair categories: single-case and 
multiple-case design; and, holistic and embedded. The latter pair can occur in combination with 
either of the first pair. This research employs a single-case embedded approach with the CFS 
making up the main unit of analysis. Yin (1994:44) explains that the single-case study design is 
most justified when a case represents a critical test of existing theory, where the case is a unique 
event, or where the case serves as a revelatory purpose. A central step in designing case study 
research is to define the unit of analysis. Yin (1994:22) provides a general definition of a unit of 
analysis as being “related to the way the initial research questions have been defined”. For this 
research the inquiry focuses on a unique event: the reform of the CFS sparked by a turning point 
in global food security governance. The CFS is thus the unit of analysis. The CFS as case study 
serves to not only test existing theories of global governance and embedded neoliberalism but 
also has a revelatory purpose insofar as it documents and analyses the workings and changes of 
a key food security organ during an important moment in the evolution of global food security 
governance. Yin (1994:24) also recommends that the research design contain specific 
boundaries to define the beginning and end of the case. As noted above, the research is focused 
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on the time from the first session of the reformed CFS (36th Session, 2010) to the end of the 39th 
Session of the CFS (2012).  
In a single-case study the addition of subunits can add significant opportunities for extensive 
analysis and serve to enhance insights into the single case. Attention needs to be paid to 
ensuring that research into the subunits does not shift the orientation of the research away from 
the main case. In this research, there are three specific subunits: the Civil Society Mechanism; 
the Voluntary Guidelines of the Responsible Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the 
Context of National Food Security; and, the Global Strategic Framework. For the purpose of 
clarity, the sub-units of analysis will be referred to as case studies in their own right, but are 
developed with the intention of supporting the main case study: the operation of the reformed 
CFS.  
For this research, each subunit case study seeks to: 
1. Define the relation to the problem and the research questions; 
2. Articulate the processes involved; 
3. Examine the instruments and interventions that were proposed and discussed with 
consideration of the themes and actors that were included and excluded; 
4. Identify the range of positions in terms of defining the issues and proposing the 
instruments; 
5. Identify where decision-making authority was located; 
6. Identify policies, mechanisms and actions along with who is responsible for enacting, 
monitoring and assessing them; and, 
7. If possible and appropriate, map the implementation. 
Analysis and comparison of the case studies will provide a better understanding of the capacity 
and authority of the CFS, as well as the relations of power therein, and help answer the research 
questions. What follows is a short introduction to and rationale of the selection of the case 
studies. 
International Civil Society Mechanism for Food Security and Nutrition (CSM) 
Central to the CFS’s claims for legitimacy in the new architecture of global food security 
governance is the inclusion of multiple stakeholders, including civil society organizations, as 
official participants. Thus, evaluating participation is central to accessing the capacity and 
success of the CFS. Moreover, the CFS offers unique insight into how civil society 
organizations, traditionally on the periphery of policy making, are organising themselves to shift 
towards the centre.  
The Reform Document of the CFS states:  
 “Civil society organizations/NGOs and their networks will be invited to 
autonomously establish a global mechanism for food security and nutrition which 
will function as a facilitating body for CSO/NGOs consultation and participation in 
the CFS. Such mechanisms will also serve inter-sessional global, regional and 
national actions in which organizations of those sectors of the population most 
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affected by food insecurity, would be accorded priority representation. Civil 
society organizations/NGOs will submit to the CFS Bureau a proposal regarding 
how they intend to organize their participation in the CFS in a way that ensures 
broad and balanced participation by regions and types of organizations keeping in 
mind the principles approved by the CFS at its Thirty-Fourth Session in October 
2008 (CFS: 2008/5; CL 135/10: paragraph 15).” (CFS2009/2Rev.2, para 16). 
A Civil Society Mechanism was developed to coordinate the autonomous participation of civil 
society actors and to facilitate communication amongst them. The mechanism is novel not only 
in so far as it has managed to bring together a broad range of perspectives from across 
constituencies and regions but also as it can be replicated at the regional and national level and 
across issues.  
Understanding the CSM is central to this thesis. First and foremost, from a methodological 
perspective, participant observation was situated within, and often in solidarity with, their field 
of relations. Therefore observation and analysis has been facilitated and also influenced and 
informed by these actors. Secondly, the CSM has emerged as an innovative mechanism for 
coordinate civil society actors and is now widely being considered for other for a across the UN. 
Finally, the successful inclusion of CSOs as participants in the Committee on World Food 
Security is now a best practice in global governance with other agencies and organizations 
looking to it for guidance.  
Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and 
Forests in the Context of National Food Security (VGGTs) 
The governance of tenure is a crucial factor in determining rights and associated duties to use 
and control land, fisheries and forests and fundamental to food security. Many tenure problems 
arise as a result of weak governance which in turn adversely affects social stability, sustainable 
resource use and the economy. The FAO began the process of developing voluntary guidelines 
for land tenure after receiving several requests for policy support from member countries. The 
process, which began before the reform of the CFS, was diverted through the CFS after a 
decision made at the 36th Session. During the policy roundtable on Land Tenure and 
International Investment in Agriculture, it was decided that:  
26. The Committee:  
i) encouraged the continuation of the inclusive process for the development of the 
Voluntary Guidelines (Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of 
Tenure of Land and Other Natural Resources – VG) building on existing regional 
processes with a view to submitting the guidelines for the consideration of the 37th 
session of CFS and decided to establish an open-ended working group of the CFS 
to review the first draft of the voluntary guidelines (CFS:2010/Final Report). 
The negotiations did not conclude in advance of the 37th session, and so an additional session 
was added in March 2012, where negotiations did conclude and a special Session (38th) of the 
CFS in May 2012 for member states to endorse the VGGTs.  
The VGGTs are inarguably the most influential and important outcome of the reformed CFS 
which in and of itself make them worthy of study. However, the process of negotiations also 
provides insight into the workings of the Committee. When the VGGTs were conceived by the 
 75 
 
FAO, staff assumed the guidelines would be a technical document aimed at policy makers and 
field workers. By bringing them into the CFS, the nature of the guidelines shifted from a 
technical process to a political one and correspondingly, influence and interest of stakeholders 
increased. A major rationale for negotiating the guidelines in the CFS was to give them this 
additional level of influence and standing. An analysis of the negotiation process and the 
outcomes serve to illustrate the effective and beneficial role of participative and consultative 
processes but also highlight continued efforts by specific governments to undermine the 
process.  
Global Strategic Framework 
In part II of the CFS reform document, under Vision and Role, it states that the CFS will: 
iii) Develop a Global Strategic Framework for food security and nutrition in order 
to improve coordination and guide synchronized action by a wide range of 
stakeholders. The Global Strategic Framework will be flexible so that it can be 
adjusted as priorities change. It will build upon existing frameworks such as the 
UN’s Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA), the Comprehensive Africa 
Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), and the Voluntary Guidelines to 
Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context 
of National Food Security (CFS:2009/2 Rev.2: 2.B.6.iii). 
The GSF is intended acts as a single reference of core priorities for food security and nutrition 
by drawing on existing frameworks and the decisions of the CFS.  
The development of the GSF was fundamental to the CFS advancing its goals of increased 
policy coordination and cohesion. Analysis of the negotiation of the GSF and of the first version 
of the document illustrates the comprehensive outputs derived from CFS policy processes, in 
turn illustrating the value of the reformed Committee. The case study also highlights points of 
tension and opposition that continue to block progress on stronger and more coordinated food 
security policies.  
3.4.3. Desk Research 
Understanding the operations of the CFS during the initial post-reform years is instructive, 
however the utility of such an analysis is limited if it cannot be understood within the broader 
context of global governance within which it operates and from which it has emerged. This has 
been addressed through a review of the evolution of global food security policy presented in 
Chapter 4. Here, the changing architecture of food security policy and governance after the food 
price spikes is mapped out.  
The research involved a detailed literature review and data collection from public documents, 
reports and websites. Relevant documents were collected and analysed over the course of the 
data collection period. Central to this process was setting up Google Alerts for “food security” 
and “the Committee on World Food Security”. Google Alerts are email updates of the latest 
relevant Google results (web, news, etc.) based on desired queries. The programme provides a 
daily monitor of activity related to the key words. Participation in relevant listservs also proved 
fundamental for ensuring that all relevant processes and documents were considered while 
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adding a useful opportunity to cross-reference analysis and to learn what civil society 
organizations were primarily concerned with. Relevant lists were coordinated by organizations 
such as the UK Food Group, the Civil Society Mechanism (including various working groups), 
NGO including Oxfam, Save the Children, Action Aid, War on Want, Sustain and World 
Development Movement), and research institutes (for example, Overseas Development Institute, 
Institute for International Economic Policy, and Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy). 
Frequent visits to the media and communication pages on the websites of the Rome-based 
agencies, the G8, G20, African Union, and the World Bank were also key. Finally, to ensure 
that all relevant documents were collected, lists were cross-referenced with literature emerging 
on the new structure of global food security governance (Cohen and Clapp 2009; Holt-Giménez 
and Altieri 2013; McKeon 2011; De Schutter 2012; Wise and Murphy 2012).   
Given the broad scope of the emerging architecture of global food security governance, 
parameters were established to manage the data. The parameters included consideration of 
meetings, documents, organizations and institutions that:   Sought to address food security, not simply analyse the crisis but advance policy 
recommendations;   Responded to the food security situation  post- food price spikes;  Contributed to broader (extra-organizational) food security policy debate;  Were multilateral in nature;   Included multiple stakeholders; and   Were global in scope in so far as an effort was made to address or influence issues of 
international policy cohesion or international policy initiatives.  
Appendix 1 provides a complete list of documents included in the analysis and illustrates how 
the criteria were applied.  Figure 13 summarises the policy documents that came to form the 
core of the analysis of the policy mapping.  
 Actor Policy/Framework 
1 UN High-Level Task Force on 
the Global Food Security 
Crisis 
Updated Comprehensive Framework for Action 
(UCFA) 
2 World Bank Group Agriculture Action Plan: FY2010-1 
3 G8 L’Aquila Joint Statement on Food Security 
4 G20/WB + poorest countries Global Agriculture and Food Security Program 
(GAFSP) Framework 
5 FAO Declaration of the World Summit on Food Security 
Principles 
6 G20 Multi-Year Action Plan on Development: Food 
Security 
7 CFS Global Strategic Framework 
Figure 14: List of policy documents that make up the focus of the analysis (Duncan 2013)  
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Within this research, the CFS and CFS-related activities were the primary site of inquiry, 
meaning that all CFS documents and CFS meetings became key sites for data collection. 
Moreover, events organised around the CFS, such as meetings of the International Civil Society 
Mechanism for Food Security and Nutrition for the CFS, and documents referencing or meant to 
influence the CFS were also included in the data set. Understandably, it was not possible to 
attend every meeting, but every effort was made to get the notes and reports of meetings that 
were missed. 
3.5. Field Work 
Fieldwork is contextual, relational, embodied and politicised (Sultana 2007:383). The field 
presents a context of “multiple axes of difference, inequalities, and geopolitics, where ethics and 
politics involved in research across boundaries and scales need to be heeded and negotiated to 
achieve more ethical research practices” (Sultana 2007:374). Sultana (2007:375) argues that 
“ethical research is produced through negotiated spaced and practices of reflexivity that is 
critical about issues of positionality and power relations at multiple scales”. It is important to 
recognise that the “field” is not an objective place but rather a site of reciprocal and contested 
relationships (Domosh 2003). The field is a site where actors co-construct meaning through 
various forms of interaction. These meanings are not static: they are continuously constructed, 
reconstructed, deconstructed, and enacted through interactions (or lack of thereof). It is 
important not to assume that shared experience results in shared meaning.  
There are almost inevitable tensions and contradictions between academic and non-academic 
realms, especially with respect to voice, authority and representation (Nagar and Ali 2003; 
Ortner 1995; Spivak 1988). Conducting international fieldwork necessitates “being attentive to 
histories of colonialism, development, globalization, and local realities, to avoid exploitative 
research or perpetuations of relations of domination and control (Sultana 2007:375). Central to 
the process is deep self-reflection on the part of the researcher.  Following many feminist and 
critical scholars, in this research there was a great deal of reflection on how the identity of the 
researcher intersect with institutional, geopolitical and materials aspects of their positionality 
(Nagar and Ali 2003). During the field work the researcher was an insider, an outsider, both and 
neither, and sometimes two or more simultaneously. This is by no means a unique experience 
(Gilbert 1994; Mullings 1999; Sultana 2007), which is not to suggest that frequency erases 
complexity.  
The Committee on World Food Security represents the dominant field and sites where data were 
collected included: CFS session and inter-sessional activities; meetings with delegates, technical 
staff, civil society organizations and the private sector; discussions and consultations; gatherings 
on farms in rural India; strategy meeting in convents in Rome; and, discussions in the halls of 
Parliament in London. 
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The majority of the participation observation took place within fields of relations defined by the 
Civil Society Mechanism. Correspondingly, the perspective taken up in this research is often 
informed by position of civil society organizations. For ontological reasons, the research and 
analysis is also often aligned with these actors. In this respect, this research takes up the spirit of 
solidarity research which understands that social movements produce knowledge and that they 
are conducive sites to privilege meaning-making as their activities foreground resistance to 
dominant norms and institutions (Kurzman 2008). Taking on this standpoint raises greater 
possibilities of alternative world-views which challenges those engaged to rethink hegemonic 
meanings which are by definition often taken for granted. Undertaking solidarity research does 
not restrict the ability to critically engage with the ideas of civil society but it does commit to 
producing knowledge that is relevant to their struggle (including critiques) but that does not 
harm or undermine them. Alongside a commitment to informants, understanding the influence 
of civil society organizations as new participants in the Committee on World Food Security is 
central to the CFS’s innovative model of governance and claims to legitimacy. As Tsolidis 
(2008:271) reminds us, “it is the ethnographer’s responsibility to account for their situationality 
and authorial power through reflexive [and we can add, positional] research practices.”  
3.5.1. Participant Observation 
Participant observation revolves around what James Clifford (1997:56) refers to as “deep 
hanging out” and forms a critical part of ethnographic research (Atkinson and Hammerslet 
1998). It is a learning phenomenon that “literally entails observing through participating such 
that the self becomes the primary research tool” (Evans 2012:3). The aim is to gain insight into 
different ways of experiencing the world and to question what is taken for granted or assumed 
to be common sense. Within the research context, participation demands that the researcher 
develop situational and material expertise through doing, which leads to a better understanding 
of existing social relations. This is key as the emerging architecture of global food security 
governance, and the reformed CFS more specifically, is constructed through meaning-making 
interactions (Kurzman 2008) between actors uniquely situated in and across multiple contexts.  
Understanding this architecture in many ways necessitates participating in it and becoming a 
“knowing member of the community” (Blommeart 2006:22 as cited in Brockmann 2011:232). 
However, it is important not to assume that shared experience results in shared meaning. As 
Brockman (2011:232) explains, participant observation provides the basis for “co-constructing 
meaning through dyadic relationships” but the meanings that are constructed are not static. 
Following the same logic of hegemony described in Chapter 2, they are instead continuously 
constructed, reconstructed, deconstructed, and enacted through interactions (or lack of thereof).  
Participant observation approaches inquiry through various sites (geographic, social, and 
electronic) often at the junction of complex sets of intersecting situations where various kinds of 
interactions take place. This comprises the field. Of interest to the ethnographer is not only 
capturing the constant unfolding of social interactions across the field or fields, but more 
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importantly, the significance and meaning of it (Evans 2012:3). Towards this end, researchers 
entering the field usually do so with a set of initial questions: what is happening? Who is 
involved? What counts as competency? Who are the experts? Who is excluded from action and 
why? How is the boundary on participation maintained? Who contests what counts as 
participation and what is the consequence of resistance? Who are the novices? What are the 
spatio-temporal arrangements/limits of the interactions? How are social relations organized and 
structured through this practice? What cultural values and ethical dispositions emerge from the 
practice? What are the tensions and conflicts? How can I take part? (Evans 2012:4).  
As such, the process can involve a great deal of uncertainty and the research plan is often 
shaped and reshaped as the researcher progresses through their fieldwork. Indeed, access to 
particular sites, unwillingness of research subjects to discuss specific topics, along with 
unpredicted events and developments, provide unforeseen but often insightful and compelling 
windows onto unfamiliar territory. At times, the demands of participation can leave little time 
for proper note-taking and/or reflection or can pull the research in directions that steer them 
away from their research questions. However, the advantages of this approach are that when 
done well, researcher can begin to see the world from new standpoints as they start to 
experience what the group experiences. This in turn provides rich and nuanced empirical 
accounts of social and political processes.  
Date What Where 
October 2010 Civil Society Consultation Rome, Italy (IFAD) 
October 2010 36th CFS Rome, Italy (FAO) 
November 2010 Global Gathering of Women Pastoralists Mera, India  
May 22-25, 2011 CC Meeting Cordoba Cordoba, Spain 
September 2011 GSF Meeting (with emails from Working 
Group) 
Rome, Italy  
October 15-16 2011 CSM Consultation Rome, Italy (IFAD) 
October 17-22 2011 37th CSM Rome, Italy (FAO) 
March  3-4, 2012 CSM WG on VG Rome, Italy  
March 5-9 2012 VG Negotiations Rome, Italy (FAO) 
March 26, 2012 EU Commission Meeting on Policy 
Coherence for Development 
London, UK  
March 27, 2012 UK Food Group Meeting London, UK  
March 29-30, 2012 FAO Expert Meeting on VG in Academia London, UK  
June 25-26, 2012 CSM WG on GSF Rome, Italy 
June 27-29, 2012 GSF Consultation Rome, Italy (FAO) 
October 12-14, 2012 CSM Consultation Rome, Italy 
October 15-21, 2012 38th CFS Rome, Italy (FAO) 
*June 8-10, 2013 Policies Against Hunger: Land Ahead Berlin, Germany 
October 2010- 
October 2013 
Listservs, websites, mailing lists, personal 
correspondence 
Global  
Figure 15: Record of participant observation (Duncan 2013) 
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Gillian Evans (2012) presents a number of key questions to take into consideration when 
approaching participant observation. Before starting the research, each of these questions was 
considered in the context of the research. The results of the process are reflected in Appendix 2. 
As noted above, the field work took place from October 2010 to October 2012, spanning the 
first session of the reformed CFS (37th) through two more sessions and an extra-ordinary session 
(39th) in May 2012 to endorse the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Tenure of Land, 
Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security. The fieldwork provides 
empirical evidence of a moment of transition in the ordering of food security policy at the 
global level and a window into the reform and functioning of the CFS.  
During the field work, extensive notes were taken. The notes focused on what was happening, 
what was being said, and what linkages or tensions existed, both explicitly and implicitly. Notes 
were collected in a series of fifteen labelled notebooks as well as in numerous word documents. 
As noted above, initial access to the field was gained through the Civil Society Mechanism. 
Note taking was exchanged for access, and served to build trust. While taking notes, if 
something was noted as interesting or useful, it would be noted in capital letters in the draft of 
the notes. The annotated copy would be saved in a field work file and a “clean” copy would be 
sent to the Secretariat. This process provided an opportunity to review the notes immediately 
after the meetings and to include additional reflections. After the meetings, reflections on the 
events would be summarised in the field work notebooks. These notes came to form a major 
part of the data for this research.  A summary of field sites is provided in Figure 14. 
3.5.2. Interviews 
In ethnographic research, participant observation is normally coupled with interviewing. This 
research project used semi-structured interviews with a purposive sample of key informants 
including actors working with relevant social movements and NGOs, policy makers and 
negotiators as well as technical staff linked to the Committee on World Food Security and other 
multilateral organizations.  
Generally, the interviews functioned to clarify or answer questions about how the CFS works in 
its reformed capacity along with the challenges and opportunities it faces. The interviews also 
provided a deeper understanding of how actors understood the reformed CFS and the changing 
architecture of food security governance by providing alternative and/or new accounts and 
insights into the activities of various key actors and their roles across policy spaces. Data 
collected through these interviews supplemented the desk research and participant observation 
and shed light on the tensions, opportunities and challenges for the CFS in the architecture of 
global food security governance.   
The interview style allowed for a conversational discussion concerning the issues surrounding 
the reformed Committee on World Food Security. The majority of these interviews were done 
in person, with follow-up by email, phone, Skype or face-to-face. Participants were given 
consent forms to read and sign before the interviews. Some of the interviews were recorded and 
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the transcripts were included as part of the data set.  Transcripts of the interview were sent to the 
participant for review. In cases where the interviews were not recorded notes from the interview 
were sent.  
Interviews were purposive and individuals were selected identifying on the basis of having 
important insights and/or perspectives that could enhance or shed light on what was being 
observed solicited. Interviews were solicited in a cold-call fashion which involved the 
researcher approaching potential informants at the meetings with a request for an interview. 
When possible, gatekeepers or interlocutors were used to provide introductions and vouch for 
the legitimacy of the project. Often contact information was exchanged at the first meeting and 
later a date and time for the interview was set. Given the rather small population active in the 
CSM, the researcher was known, at least by sight, to most of the individuals approached for 
interviews. Not everyone who was approached agreed to be interviewed. Notably, 
representatives from Latin America and Asian member countries, and to a lesser extent African 
member states would often initially agree to interviews and then not come to the interview or 
would agree in principle and then never reply to follow-up requests. There are also issues 
related to language barriers, and lack of availability due to the fact that these missions tend to be 
small placing time pressure on representatives and general unwillingness.  This helps to explain 
the EU bias in the sample. Another reason for the EU bias is that in the first few years of the 
reformed CFS, the most active member states tended to be from wealthier nations, although this 
is changing. Given that the aim of the interviews are to provide additional insights, especially 
into activities where access was more limited, the interviews were not meant to be 
geographically representative or necessarily equally distributed across key actor sets. For 
example, proximity and engagement with civil society resulted in greater awareness and 
understanding of their positions and therefore less need to interview.  At the same time, this 
greater engagement with CSOs meant that they were over-represented in analysis (see Appendix 
3). Having described the methods for collection data, attention now turns to how the data was 
analysed.  
3.5.3. Inclusion of Interviews and Field Work in the Thesis 
Research Ethics’ protocols ensured the anonymity of all research participants. The identities of 
all informants have been concealed to maintain anonymity. A summary of the titles attributed to 
participants as well as breakdowns of participant categories are listed in Appendix 3.  
At first glance, CSOs appear over represented in terms of what was actually included in the 
thesis. However, this speaks to not only the diversity across CSOs but it is also illustrative of the 
positionality taken up during participant observation. Furthermore, given that a key aspect of the 
CFS’s reform was the inclusion of CSOs, understanding their engagement is central to 
answering the research questions. Reflecting on the regional breakdown of who was included in 
the thesis, the EU bias remains. The reasons listed above hold true here as well. Furthermore, 
most field work took place in Europe. Within the Civil Society Mechanism, the majority of 
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leaders were European. These individuals thus had the insights and experiences that needed to 
be captured in the thesis. At the same time, for linguistic and cultural reasons, their 
interventions were admittedly easier to take note of and conformed more easily to a western and 
academic thought process. As explored in the Civil Society Mechanism Sub-Case Study, 
understanding social movement and their interjections requires a level of cultural fluency and 
sensitivity. This developed over the course of the field work and with greater engagement with 
social movements but remains a challenge and limitation. It is important to reiterate that while 
these figures do not represent the entirety of the data analysed, it only reflects quotes that are 
attributed to individuals within the thesis. 
With respect to gender breakdown, it is also perhaps not surprising that men outnumber women. 
This reflects the reality that the CFS remains a forum that is predominantly male, both in terms 
of leadership but also in terms of member state representatives. This is not to suggest that 
women are not present or are inactive, they are just less represented. Similarly, within the field 
work, focus was placed on financial issues which tend to be dominated by men, in lieu of 
gender and nutrition, areas which tend see more female engagement. This again helps explain 
the over representation of men in the final selection. The results of the sample of participants 
explicitly used in the thesis continues to reflect the composition of both the Committee on 
World Food Security and the Civil Society Mechanism, at least in terms of leadership and 
participation. It is however important to note that this is changing. 
Finally, much of the field work took place in public settings, including open meetings and 
Committee on World Food Security Sessions. Both the Committee on World Food Security and 
the Civil Society Mechanism accredit observers, including researchers and in both cases 
participants are made aware of their presence. During the field work, notes were kept detailing 
the specific engagements and interactions of country representatives and other CFS participants. 
Given the public nature of the meetings, and the democratic and analytic implications of 
interventions made by representatives of member states, a decision was made to attribute 
statements to country representatives. This is important in so far as it helps to map out the 
geographic alliances and tensions that exist within and across the reformed CFS.  
3.6. Ethics 
The commitments and processes outlined within the ethics proposal have been upheld. With 
respect to issues of consent, especially during participant observation, efforts were made to 
ensure that the participants were aware of my identity and purpose among the group through 
one-on-one interactions, name tags/badges and announcements. Participants were made aware 
that any of our interactions may constitute some form of data. Permission to participate as a 
researcher was always requested from the group leaders or spokespersons. They would then 
announce my identity, purpose and method. All participants have remained anonymous with the 
exception of quotes taken from public meetings where the participant was acting in an official 
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capacity and addressing a public audience. With regards to the interviews, and when acceptable 
to the participant, interviews were recorded and transcribed and all identifying information 
removed. Informed consent was obtained from interviewees (see Appendix 4 and Appendix 5).  
While engaging in participant observation every effort was made to recognise the wide range of 
relationships that exist between and within the study population, such as power and educational 
differences as well as degrees of formality. This was particularly important when moving from 
civil society meetings to more formal diplomatic or UN meetings. Power differentials based on 
class, gender and health, religion, among others, required a great degree of sensitivity. There 
was also awareness of the need for constant reflection on the changing role and relationship of 
the researcher within these various settings to avoid ethical issues. 
Throughout the research process, every effort was made to remain conscious of the variety of 
roles and statuses held by researchers, with particular sensitivity paid to differences in age, 
gender, class, health, culture, religion that may raise ethical issues during the course of 
observation. The primary consideration, when undertaking field work and writing up the 
analysis, was to respect the primary ethical obligation to the people being studied and 
potentially affected by the study. 
The issue of the importance of protecting the research participants was not taken lightly. To 
date, at least three people involved in the research have received death threats in their home 
countries are a result of their activism and work (with absolutely no relation to their 
involvement in this research). Others live in exile from their countries. Interestingly, the 
networks within which my participation was predominantly situated were used to protect people 
at risk. For example, the Civil Society Mechanism networks were used to try to raise awareness 
of death threats made to Herman Kumara, a leader in the World Forum of Fisher People 
(WFFP). On March 1, 2012, the Secretariat of the Civil Society Mechanism sent out an email 
with the subject “Please show your support for our friend Herman Kumara”. The email read: 
Dear All, 
Please circulate the attached urgent appeal that was sent to the Asia Human Rights 
Commission, after Herman Kumara, fisherfolk leader (WFFP) received death 
threats after helping fellow fisherfolk in protest against the rising fuel prices in Sri 
Lanka. 
Suggested action: You will find a sample letter in the attached appeal, please send 
this letter to the intended recipients (contact details also in the appeal) to show your 
support.  
You can also view an article that was published in the BBC 
here: http://www.bbc.co.uk/sinhala/news/story/2012/02/120226_herman_hiding.sht
ml 
In solidarity,  
 
The Secretariat International Food Security and Nutrition Civil Society 
Mechanism 
 
This example serves to highlight not only the very real risks involved in such research but also 
as the strengths of such networks. It is also a sober reminder that many actors who participate in 
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the CFS often do so at great risk to themselves. Despite the often safe and sterile environment of 
the FAO and the UN, the local struggles waged around issues of food security have potentially 
serious consequences and nothing in this research should compromise the safety of these actors.  
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4. Evolution of Global Food Security Policy 
4.1. Introduction   
Food security is a complex, contentious, contested and politically loaded term whose usefulness 
as a policy approach has been called into question (Devereux and Maxwell 2001; Maxwell and 
Slater 2003; Shaw 2007). In spite of this, or perhaps despite it, food security, in all its forms and 
limitations, remains the primary frame through which hunger and nutrition are defined and 
addressed at the level of international policy making. 
What ensues in this chapter, and the proceeding four chapters, reports on what was uncovered 
using the methods set out in Chapter 3. In this chapter, the evolution of food security policy is 
considered. Building on the theoretical framework (see Chapter 2), this chapter begins with a 
review of the literature on shifts in discourses of food security. Focus then turns to an analysis 
of the evolution of global food security policy. Here, major events and policy approaches related 
to food security are traced through to the World Food Summit in 1996 where the “gold 
standard” definition of food security was intergovernmentally negotiated and adopted. Particular 
focus is placed on the evolution of food security as discourse and the factors that prompted 
changes to status quo understandings. Finally, global food security policy in a post-2008 world 
is reviewed, building on the chronology of international reactions outlined in Chapter 1. Chapter 
5 introduces the Committee on World Food Security, exploring the evolution of the CFS 
through to its reform. Here, the reform objectives are identified. Following from this, three 
cases studies are presented, each providing insight into the operationalization of one of the 
CFS’s key reform objectives. The results and implications of the research are summarised in 
Chapters 9 and 10.  
4.2. Shifts in Food Security 
Since its introduction at the World Food Conference of 1974, the concept of food security has 
evolved, multiplied, diversified and left us with a term that now represents “a cornucopia of 
ideas” (Maxwell 1996:155). 21F22 This cornucopia has developed through a series of phases. By no 
means uncontested, these phases allow us to rather broadly define the dominant themes that 
inform and rationalise status quo food security research, policy, and practice at a certain 
moment in time. It is important to understand these phases and how they came about. It is also 
important to recognize that food security has been taken up by development practitioners, 
notably aid agencies and NGOs, in multiple ways. In this research, analysis is limited to global-
level (multilateral) food security policy (as outcome) and does not explicitly tackle the various 
                                                     
 
22
 More than 200 definitions and at least 450 indicators for food security have been presented (Mechlem 
2004; Sage 2002; Maxwell 1996). 
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ways these policies translate into actionable programmes. Neither does it detail the 
methodologies used to calculate or assess food security.  
Simon Maxwell’s (1996) tri-phased approach is the most commonly cited version of the 
evolution of food security. The three categories presented are useful for beginning to sketch out 
the evolving nature of food security in global policy making and to start to piece together this 
contemporary cornucopia. For Maxwell, food security policy, since the 1970s, can been defined 
by three paradigms that represent shifts in policy outlooks: a shift from global and national level 
policies to the household and individual level (1975-1985); a move from a food first perspective 
to a livelihood perspective (1985 onwards); a shift from objective indicators to subjective 
indicators (1980s onwards). Maxwell argues that collectively these shifts have brought food 
security theory and policy “progressively closer to ‘real’ food insecurity” (Maxwell 1996: 156, 
see also Hewitt de Alcantra 1993). There is evidence to suggest the evolution from a global and 
national policy approach to food security towards one that focuses on a livelihood perspective at 
the household level, in line with a greater embedding of neoliberal policies and practices. 
However, Mooney and Hunt  (2009:472) note that these shifts are not as humble as Maxwell 
(1996) suggests and each shift “might be seen as distinct dimensions of a single shift towards an 
individualization that privileges a subsequent affinity with, or focus on, livelihood and 
subjectivity.” Indeed, the paradigm shifts end in the mid-1980s and corresponding phases of 
food security emerge less from changes in ideologies and more from shifting political needs 
(food aid) of broader social focus (famine in Africa).  There is less evidence at the level of 
global food security policy to support the third shift Maxwell identifies as a move towards 
subjective indicators.  Instead, it is here argued, that by the mid-1980s food security had become 
aligned with wider neoliberal objectives and consequently food security policy merely adapted 
and altered to address contestation and change, in line with definitions of hegemony. This led 
not to new phases or paradigms but instead to variations or extensions of the same project. 
However, a third phase in the evolution of food security policy at the global level can be 
identified by the 1996 World Food Summit where the most influential and used definition of 
food security was negotiated. 
Seven years after the publication of “Food security: a post-modern perspective” where Maxwell 
presents the three paradigm shifts as sharpening programmatic policy and making it more 
relevant, he changed his tone. In a 2003 article “Food Policy Old and New” co-authored with 
Slater, he argues that “a preoccupation with food security is no longer sufficient” (Maxwell and 
Slater 2003:533) as too many “other issues” have infiltrated food security policy. Instead of 
focusing on food security policy, they argue we need to return to food policy.  
Maxwell and Slater (2003) define food policy “old” as being focused primarily on rural 
populations, with concern for agriculture-based employment and food productions. The major 
actors in food marketing were traders (especially grain traders) and supply chains were 
relatively short. With respect to consumption, policy was designed to address at home 
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consumption of food, purchased in local shops or open markets. The main nutritional concerns 
were under nutrition, with a focus on calories and micronutrients. The food insecure were 
understood to be peasants. Food shocks at the national and household level were predominantly 
linked to poor rainfall and other production shocks and the remedy for household food shortages 
was food based-relief and safety nets. Food policy “old” was focused in the ministries of 
agriculture and health as well as relief/rehabilitation ministries and focused on agricultural 
technologies, parastatal reform, supplementary feeding and food for work.  
By comparison, food policy “new” is concerned mostly with urban populations. With respect to 
employment the focus is no longer on agricultural jobs but rather on food manufacturing and 
retail with food companies emerging as main actors in food marketing. The supply chains are 
longer with a large number of food miles. Food policies for consumers are geared towards a 
population that eats a high proportion of prepared meals, including food eaten outside of the 
home. Nutritional policy is focused on chronic dietary diseases including obesity, heart disease 
and diabetes linked to higher consumption of fat sugar and salt.  The food insecure are 
understood to be the urban and rural poor. The sources of food shocks shift from production 
issues to international prices and trade issues at the national level and income at the household 
level. Food policy “new” is the domain of the ministries of trade and industry, consumer affairs, 
finance as well as food activist groups and NGOs. Food policy “new” is focused predominantly 
then, according to Maxwell and Slater (2003), on competition and rent-seeking the value chain, 
industrial structure in retail, futures markets, waste management, advertising, health, education, 
and food safety.  With food policy “old” the key international institutions were the FAO, WFP, 
UNICEF, WHO, CGIAR. With food policy “new”, FAO and WHO remain key institutions but 
the rest are overlaid with UNIDO, ILO and the WTO.   
Lang et al.’s (2010) critique of “new” food policy argues that it fails to properly historicize food 
security and assumes its development arises almost from thin air in the 1970s. This critique can 
be extended to Maxwell’s three paradigms. As will be discussed below, the evolution of food 
security is indeed routed in the experiences of the first half of the twentieth century and key 
changes in science and technology and geopolitics. The tension is that food security “new” calls 
for a rejection of food security policy in favour of food policy. But we can see food security 
policy emerging as a sub-sector- or a thread – of a more complex food policy. What is of 
interest is the way that food security policy is being developed, framed and then how it relates 
to food policy more broadly. 
At this point, the call to abandon food security policy for food policy will be ignored. Despite 
the complex and expansive definitions and acknowledging the repetitive failure of policies and 
processes, the current high-level renewed interest in food security suggests that the term and 
associated policies will remain relevant for the foreseeable future and for this reason need to be 
further examined and analysed. 
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The FAO (2006) suggest that concepts of food security have evolved to reflect changes in 
official policy thinking, but provide few hints as to what these changes were or how they came 
about. They do usefully outline key eras in the development of the concept, starting in 1974 
when food security was defined in terms of supply. By the 1980s focus had moved to access at 
the individual and household level. With the 1996 World Food Summit, the multi-dimensional 
nature of food security was acknowledged. For the FAO (2006:1) “as the link between food 
security, starvation and crop failure becomes a thing of the past, the analysis of food insecurity 
as a social and political construct has emerged.” 
This shift to the social and political nature of food security can be examined through an attempt 
to uncover the nuances and competing understandings that make up and challenge hegemonic 
definitions. Mooney and Hunt (2009) introduce the notions of frames and keying as two 
concepts that help to articulate variations and their implications for agriculture, hunger, and the 
organization of food security policy at the global level.  They set out to analyses the process of 
frame elaboration by examining food security as a potent form of master frame that produces 
several distinct claims to ownership over a term for social problem that has developed multiple 
meanings. They are inspired by Snow and Byrd (2007:130) who articulate the process of “frame 
elaboration” as a means of accenting certain beliefs or issues in service of a newly articulated 
“alignment of events, experiences, and strands of moral codes”. 
Relying on Goffman’s loosely musical theory, Mooney and Hunt (2009:471) build on collective 
action framing by considering the frames in relation to what Goffman (1974) called keying, that 
is, “a process that may yield multiple interpretations within each of these collective action 
frames.” One reason for focusing on collective action frames is that variations between and 
within the food-security-collective-action-frames are linked to the ways in which distinct 
interests align themselves in the multi-organizational field (Mooney and Hunt 2007:471).  
Mooney and Hunt (2007:471) illustrate that food security frames can each carry a flat keying 
that “reinforces extant dominant interpretations and practices, usually advanced by power 
holders” and a sharp keying “that offers interpretations and practices” which tend to offer 
“critical alternative interpretations and practices usually voiced by challengers”. To use 
language presented in Chapter 2, we can see flat keying as hegemonic and sharp keying as 
counter-hegemonic.  
In their analysis, Mooney and Hunt (2009:470) explain that the successful elaboration of the 
term “food security” is “due, in part, to a resonance that does not immediately engender 
oppositional claims, making it difficult to mobilize opinion in favour of alternatives.” They 
argue that it would be challenging and “strategically dysfunctional” to mobilise a movement in 
favour of “food insecurity” or “unsustainable development” even for those seeking objectively 
insecure of unsustainable outcomes. Even in the most oppositional discourses around food 
security, such as those forwarded by food sovereignty activists, food security is rarely rejected 
outright and is often framed as part of the end goal. Indeed, discourse is now very much 
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intertwined and dependent on food security if for nothing more than a starting point for 
discussion. At the same time, producing definitions or frameworks with the capacity to mobilise 
are needed to unify resistance, support the building of coalitions and guiding the work needed to 
change the dominant food system (Mooney and Hunt 2009:471; Stevenson et al. 2007:51).  
Mooney and Hunt (2009:470), building on the work of Gamson (1995), argue that “nonreflexive 
consent to the values and objectives signified by terms such as “security” and “sustainability” 
can be usefully conceptualized as a ‘consensus frame’.” They offer broad support for the idea 
that the goals of a social movement can engender opposition with respect to how those goals are 
translated into “action imperatives”. Mooney and Hunt (2009:470) argue that within consensus 
around the term “food security”, there is contested ownership and that “’food security’ functions 
as an elaborate master frame encompassing at least three collective action frames”. It is by 
uncovering the diversity of collective action frames that we can “recognise the dynamic 
processes underlying discursive work in the field of organization and social movements” 
(Mooney and Hunt 2009:470, see also Snow and Byrd 2007). Collective action frames “remain 
in a field of contested ownership of the concept, reflecting variations in power and shifts in 
political opportunity structures” (Mooney and Hunt 2007:472). 
Mooney and Hunt’s approach is useful in terms of unveiling key motivations of actors engaged 
in global food security governance.  At the same time, there are limits to creating strict labels 
and categories for the various discourses at play. The frame approach fails to make space for the 
process of negotiation and contestation and consent at play in the global governance of food 
security. Policy makers, the private sector and social movements are not static in their position 
and a frame analysis can mask the complex strategies adopted by actors in global level 
negotiations which often mean sacrificing key issues to gain in other areas.   
Michael Carolan (2013) presents a phased history food security derived from an examination of 
the stated and implied aims of agrifood policies since the 1940s. 22F23 He argues food security was 
originally imagined in the context of freedom from want, mirroring the proclamations of U.S. 
President Roosevelt’s influential four freedoms speech. Following from this so-called “original 
intent” Carolan identifies three overlapping and cumulative foci across food security policy. 
First is the calorie-ization of food security (1940s to present) where focus is on increasing 
agricultural output, characterised best by the Green Revolution. Second is the neoliberalization 
of food security (1970s to present), marked by a push for trade liberalization and market 
integration. The final focus is the empty calorie-ization of food security (1980s to present) 
where for factors including foreign direct investment and the liberalization of marketing led to a 
proliferation of processed foods across national food systems.  Carolan’s (2013:6) contention is 
                                                     
 
23
 To be historically accurate, the focus here is on ‘modern’ food policy discourse on food security. 
Arguably, Western debate begins at a serious level with Joseph Malthus’ (1798) essay on the Principle of 
Population. James Vernon (2007) goes back even further.  
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that measured against the food security yardstick of security of food (in contract to security 
through food), agrifood policy has been a success: “the world has never seen such abundance of 
cheap calories”. However, the cost of these “gains” have been great and have come at a cost to 
the environment, individuals, communities, health and the sovereignty (food or otherwise) of 
nations).  
Importantly, Carolan (2013:7) points out that “the fact that countries with clearly oversized 
ecological food-prints (the ecological food print of an entire food system) are simultaneously 
lauded for their levels of food security is as unfortunate as it is telling”. To get food security 
back to its original intention – freedom from want – Carolan proposes broader uptake of the 
Food and Human Security Index which takes into consideration indicators for individual and 
societal well-being, ecological sustainability, potential for food independence, nutritional well-
being and freedom in the agri-food chain.  For Carolan (2013:8), food security is not an end in 
itself, but rather “a process that ought to make people and the planet better off”.  
This research acknowledges the foci identified by Carolan across agrifood policy but does not 
agree about the origins of food security or the appropriateness of mixing agri-food policy with 
food security policy, especially after the mid-1980s. As the review below will illustrate, food 
security emerged as a concept not with the inception of the FAO in 1945 but rather as a reaction 
to the 1970s food price crisis, although the history leading up to the launch of the FAO through 
to the 1974 World Food Conference is acknowledged. In this research, and in slight contrast to 
Carolan, the concept did not emerge from a position of securing freedom from want, but rather 
securing grain markets. Second, and notably since the 1980s when food security policy shifted 
focus from global and national-level policies towards household and individual indicators and 
poverty-reduction, it has been framed as a development discourse and has not been part of a 
wider agri-food strategy. In contrast to a narrowing of food security policy to the development 
discourse, agri-food policy was internationalising.  While both food security and agri-food 
policy have focused on productionist policies, they have been imagined and framed by different 
policy objectives that should not be conflated. That said, they are certainly worthy of 
comparison and inarguably developed in relation to one another and within a broader neoliberal 
policy environment. Given the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2, this comparison 
takes place throughout the Part 2 of this thesis. 
Food security in its various manifestations is contentious and problematic. The paradigm shifts 
outlined by Maxwell represent shifts in hegemonic definitions of food security informed by a 
productionist paradigm within an increasingly neoliberal/corporate food regime. The 
complexity that arises at the confluence of food, agriculture, aid, trade, labour, environment, 
health, nutrition, rights and justice, where food security and insecurity emerge, necessitates a 
sufficiently comprehensive policy process capable of a systems approach that tackles the root 
causes of food insecurity.  
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4.3. Food Security: A summary of policy developments since 1945 
As noted above, the term “food security” came into widespread policy use with the World Food 
Conference in 1974 but the beginning of modern interest in food security is often located in 
World War II, “which demonstrated that localised hunger and instability could escalate into 
problems of global significance” (McDonald 2010:12). Friedman and McMichael (1989), and 
Lang and Heasman (2004), both conclude that the triumph of the Mercantile-Industrial Food 
Regime, and the Productionist Paradigm respectively,  is rooted in the experience of food 
shortages, meal distribution and starvation that effected many countries in the early twentieth 
century. It is thus useful to start the analysis at the point where the international community 
came together to begin to address these problems.  
In 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt hosted the United Nations Conference on Food and 
Agriculture in Hot Springs, Virginia.  The use of “United Nations” in the conference title was 
reference to the forty four nations 23F24 that attended the conference (FAO 1981). The aims of the 
conference were summed up in the opening sentence of the Declaration adopted by the 
Conference: 
This Conference, meeting in the midst of the greatest war ever waged, and in full 
confidence of victory, has considered world problems of food and agriculture and 
declares its belief that the goal of freedom from want of food, suitable and 
adequate for the health and strength of all peoples, can be achieved (FAO 1981). 
There was clear agreement on several issues at this conference, and the foundation for the future 
of food security was laid down. The Conference agreed that there was not, nor had there ever 
been, enough food to eat. They noted “at least two-thirds of its people are ill-nourished; many 
face periodic starvation; and this in spite of the fact that two thirds of the world's people are 
farmers” (UN 1947:685). Advanced in science, and the promotion of scientific outcomes 
coupled with scientific rationalisation were highly prevalent in development of the FAO. As 
noted above, the development of a scientific discourse is entrenched in the embedding of 
neoliberalism. Developments in the science of nutrition led the Conference to agree that access 
to the right kinds of food would raise levels of health and well-being. Faith in the modern 
science of production was also referenced as having the solution for how to “produce enough of 
the right kinds of foods” (UN 1947:685). There was agreement that issues of distribution must 
be addressed to raise the levels of consumption of those who do not have enough. The UN Year 
Book noted that they required a prerequisite of “an expanding world economy, in which each 
nation will play its own part, but all will act together” and that “[o]nly by acting together can 
                                                     
 
24 The countries were: Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, 
Great Britain, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Luxembourg, 
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand,  Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Union of South Africa, Union of  Soviet Socialist  Republics, United States of America, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, Yugoslavia. In addition, an official from Denmark was present in a personal capacity (FAO 
1981). 
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nations, in the close-knit modern world, achieve peace, prosperity and rising standards of 
living” (UN 1947:685). This cooperative tone foreshadowed the ideals of the post-war world, 
where nations worked together to solve problems and ensure a stable future.  
On recommendation of the Conference, in July 1943 the United Nations Interim Commission 
for Food and Agriculture was set up with representatives appointed by each of the governments 
that attended the Conference. The role of the Commission was to plan for a permanent 
organization to deal with food, agriculture, forestry and fisheries. The Commission, financed by 
contributions of member governments, had the support of a small international secretariat as 
well as international technical committees.  The Commission drafted a Constitution for the UN 
Food and Agriculture Organization which more than twenty governments accepted. This 
fulfilled the terms of the Constitution and made the establishment of the FAO possible. The 
FAO came into being on October 16, 1945 with the signing of the constitution. This ceremony 
took place at the opening meeting of the first session of the Conference, held in Quebec, 
Canada, from October 16 to November 1, 1945 (UN 1947:685).   
The vision and approach of the FAO were clearly laid out in the preamble to the Constitution: 
The Nations accepting this Constitution, being determined to promote the common 
welfare by furthering separate and collective action on their part for the purposes of 
raising levels of nutrition and standards of living of the peoples under their 
respective jurisdictions, securing improvements in the efficiency of the production 
and distribution of all food and agricultural products, bettering the condition of 
rural populations, and thus contributing toward an expanding world economy, 
hereby establish the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 
The focus on nutrition, improving production, securing rural livelihoods and supporting a world 
economy are strong threads that run through the organization and frame its work to this day.  
Three years after the launch of the FAO, the right to food was formally recognized by the 
United Nations in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (1948), as a part of the 
right to a decent standard of living.  Article 25 of the UDHR Article states: 
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical 
care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of 
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood 
in circumstances beyond his control. 
While the UN was adopting the UDHR, a process of decolonization was underway. 24F25 When the 
UN was founded in 1945, it was estimated that 750 million people, nearly a third of the world’s 
population, lived in territories held by colonial powers (UN 2013). The post-colonial integration 
of developing countries into the global trading system, and in post-World War II development 
assistance programs have been linked to the genesis of neoliberalism (Gonzales 2007).  
Gonzalez (2007:7) identifies the origin of the inequities in the global trading system within the 
colonial division of labour that “relegated the colonized ‘periphery’ to the production of primary 
                                                     
 
25 Remarkably,  discussions of decolonization are absent in the bulk of the literature on food security but 
is referenced in food regime literature (e.g. Friedmann and McMichael 1989). 
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agricultural products for the benefit of the colonizing ‘core’”. As many European countries lost 
control over their colonies, they focused on outsourcing their production to support the 
emerging upper classes with food products from former colonies. The implementation of new 
liberalized models of trade with emerging economies (many of them from former colonized 
areas) and market advantage through heavily subsidized agricultural production, allowed for 
economic domination by the West. 
The 1960s reflected an era of hope. The Green Revolution was leading to exciting innovations 
in crop-breeding, especially around new varieties of rice, and there was a great deal of 
confidence that advances in tropical agriculture would lead to increased self-sufficiency and 
productivity amongst the world’s poorest farmers.  In the 1950s and 1960s, developing 
countries expanded their agricultural outputs at a similar rate to developed countries (Shaw 
2007:117-118). What differed were differences in rates of growth in demand (3.5% per annum 
in developing countries compared with 2.5% in the so-called developed world) (Shaw 
2007:118). However, to suggest that growth was evenly distributed across regions would be 
misleading. For example, while agricultural performance rose in India under the influence of the 
Green Revolution, agricultural productivity stagnated in sub-Saharan Africa. At this time, “the 
need for food imports rose markedly in developing countries at a time when their ability to 
purchase them on commercial terms did not increase commensurately” (Shaw 2007:118). While 
food production was increasing, the total number of hungry people increased (FAO 1974:55; 
Shaw 2007:118). As we will explore later, availability of food does not correspond to 
accessibility, a statement that holds true at the international level down to the household level. 
Part of the problem was that two-thirds of the developing world’s population lived in countries 
where food outputs had risen more slowly than the demand for food. Large grain reserves 
(notably those held by the US, Canada and Australia) served to buffer prices and stabilize 
markets (Headley and Fan 2010).  
By 1970, despite 400 million people estimated to be suffering from malnutrition, there remained 
a feeling of communal optimism that the problem of world hunger could be addressed. This all 
changed in the early 1970s.  As Shaw (2007:118) writes, the emergency of 1972-1974 “was the 
first intimation of what might become a recurring manifestation of an underlying basic 
imbalance.” The 1970s food crisis was marked by the threat of mass starvation and half a 
million people were estimated to have died as a result of food shortages, high prices and 
inadequate emergency distribution. Many more suffered malnutrition resulting in important 
longer-term impacts.  Not unlike the 2007-2008 food price spikes, the 1970s food crisis 
occurred in conjunction with a weakened US dollar, high energy prices, short-term climatic 
shocks, concerns over market information and growing export demand from transitioning 
economies (in that time, Spain, Korea and Taiwan) (DEFRA 2010:12). It was also impacted by 
changing consumption patterns.  
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In a speech at the National Agricultural Outlook Conference held in Washington, D.C, in 
December 1973, Assistant Director-General to the FAO, E. M. Ojala explained:  
The events of 1972/3 were very disturbing. The international community has 
become accustomed to personal surpluses of wheat and other grains in North 
America, which the two governments of this region had generously made available 
through two decades to poorer nations with food deficits. Not enough attention was 
paid to the more recent statements of these governments to the effect that North 
America could no longer be expected in the future to maintain what had amounted 
in practice to the entire world’s food reserves. Meanwhile, the world’s wheat 
consumption has risen dramatically. Thus, North American stocks which 
represented 10 weeks of world consumption in the early 1960’s constituted only 5 
weeks supply in the early 1970’s. This diminution in the world’s food security was 
only mildly noted, is at all, until it was starkly revealed by the events of 1972/1973. 
But wheat prices trebled. And experts estimated that it would take two years of 
more of good crops to replenish stocks. Meanwhile [sic.], the world’s population 
was exposed more dangerously than in the past to the recurrence of shortage 
situations (Ojala 1973:4).  
While there are important natural events that contributed to low yields, as Dereck Headley and 
Shenggen Fan (2010:82) argue, the 1972–74 crisis can be linked to “U.S. production and trade 
conditions, especially with respect to wheat and other coarse grains”.  In the 1930s North 
America exported 5 million tons of grain, and by 1966 North American grain exports had 
increased twelvefold to reach nearly 60 million tons, while the Communist countries went from 
a 5 million ton surplus to a 4 million ton deficit. At the same time Asia moved from a 2 million 
ton surplus to a deficit of 34 million tons (Headley and Fan 2010:82). The U.S. clearly 
dominated international grain trade and production and held the power to impact international 
prices and by extension, global food security. To this end, it has been argued that one of the 
main contributing factors to the 1970s food crisis was U.S. policies regarding wheat production 
(Destler 1978; Headley and Fan 2010; Johnson 1975). 
In the 1960s, due to policies that supported prices above market-clearing levels, the US 
Commodity Credit Corporation had accumulated a large amount of grain stocks and distributed 
the grain through cheap exports and food aid. However, there are important costs associated 
with storing grain, especially when income from selling grain does not cover those costs. Thus, 
in the early 1970s, the US government (along with Canada and Australia) set about to reduce 
the large stocks of wheat they had amassed and reduced production of wheat by one-third 
between mid-1970 and mid-1972, effectively cutting their global share of world grain 
production to 10 percent from 15 percent (Headley and Fan 2010; Johnson 1975). As a results 
of those policies, by the 1970s grain reserves has been largely depleted and international grain 
markets became vulnerable to extreme fluctuations in price (Headley and Fan 2010; Hopkins 
and Puchala 1978) leading to an increasingly fragile trade regime for grains.  
The US liberalization of grain exports to China, the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe, and the large 
amount of grain purchased by the U.S.S.R. in 1971 saw a further depletion of North American 
stocks leading wheat export prices to jump from 1.68 USD per bushel in July 1972 to 2.40 USD 
per bushel just one month later.   
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4.3.1. World Food Security as a Problem of Global Supply 
This was the situation which led the General Assembly of the United Nations to convene the 
World Food Conference with an aim to develop “ways and means whereby the international 
community, as a whole, could take specific action to resolve the world food problem within the 
broader context of development and international economic co-operation” (UN 1975). The 
Conference was important not only insofar as it led to the creation of the World Food Council 
and the Committee on World Food Security but also because it launched the International 
Undertaking on World Food Security.  
At the 1974 World Food Conference, governments examined the global problem of food 
production and consumption, and proclaimed that “every man, woman and child has the 
inalienable right to be free from hunger and malnutrition in order to develop their physical and 
mental faculties” through the Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and 
Malnutrition (1974). The Declaration also clarified the responsibility of governments to work 
together to ensure increased production and equitable distribution, stating that food problems 
need to be tackled through national plans and that states must remove obstacles and provide 
incentives for food production. In some ways, the Declaration is more progressive than more 
recent declarations on hunger and food security, due to its assertion of the importance of 
waterways and waste prevention as well providing technical and financial assistance free from 
conditions to least developed countries, conservation of natural resources, and national policies 
to prioritise food production. Within the Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger 
and Malnutrition, there is no explicit mention of the private sector but there is a call for 
governments and NGOs to work together to end hunger, highlighting the important role NGOs 
were starting to play in food security policy.  
The Declaration does not provide a definition for food security. However, Annex 1 of the final 
report, which outlines the International Undertaking on World Food Security, reaffirms “the 
urgent need for effective international action aimed at ensuring the availability at all times of 
adequate world supplies of basic foodstuffs, so as to avoid acute food shortages in the event of 
widespread crop failure, natural or other disasters, to sustain a steady expansion of consumption 
in countries with low levels of per caput intake, and offset fluctuations in production and 
prices.”  Food security is here defined in terms of supply and price stability of basic foodstuffs 
at the national and international level (FAO 2006). More specifically, we can identify three key 
components of an emerging definition of food security: Food security as a supply problem, a 
global problem, and a natural problem.  
Hunger, which had been framed as a supply issue prior to the World Food Conference, 
continued to frame the discourse of food security afterwards. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, 
Keynesian logic still dominated and debate focused on the transfer of goods and a strong state. 
By the 1970s, when the World Food Conference takes place, Keynesian theory was being 
replaced by neoclassical economic theories of growth which advanced a move towards 
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microeconomics, foreshadowing a shift that would take place in food security discourse in the 
following decade. But in this period of transition, the emphasis for food security was clearly on 
“strengthening the food production base of developing countries” (FAO 1974: annex to 
resolution 1/64, I.2) directly in line with the productionist paradigm.  
A second aspect of the emerging definition of food security was recognition of hunger as a 
global problem. The text makes reference to the international community and to adequate world 
food supplies (not national food supplies). This international community is encouraged to rally 
to increase production and stabilise prices. However, the solutions need to be applied at the 
national level and are targeted towards developing countries. Here then, food security becomes 
defined in terms of global and national priorities linked to availability based on objective 
indicators.   
Finally, in that definition, the world food problem is constructed as a natural problem, echoing 
the Malthusian rhetoric that was dominant at the time. The framing of the food crisis as a 
natural problem conveniently ignores a series of policies that preceded the food crisis, including 
the U.S.’s policy of stock reduction, unforeseen large-scale grain imports into the U.S.S.R., or 
the high cost of oil following supply cuts by OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries) in 1973. By constructing food security as a natural problem, the emerging definition 
of food security skirts politics. Instead of a shift in policies affecting food production and 
distribution, international cooperation was needed to conquer natural problems: it was states 
against nature. Winning this battle required increasing production in the developing world and 
finding places to store the outputs in the form of international grain reserves. Achieving this 
meant handing over policy making to technocrats and scientists with the knowledge and skills to 
control nature and increase agricultural production. Thus from the get go, food security was 
defined apolitically and through technocratic language. Indeed, despite evidence highlighting 
the role of trade and stock policies on the food crisis, the political discourse faithfully 
maintained its allegiance to natural causes. The FAO Conference in 1973 notes that “cereal 
supplies in 1973/4 were dependent almost entirely on the result of the 1973 harvests and were 
thus vulnerable to the uncertainly of one season’s weather”. Yet as explored above, and albeit 
with the advantage of hindsight, the crisis was very much linked to grain and trade policies and 
while discussions of food security at the time did reflect this, solutions were not found.  
At the Sixtieth Session of the Council of the FAO, the Director General was requested to 
develop “a proposal for ensuring a minimum level of world security against serious food 
shortages and for international action to assume adequate basic food stocks” (FAO, 1973: para. 
1). At this time, the framing was very much around the problem of world security: “the problem 
of world security against food shortages has become increasingly serious following important 
changes in the world cereal supply situation in the past season (FAO, 1973: para. 2). 
With recovery from the 1970s world food crisis, and as a result of difficulties negotiating a new 
international grain agreement, focus drifted towards more national-level measures (Mechlem 
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2004:634). In 1979, the FAO Council adopted a “Plan of Action on World Food Security” 
urging governments to “take full advantage of the relatively ample world supply situation for 
cereals in order to build up stocks” and to “adopt and implement national cereal stock policies, 
and targets of objectives”. Global food security was increasingly understood to be contingent on 
national-level programmes and remained focused on increasing the amount of food available. 
Food security was still framed as a production problem defined by a lack of available food and 
remained disassociated from the political and economic decisions that impacted hunger and 
food availability. The policy responses were geared towards addressing fluctuations in the food 
supply and interventions were developed to buffer against fluctuation, which, in line with 
technological advancements and shifts in modes of labour, lent itself well to the advancement of 
the productionist paradigm (Lang and Heasman 2004). However, this logic was proving 
inadequate for dealing with new food security challenges, including periods of mass starvation 
and famine (e.g., Ethiopia and Bangladesh) that marked the early 1980s. This period marks the 
shift from Maxwell’s (1996) first paradigm of food security as global and national level policies 
towards a policy focus on households and the individual.  
4.3.2. Embedding Neoliberalism in Food Security Policy: Food security as access 
Throughout the 1980s food security practitioners, analysts and policy makers had to grapple 
with the increasingly “complex relationships between chronic, seasonal and temporary food 
insecurity, peoples’ coping strategies, their priorities when making choices as to how to spend 
overall insufficient resources, food security as part of a wider livelihoods concepts, and the 
relationship between household and individual food security” (Mechlem 2004:635). At the same 
time, the IMF and World Bank were promoting structural adjustment policies by way of 
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). Much has been written on SAPs and the implications 
for food security (See for example, Fan and Rao 2003; Loewenson 1993; Uvin 1994) and they 
are mentioned here only to highlight the shift towards neoliberal policies at the multilateral 
level. SAPs had the stated goal of reducing a borrowing country's fiscal imbalance by 
reorienting the borrowing country’s economy toward trade and export production as a way of 
strengthening their economy. The rationale was that open markets and strong specialized export 
economies would ensure food security through international cooperation and trade. Countries 
could ensure access to food by strengthening their economies, specializing in exporting crops, 
and importing national foodstuffs. It was at this time that “donors developed an enthusiasm for 
national food security planning, partly as a ‘proxy for poverty planning during the darkest years 
of structural adjustment´” (Hindle 1990). As we will see, this focus on national food security 
planning will re-emerge as a policy priority after the 2007-8 food price spikes, but with 
emphasis on public-private partnerships.  
While SAPs are credited with improving economic growth in Asia and Latin America (Fan and 
Rao 2003) they proved detrimental across Africa. The evidence indicates that SAPs have been 
associated with increasing food insecurity and under-nutrition, rising ill-health, and decreasing 
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access to health care in the two-thirds or more of the population of African countries that 
already lived below poverty levels (Loewenson 1993:717). 
In 1981, Amartya Sen, an Indian economist who later won the Nobel Prize in Economic 
Sciences in 1998 for his contribution to welfare economics and social choice theory, published 
Poverty and Famine, which dismantled the idea that food insecurity was due to a lack of 
availability of foodstuffs. Sen suggested that an individual’s food security depended on their 
ability to access food or, in Sen’s words their ability to “establish entitlement to enough food”. 
Entitlements, for Sen (1984:497), are defined as “the set of alternative commodity bundles that 
a person can command in a society using the totality of rights and opportunities that he or she 
faces”.  An entitlement approach to poverty and famine works to describe all legal sources of 
food which Sen (1981:2) outlines through four categories: “production-based 
entitlement”(growing food); “trade-based entitlement” (buying food); “own-labour entitlement” 
(working for food) and “inheritance and transfer entitlement” (being given food by others). 
Starvation thus occurs when people’s full entitlement set does not provide them with adequate 
food for subsistence. With the publication of Sen’s work on entitlements, food security policy 
shifted focus from states securing adequate supplies of food for their populations to a focus on 
the household and individual having access to food. 
The value of Sen’s thinking, which was not new but which Sen successfully brought to the 
centre of development thinking, was the shift away from Malthusian claims that hunger was the 
result of too many people and too little food and towards a focus on the inability of people to 
acquire food. From this perspective, food security is linked to access and food insecurity and 
famine can occur irrespective of food availability (Devereux 2001:246). Indeed, Sen (1981:8) 
showed that some of the worst famines in the world had taken place due to entitlement shifts 
with no significant decline in food availability per capita.  
The limitations of this approach, as identified by Sen (1981:48-50), are the ambiguities in the 
specification of entitlements; the focus on legal rights disregards the fact that the transfer of 
entitlement relations can involve the violation of these rights (e.g., looting); the actual food 
consumption of people may fall below their entitlement; and, starvation is not the same as 
famine. Stephen Devereux (2001:246) also points out that Sen’s analytic approach is limited 
insofar as it appropriates a normative term like “entitlement” and strips it of all ethical and 
political connotations.  
Despite these limitations, and with good reason, Sen’s concept of entitlements gained currency 
as public and political focus shifted to addressing the growing famine in Africa and while 
UNICEF sought to put a human face to hunger (Shaw 2007). In 1983, the FAO revised the 
concept of food security to include a third dimension to the established dimensions of ensuring 
adequate food production and maximizing the availability of food supplies:  “security of access 
to supplies on the part of all those who need them” (FAO 1983:15). This third dimension sought 
to balance the supply and demand side of food security (FAO 2006:1; Shaw 2007:349).  This 
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definition was later revised to include the individual and household level as well as regional and 
national level of aggregation in food security analysis (FAO 2006).  
In 1985, the World Food Security Compact (FAO 1985; see also Mechlem 2004:635), adopted 
by the FAO Conference to collect principles and suggestions for action at the governmental, 
organizational and individual level, made reference to food security at the national, household 
and individual level, a clear shift from the 1974 definition of food security as a the “availability 
at all times of adequate world food supplies”. This Compact also pushed forward the link 
between food security and poverty, recognizing that the “achievement of the ‘fundamental right 
over everyone to be free from hunger’ depends ultimately on the abolition of poverty” (FAO 
1985: Para. 2).   
At the same time, the food security agenda expanded to include chronic hunger (Clay 1997:7; 
Mechlem 2004:635). The World Bank (1986:v) led the trend, placing people’s needs as the 
starting point in their definition of food security as “access by all people at all times to enough 
food for an active, healthy life” (see also Mechlem 2004:635). The focus is shifted from 
availability to access and also foreshadows the health discourse that will come to influence food 
security policy. The World Bank report Poverty and Hunger  disregarded the availability 
question and reframed the debate around access in economic terms. “The world has ample food” 
opens the report: 
The growth of global food production has been faster than the unprecedented 
population growth of the past forty years… Yet many countries and hundreds of 
millions of poor people do not share in this abundance. They suffer from a lack of 
food security, caused mainly by a lack of purchasing power (WB 1986:1). 
The report takes the complexity of Sen’s argument and reduces it to a grossly simplified 
discussion of purchasing power. The World Bank’s report (1986:v) argued that economic 
growth would provide people with the income needed to acquire adequate amounts of food, 
illustrating absolute faith in the trickle-down theory of economics. Yet, despite rejecting the old 
tenant that supply is the main challenge for achieving food security, the report suggests that 
supply, production and trade are central to ending world hunger. Poverty and Hunger  served to 
frame food security through an economic development discourse linked to income growth as a 
means for ending poverty.  
Having established the link between famine and poverty and the need for focus to be at the 
household and individual level, the World Bank was then able to take the next step and link 
food insecurity to lack of purchasing power, again diverting the political, social, cultural and 
environmental factors that also contribute to food insecurity. However, this is arguably a 
misrepresentation of Sen’s work. Sen (1981:166–7) argued while that income is relevant, 
especially in areas affected by famine, such an approach is inadequate. He also noted that: 
[T]he inadequacy of the income-centred view arises from the fact that, even in 
those circumstances in which income foes provide command, it offers only a 
partial picture of the entitlement pattern, and staring the story with the shortage of 
income is to leave the tale half-told (Sen 1981:156). 
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Poverty and Hunger was published at the end of a major humanitarian food crisis and at a time 
where structural adjustment programmes were showing signs of promoting economic growth 
and development.  The launch of report, which built on the momentum of the Sen’s work, 
established the World Bank as a key actor in food security and in doing so presented a 
challenge the FAO’s unilateral authority on the issue. These developments changed status quo 
understandings of food security. No longer the collective responsibility of the international 
community, food security is now an output of economic growth. This mirrors wider processes 
of neoliberalization underway across other sectors. From a food security perspective, this move 
facilitates blame towards the poor as much as it facilitates a stepping away not only from 
international commitments, but also from international factors that aggravate food insecurity. 
Here again, food security is made apolitical. It is defined by technocrats who are constructed as 
technicians and rational-decision makers, free of ideology and thus most suited to make 
decisions and guide policy. A further consequence is that agricultural experts (including 
farmers and all other food producers) are further removed from decision-making.  
The shift from world food supply to household access illustrates the downward focus of this era 
of food security policy: no longer were States responsible for solving challenges of global 
supply and distribution, instead, the focus was on ensuring access at the household level through 
poverty reduction and increasingly open and international markets. Importantly, changing how 
food security is defined, changes who should be consulted about it. If production is no longer an 
issue, then agricultural specialists are no longer the authoritative voice informing policy. They 
must be replaced by social scientists and economists who can address issues of access and 
markets. This represented a challenge for the FAO which had established itself, its reputation 
and its legitimacy as the primary actor in food security on a foundation of research and 
knowledge. This challenge only amplifies with the acceleration of globalization through the 
1990s into the 2000s.  
4.3.3. World Food Summit: Food security as development 
The 1990s were marked not only by a deeper embedding of neoliberal logic in international 
policy processes but also by a new era of globalization. The European Union was formally 
established when the Maastricht Treaty came into force on 1 November 1993. The USA, 
Canada and Mexico signed a continental free trade agreement which came into force in 1994. In 
1996, the World Trade Organization (WTO) emerged as the result of pressure through the 1980s 
to formalise the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). The WTO, established 
during the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations (1986-1994), subsumed the GATT and 
transformed it into a formal international organization with a broad mandate to address issues 
once reserved for nation states, such as subsidies, food safety, agriculture, intellectual property. 
Amidst this economic reordering were a series of World Summits which added another layer to 
globalization: global-level problems required global solutions. At most of these Summits, 
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poverty was forwarded as the major cause of hunger, framing food security as a development 
issue. A notable example was the 1992 International Conference on Nutrition. The conference: 
focused on food security at the household and community levels and helped to 
make more explicit the linkages between nutrition and agricultural development. 
FAO is promoting agricultural development to increase food consumption and 
provide income to reduce poverty. In light of the challenges facing countries and 
the international community in their efforts to obtain lasting food security for all, 
FAO will convene the World Food Summit in 1996, at which heads of State will 
deliberate the pragmatic and concrete measures needed to achieve this goal at the 
national, regional and global levels (FAO 1992). 
In a similar spirit, the World Food Summit was proposed by Jacques Diouf, following his 
election as Director-General of FAO in 1994. The aim was to use the Summit to launch changes 
in FAO related to programmes, structure and policies (FAO 1994b; Shaw 2007:347). Diouf took 
over the position of Director-General of FAO at a time when 800 million people were without 
adequate food. Referencing the FAO’s constitution in his proposal, Diouf reminded member 
states that they had “made a solemn pledge to raise levels of nutrition and standards of living 
and thereby contribute towards ensuring humanity’s freedom from hunger” (Shaw 2007:345). 
The 1996 World Food Summit resulted in a major shift in the concept of food security (Shaw 
2007:348). At the Summit, consensus emerged around a new, highly negotiated definition:  food 
security exists “when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, 
safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and 
healthy life.” It was also understood that these dimensions could be undermined by root causes 
of food insecurity, including natural disaster, war, “inappropriate national policies; inadequate 
development, dissemination, adaptation and adoption of agricultural technologies, poverty, 
population and gender inequalities; and poor health” (Shaw 2007:349). 
Food security was thus understood to be based on four pillars:  Food availability: The availability of sufficient quantities of food of appropriate 
quality, supplied through domestic production or imports (including food aid).  Food access: Access by individuals to adequate resources (entitlements) for acquiring 
appropriate foods for a nutritious diet. Entitlements are defined as the set of all 
commodity bundles over which a person can establish command given the legal, 
political, economic and social arrangements of the community in which they live 
(including traditional rights such as access to common resources).  Utilization: Utilization of food through adequate diet, clean water, sanitation and health 
care to reach a state of nutritional well-being where all physiological needs are met. 
This brings out the importance of non-food inputs in food security.  Stability: To be food secure, a population, household or individual must have access to 
adequate food at all times. They should not risk losing access to food as a consequence 
of sudden shocks (e.g. an economic or climatic crisis) or cyclical events(FAO 2006). 
This definition has since remained the “gold standard”. The definition does not start anew but 
rather builds on the concept’s evolution. The definition, which includes issues of availability, 
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production and supply through “physical access” and “economic access”, highlights Sen’s 
contribution as well as that of the World Bank. Nutrition, preference and healthy life speak to 
livelihoods and hint at social access. The discourse of food security at the international level 
remains framed as a development issue. The inclusion of preference illustrates cultural 
sensitivity but fails to explain how preferences of wealthy consumers, or consumers in wealthy 
countries, impact the food security of others. The FAO (2006:1) argues the new definition 
“reinforces the multidimensional nature of food security” and “has enabled policy responses 
focused on the promotion and recovery of livelihood options. It is at this point that analysis of 
food security as a social and political construct begins to take hold (FAO 2006:1). 
While two years earlier, there was fear of a growing food crisis necessitating humanitarian, 
political and economic engagement in North Korea and Somalia, by the time the World Food 
Summit came around the world food situation appeared to have stabilized. Unlike the world 
food crisis of the 1970s, the food problems of the 1990s were informed by a mutated version of 
Sen’s theory and understood to be linked to poverty, purchasing power and food insecurity and 
consequently, a geographically concentrated problem (Shaw 2007:348). As Shaw (2007:348) 
highlights, by the “FAO’s own assessment of the world food security situation”, there had only 
been “a modest deterioration [in world food markets] in 1993/1994 compared with the previous 
year” (FAO 1994a).  
Shaw (2007:348) argues that the World Food Summit was poorly scheduled, organized at the 
end of a series of international conferences that dominated the first half of the decade and that 
there was a “distinct feeling of conference fatigue” in the lead-up to the summit.  Shaw also 
highlights a growing concern within official circles of a saturation of institutional arrangements 
with too many bodies grappling with overlapping mandates and responsibilities. The World 
Food Summit came on the eve of the first meeting of the newly established WTO and in the 
midst of presidential elections in the United States, while at the UN energy was focused on the 
election of a new secretary-general and the FAO was particularly preoccupied with an outbreak 
of a large-scale human-made disaster in central Africa (Shaw 2007:348). There was also 
concern over the aims of the summit and in a position paper the USA argued that the WFS was 
designed to review ways of achieving food security and was not to be a venue for pledging new 
resources, creating new financial mechanisms, institutions or bureaucracies or re-examine 
previous agreements (Shaw 2007:348).   
One outcome of the World Food Summit was the Plan of Action which articulated the 
objectives and actions around food security. The Plan of Action called on every nation to “adopt 
a strategy consistent with its resources and capacities to achieve its individual goals and, at the 
same time, cooperate regionally and internationally in order to organize collective solutions to 
global issues of food security” (FAO 1996: Para. 1). It continued that “[i]n a world of 
increasingly interlinked institutions, societies and economies, coordinated efforts and shared 
 103 
 
responsibilities are essential.” The Plan of Action listed a series of commitments with related 
objectives on how to achieve food security: 
1. We will ensure an enabling political, social, and economic environment designed to 
create the best conditions for the eradication of poverty and for durable peace, based 
on full and equal participation of women and men, which is most conducive to 
achieving sustainable food security for all. 
2. We will implement policies aimed at eradicating poverty and inequality and 
improving physical and economic access by all, at all times, to sufficient, nutritionally 
adequate and safe food and its effective utilization. 
3. We will pursue participatory and sustainable food, agriculture, fisheries, forestry 
and rural development policies and practices in high and low potential areas, which 
are essential to adequate and reliable food supplies at the household, national, regional 
and global levels, and combat pests, drought and desertification, considering the 
multifunctional character of agriculture. 
4. We will strive to ensure that food, agricultural trade and overall trade policies are 
conducive to fostering food security for all through a fair and market-oriented world 
trade system. 
5. We will endeavour to prevent and be prepared for natural disasters and man-made 
emergencies and to meet transitory and emergency food requirements in ways that 
encourage recovery, rehabilitation, development and a capacity to satisfy future needs. 
6. We will promote optimal allocation and use of public and private investments to 
foster human resources, sustainable food, agriculture, fisheries and forestry systems, 
and rural development, in high and low potential areas. 
7. We will implement, monitor, and follow-up this Plan of Action at all levels in 
cooperation with the international community (FAO 1996: Para. 1, emphasis added).  
The commitments reinforce the updated definition and draw attention to poverty eradication, 
participation, stronger markets and better investment. This changes little from status quo 
definitions of the 1980s. What we can note is a new focus on participation. This can be traced 
back to the participatory turn in global governance that marked the world summits.  
4.4. Global Food Security in an Era of Food Price Volatility: 2008-2013 
As the above review of literature and policy evolution of food security illustrated, large-scale 
food crises have prompted empirical shifts in the discourse of food security policy (e.g., 1974 
food crisis, 1983-5 famine, 1990 famine). The 2007-8 crisis is no exception. At the same time, it 
is recognised that since the 1980s food security policies have not so much as shifted 
ideologically, but rather have evolved alongside wider neoliberal trends. In the wake of the 
neoliberal turn, arguably marked by launch and subsequent influence of the World Bank’s 1986 
report Poverty and Hunger , food security policy has incorporated critique and contention but 
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failed to systematically shift or reform in ways that would disrupt the logic of neoliberalism, 
despite on-going failure of food security policy to address hunger and malnutrition and 
increasing evidence that these policies are in fact responsible for much of the problem (Wise 
2009).  
The definition of food security negotiated at the World Food Summit remains the preeminent 
and predominant definition. Despite the many weaknesses and limitations of the definition, it 
has ensured intergovernmental agreement around what is meant by food security in the context 
of multilateral processes. That said, causes of food insecurity and solutions remain key sites of 
contention and contestation.  
Since 2008, food security has been a fixture on the international agenda. The nature of 
contemporary food systems now demands that policy makers come to terms with increased 
complexity including the inclusion of new actors and a push for more integration, systems 
approaches, inclusivity and varied knowledge systems. Critiques of food security as a concept 
(as a process within global governance) and as a serious problem for close to 1 billion people 
(as observable phenomenon within global governance) are being advanced to contest inadequate 
hegemonic definitions of food security in an effort to change status quo. As can be expected, 
and as will be illustrated throughout this thesis, overwhelmingly, elite actors are working to 
maintain status quo, while others are calling for the concept of food security to be enhanced, for 
example through the addition of explicit reference to nutrition (CFS 2012a). Others, like the 
UN’s Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food and FIAN International are fighting for it to be 
reframed within a Human Rights discourse. Others, most notably La Via Campesina, are in 
favour of a new approach like food sovereignty. In practice, these actors are staking claims that 
will certainly influence and construct the next variation of food security policy and by defining 
the problem, they will also set out parameters for solutions. The result is a discursive turf war 
which is taking place amidst a restructuring of the global architecture of global food security 
governance. Importantly, these points of contestation are rich sites of inquiry and will help to 
articulate and uncover emerging trends and future directions of food security policy and 
governance at the global level. 
The battle over the global governance of food security is reaching a climax with one billion 
hungry people, increased water scarcity, increased land-grabbing in poor nations by wealthy 
nations to enhance domestic food security, climatic variability and growing populations. This 
battle for leadership is being waged by the several key actors including the G8, G20, the UN 
Secretary-General and the Rome-based food agencies (FAO, WFP and IFAD), networks of civil 
society organizations, the private sector and philanthropic foundations. The stakes are high: the 
winner will decide who eats, and how.   
4.4.1. Interconnection of multilateral actors in global food security policy 
Recalling the chronology outlined in Chapter 1, the relationship, or interconnectedness, of the 
main multilateral actors in global food security policy can be summed up as follows. The G8 
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developed the five L’Aquila Principles which were adopted as the five Rome Principles for 
Sustainable Global Food Security at the FAO hosted World Food Summit. At the L’Aquila 
Summit countries also made pledges to increase funding for food security and agriculture 
programmes. The G20, many of whom are G8 members, proposed a Fund (the Global 
Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) to manage the pledges made by the G8. The 
World Bank was made the trustee of the GAFSP. The World Food Summit reinforced the 
reform of the CFS as the forum for discussion about food security in the UN. The UN Secretary 
General launched a High Level Task Force on the Global Food Crisis and tasked them with 
developing a Comprehensive Framework for Action to guide countries on food security 
policies. The World Bank is a member of the High Level Task Force. The Updated 
Comprehensive Framework for Action later informed the CFS’s Global Strategic Framework. 
The CFS included the Standing Committee on Nutrition as member of the Advisory Group 
where the World Bank was already a member along with civil society actors, the private sector 
and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. This rather abstract review illustrates a level of 
coherence and cooperation, but it also highlights a great deal of overlap, inefficiency, and a 
process of decentralising influence and focus, even after countries agreed on the function and 
responsibility of the reformed CFS.    
Taking this analysis a step further, a careful review of key multilateral policy documents and 
initiatives developed by these actors to address food insecurity after the 2007-8 food price 
spikes helps to map out the contemporary policy landscape. The picture that emerges is one of 
tensions and fragmentation: far from the unanimous calls for improved coordination and 
cohesion. For example, the FAO promotes increased agricultural production while the G8 is 
concerned with financial markets, notably market growth. The G20 provides a broader 
perspective and extends beyond, or at the very least dampens the market-driven imperialism of 
the G8, showing greater awareness of and for the challenges of emerging markets, highlighting 
the need for not just investment but also financial support in their policy proposals and 
directives. The World Bank is focused on poverty; presenting agriculture and food security as a 
way of reducing poverty. Following from this, it is noted that across the transnational policy 
space, the means and the ends of the policy frameworks differ. For the World Bank agriculture 
and food security are the means to reducing poverty. For the G8, food security supports stable 
markets while in turn stable markets support food security.  
Understanding the various ways that food security is understood and enacted at the global level 
provides insight into the future direction of food security and allows for better understanding of 
the current phase or era in policy development. What it also illustrates is that when compared to 
other actors seeking leadership of global food security governance, CFS stands apart. The 
structure of the reformed Committee and the commitment of actors opens up spaces for new 
ideas which is in turn supported by a wide acceptance of “learning by doing”. As will be 
illustrated in the next chapter, the CFS’s commitment to discussion in lieu of a reading of 
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political statements, and the inclusive nature of these discussions, opens up the dialogue and 
provides space for contestation of assumptions and the introduction of alternatives.  
4.5. Summary 
As noted above, since the mid-1980s food security has been deeply embedded within a 
neoliberal logic. Prior to the 2007-8 food price and financial crises, it was perhaps more easily 
argued that food security and price stability could be assured by way of trade liberalization. 
However, the price spikes illustrated the inelasticity of the market and its capacity to adapt when 
challenged. In practice, the 2007-8 food price crisis placed the global food and financial system 
under-pressure and the poor ended up being the release valves. As a result, post-crisis, the logic 
of international trading systems was put back into question as confidence in the international 
markets was challenged. In response, many poorer nations have begun adopting national and 
regional strategies (such as food reserves) to by-pass or lessen risky international markets and 
on-going price volatility.  
Examining the international reaction to the food price spikes, it becomes clear that there has not 
been a shift to a new era of food security nor has there been an emergence of a new paradigm. 
However, food security policy discourse in increasingly contested terrain and multiple actors are 
now seeking out ways to redefine it. Reflecting back on the theoretical framework, some 
(notably the G8 and the World Bank) are seeking to maintain status quo while offering up small 
concessions (e.g., gender-sensitive approaches, a focus on small-holders, public-private 
investment programmes). Others (e.g., food social movements) are pushing for structural level 
changes. As the following chapters will show, the CFS is one location where these debates are 
playing out. Does the inclusion of new actors into the CFS lead to new ways to meaningfully 
challenge hegemony? Or, is the reformed CFS an example of a concession: a minor course 
diversion to accommodate social and economic change and critique, just as a ship may alter 
course to avoid rough waters, never losing sight of the end goal. 
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5. The Committee on World Food Security 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the history and evolution of the Committee on World Food Security, from 
its conception at the 1974 World Food Summit through to its reform. The rationale for the 
reform and the process of consultation and planning that led to the reform structure are reviewed 
in detail. Following this, the organization of the reformed CFS is presented with particular 
attention given to the actors that make up the Committee. Of note in this section are the roles 
and responsibilities secured by a new group of participants that include civil society 
organizations and the private sector. To conclude, a review of key post reform activities serves 
to shed light onto the operation of the reformed CFS and situates the three proceeding case 
studies.  
5.2.  Leadership and legitimacy in global food security governance 
In October 2009,  Jacques Diouf, then Director-General of the FAO, declared that “[t]he food 
crisis of 2007-2008 highlighted the inadequacy of current governance of world food security” 
(CFS 2009b:12). His comments reflected a trend: amidst all the changes and new initiatives 
launched in response to the 2007-2008 food price crisis there was widespread recognition of the 
need for enhanced global governance and coordination around food security policy (Committee 
on World Food Security 2009, 2012b; Duncan and Barling 2012; European Commission 2010; 
FAO 2009b, 2012; G20 2009; G8 2008, 2009; IFPRI 2013; Macmillan 2010; McKeon 2011; De 
Schutter 2012). While there was consensus on the need to coordinate around global food 
security policy, understandings and approaches of how international coordination should be 
organised took various forms. Two approaches emerged as the most likely contenders: a Global 
Partnership for Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition and the Reformed Committee on 
World Food Security. While often juxtaposed, the Global Partnership and the reform of the 
Committee on World Food Security began as complementary processes. The idea for a global 
partnership came in June 2008 at the High-Level Conference on World Food Security at the 
FAO in Rome, when the President of the French Republic proposed the idea of a global 
partnership for agriculture, food security and nutrition based on three pillars: governance, 
knowledge and finance. According to a report released by the French Government two years 
later, the global partnership sought to insure “coherence among policies that have an impact on 
food security, mobilising expertise and research to ensure food security and reversing the 
downward trend of food security funding” (République Française 2010:3). 
In an interview with an EU delegate, it was noted that the idea was perhaps exposed before its 
time (Interview (EU delegate), October 2011, Rome) As it was explained, French President 
Sarkozy was en route to a G8 meeting at Hokkaido and needed something to present. France 
was gearing up to take over the G8 and G20 Presidencies in 2011 and was keen to demonstrate 
strong leadership. The President’s office contacted the Government’s food security experts who 
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were asked to provide a brief of their activities. It was mentioned that they were drafting a 
proposal for a global partnership that would help to enhance coordination and collaboration on 
food security policy. This apparently struck a cord and the process was accelerated. It was, by 
the accounts of one French civil servant, not ready to be presented to the public at that stage. 
But the idea had traction and presidential backing.   
The idea was presented to the Madrid High-Level meeting on food security for all (January 
2009), although interestingly, this meeting was left out of the Global Partnership report released 
by the French Government in 2010, perhaps because the meeting failed to deliver on any 
outcomes or due to the backlash caused by the introduction of the idea of the Global 
Partnership. However, at the High-Level meeting in Madrid, participants “agreed on the 
importance of an inclusive and broad process of consultation on options leading to the 
establishment of a Global Partnership for Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition, which starts 
at the Madrid High Level Meeting” (UN 2009).   
Concerns were raised by some countries and participants about the launch of the Global 
Partnership and the Contact Group.  In a statement at the closing plenary CSOs expressed their 
opposition to the top-down approach that was being forwarded and the lack of consultation and 
consensus involved in setting up the Global Partnership. Many CSOs rejected the entire process 
and saw it as a strategic move by wealthy countries and private interests to usurp power and 
legitimacy from a parallel process of reforming the UN Committee on World Food Security that 
was happening in consultation with CSOs and all UN member countries, not just the wealthiest. 
There was serious concern that the Global Partnership would promote the models of production 
and development that produced the problems governments were now trying to solve: depletion 
of natural resources, high-input dependency, reliance on fossil fuels for production and 
distribution and maintained focus on external markets. There was also concern that the Global 
Partnership did not build on existing institutions, but starting from new. In a statement to the 
Plenary, Louis Michel, the EC Development Commissioner, stated "We should not reinvent the 
wheel: we do not need new mechanisms." 
Seven months later, in July 2009, at their Summit in L’Aquila, Italy, the G8 pledged to advance 
“the implementation of the Global Partnership for Agriculture and Food Security” consistent 
with their “other actions aimed at an improved global governance for food security”. They 
continued that the mission of the Global Partnership would include “enhancing cooperation in 
achieving global food security, promoting better coordination at the country level and ensuring 
that local and regional interests are duly voiced and considered” (G8 2009:para 9). It is 
interesting to note that “nutrition” had been dropped from the title of the Global Partnership. 
In the Declaration of the World Summit on Food Security (November 2009), participants voiced 
support for the G8’s initiative with a decision to join “efforts and expertise to work in the 
Global Partnership for Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition – building on existing 
structures to enhance governance and cooperation – promote better coordination at global, 
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regional and national levels and ensure that national and regional interests are duly voiced and 
considered”(FAO 2009a:para 7.2). Again, many rejected the Global Partnership which was 
widely perceived to be G8-led, at the exclusion of others. Those nations and organizations that 
opposed the Global Partnership pushed instead for the international community to do what the 
Global Partnership was claiming it wanted to do and make use of existing institutions, notably, 
the Committee on World Food Security.  
The Committee on World Food Security is a forum in the United Nations System for review and 
follow-up of food security policies. Weeks prior to the World Summit on Food Security, 
intergovernmental agreement amongst the 123 member states had been reached: the CFS would 
reform to position itself as the foremost international forum for dealing with food security and 
nutrition. The Committee had adopted a reform document that aimed to ensure that the CFS 
would “fully play its vital role in the area of food security and nutrition, including international 
coordination” (CFS 2009b:Appendix H, para 2). This was after the Director-General of the FAO 
declared that one of the main reasons why “the CFS has [previously] been unable to fully 
accomplish its mission of monitoring food security”  was due to a lack of “authority to evaluate 
and coordinate policies affecting world food security, in particular as regards production, 
agroindustry, trade, social safety nets and financing” (CFS 2009b:12). The new vision of the 
CFS was however defined within the emerging new architecture of global food security 
governance as a key part of the Global Partnership:  
The reformed CFS as a central component of the evolving Global Partnership for 
Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition will constitute the foremost inclusive 
international and intergovernmental platform for a broad range of committed 
stakeholders to work together in a coordinated manner and in support of country-
led processes towards the elimination of hunger and ensuring food security and 
nutrition for all human beings (CFS 2009b:para 4).  
This particular statement is politically laden and the result of intensive negotiations amongst 
CFS member states. The statement declares that the CFS will constitute “the” foremost 
platform. As one active negotiator from a G20 country explained in an interview: 
The negotiations between “the” and “a” in the Summit Declaration – “the 
foremost” or “a foremost” – was huge and [some countries] couldn’t accept “the”, 
never. Perhaps they are now saying “the” just in their speech, but we have moved 
beyond that, because what other platform is there?  There is no alternative unless 
we work with the institutions we have (Intervew (negotiator from a G20 country), 
October 2011, Rome).  
By 2013 there was widespread recognition that the reformed Committee on Food Security was 
the international platform for the discussion and coordination of food security policy. The G8 
stated its support for the “fundamental” reform process in the “‘L’Aquila’ Joint Statement on 
Global Food Security”. The Declaration from the first meeting of G20 Agriculture Ministers 
expressed a commitment to work closely with the CFS to promote greater policy convergence 
and strengthen policy linkages at the global level (G20 2011). The UN Conference on 
Sustainable Development (Rio+20) negotiated outcome document “The Future we Want”  
reaffirmed: “the important work and inclusive nature of the Committee on World Food Security 
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(CFS), including through its role in facilitating country-initiated assessments on sustainable 
food production and food security” (UN General Assembly 2012b:para 115). Most recently, at 
the 67th Session of the General Assembly (December 2012), in the report on Agriculture 
Development and Food Security, the General Assembly recognised “the important role and 
inclusive nature of the Committee on World Food Security as a key organ in addressing the 
issue of global food security, including in the context of the global partnership for food 
security” (UN General Assembly 2012a:para 26). While admittedly a “key organ” falls short of 
the reform vision of being the foremost platform, the quotes above suggest that at least 
rhetorically, and procedurally perhaps, the CFS is increasingly recognised as the 
intergovernmental and international platform for coordinating international food security 
policies. 
However, to say that the CFS won the battle for leadership over varied attempts (explicit and 
implicit) by the G8 and G20 to usurp authority would be misleading and even naïve.  A major 
loss in the battle for legitimacy between Rome-based agencies and New York-based agencies 
was the CFS’s failure to secure control over the financial arm of the restructuring of the 
architecture of global food security governance. On the eve of the French G8/G20 Presidency, a 
report noted that “[m]ore can be done to modernize global food security governance” and that 
the “CFS reform decided in 2009 is only one step” (République Française 2010:5). The Global 
Partnership faded from the political agenda only to be reimagined and re-launched in several 
different ways, for example through the G8’s New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition. 
Yet, despite these challenges, the CFS continues to play a revitalised and central role in the 
emerging architecture of global food security governance.  
In this chapter, the reformed CFS is reviewed with the aim of answering the primary research 
questions: To what extent is the CFS realising its reform objectives? To do this, a history of the 
CFS is presented. This is followed by a summary of the reform process and post-reform 
activities with a focus on the specific roles of the reformed CFS as outlined in the reform 
document, including: coordination at global level; policy convergence; support and advice to 
countries and regions; coordination at national and regional levels; and, promoting 
accountability and share best practices at all levels (CFS 2009a:para 5).25F26 To gain greater insight 
into the workings of the CFS, two case studies are presented addressing civil society 
participation; policy roundtables; and, negotiations on the Voluntary Guidelines on the 
Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National 
Food Security. The inquiry is informed by analysis of key documents, and data collected 
through field work and interviews.  
                                                     
 
26 The final role of the CFS reform (Phase II) was to develop a Global Strategic Framework for food 
security and nutrition. This is reviewed in detail in Chapter 8.  
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If the parable of the tortoise and the hare holds true for food security policy, the CFS may have 
the slow and steady advantage. Currently, the CFS has legitimacy and steady momentum. What 
it lacks in reaction time, high-level political interest and implementation capacity, it makes up 
for in experience, meaningful discussion and policy making, and innovative, transparent, 
participatory governance. However, in politics, races are not won by steady determination. As 
this section will illustrate, for the CFS to cross the finish line it will require more funding, the 
ability to broaden discussions to issues of trade and the environment, and the capacity to hold 
governments accountable for the decisions they make in the Committee. It also requires other 
actors to recognise its role and to respect the processes underway. This however raises the 
question of whether the world has the luxury of moving at a slow pace when it comes to 
addressing the pressing nature of food insecurity? 
5.3.  History of the Committee on World Food Security 
As outlined in Chapter 4, the early 1970s were marked by a large-scale food crisis that 
prompted the organization of the 1974 World Food Conference. Upon recommendation of that 
Conference, the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) was established as a Committee of 
the Council at the Eighteenth Session of the FAO Conference the following year 
(1975, Resolution 21/75). At the conference Member states 
agreed on the need to establish a Committee on World Food Security as a standing 
committee of the Council, in order to provide a forum for regular 
intergovernmental consultations and to carry out the functions proposed by the 
World Food Conference ... The new Committee should, inter alia, keep under 
review the progress achieved towards an effective international grains arrangement 
and the degree to which it was likely to accelerate implementation of the principles 
of the Undertaking. The Conference also recommended that at its first session the 
Committee on World Food Security review the actions being taken by interested 
governments to implement the Undertaking [on World Food Security] as well as 
the further steps required (FAO 1975: IV.43).  
The CFS was thus originally envisioned not only as a forum for consultation but was also tasked 
with a monitoring function through the review of the international grains arrangement as well as 
policies supporting the International Undertaking on World Food Security including: current 
and prospective demand; supply and stock position for basic food-stuffs; periodically evaluating 
the adequacy of current and prospective stock levels in exporting and importing countries; and, 
reviewing steps taken by governments to implement the International Undertaking on World 
Food Security. 
The constitution of the FAO further described the role of the CFS as being to assist the FAO 
conference. While the Terms of Reference and composition of the CFS were also to be 
governed by the FAO Conference, reporting of the CFS was to be to the Conference and to the 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), through the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) (Article III.9). The reporting to the UN General Assembly is important as it extends 
the mandate and reach of the CFS beyond the FAO.  
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Historically, the CFS played a relatively minor role in international politics and was generally 
ineffective and inactive due to a lack of interest and buy-in from member states and an 
insufficient budget (Shaw 2007). Echoing these sentiments and going a step further, at the time 
of the reform in 2009, the Director-General of the FAO noted that despite “its 
intergovernmental nature as a forum of sovereign States, its universal composition and its 
neutrality” there are at least five reasons why the CFS failed to achieve its mission of 
monitoring food security:  
i) it lacks a high-level international policy-making body in the sectors of 
international cooperation and of food and agriculture; ii) it lacks an integrated 
framework for short-, medium-, and long-term sectoral scientific advice on hunger; 
iii) it lacks authority to evaluate and coordinate policies affecting world food 
security, in particular as regards production, agroindustry, trade, social safety nets 
and financing; iv) it lacks an effective mechanism to track food security decisions 
and actions at national and regional level; and v) it lacks the financial resources 
needed to carry out its mandate (CFS 2009b:13). 
These limitations will be revisited in the conclusion of this section to assess whether they have 
been addressed through the reform process.   
5.4. Original Structure and Mandate: Pre-reform (1974-2008) 
The CFS emerged as a Category 1 governing and statutory body, meaning that it hosts 
intergovernmental meetings to which Member Governments send official delegations. The 
terms of reference of the Committee are outlined in Rule XXXIII of the General Rules of the 
Organization (GRO) with the 2009 reforms outlined in the CFS Reform Document (CFS: 
2009/2 Rev.2) incorporated in Part Q of Volume II of the Basic Texts of FAO. The points that 
make up the Rule were laid out in 1976 and amended in 1997 after the World Food Summit. 
The Rule clarified that the CFS would be open to all Member Nations of the FAO and UN and 
states wishing to become members of the CFS needed to notify the Direct-General in writing of 
their intention to participate in the work of the Committee. Rule XXXIII also stipulates that 
consultants may be used by FAO to assist the Secretariat in various ways, including the 
introduction of agenda items.  In accordance with the General Rules of the FAO and with the 
"Principles" set out in Volume II of the Basic Texts, meetings of the CFS could be attended by 
observers from Member Nations, non-Member Nations, and international intergovernmental and 
non-governmental organizations having established relations with FAO.  
In 1997, the objective of the CFS was renewed to bring them in line with the outcomes of the 
World Food Summit. The updated objective was listed as being to “contribute to promoting the 
objective of world food security with the aim of ensuring that all people, at all times, have 
physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs 
and food preferences for an active and healthy life”.  
Other changes made to the Rule in 1997 are instructive. For example, in the 1976 versions, 
point five notes that:  
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5. The Committee shall: a) Keep the current and prospective demand, supply and 
stock position for basic foodstuffs under continuous review, in the context of world 
food security, and disseminate timely information on developments; b) Make 
periodic evaluations of the adequacy of current and prospective stock levels, in 
aggregate, in exporting end 'importing countries, in order to assure a regular flow 
of basic foodstuffs to meet requirements in domestic and world markets, including 
food aid requirements, in time of short crops and serious crop failure; c) Review 
the steps taken by governments to implement the international Undertaking on 
World Food Security; and d) Recommend such short-term and longer-term policy 
action as may be considered necessary to remedy any difficulty foreseen in 
assuring adequate cereal supplies for minimum world food security. 
This changed in 1997 to read:  
5. The Committee shall contribute to promoting the objective of world food 
security with the aim of ensuring that all people, at all times, have physical and 
economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs 
and food preferences for an active and healthy life. 
In the revised rule, the monitoring and evaluation functions of the Committee were dropped 
along with requirements to report to the World Food Council and to encourage the participation 
of the International Wheat Council. Instead the CSF was to provide regular reports to ECOSOC, 
to work more closely with the other Rome-based food agencies and “invite relevant 
international organizations to participate in the work of the Committee and the preparation of 
meeting documents on matters within their respective mandates in collaboration with the 
secretariat of the Committee” (FAO 1997).  
The changes made to point 6 of the Rule placed emphasis on the CFS “as a forum in the United 
Nations system for review and follow-up of policies concerning world food security” that will 
“in particular examine major problems and issues affecting the world food situation, examine 
the implications for world food security relating to the supply and demand of basic food stuffs 
and food aid and recommend such action as may be appropriate to promote the goal of world 
food security” (FAO 1997).  
Whereas the CFS was originally meant review the steps taken by governments to implement the 
International Undertaking on World Food Security, after the World Food Summit the focus of 
the Committee shifted to monitoring the implementation of the Plan of Action adopted by the 
World Food Summit in accordance with the relevant commitment of the Summit.   
Considering the evolution of the CFS in relation to the evolution of food security policy 
described in Chapter 4, discrepancies arise. Maxwell’s (1996) paradigms that saw the objectives 
of food security shift from global and national focus to household level focus; from a food first 
approach to a livelihoods approach; and from objective indicators to subjective indicators. 
Similar observations can be made when reflecting on other evaluations of the evolution of food 
security (Carolan 2013; FAO 2006). Changes made to the structure of the CFS between 1974 
and 1997 suggest that the very little had changed at least with respect to status quo 
understandings of the problems, solutions and the role of the UN therein. After the World Food 
Summit, the CFS remained focused at the global and national level with a commitment on 
production and objective indicators. Perhaps this reflects a stagnation in global policy processes, 
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where development, agrifood and agricultural practitioners have moved ahead. It also suggests 
that Maxwell’s genealogy of food security up to the mid-1990s is not relevant to the 
institutional reform and evolution of the CFS.   
Despite changes to the Rule, for reasons listed above, the CFS remained politically inactive and 
increasingly benign, despite on-going support of various CSOs – notably the International 
Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty (IPC) – that had been increasingly active in the CFS 
and saw the potential and value of a UN Committee to coordinate global food security policy.  
5.5. Reforming the CFS 
Faced with rising hunger, a poor history of performance, and threats to FAO leadership in the 
area of food security, CFS member states agreed at the 34th Session in October 2008 to 
undertake a reform “so that [the CFS] can fully play its vital role in the area of food security and 
nutrition, including international coordination” (FAO 2013a:207). The FAO Council considered 
“the CFS reform to be crucial to the governance of world food security, with a view toward 
exploring synergies with the emerging Global Partnership for Agriculture, Food Security and 
Nutrition” (FAO 2009c:para 29). There were several factors that contributed to the reform for 
the CFS. The Reform Document specifically referenced rising hunger, weak performance, and 
the need to “fully play its vital role in the area of food security and nutrition, including 
international coordination” as key motivations (CFS 2009a:para 2). Alongside these factors, it is 
important to recognise that the seeds of reform had been planted well before the food price 
spikes. This point was reinforced in the final report of the civil society consultation: 
For the last decade, civil society, people’s/social movements and NGOs have been 
working not only to have civil society recognized as official participants in the CFS 
process but also to ensure that they are able to organize autonomously and give 
priority to those most affected by hunger. In particular, since the 2002 World Food 
Summit: Five Years Later, the International Planning Committee for Food 
Sovereignty (IPC) has been working towards such efforts, acting as a facilitating 
network to bring local struggles of marginalized groups into global debates 
(Duncan and Von Anrep 2010:5).  
The IPC is an international network that brings together several organizations representing 
farmers, fisherfolk, and small and medium scale farmers, agricultural workers and indigenous 
peoples, as well as NGOs. It plays the role of facilitating the discussions between NGOs, social 
organizations and movements, as well as facilitating the dialogue with FAO. The IPC 
formalised in preparation for the June 2002 World Food Summit: Five years later. In January 
2003, the IPC and FAO co-signed an Exchange of Letters which laid out a programme of work 
in follow-up to the Summit and the Forum in four priority areas: the Right to Food; agro-
ecological approaches to food production; local access to and control of natural resources; and 
agricultural trade and food sovereignty. This network played a fundamental role not only in 
advancing the reform of the CFS but in discrediting the proposal for a Global Partnership for 
Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition. Many of the leaders within the IPC came to play a 
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key role in the development of the International Civil Society Mechanism to the Committee on 
World Food Security (described in more detail in Chapter 6).  
The process for developing the reform document was tasked to a Contact Group, established by 
the CFS Bureau. The Contact Group was structured in a novel way, giving full participation to 
civil society organization. This meant that in practice CSOs had the right to table and respond to 
reform proposals through the Contact Group’s website and to attend and intervene at meetings. 
Through this process, it was widely recognised by member states that civil society participation 
was fundamental not only to a successful process but also to the vision of the final document.  
Work within the Contact Group was divided across four Working Groups that focussed on key 
sections of the reform process: role and vision of the renewed CFS; membership and decision 
making; mechanisms and procedures; and High Level Panel of Experts. The Contact Group met 
in person a total of seven times between their first meeting in April 2009 and the adoption of the 
reform document in October 2009. They also communicated online. Over these months, the 
reform document went through a number of drafts.  
The reform of the CFS involved eight months of negotiation between the Committee’s Bureau 
and an interim Contact Group, which included civil society representatives. Thus, from the very 
start of this phase, civil society participated in the reform process. However, their engagement 
was based on at least three key factors: the broader and longer-term participatory turn that had 
already infiltrated the FAO and the Committee; a history of lobbying on the part of CSOs; and, 
a sympathetic Chair. As one negotiator from a G20 country explained in an interview: 
In the beginning of 2009… the new chair of the CFS… got a mandate to reform but 
they didn’t know where to go or what to do, and she called that meeting … to 
propose to countries to create the contact group for the reform of the CFS... And in 
the end people decided to compose this loose Contact Group that would include 
people from civil society, and then the precedent was set and this Contract Group 
moved things away from the usual bureaucracy of FAO (Interview (negotiator 
from a G20 country), October 2011 Rome).  
In October 2009, at the 35th Session of the CFS, the then 123 member countries approved the 
final version of the reform document, thereby agreeing to reform the Committee with the aim of 
making it the foremost inclusive international and intergovernmental platform for a broad range 
of committed stakeholders to work together in a coordinated manner and in support of country-
led processes towards the elimination of hunger and ensuring food security and nutrition for all 
human beings (CFS 2009a:para 4).  
The Reform Document outlined specific terms of reference for the Committee on World Food 
Security designed to roll out in two phases. Phase I concerned coordination at the global level, 
policy convergence and support for countries and regions. The goal was to ensure that the CFS 
“provide a platform for discussion and coordination to strengthen collaborative action among 
Governments, regional organizations, international organizations and agencies, NGOs, CSOs, 
food producers’ organizations, private sector organizations, philanthropic organizations and 
other relevant stakeholders, in a manner that is in alignment with each country’s specific context 
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and needs.” The focus on collaboration reinforced the CFS as an inclusive forum and making 
linkages to the national context to ensure relevance and applicability. For Phase II the CFS was 
to gradually take on additional roles of national and regional level coordination by serving as a 
“platform to promote greater coordination and alignment of actions in the field, encourage more 
efficient use of resources and identify resource gaps,” promote accountability and share best 
practices at all levels; and, develop a Global Strategic Framework for food security and 
nutrition  “to improve coordination and guide synchronized action by a wide range of 
stakeholders” (CFS 2009a:para 6). By 2013, the CFS had begun to share best practices through 
plenary presentations as well as voluntary guidelines, and adopted a Global Strategic 
Framework. With respect to regional and national coordination, this is arguably well outside the 
scope and capacity of the CFS. The CFS has been active in the FAO regional conferences and 
does have a key role to play ensuring coordination and cohesion around food security policy at 
the global, regional and national levels. There is also recognition that for the CFS to be 
effective, the policy recommendations and guidelines endorsed by the Committee will need 
national and regional-level uptake.  
The phased roles of the reformed CFS mirror the Committee’s 1974 objectives with expanded 
participation and less responsibility for monitoring. As a reminder, the original resolution 
established the CFS to provide a forum for regular intergovernmental consultations, review 
progress achieved towards an international grains agreement while also reviewing the actions 
taken by states towards advancing the Undertaking on World Food Security. It is indeed 
fundamental to recognise that there was a specific political context that allowed for the CFS 
reform. 
5.6. Actors in the CFS 
The reformed CFS includes the Plenary of the CFS; the CFS Bureau and its Advisory Group; 
the High Level Panel of Experts (HLPE) and the Secretariat serving the CFS (Plenary, Bureau 
and its Advisory Group, and HLPE). 
5.6.1. Plenary 
According to the Reform Document (CFS 2009a:para 20): 
The Plenary is the central body for decision-taking, debate, coordination, lesson-
learning and convergence by all stakeholders at global level on issues pertaining to 
food security and nutrition and on the implementation of the Voluntary Guidelines 
to Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food in the 
Context of National Food Security. It should focus on relevant and specific issues 
related to food security and nutrition in order to provide guidance and actionable 
recommendations to assist all stakeholders in eradicating hunger. 
The Plenary meets annually in Rome but can come together for extra-ordinary sessions when 
deemed necessary. The Plenary is made up of member states, participants, including 
representatives of UN agencies and bodies with a specific mandate in the field of food security 
and nutrition; Civil society and non-governmental organizations and their networks with strong 
relevance to issues of food security and nutrition with particular attention to organizations 
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representing smallholder family farmers, artisanal fisherfolk, herders/pastoralists, landless, 
urban poor, agricultural and food workers, women, youth, consumers, Indigenous Peoples, and 
International NGOs; International agricultural research systems; International and regional 
Financial Institutions; and, representatives of private sector associations and private 
philanthropic foundations active in the areas of concern to the Committee (CFS 2009a:para 11).  
5.6.2. Member States 
Questions of legitimacy loom large over multilateral fora and part of the CFS’s claim to 
legitimacy has been based on the opening up of participation within the Committee. While the 
Global Partnership was perceived by many to be creating a new institution behind closed doors 
and under the leadership of a small group of elite nations, in contrast, the CFS worked to 
enhance transparency and participation. This sentiment is affirmed in the Reform Document:  
the process of defining strategies and actions to be adopted by Members should be 
transparent and take into consideration the views of all participants and 
stakeholders to the fullest extent possible in order to foster ownership and full 
participation during implementation of these strategies and actions (CFS 
2009a:para 18). 
This, along with the commitment to UN principles of consensus decision-making, one-country-
one-vote, and recognition of the need to support the autonomous participation of civil society 
organizations, the private sector and philanthropic foundations, was pivotal in distinguishing the 
CFS from other initiatives, such as the Global Partnership. 
The language around inclusiveness, especially with reference to “those most affected by food 
insecurity” is important. This language reflects not only the recognition of the historic and 
important role of CSOs in and across the work of the FAO and the CFS, it also conforms to a 
trend in global governance towards increased participation. Another important thing to note 
about Paragraph 7 of the Reform Document is the focus on “effectiveness” which is backed up 
by the description of “inter-sessional activities”. In order to make the CFS more effective, it was 
agreed that the Committee needed to be active throughout the year, and not just at the annual 
sessions. To support this work, the CFS established Open-Ended Working Groups (OEWG) and 
Task Teams (TT). Examples of this include:   OEWG on the Voluntary Guidelines for the Responsible Governance  of Tenure of 
Land, Forests and Fisheries (VGs);   OEWG on Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investments;   Task Team on How to Increase Food Security and Small-holder Sensitive Investment in 
Agriculture;   Task Team on Food Price Volatility;   Task Team on Gender, Food Security and Nutrition;   Task Team on the Global Strategic Framework; and,  Task Team on the Mapping of Food Security and Nutrition Actions and Country Level.  
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The implication of the inter-sessional focus, which comes through in the wider analysis of the 
reformed CFS, is an increased workload but also increased output. Furthermore, the CFS opted 
to focus on building linkages at the regional and country level, as it is “crucial that the work of 
the CFS is based on the reality on the ground”(CFS 2009a:para 23). This is central to the reform 
strategy to increase communication and to ensure that results of deliberations of the Plenary are 
disseminated. Indeed, as noted above, food security is a national responsibility and within the 
CFS, member-states remain decision makers. It is thus fundamental that the outcomes of the 
CFS are relevant and applicable at the national level.  
Members of the CFS have the right to intervene in plenary and breakout discussions, approve 
meeting documents and agendas, submit and present documents and formal proposals, and 
interact with the Bureau during the inter-sessional period. They also have the exclusive right to 
vote and take decisions, including drafting the final report of CFS Plenary sessions. The 
membership of the Committee is open to all Members of FAO, WFP or IFAD, or non-member 
States of FAO that are member States of the United Nations.  
At the 39th Session of the CFS (2012), 116 member countries were represented by delegations 
along with 15 non-Member States of the Committee. Amongst these delegations, 24 ministers 
were registered. Also in attendance were 11 UN agencies and bodies, 111 CSOs, two 
international research organizations, three international and regional financial institutions, 46 
private sector associations and private philanthropic foundations and 32 observers.  In 2013, 
there were 121 member nations, down from 123 at the time of reform in 2009. Between 2009 
and 2010, Latvia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Togo left the CFS but many countries 
joined, bringing the number of member nations up to 126. New countries were: Central African 
Republic; Democratic Republic of the Condo; Djibouti; Oman; the former Yugoslav; and 
Republic of Macedonia.  
Other Countries that were involved in the reform but have since left the Committee are: 
Azerbaijan; Croatia; Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; Lithuania; Mauritius; Namibia; Niger; Republic 
of Moldova; Serbia; and, Tunisia. However, many countries have joined or re-joined the CFS 
since 2009: Burundi; Chad; Israel; Lyberia; Lybia; Mauritania; Togo; and Syrian Arab 
Republic.  
Ensuring the engagement of Member States is fundamental to the success of the CFS. As one 
leading human rights campaigner noted: 
The CFS has not demonstrated itself to be the alternative for the governments. 
What is the role of the CFS as a platform? It is the multiplatform space that the 
governments have to choose as the main mechanism to govern food security and 
nutrition but if we look at the G20 and the G8 they continue to talk about the global 
partnership which is a process led by the private sector. The CFS needs a mandate 
to promote international policy coherence and they need governments to be in the 
seat where they can make decisions (field work May 2011, Rome). 
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This statement was later reinforced by a representative of a large International NGO active in 
the CSM since the beginning, who noted “the CFS is nothing without governments” (Interview 
(Representative of a large International NGO), June 2012, Rome).  
Member States are “encouraged to participate in Committee sessions at the highest level 
possible (Ministerial or cabinet level is desirable), insofar as possible representing a common, 
inter-ministerial governmental positions” (CFS 2009a:Para 9). Ministerial engagement in the 
CFS has been limited but the engagement of ministers can be interpreted as a double-edged 
sword. While low-level political engagement in the CFS results in a host of challenges and 
places the CFS low on the list of political priorities, the lack of high-level engagement also 
gives the CFS the ability to work on more controversial issues. From observing CFS Sessions it 
is clear that Ministers come and deliver speeches, often focused on initiatives underway in their 
countries. This supports the CFS goal of sharing best practices but these interventions often fails 
to tie into the broader work underway at the CFS. These are political speeches and not 
contributions to discussion. The reformed CFS seeks to be a platform for discussion. Indeed, 
throughout the first few post-reform sessions, many diplomats presented political speeches 
instead of providing contributions to the discussions, however, by the 39th session, most had 
begun to understand the new format and grandiose statements about local initiatives were 
increasingly rare. If the CFS was to gain greater political clout it is likely that there would be 
increased ministerial interest and by extension, ministerial presence in Plenary. Almost 
paradoxically, this increased high-level interest could threaten the CFS insofar as it would likely 
result in a regression to political speeches, moving away from the very important, engaging and 
inclusive discussions that now mark the plenary sessions. This observation and analysis was 
correlated in many interviews.  
As a negotiator from a G20 country explained: 
I think the most appropriate level for the CFS… is just under the minister level, the 
national secretary level that we have there [in the negotiator’s country]. It’s a high-
level office that has the power to … these are the guys that run the government 
programmes. They report to their Ministers. They have a lot of capacity to sell 
ideas to their Ministers, if they want. They are pretty high-level, but still they don´t 
require to be there and give general statements and that kind of thing. Whenever a 
minister comes, their delegations are only worried about taking care of the 
minister… so I don´t think it’s also healthy for it to be only the permanent 
representatives. I think that is also a failure. People have to come from the capital. 
Also, the officers involved with the policies and so on. It may be different for each 
country. In developing countries, maybe those who are running food security 
programmes. For Canada, maybe the head of the food security and development 
agencies (Interview (negotiator from a G20 country), October 2011, Rome).  
When asked what role relevant Ministers should play, they responded: 
The conference, the FAO conference, is political, where the ministers come. In one 
room, they are representing everything that comes from the sub-committees of the 
FAO. That is done by the same people [representing member states in the CFS]. In 
the other room, in the Plenary, there is scheduled of time for general statements by 
the ministers over the whole week (Interview (negotiator from a G20 country), 
October 2011, Rome). 
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5.6.3. Secretariat 
The CFS Secretariat is meant to remain small and permanently located within the FAO. 
However, the reform document stipulates:  
For the biennium 2010-2011, the Secretariat will be headed by a Secretary from 
FAO and include staff from the other Rome-based agencies (WFP and IFAD). 
Further arrangements regarding the Secretary, including possible rotation among 
the three Rome-based agencies, and the inclusion in the Secretariat of other UN 
entities directly concerned with food security and nutrition, should be decided by 
the CFS plenary in 2011 (CFS 2009a:para 34).  
Internal discussions and letters sent to the CFC Chair suggest that the FAO was actively trying 
to maintain control of the Secretariat whereas the World Food Programme was trying to gain 
more authority, and, importantly backing up their proposals with funding. The FAO’s position 
expressed in a letter from the Director General of the FAO, was that given the multi-disciplinary 
nature of the activities of the CFS, there was a requirement of involvement from numerous FAO 
Departments and Divisions, as well as substantive and organizational contributions.  Given the 
“exigencies of the function” of the Secretariat, the FAO argued that the Secretary of the 
Committee be a FAO senior staff member. They further rationalised this by stating that the 
Chair was a Division Director and had played a key role mobbing the CFS reform forward.  
Importantly, the FAO argued that “changing the Secretary at this juncture would be ill-advised 
and would not be a strategic move as it may very well jeopardize the achievements made to 
date”.  
The FAO rejected the argument for a systematic rotation of the Secretary, arguing that 
“ownership involves primarily a common sharing of the vision and goals of the Committee, 
translated in common work”. They continue “a system where the Secretary would have to rotate 
every two years would create unnecessary discontinuity and disruption and have a negative 
impact on the substantive work of the Committee.” 
The Executive Director of the World Food Programme disagreed. In her letter to the Chair, she 
noted that the “WFP is of the opinion that the rotation of the function of the Secretary of the 
Committee is fully in line with the vision and the spirit of the CFS reform process.” She 
continued that the rotation of the function of CFS Secretary would “be among the next steps to 
complete the reform process. Noted benefits of the rotation for the WFP included further 
consolidation of the identity of the CFS as a central UN political platform and the addition of 
new perspectives to the CFS, including further emphasis on national and household food 
security and nutrition concerns. The WFP proposed modalities of operation for the CFS 
Secretariat to be reflected in a revision of the Rules of Procedures of the CFS. First, the CFS 
would remain physically located in FAO, as per the reform document, meaning that FAO would 
continue to provide office space. The Secretary post should be full time and the WFOP was 
willing to provide a staff member at the level of Director to assume the function of the CFS 
Secretary on a rotational basis for two years. The incumbent would be identified following 
WFP’s internal selection procedures with the staff cost registered as in-kind contribution to the 
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core CFS Secretariat budget. The WFP-appointed CFS Secretary could manage WFP, FAO and 
IFAD staff who would remain the original contractual status of their respective agencies.  In 
support of these proposals, WFP noted it was willing to increase its financial participation in the 
CFS to cover a third of the total CFS Secretariat operating costs, increasing their contributions 
from $900,000 USD per biennium to around $1.4 million USB for the 2012/2013 biennium.  
By the 39th Session in October 2012, the CFS decided to mandate the “Bureau to develop the 
selection procedures, including the required qualifications and the terms of reference, for the 
position of the CFS Secretary, together with modalities and requirements for inclusion in the 
Secretariat of other UN entities directly concerned with food security and nutrition, with a view 
to submitting proposals to the Committee during its plenary session in October 2013” (CFS 
2012b:para 43). 
5.6.4. Chair, Bureau and Advisory Group 
The Chairperson role has been fundamental to the success of the CFS and indeed the individuals 
who held the role of Chair during the reform and for the first two sessions of the reformed CFS 
played critical roles in the evolution and success of the reformed Committee. It was the 
Argentinian chair, Alternate Permanent Representative of Argentina to FAO who, during the 
reform process, encouraged the inclusion of civil society as official participants. The Chair that 
presided over the first two Sessions of the reformed CFS exemplified a deep understanding of 
and respect for process. He was able to enforce the process when members steered away and 
reinforce the rights of participants to engage in the process in accordance with the terms of the 
reform document.  
At the 39th Session of the CFS, the Committee examined document CFS 2012/39/12 Rev.1 
“Proposed Amendments to the CFS Rules of Procedure and to Rule XXXIII of the General 
Rules of the Organization” and proposed an amendment. By exceeding the required two thirds 
majority of votes cast, the Committee approved the amendment: 
The Chairperson shall be elected for a period of two years on a rotational basis 
among regions and on the basis of individual qualifications and experience relevant 
to the mandate of CFS. He or she shall not be eligible for election for two 
consecutive terms in the same office. His/her term of office shall expire at the end 
of the Committee meeting where the elections of a new Chairperson is held. 
The results of the vote were 88 votes for, one against and zero abstentions although the Member 
State which voted against indicated that it did so by mistake and that its intention was to vote 
for the amendments. The biggest issue on the new Rules was that the Chairperson can be elected 
for a period of two years on a rotational basis of individual qualifications and can only hold the 
term two times (total of four years). 
The Chair of the first two Sessions of the reformed CFS, had been seconded by the Department 
of Agriculture of the Philippines as Agriculture Attaché to Philippines Permanent 
Representation to FAO. From 2003-04 he served as Co-chair in the Intergovernmental Working 
Group that formulated the Right to Food Guidelines. In 2009, he was elected to serve as the 
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Chairperson of the CFS and successfully guided the Committee through the implementation of 
the CFS Reform. Importantly, this chair was not a diplomat or a negotiator, he was technically 
oriented with field experience and experience facilitation participatory processes.  
The election of the Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Nigeria to FAO as CFS Chair 
in 2011 was important insofar as it motivated many African Nations to become more involved, 
a feeling confirmed in many of the interviews. For example, it was noted that country 
representatives are more likely to get involved in the CFS if the Chair comes from the same 
region as they feel that they will be better represented. Given that there have only been two 
chairs since the reform, it is hard substantiate this observation. That said, the new Chair, the 
Africa Group has become more engaged. It is perhaps more likely that the issues being 
addressed by the CFS (such as land tenure and investment in agriculture) explain this. However, 
when asked about participation of Asian countries in the CFS, a representative of an 
international NGO based in Rome, noted that:  
over the last few years we had a chair that was from the Philippines, so I think they 
[Asians] felt like they were represented. They needed… they were a bit more there, 
to support the chair. Now, an African is Chair and so there has been a change 
(Interview (Representative of an international NGO), October 2012, Rome).   
There was also concern, especially amongst CSOs, that replacing someone with technical 
expertise with someone with a political mandate could potentially challenge a fragile CFS.  
The importance of a strong chair was identified by many to be central to the success of the CFS, 
not only to ensure legitimacy but also to enhance participation. One UK Diplomat noted that:  
I think finally, and most importantly, I think people are central. I think it is really, 
really important to have a good chair of the CFS, who not only can act as an 
ambassador of the CFS, but also is able to coordinate and bring these functional 
elements together in order so that they may work together. I think that is absolutely 
key. So, what the UK has been pushing, and it hasn’t got a lot of traction yet, 
obviously politics gets in the way, is to have a Chair’s Terms of Reference for the 
role of the Chair of the CFS. It should not just be a political appointment but be 
based around a rotation between G77, OECD or Europeans, Africans, etc.  You 
should have to be competent to qualify as a person who can do the job and deliver 
the mandate, and once to start writing out terms of reference, or a job description, 
you automatically start disqualifying a lot of potential candidates (Interview (UK 
Diplomat), date withheld to protect anonymity, Rome).   
The Bureau is the executive arm of the CFS responsible for its administration. It is made up of a 
chairperson and representation on the Bureau is regionally organised with members drawn from 
twelve member countries: two from Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, 
Near East, and one from both North America and South-West Pacific. 
The Advisory Group aides the Bureau to advance the objectives of the CFS, particularly to 
ensure linkages with stakeholders at all levels to support information exchange and provide 
outreach at the local level. The Advisory Group is made from representatives from UN bodies 
as well as four civil society representatives, one representative from international agricultural 
research bodies, one representative for the private sector, and one representative from 
philanthropic bodies. Presently, the private sector is lobbying to get an equal number of seats on 
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the Advisory Group as civil society. Their central argument has been that farmers are part of the 
private sector. Their attempts thus far have been unsuccessful.  
5.6.5. Participants 
The reformed CFS is open to participants who are representatives of UN agencies and bodies 
with a specific mandate in the field of food security and nutrition such as FAO, IFAD, WFP, the 
HLTF; civil society and non-governmental organizations and their networks; international 
agricultural research systems; international and regional financial institutions; and 
representatives of private sector associations and private philanthropic foundations active in the 
areas of concern to the Committee. The history of this trend is outlined in Case Study A.   
When questioned about where the mandate for reforming the CFS came from, a negotiator from 
a G20 country said: 
The mandate came from the CFS itself, the previous one, after the food crisis. So 
the food crisis was the start, and there was talk within the EU and Sarkozy, the 
French President and others, about that so-called global partnership, that no one 
quite knew what it was, and there was … a resistance on the part of many G77 
countries, and from FAO itself. They were feeling estranged by this talk of global 
partnership. And they said, look, you can do a global partnership for agriculture 
and food security, but we have an organization called Food and Agriculture here 
and everything should be done inside its premises, and look we have the 
Committee on Food Security. So it was the first defensive answer by FAO, led by 
FAO and fought by the developing countries that this proposal that came from 
some developed countries, because they didn’t know what they were trying to get 
at (Interview (Negotiator from a G20 country), October 2011, Rome).  
Civil society organizations played an active role in the reform process and managed to secure 
the right to facilitate their participation in the CFS through an autonomous Civil Society 
Mechanism (CSM). Their inclusion as participants on the Committee presents opportunities for 
more meaningful and active engagement in the procedures and debates leading up to final 
decision-making in the CFS, while final voting authority remains with the nation states. The 
term “civil society organizations” (CSOs) is used as an umbrella term to refer to both social 
movements and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). NGOs are understood to be 
organizations that represent a specific issue or theme or the interests of certain social groups. 
Social movements are defined here as self-organized social actors with a shared identity that 
have come together to represent their own interests and in the case of the CSM are from the 
developing world and live predominantly on the front line of food insecurity (Duncan and 
Barling 2012).26F27  
                                                     
 
27 The FAO’s (2013b) Strategy for Partnerships with Civil Society Organizations, the FAO proposes 
different definitions. Here, social movements are defined as a category that includes “platforms, 
committees, mechanisms, federations and networks of advocacy-based and policy-oriented organizations 
related to FAO’s mandate on food security and nutrition, which promote claims or rights of specific 
constituencies. It then goes on to state “FAO has collaborated with various social movements working in 
food security including: the Civil Society Mechanism and the International Planning Committee for Food 
Sovereignty”.  The CFS CSM?is in no way a social movement: it is a facilitation mechanism that plays a 
communications role to help civil society actors participate in the CFS.  
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The private sector also developed a mechanism outlined in a document titled “Proposal for 
Modalities for Private Sector Participation in the Committee for World Food Security [sic] (CFS 
2011c). The Private Sector Mechanism is open to all private sector food actors who want to 
participate with a particular emphasis on those active in the area of food and nutrition at any 
level, particularly those that represent food producers, input suppliers, agro-retailers, grain 
traders, food manufacturers and retailers and other actors directly involved in producing and 
selling. 
The Private Sector is represented by the International Agri-Food Network, an informal coalition 
of international trade associations involved in the agri-food sector at the global level created in 
1996. The aim of the network is to facilitate informal liaison among the professional 
organizations and towards international organizations in the agri-food chain at global level. 
Currently, one person serves as the private sector representative at CFS. She has been 
responsible for coordinating the input business entities through the private sector mechanism, on 
behalf of the International Agrifood Network. She is directly affiliated is with the International 
Fertilizer Industry Association where she holds the position of Director of Communications.    
Interestingly, the Private Sector was supported by the Government of the United Kingdom for a 
year. In 2010, for the first session of the reformed CFS, the UK paid for the Chair of the CFS to 
have an assistant who provided procedural support. The following year, for the 37th session, the 
support to the Chair was dropped in favour of a position “Senior Private Sector Advisor” to the 
Secretariat of the Committee on World Food Security. The position was filled by a former 
consultant on private sector finance with experience working in the Trade and Markets Division 
of the FAO. The UK provided no support to the Civil Society Mechanism.  
However, that the UK has engaged at all in the CFS is telling. As one UK diplomat explained in 
an interview: 
The UK wasn’t engaged in the CFS at all until 2010. As part of the FAO reform, 
we pushed very strongly for the CFS reform. And the new structure of the CFS, to 
be a more inclusive body, is an approach that we value a lot. In terms of how it’s 
progressing from 2010 to 2012, it remains to be seen (Interview (UK diplomat), 
date withheld to protect anonymity, Rome).  
That said, they remained focused on engaging the private sector, noting that they “would like to 
see more contribution from the private sector”. When questioned about their satisfaction with 
their investment, a UK Diplomat explained:  
Answer: It was a small investment.  
Question: Like $1,000? 
Answer: 60,000 pounds. Yes and no. No, probably because there is a point of re-
education amongst the member states to identify what the value of having the 
private sector there was. There is a real suspicion within the FAO of the private 
sector and of how to work with them, so. That was one negative. So, he [the 
consultant] couldn’t get as much traction as he wanted. Then there was an issue 
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with Agri-Food Network. They had a very different perception of how to work and 
it was quite difficult to manage. And the previous Chair didn’t manage it as well as 
he could. But, as a positive, it put the private sector on everyone’s radar. Because 
people have been hammering on about it. They have been saying it without 
knowing what it means. The next step is to have a definition of where the private 
sector comes in. And coming back to your point about small-holder farmers and 
where they fit it, they fit in civil society as well as the private sector, so (Interview 
(UK diplomat), date withheld to protect anonymity, Rome). 
The reference to the re-education of member states about the value of the private sector is 
illustrative of a tension between many states: those who actively advance a neoliberal agenda in 
the fight against hunger, and those who seek out alternatives, normally grounded in a strong 
state. This is illustrative of the tensions between the Washington Consensus and Seoul 
Consensus described in Chapter 2. The statement also highlights the key role of the chair in 
ensuring the functioning of the CFS, an issue discussed above. The issue of challenges between 
the consultant and the Agri-Food Network that represents the private sector at the CFS is 
illustrative of tensions between experts and self-organising mechanisms within the CFS. The 
statement also highlights the importance of timing which comes up in the case studies.  
Reflecting on this statement made in the name of the UK Government, it is surprising to read 
about the perception of “real suspicion” of the private sector on the part of FAO staff. While it 
is very likely that individuals across the FAO are cautious when it comes to engaging with the 
private sector, there are also many examples of the FAO partnering with the private sector. The 
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, has argued that that despite arguably legitimate 
objectives, there is a “lack of transparency over the conditions of deliberation, acceptance or 
finding of certain past partnerships and initiatives” between the FAO and the private sector (de 
Schutter 2013). Given the increase in private sector interest in agriculture since the 2008 food 
price crisis, and the corresponding interest in activities of the FAO, the Special Rapporteur 
questions “whether the FAO will remain credible as a guardian of the public interest and as an 
impartial body when it intervenes to share global responses to food insecurity” (de Schutter 
2013:para 54). 
In an interview with a UK Diplomat, a discussion came up about make-up of the Advisory 
Group and a question was put forward by the Diplomat: 
Diplomat: What do you think about the inclusiveness of the CFS? How do you feel 
about the idea that there should be more representation from the private sector or 
from the Civil Society Mechanism? 
Interviewer: I don’t think that they [the private sector] need more representation … 
the role of civil society, through the mechanism, is to represent or communicate the 
views of a wide diversity of constituencies. That is not the aim of the private 
sector. The main role of CSOs after contributing to debate within the CFS is 
accountability. Their main job is to ensure that governments are doing what they 
said they are going to do. And this is not the role of the private sector… So I don’t 
see the need for four representatives from the Private Sector on the Advisory 
Group to the Committee on World Food Security. There is a real need for a strong 
single representative, but I don’t know what value it would add, having four 
representatives.  
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Diplomat: I think having a more representative role of the private sector, having the 
Agri-Food Network as one representative trying to represent all the private sector is 
ridiculous. It’s silly (Interview (UK diplomat), date withheld to protect anonymity, 
Rome). 
  
Cohesion aside, the CFS benefits from private sector engagement in so far as it demonstrates 
wide participation across stakeholder groups. Forty-six private sector representatives attended 
the 39th Session of the CFS. Yet, far from engaged in the negotiations – a responsibility 
delegated to the Private Sector Focal Point – they were most visible at the side events, often 
giving presentations.  
There has been widespread recognition across the CFS that because CSOs represent the voices 
of those most affected by food insecurity, because they also represent the largest group of food 
producers, and because of existing relations of power and access to resources, they should hold 
more seats on the CFS Advisory Group than the private sector or philanthropic foundations. 
However, mechanisms to ensure inclusion do not inherently ensure inclusion, both in terms of 
who can engage (as seen in the example of the food price volatility roundtable) but also in terms 
of who tries to engage. With respect to the latter, the private sector has developed a mechanism 
and have been present and relatively active in negotiations. The same cannot be said for 
philanthropic foundations.  
In an interview with a UK Diplomat it was noted: 
Answer: The last conversation I had [with the Gates Foundation] about the CFS 
was very telling. And it was not a very positive conversation. They were 
reconsidering their engagement and assessing what the value of the CFS was. And 
if you have a stakeholder like the Gates Foundation “saying what is the value of 
this body? We are not going to engage anymore”, it has a political domino effect 
… To paraphrase their view last year, it was, “we don’t need the CFS: we can do it 
ourselves”. But their idea was that there doesn’t need to be a policy coherence and 
coordination mechanism. Well, for them, they think it already exists. It is an 
interesting way of looking at it. Also, they have got...they attend Davos, they attend 
the G8, they attend the G20, and so they think there are a huge number of bodies 
out there trying to coordinate around agriculture, food security and nutrition and 
the value of the CFS only recently came out (Interview (UK diplomat), date 
withheld to protect anonymity, Rome). 
The point about the Gates Foundation, which has a seat on the CFS Advisory Group, is an 
important one. The issue, from the perspective of CFS supported is that to by-pass the CFS, or 
to withdraw, the Gates Foundation is taking itself out of the legitimate, democratic forum for 
discussions and sharing of best practices on food security policy. It could be argued that given 
the work they do, the projects the fund, and the influence they have, it would be irresponsible of 
them to withdraw their participation and would suggest that they assume they can act 
unilaterally, outside of consultative and informative discussions on food security. This is highly 
problematic. Unfortunately, for reasons of time and space, this research does not delve into the 
complexity and changing influence of philanthropic foundations in the CFS or the multilateral 
transnational food security governance space. However, it recognises that without meaningful 
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participation from one of the world’s largest donors to agriculture projects, the CFS will not be 
able to secure its position as the foremost inclusive platform for food security.  
5.6.6. High-Level Panel of Experts 
The CFS reform sought to position the CSM as a decision-making committee whose decisions 
“gain resonance and efficiency on the ground” (HLPE 2013:1). Decisions are often expected to 
be taken on issues where uncertainty abounds, both with respect to the knowledge base as well 
as the potential impacts of policies. Furthermore, with increased participation from diverse 
actors comes a welcomed widening of perspectives which can exacerbate already divergent 
positions. Aware of this tension, during the Reform process the CFS decided that decisions 
taken in the CFS should be informed by shared, independent and comprehensive advice. The 
High Level Panel of Experts for Food Security and Nutrition (HLPE) was thus created as the 
scientific and knowledge-based pillar of the Global Partnership for Agriculture, Food Security 
and Nutrition (HLPE 2013:1). 
The design of the HLPE process, its rules and procedures, and the composition of the Steering 
Committee were decided on by the CFS. The HLPE reports to the CFS to “ensure the legitimacy 
and relevance of the studies undertaken, and their insertion in a concrete political agenda at 
international level” (HLPE 2013:2). The HLPE has a two-tier structure composed of a Steering 
Committee of fifteen internationally recognised experts in food security and nutrition-related 
fields. The experts were appointed by the Bureau of the CFS following a call for nominations 
and the review of candidatures and a proposition by an ad-hoc technical selection committee 
comprised of members of FAO, WFP, IFAD, Bioversity International (for CGIAR) and a CSO 
representative. The Steering Committee is supported by Project Teams that are compiled and 
managed by the Steering Committee to analyse and report on specific issues. The HLPE is 
exclusively funded through a voluntary trust fund held in the FAO. The Fund covers the costs of 
the preparation of reports, Steering Committee and Project Teams meetings, translation and 
publication of reports, and Secretariat support. 
The HLPE does not conduct new research. Instead, the reports are summaries of their review of 
existing research and knowledge with the value-added of global, multi-sectoral and 
multidisciplinary analysis and recommendations. These recommendations combine the 
extensive literature review with grounded experience from the field.  Importantly, the HLPE has 
a commitment to reviewing and incorporating many forms of knowledge and best practices, 
much of which comes from local and global experiences and best practices. This commitment 
extends to the Steering Committee which has a civil society representative acting as co-
chairperson.  
The HLPE’s role it is to provide advice on policy as well as technical and scientific issues upon 
the request of the CFS. The reports are meant to inform policy debates and improve the quality, 
effectiveness and coherence of food security and nutrition policies at all levels. A member of the 
HLPE Steering Committee explained:  
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If they [the CFS] want effective space for global policy discussion, coordination 
and decision making, they need special expertise and if only left to governments to 
make documents, the results are very weak. The idea is that an expert panel, which 
is not political, may help support better decision making. This is quite 
unprecedented. It is not normal for a global committee to have its own expert 
committee and there is recognition that there are various types of expertise (Field 
Work, October 2010, Rome). 
These themes of the reports are decided upon during the Sessions of the CFS with input from all 
participants and the HLPE. The themes of the studies become the themes of the policy 
roundtables that take place during the Sessions. Once the themes are decided upon, the Steering 
Committee compiles a project team following an open call for interest of experts, and the 
reports are then produced following topic and time restrictions. The work then follows clearly 
defined stages “separating the elaboration of the political question and request by the CFS, its 
scientific formulation by the Steering Committee, the work of the time-bound and topic-bound 
Project Team, external open consultations to enrich the knowledge base, and an external 
scientific review” (HLPE 2013:2). The process aims to promote a scientific dialogue between 
the Steering Committee and the Project Team throughout the project cycle. 
Within the project cycle, the HLPE coordinates two external consultations per report. The first 
focuses on the scope of the study and the second on a first draft (V0). This provides an 
opportunity to open the process to the public as well as to the HLPE roster of experts, which 
currently numbers over 1200. This process also provides important contributions and input 
which in turn allows the HLPE to further expand its knowledge base while being receptive to a 
diverse range of stakeholder perspectives.  
According to a UK diplomat:  
Another advantage of the CFS is that most of its policy products tend to be 
evidence-based because of the High-Level Panel of Experts. For example, the 
recent paper on Climate Change, in a way it’s very good because it identifies and 
articulates a role for multilateral bodies working around climate change and food 
security, trying to really give us a way to go about it (Interview, March 2012, 
Rome) (Interview (UK diplomat), October 2012, Rome). 
Since its reform the CFS has made annual requests to the HLPF. At its 36th Session (October 
2010) the CFS requested the undertaking of studies and the development of policy 
recommendations in accordance with the CFS reform document, and the Rules and Procedures 
for the work of the HLPE. The topics of studies were: Price volatility and food security; Land 
tenure and international investments in agriculture; Climate change and food security; Social 
protection and food security.  
For Price Volatility, the CFS specifically requested that the HLPE research: 
All of its causes and consequences, including market distorting practices and links 
to financial markets, and appropriate and coherent policies, actions, tools and 
institutions to manage the risks linked to excessive price volatility in agriculture. 
This should include prevention and mitigation for vulnerable producers, and 
consumers, particularly the poor, women and children, that are appropriate to 
different levels (local, national, regional and international) and are based on a 
review of existing studies. The study should consider how vulnerable nations and 
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populations can ensure access to food when volatility causes market disruptions 
(HLPE 2013:9). 
With respect to land tenure and international investment in agriculture, the HLPE was requested 
to examine the respective roles of large-scale plantations and of small-scale farming, including 
economic, social, gender and environmental impacts; review the existing tools allowing the 
mapping of available land; and, undertake a comparative analysis of tools to align large scale 
investments with country food security strategies. 
These two reports on price volatility and food security and on land tenure and international 
investments in agriculture were finalized and published in July 2011. They served as 
background papers to the 37th Session of the CFS (October 2011) and are reviewed more 
extensively in Chapter 7.  
The reports on climate change and on social protection, finalized and published in June 2012, 
informed discussions at the 39th Session of the CFS (October 2012). The HLPE was also 
requested to undertake studies on “biofuels and food security” as well as “constraints to 
investment in smallholder-farming” which were published in June 2013 in advance of the 40th 
Session of the CSF. At the 39th session (October 2012), the CFS also decided that the HLPE 
should undertake studies on “the role of sustainable fisheries and aquaculture for food security 
and nutrition”, and “food losses and waste in the context of sustainable food systems” which are 
expected for October 2014. 
The reports of the High Level Panel of Experts have failed to have the impact that they were 
originally designed to have. The first indication of this came at the 37th Session when 
background session documents included not only HLPE reports but also reports by other actors. 
The concern here was that the HLPE was developed to provide the CFS with an independent, 
expert-led analysis of the state of the art on key issues and to develop appropriate 
recommendations. The process of developing the reports were not only independent and 
scientific but also consultative and paid attention to the inclusion of multiple forms of 
knowledge. In lieu of starting from the shared position of CFS commissioned research, the 
reports used in the preparation of the background documents for the Policy Roundtables at the 
37th session included:  The State of Food Insecurity in the World (SOFI) 2011 “How does 
international price volatility affect domestic economies and food security?;  The State of Food 
and Agriculture (SOFA) 2011 “Women in agriculture: Closing the gender gap for 
development”;  The World Bank World Development Report 2012 “Gender Equality and 
Development”;  United Nations System Standing Committee on Nutrition (2010) “Sixth Report 
on the World Nutrition Situation”;  “Addressing High Food Prices – A Synthesis of FAO Policy 
Consultation at Regional and Sub-Regional Level”; and, the G20 “Action Plan on Food Price 
Volatility and Agriculture”. The inclusion of these reports as background documents illustrate 
the scope of the CFS and highlight links to other processes which does potentially advance the 
CFS’s goal of improved policy cohesion. At the same time, their inclusion diminishes the 
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research and reporting undertaken by the Committee’s own Panel of Experts and provides an 
example of ways in which the CFS is potentially being undermined.  
Despite these setbacks, the HLPE has maintained broad support from civil society 
organizations, facilitated in great part by the co-Chair of the Steering Committee, who 
represents civil society. The HLPE did however face critique with the publication of  the report 
“Land tenure and international investment in Agriculture” (High Level Panel of Experts 2011a) 
when controversy was sparked around definitions of agro-ecology. Within Appendix 1, the 
Report noted:  
Many processes affect crop performance, but a few have a major impact. They 
include processes helping plants use radiation, water and nutrients efficiently and 
evenly for crop growth (Monteith, 1990; Sinclair, 1990), those contributing to the 
soil water balance, and those affecting soil fertility. ‘Optimum growth conditions’ 
means agro-ecological conditions where crops have all the water and nutrients they 
need for growth and are protected against pest, diseases and weeds. We focus on 
primary plant production as it also determines secondary animal production (High 
Level Panel of Experts 2011a:53). 
The definition included in the report reflected a productionist approach and it was felt that the 
definition included in the report could be easily applied to industrial modes of production that 
did not uphold agro-ecological principles. CSOs challenged this definition of agro-ecology 
arguing instead that the definitions outline in the International Assessment of Agricultural 
Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD 2009) would have been more 
appropriate and reflective of international consensus. They argued that IAASTD was a major 
global consultative process involving 900 participants and 110 countries from all regions of the 
world. The Executive Summary of the Synthesis Report was approved by 58 countries.  
To summarize, a key part of the CFS’s claim to legitimacy is the work of its independent Panel 
of Experts. Given the political nature of the negotiations, it is expected that some governments 
will not approve all of the recommendations. However, a strong HLPE is fundamental for a 
strong CFS and enforces the reform objectives and claims to legitimacy. As a final point on the 
HLPE, it is important to note that the topics undertaken by the HLPE upon request of the CFS 
are in no way simple or uncontroversial. Indeed, in the last four years, the HLPE has tackled 
some of the most controversial issues in food policy.  
As a representative of a large International NGO active in the CSM since the beginning noted in 
an interview:  
Another positive element is that I think that the CFS, they didn’t choose necessarily 
the easy way and I think that they have chosen issues that were relevant. So they 
didn’t escape the difficult debates. The member states, they didn’t want to discuss 
food price volatility, but at the same time, the CFS is able to put issues on the 
agenda which are contentious (Interview (International NGO active in the CSM), 
June 2012, Rome). 
This is illustrative of the willingness of the CFS to address some of the “big questions” that 
loom over food security policy. Whether the CFS can be, or even should be, effective beyond its 
function as a platform discussions is explored throughout the case studies. 
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5.7. Post-Reform Activities (2009-2013) 
Post-reform, the CFS is facilitating increasingly participatory policy-making processes, offering 
potential solutions to many of the concerns about multi-lateral policy processes such as 
inclusivity, legitimacy, accountability, transparency, legitimacy and representation.  Since 
undergoing reform, the CFS has taken a number of important decisions and has managed to 
implement many of them.  
At the 36th Session there was a decision to have a roundtable to review methods used to estimate 
the number of hungry. The round table was held and findings were presented at the 
37th Session. The following year, the FAO used the new methodology in its State of Food 
Insecurity report. At the 36th Session, the CFS invited submissions of progress reports on 
initiatives linked to global developments relevant to food security and nutrition. At the 37th 
Session, there were updates on global and regional initiatives and linkages with the CFS and at 
the 39th Session there was a panel on global initiatives. The CFS made a decision to strengthen 
and maintain linkages with regional initiatives in the intersessional period. Towards this end, the 
CFS Chair has participated in FAO Regional Conferences, hosting CFS side events to discuss 
possible linkages and strengthen regional multi-stakeholder mechanisms.  
There was a decision to explore the possibility of organizing a High-Level Expert Forum on 
Protracted Crises with a view of discussion the elaboration of a new “Agenda for Action for 
Food Security in Countries in Protracted Crises” in collaboration with other specialized 
agencies and humanitarian partners.  The preparatory work began in 2011, including a review of 
existing programmes and initiatives and to determine the value of such an event. A concept note 
was prepared and submitted to the CFS Bureau and Advisory Group for consideration at the 37th 
Session. A policy roundtable “Addressing food insecurity in protracted crises” was organised 
and from these discussions the CFS requested that the possibility of organizing a High-Level 
Expert Forum on Protracted Crisis no later than 2012 be explored with the aim of discussion the 
elaboration of a new Agenda for Action for Food Security in Countries in Protracted Crises in 
collaboration with other specialised agencies and humanitarian partners (CFS 2011b:para 25v). 
The CFS also agreed that an addendum be added to the 2010 State of Food Insecurity Report on 
Food Security in Protracted Crises  that would include a revised table to include all countries 
and territories in protracted crisis and that the list include Palestinian territories, West Bank and 
Gaza strip. The addendum was later published online. 
The CFS completed negotiations on the Voluntary Guidelines for the Responsible Governance 
of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the context of national food security and endorsed 
them at an extra-special session of the CFS.  The CFS has also advanced with the consultations 
on CFS Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment and have hosted two policy 
roundtables addressing smallholder producers and investment. 
By the 40th Session in October 2013, the High Level Panel of Experts had completed six reports 
on issues that were subsequently discussed in policy roundtables. The CFS completed and 
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endorsed the first version of its Global Strategic Framework which aims to enhance policy 
cohesion and make all policy decisions taken by the CFS easily accessible to policy makers. 
Decisions arrived at by the CFS through the policy roundtables were all included in the first 
version.  
As noted above, during the reform process the Director General of the FAO (CFS 2009b:13) 
highlighted five key limitations that prevented the CFS achieving its mission of monitoring food 
security. It is important to note that the mandate of the CFS now extends well beyond the 
monitoring of the World Food Summit but it is a valuable exercise to examine how the CFS has 
addressed these limitations through the reform. The first challenge was that prior to the reform, 
the absence of a high-level international policy-making body in the sectors of international 
cooperation and of food and agriculture. In effect, this is what the CFS has sought to become 
and is working towards this with the recommendations and actions of the policy roundtables, the 
Global Strategic Framework and Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of 
Tenure of Land Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security. The second 
limitation of the CFS was that it lacked an integrated framework for short-, medium-, and long-
term sectoral scientific advice on hunger. This has been remedied again through the policy 
roundtables which build on the research, analysis and recommendations of the independent 
High-Level Panel of Experts. This is further supported by the inclusion of a range of actors who 
can contribute various perspectives. The third challenge was the lack of authority to evaluate 
and coordinate policies affecting world food security, in particular as regards production, 
agroindustry, trade, social safety nets and financing. As will be illustrated through the case 
studies, this remains a limitation of the CFS. While the capacity and legitimacy exists to 
coordinate a wide range of policies related to food security, the will to allow it to do so remains 
limited (see Chapter 4). Furthermore, the CFS remains weak on evaluation. As will be described 
below, the CFS has started to address issues related to monitoring and evaluating its own 
impact. However, the nature of the Committee, and the etiquette of diplomacy suggests that the 
evaluation of policies emerging from outside of the CFS will remain off-limits. That said, the 
CFS has offered countries the opportunity to present their food security programmes and 
policies as case studies during CFS Sessions. The fourth challenge related to the lack of an 
effective mechanism to track food security decisions and actions at national and regional level. 
Since its reform the CFS has been working on a mapping initiative that sought to profile actions 
(policies, programmes, strategies, plans and projects) that support food security and nutrition 
objectives and to then chart the “linkages of these actions to domestic and donor resources, 
implementing institutions and beneficiary population groups” (CFS 2012e). The overall purpose 
of mapping actions was to provide policy makers and other users with better information to 
support decision making around national and regional policies, strategies and programmes. For 
donors, the mapping tool could also help identify where to allocate resources. The CFS 
launched an Actions Mapping Task Team to advise and provide guidance. They proposed the 
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development of a mapping tool that builds on existing tools and methods and on-going country 
experiences. A demonstration web-based version of the tool was launched for the 39th Session 
of the CFS but is no longer functional. The fifth constraint facing the pre-reformed CFS was a 
lack of financial resources to carry out its mandate. This continues to be a problem but 
hopefully as the CFS continues to prove itself, donor countries and UN Agencies will be more 
willing to finance its work.   
Following the case studies, Chapter 9 introduces the CFS’s Results-Based Framework and uses 
the roles outlined in the reform document to assess how the CFS has progressed towards 
achieving its goal of eradicating hunger functioning as the foremost international and 
intergovernmental platform for food security and nutrition.  
5.8. Summary 
Despite the limited high-level buy in for the CFS and its limited resources, it has managed to 
take a broad range of decisions related to global food security policy in a relative participatory 
and transparent manner. Furthermore, the CFS has followed up on the majority of the tasks it 
has assigned itself. In doing so it has steadily gained recognition as the foremost platform for 
food security at the global level. It has also garnered interest from other multilateral fora seeking 
to increase the participation of stakeholders. Yet alongside these successes, the CFS has faced 
considerable challenges.  
In what follows, three case studies are presented to provide greater insight into the workings of 
the reformed CFS with the aim of better understanding how the CFS is achieving its reform 
mandate. Particular attention is paid to the tensions, challenges and opportunities that exist 
across the work plan of the reformed Committee.  
The first case study presents and analyses the International Civil Society Mechanism (CSM). 
The CSM is presented first for two reasons. First, the research into the CFS was situated within 
the CSM, meaning that the researcher gained access and participated in CFS activities through 
the Mechanism. The research thus begins from a civil society standpoint and in many ways 
maintains an ethical commitment to their struggle in line with solidarity research (described in 
Chapter 3).  Second, starting with the CSM aligns the analysis with the reform goal of making 
the CFS inclusive and sensitive to the challenges faced by those most affected by food 
insecurity. In this case, the history of engagement, the struggle for inclusion, the development 
and structure of the coordinating mechanism, and key internal challenges are identified. 
The second case study reviews and analyses the negotiations of the Voluntary Guideline on the 
Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National 
Food Security (VGGT). The Guidelines in many ways represented a litmus test for the reformed 
CFS and the most significant accomplishment and contribution of the reformed CFS to date. 
The process of consultation and negotiation that informed them is certainly a best practice in 
global governance.   
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The third case study considers the development of the Global Strategic Framework, a single 
reference document of core priorities for food security and nutrition. The Global Strategic 
Framework offers guidelines and recommendations for coherent action at the global, regional 
and country levels by the full range of stakeholders, while emphasizing the central role of 
country ownership of food security programmes. As such, it is fundamental to the CFS’s work 
on policy coordination and cohesion. 
The three case studies provide empirical insights into the working processes of the newly 
reformed CFS, including how the Committee functioned in practice. Importantly, they illustrate 
the complexity of actors’ positions and highlight a limitation in the literature on global food 
security governance: the tendency to put actors into ideological boxes and to assume (wrongly) 
that they do not stray from these negotiation positions. They also highlight the way actors 
strategize and give-and-take in the spirit of compromise and how coalitions are being built 
around specific issues, and not necessarily following traditional alliances. 
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6. Case Study 1: International Food Security and Nutrition Civil 
Society Mechanism 
6.1. Introduction 
In the reform document of the UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS), Member States 
recognised that while the CFS is an intergovernmental Committee,  
[i]t will be composed of members, participants and observers and will seek to 
achieve a balance between inclusiveness and effectiveness. Its composition will 
ensure that the voices of all relevant stakeholders – particularly those most affected 
by food insecurity - are heard (CFS 2009a:para 2).  
Towards this end, member states also agreed that civil society organizations had the right to 
“autonomously establish a global mechanism for food security and nutrition which will function 
as a facilitating body for CSO/NGOs consultation and participation in the CFS” (CFS 
2009a:para 7).  A proposal for the establishment of such a mechanism was developed and 
endorsed by civil society organizations (CSOs) at a Civil Society Consultation held in Rome in 
October 2010. It was later presented to the CFS at the 36th Session and acknowledged by CFS 
Member States during the 36th Session of the CFS. Following the Reform Document, the 
purpose of the Civil Society Mechanism (CSM) is to facilitate civil society participation in 
agriculture, food security and nutrition policy development at national, regional and global 
levels in the context of the CFS (CSM 2012:3).  
In this case study the process of developing the Civil Society Mechanism is reviewed and the 
final organizational structure is presented. This leads to a review of the internal challenges 
facing the CSM including issues of time, representation, consensus, trust, decision making and 
ensuring the engagement of social movement actors. From there, focus turns to a review of how 
the CFS interacts with the CFS by highlighting key challenges and successful strategies for 
meaningful participation. The case study concludes by reflecting on the potential of scaling-up 
the CSM to other intergovernmental fora.  
6.2. Civil Society Organizations in the Committee on World Food Security 
In 1997, a year after the World Food Summit, in an attempt to modernize the CFS’s Terms of 
Reference, and responding to changes in the institutional organization of the UN system27F28, the 
Committee amended its General Rules of the Organization. Under the amended rules, the 
members of the CFS remained interested FAO or UN Member States. However, reference was 
made to inviting “relevant international organizations to participate in the work of the 
Committee and the preparation of meeting documents on matters within their respective 
mandates in collaboration with the secretariat of the Committee” (FAO 1997:Res 8/97:Rule 
XXXIII:12). At this time, CSOs attending the CFS had observer status, and their ability to 
                                                     
 
28 One such change was the replacement of the Committee on Food Aid Polices and Programmes by the 
Executive Board of the World Food Programme. 
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engage in processes lay with the discretion of the Chair. Two years later, during the 25th 
Session (1999), the CFS made broadened participation of civil society and other partners a main 
agenda item. The background paper provided suggestions for broadening the participation of 
civil society organizations in the work of the CFS and the World Food Summit implementation 
process (CFS 1999:Para 5.1). The proposals included enhanced information exchange, 
contributions to technical documents, participation in CFS meetings, and enhanced dialogue. It 
also provided possibilities for enhanced CSO engagement in the CFS, including having the 
Chair ask CSOs to appoint designated spokespersons to intervene in debates; grant CSOs the 
right to make one intervention per topic; and, allow CSOs to present consolidated reports of 
their conclusions and findings on achievements and lessons learned.  
CSOs were proving themselves to be useful allies to Committee members who, in the wake of 
the World Food Summit, had been tasked with monitoring the implementation of the resulting 
Plan of Action. This also helped to pave the way for increased CSO participation in the 
Committee. Yet, beyond the role of observers, their engagement continued to be needs-based or 
subject to sympathetic Chairs. At the 32nd Session of the CFS, various stakeholders, including 
CSOs, were engaged in a dialogue on progress made towards attaining the World Food Summit 
Goals. At this point, some members of the CFS “requested that options for continued 
engagement of multi-stakeholders in future years be discussed at the next Session of the CFS” 
(FAO, 2006: CL 131/REP par. 31).  
At the 33rd Session of the CFS (2007), the Secretariat followed up by providing background 
information on current practices of multi-stakeholder engagement and highlighted four potential 
options for the continued engagement of CSOs including: interventions by observers, CSO 
reports on the World Food Summit Follow-Up to be presented at the CFS Sessions, multi-
stakeholder dialogues with the Chair, and, Informal Panels (CFS 2008: para 3). The Committee 
requested the Secretariat to prepare a document outlining these and other possible options to be 
discussed at the 34th Session of the CFS. The resulting paper – “Participation of Civil 
Society/Non-Governmental Organizations (CSOs/NGOs)” – listed best practices adopted in 
other FAO bodies and a suggestion that they could be applied to the CFS. These practices 
included allowing CSOs to organize side events; seeking CSO input into documents; 
encouraging CSO caucusing; permitting CSO presence during the drafting of outcomes; 
promoting direct dialogue between governments and CSOs; and, formalising and 
communicating procedures for engagement (CFS 2008: para 18). Principles of participation 
were also outlined along with specific measures to improve interactions between the CFS and 
CSOs.  However, the actual reform process proved much more radical than the Secretariat had 
envisioned. Comparing the Secretariat’s paper on participation to the results of the reform 
process, one negotiator from a G20 country noted: 
There is a background document with the options and proposals that were put forth 
by the secretariat for the reform of the CFS. That was like the options that would 
be possible goals to get at, at the end of the reform process. Look at those options. 
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They are so petty, they are so small. And you see this is what they were trying to 
achieve with the reform (Interview (Negotiator from a G20 country), October 2011 
Rome).  
They went on to explain how the reforms had managed to surpass these initial suggestions.  
This could have started as bad and ended as bad in the usual: ‘let’s say we change 
something to keep doing what we always did’. But at some point, the Chair being 
who she was, and that Contact Group being created, things got out of hand for 
FAO itself. So this was the fascination of the process, because the reform that I 
thought usually would come up… business as usual… it got out of hand, in a good 
way, and developed into a much stronger version of the CFS (Interview 
(Negotiator from a G20 country), October 2011 Rome). 
The reformed CFS offers an official space where an increasingly diverse group of civil society 
actors can congregate. These actors have, over time, been able to secure greater and more 
meaningful involvement in planning, research, debate and policy making. CSOs have created a 
mechanism to ensure that this engagement is coordinated and that the social actors, who have 
traditionally been on the perimeter of these processes, are not just brought in, but are 
meaningfully contributing to them. 
6.3. The International Food Security and Nutrition Civil Society Mechanism 
In the reform process CSF Member States recognised the right of CSOs to autonomously 
establish a global mechanism to facilitate CSO participation in the CFS.  Civil society actors 
endorsed the Mechanism at a Civil Society Consultation in Rome in October 2010 and later that 
month, after a presentation to the Plenary, the CFS acknowledged the Mechanism. Through the 
Civil Society Mechanism, CSOs have become involved in various aspects of the Committee on 
World Food Security, including as: member of the Advisory Group, CFS Task Teams and Open 
Ended Working Groups, and most obviously, in the CFS plenary discussions. In the CFS 
activities, the CSM has facilitated CSO proposals, suggestions and dissent, up to the point 
where member states achieve consensus.  
6.3.1. Designing the Mechanism 
As noted above, the reform document of the Committee on World Food Security invited civil 
society organizations to autonomously establish a global mechanism to facilitate their 
participation in the CFS. Several groups submitted proposals requesting leadership of the 
process but the successful proposal was one jointly written and submitted by the Governance 
Working Group of the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty (IPC), Oxfam 
and Action Aid International, with the support of a methodology group made of reference 
people. Discussions with actors in the CFS and FAO revealed that the reason this proposal was 
chosen over the others was because it extended beyond the interests of the coordinating 
organizations, had principles to ensure transparency and sought to be globally inclusive. It was, 
overall, the most sophisticated mechanism to be presented.  
The Civil Society Mechanism builds on the extensive experience and networks of civil society 
organizations across a range of policy areas as well as from existing mechanisms, notably the 
International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty (IPC), the Farmers’ Forum and the 
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Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. This history is not lost on those involved in the broader 
CFS process. At the first meeting of the Coordination Committee, one FAO representative 
acknowledged that: 
This meeting is historic, the fruit of many years of hard preparatory work, from 
social organizations comprised of many social groups and social movements and 
other movements who have been advocating and affecting change for many 
decades. The engagement of CSOs as participants in the CFS process builds on the 
collective experience of this group. Contributions to the World Food Summit, 
World Food Summit +5, development of the IPC, inception and adoption for the 
guidelines for the realization of the right to food (Field notes, Cordoba, June 2011). 
This recognition of the history and knowledge of the process and actors involved has been 
fundamental to the ordering, structuring and functioning of the CSM over the first years of 
operation. At the same time, the CSM is an innovative mechanism that is adapting to the 
changing governance architecture of food security. As such, throughout the development and 
implementation of the CSM, there has been recognition that the process will not be perfect. 
What has been stressed is the need for transparency, to follow the established processes and to 
maximise communication (CSM, 2010).   
The process of drafting the Mechanism took time. A core group, led by ActionAid International, 
the Governance Working Group of the International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty 
and Oxfam began work on it in 2009 and distributed a Zero Draft in March 2010 through 
networks. A First Draft, building on the feedback on the Zero Draft was distributed in July 2010 
and a Second Draft was written up by the end of August. A Final Draft was released on 
September 15, 2010 and aimed to include all compatible recommendations collected during the 
consultations.28F29 
Many of the people active in developing the mechanism came to form the “Methodology 
Group” that acted as de facto leadership while the CSM was developing. Within the 
Methodology Group there was a high level of reflexivity and awareness of the need for an 
eventual hand-over of power to the CSM Coordination Committee. This was made visible not 
only in the way that the CSM was structured but also in the way that CSM meetings were 
coordinated. As one member of the group, a representative of a large International NGO active 
in the CSM since the beginning, explained: 
So I was involved in the Methodology Group, which was also kind of uneasy, 
because it had no real mandate but at the same time, it was taking important 
decisions, in terms of programming. But now, with the new Coordinating 
Committee, well, I think roles are clear, so there is no methodology group 
anymore… (Interview (International NGO active in the CSM), Rome, June 2012). 
At a Civil Society Consultation held in Rome in October 2010, the Chair of a Plenary Session 
presented those in attendance with the Final Draft of the Mechanism and encouraged the 
delegates to endorse the Mechanism. On a methodological note, the meeting was open to all 
                                                     
 
29 It is interesting to note that the CSM process mirrors the CFS process for consultation and drafting 
(see Case Study C on the Voluntary Guidelines for example). 
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CSOs but delegates has to be nominated from constituencies and sub-regions. In selecting 
delegates, balance was sought across constituencies, regions, and gender. At the consultation, 
decision-making processes were to be consensus-driven where possible but only delegates had 
decision-making authority. Thus observers could participate but did not have decision-making 
authority. Facilitators sought to maintain an open forum for discussion and open processes for 
clarification and discussion. Everyone was asked to speak slowly and to be concise to facilitate 
interpretation and translation. This was particularly important as the final draft of the 
Mechanism had not been translated into French and Spanish, the two other working languages 
of the CSM. This in turn limited who could fully comprehend and assess the Mechanism, and in 
particular excluded social movement actors from West Africa and Latin America. Organisers of 
the consultation noted that the FAO had failed to provide timely support with respect to 
translation.  
Developing a mechanism capable of facilitating the participation of the voices civil society, 
particularly of “those most affected by food insecurity” is a daunting task to say the least. 
However as one leader if a European farming social movement explained:  
We have fought of the autonomous and independent organization of civil society. 
The identified constituencies and geographically distant-demographics, to have 
their voice here in Rome implies a great deal of work based on respect, 
understanding of difference, working together. This is a complicated process but 
the biggest challenge we are facing is to show the governments that we are capable 
of self-organizing even if they are 198 and we are 198,000 (Field notes, Rome, 
October 2010). 
Furthermore, at the CSO consultation, the Chair, a leading human rights campaigner, noted: 
The drafting team knows this is not a perfect document because it would be 
impossible with such restrictions… time and money. A great effort was made. 
There has never been an attempt to draft this type of document: with this type of 
work, it is one step forward…This mechanism isn’t aimed at representing involved 
organizations. The goal is to facilitate involvement in decision making processes. 
This ensures this is an independent process that cannot be interfered with by power 
interest (Field Notes, Rome, October 2010).  
These comments made early on in the development of the mechanism introduce key themes and 
challenges that loom over the development of the CSM, notably, decision-making, learning 
while doing, power relations and representation. These are all discussed below.  
At the Consultation many delegates stood and expressed their support for the Civil Society 
Mechanism as a positive first step and highlighted changes and considerations to consider over 
the next year. Many spoke in favour of the organizing principles and the structure the 
mechanism which took into account inclusiveness, transparency, and openness. However, others 
drew attention to potential limitations. Some noted that the inclusivity, accountability 
mechanisms still needed work. Related to this, there was a call to clarify the decision-making 
processes in the Mechanism, for example, by defining what is meant by consensus in this 
context. People requested for all documents to be translated in advance of meetings which in 
turn raised questions of resources. Finally, there was a call to ensure that work continued at the 
national and regional levels and that the CSM not be restricted to what happened in Rome. 
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Many of these potential limitations were addressed or ironed out within the first few years of 
operation. However, as will be discussed below, the issue of accountability and decision-making 
were not adequately dealt with and could be emerging as a significant challenge.  
At the Consultation it was decided that the CSM’s Terms of Reference would undergo formal 
review in one year’s time, at which point changes and improvements could be made. The review 
never happened. This was in part due to a delayed start to the functioning of the Coordination 
Committee. Identifying constituency and sub-regional focal points through approved processes 
took more time than anticipated and by the end of the first year not enough had be accomplished 
within the operation of the CSM to warrant evaluation and review. Another reason was 
resources. A third and on-going reason ties to power: there is no incentive for those currently in 
power to review the Mechanism.  
6.3.2. Organizational Structure of the CSM 
The CSM is open to all civil society organizations working on issues related to food security. It 
is made up of the general membership, a Coordination Committee, Working Groups and a 
Secretariat.   
CSM Executive 
The Coordination Committee acts as the executive of the CSM. In theory there should be 41 
Coordination Committee members: one focal point per sub-region and two focal points per 
constituency, with the exception of smallholder farmers who get four seats. The reasons given 
for this were that farmers do the work of providing food but they are also disproportionately 
food insecure. A focus on farmers helped ensure that those most affected by food insecurity 
were engaged in CFS processes. Figure 15 outlines the sub-regions and constituencies that make 
up the CSM.  
 
The processes through which each sub-region and constituency select their focal points to the 
Coordination Committee is determined by each group in recognition of the diversity of 
histories, realities and experiences. At the CSO Consultation, delegates began to plan the 
selection process, working first by region and then by constituency. Some regions opted to join 
together. A Latin American regional group was formed as was an African group. There was a 
joint South and South East Asia group, and Europe and North America also formed a group. 
The sub-regions themselves opted for these groupings not only because numbers were low but 
also because in many cases they were already working together at a regional level and their 
situations were comparable. Groups were assigned a list of questions requesting reflection on 
the context, key actors to be involved, strengths, weaknesses and barriers and available 
resources.  Groups were then encouraged to developed processes for the selection of the Focal 
Point (each region is able to forward one nominee). After the sub-regional working groups, the 
constituencies met and worked on the same task with the same questions, the difference being 
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that constituencies are able to forward two Focal Points (members) to the Coordination 
Committee, with the exception of small-holder family farmers who forward four Focal 
Points. Across both processes, the goal was not to select focal points, although some groups did. 
Rather the aim was to establish a clear, transparent and open process with people identified to 
move the process forward. This was important as many individuals and delegates were missing 
due to inabilities to get visas or tickets to attend the forum.  
 
Figure 16: Constituencies and Regions within the CSM Coordination Committee (Duncan and 
Barling 2012). 
 
Coordination Committee member held the function of 12 months during the interim period of 
2010/11 after which focal points were selected for a period of two years (2011-2013). The roles 
and responsibilities of the Coordination Committee are outlined in Terms of Reference. First, 
the Coordination Committee is to ensure that the functions of the CSM are carried out as 
effectively as possible and according to the organizing principles contained in the CSM 
proposal. These principles include inclusivity; diversity; pluralism, autonomy and self-
organization; gender and regional balance; and, cooperation. Another key organising principle is 
for “self-organized groups to speak for themselves in the CSM and have a greater representation 
in the mechanism” (CFS 2010b:FN 2). In practice, this means prioritising the voices of social 
movement actors. Officially, the Coordination Committee has the role of facilitating 
participation of CSOs in CFS processes, including overseeing the work of civil society members 
of the CFS Advisory Group and the Secretariat of the Mechanism, as well as ensuring 
accountability of finances of the Mechanism, although in practice this falls to the Secretariat. In 
practices, the accountability of finances falls under the responsibility of the Finance and 
Sub-Regions 
Total of 17 (1 member per sub-region) 
North America South East Asia 
Central America & Caribbean Central Asia 
Andean Region Oceania 
Southern Cone Southern Africa 
Western Europe West Africa 
Eastern Europe East Africa 
West Asia Central Africa 
South Asia North Africa 
Pacifica  
Constituencies 
Total of 24 (2 members per constituency, smallholder farmers have 4) 
Agricultural & food workers NGOs 
Artisanal fisherfolk Smallholder farmers 
Consumers Urban poor 
Pastoralists Women 
Indigenous Peoples Youth 
Landless  
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Administrative sub-working group (FWG) of the Coordination Committee. The Coordination 
Committee are to ensure, to the best of their ability, effective two-way communication with 
CSM members and broader networks. With respect to decision-making, the Coordination 
Committee is responsible for clarifying criteria for participation in the Mechanisms, quotas for 
participation (including speaking) at the CFS Plenary,29F30 selecting civil society members of the 
Advisory Group, providing support to the CSO Advisory Group members, and assisting in the 
organization of the civil society forums related to the CFS. In practice, there is an ad-hoc 
organizing committee made up of approximately five to eight Coordination Committee 
members representing different regions acting with the support of the Secretariat. Members of 
the CSM, including members of the policy working groups, communicate views to the CFS 
during the various sessions (apart from AG meetings).  The Coordination Committee is 
responsible for communicating the range of divergent positions held by participants in the 
Mechanism when providing views to the CFS and at the Advisory Group. In the original terms 
of reference the Coordination Committee also had the responsibility to dialogue with the CFS 
Bureau regarding the allocation of civil society seats and speaking slots in the annual CFS 
Plenary Sessions.  
A major limitation in the design of the CSM is that there is no incentive for those who currently 
sit as focal points to review the process, nor is there any incentive for then to develop 
accountability mechanisms or to find ways to improve decision-making from a transparency and 
efficiency perspective. Furthermore, the way that the Coordination Committee is currently 
structured, those who are least efficient in their work as communication focal points are 
potentially most likely to retain their position as there is less chance that they have adequately 
informed and engaged others able to fill the position. At the same time, having a complete 
change-over of the Coordination Committee could be potentially devastating to the functioning 
of the Mechanism. The CSM would have been well advised to develop a rotational mechanism 
when this problem first was first anticipated. For example, at the 2010 CSO Consultation a 
proposal was made suggesting that each region and constituency create a committee that rotates 
members every two years. This would provide the benefit of support, training and knowledge 
transfer to members on the committee while working to ensure better diversity and sharing of 
power. The proposal was not taken up meaningfully by any of the groups.  
At that same meeting, a key actor in the CSM noted that: 
there are still issues that need to be addressed: inclusivity, accountability 
mechanisms. Reviewing constituencies and making sure no one is falling through 
the gaps. Clarify the decision-making processes in the mechanism. Ensure gender 
is addressed through the mechanism. What are the criteria for membership? How 
will we ensure documents are translated? How do we make sure this is working at 
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 In practice, policy working groups mostly do this but under the "guidance" of the Coordination 
Committee members 
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the national and regional levels… we need to build on this good start, keep moving 
forward so that in one year we are more organised and more inclusive and working 
together (Field Notes, Rome, October 2010). 
Unfortunately, these calls were set aside in lieu of focused discussions on process which came 
to dominate the discussions amongst the Coordination Committee. Actors newly engaged in the 
CFS have identified the CSM’s focus on structure as limiting and have expressed this publically 
in CSM meetings. The CSM is a young and innovative mechanism and participants are 
conscious of the continuing need to develop, adapt and ameliorate its governance structure. 
However, the initial focus of CSM leadership on structural issues led some participants to view 
it as limiting the ability of the CSM to adequately address technical or political issues. As one 
participant from a prominent rural network lamented during the 2011 Civil Society Forum in 
advance of the 37th Session of the CFS:  
I feel like this is a waste of time. I came here to talk about issues, about solutions, 
and they spent the whole meeting talking about how they will organize themselves. 
I don’t have time for that (Interview (Participant from a prominent rural network), 
October 2011, Rome). 
The Coordination Committee also began organizing meetings in camera, excluding many of the 
individuals who had worked to develop the mechanism, many of whom had raise concerns 
around accountability and decision-making. At times, they also exclude the Secretariat. While 
this does raise worrying questions about transparency and legitimacy, this is not necessarily 
negative. Instead, despite the growing pains, these actions can be seen as social movement 
actors coming to own the process and the mechanism and working through the issues in a way 
they deem appropriate.  
That said, the structure of the executive remains such that those in power are in charge of 
making decisions to limit their power and very few are willing to do this. As one EU-based food 
security analyst noted: “The Terms of Reference of the CC [Coordination Committee] talks 
about what the collective does but not the responsibilities of the individual CC members when 
they go back” (Field Notes, Cordoba, June 2011). Those who have expressed a recognition of 
the need to step back and a willingness do so have predominantly been from wealthy countries 
and/or more internationally established organizations suggesting at least two things. First, there 
is arguably greater awareness in and  across these regions and constituencies about the CFS and 
the CSM as well as opportunities for leadership through the Coordination Committee. Second, it 
illustrates the power and influence that such a position can bring to civil society actors, 
especially in the global South. Frequent paid trip to international locations brings legitimacy to 
social movement actors in their local communities. Problematically, by bringing these actors out 
of their communities, and re-focussing their work on global issues, their ability to engage at the 
community level – a main reason for their selection is the first place – becomes restricted. 
Furthermore, once actors begin to represent their constituency in multilateral fora, they often get 
invitations to speak at other events, which forms them into “UN-tourists” of sorts.  
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A lack of consideration and processes around monitoring, accountability (how to ensure focal 
points are actually consulting and communicating with their regions or constituencies),  and a 
lack of measures for recourse against those who do not fulfil their roles are all potentially 
significant challenges and limitations in the operation of the CSM. Time will tell if the 
Coordination Committee is able to develop, implement and then uphold such measures and if 
they find a way to rotate Coordination Committee members.  
CSM Member to the CFS Advisory Group 
Civil Society actors have four seats on the Advisory Group to the CFS’s Bureau. The CSM 
facilitates the selection of civil society actors from the Coordination Committee to sit on this 
Advisory Group. It is the responsibility of the CSO Advisory Group members to ensure that the 
views of civil society are heard by facilitating two-way communication between civil society 
and the CFS Bureau. Within the CSM it was decided that eight focal points would rotate in the 
four allotted seats. This was in part because of the difficulty of making a representative selection 
with only four people. This also reflects the fact that many of the actors selected to hold the 
Advisory Group seats are unable to travel at certain times because of existing commitments 
(e.g., harvest). These Advisory Group members are accountable to the Coordination Committee.  
 
Advisory Group Members 2010-2011 Advisory Group Members 2011-2013 
NGO Coordination Committee Member 
(Oxfam then FoodFirst Information and 
Action Network (FIAN)) (male then 
female) 
Indigenous Coordination Committee Member 
(2011-12) (male) 
Small-Scale Farmer Coordination 
Committee Member (male) 
Fisherfolk Coordination Committee Member 
(2011-12) (female) 
IPC Representative (female) Pastoralist Coordination Committee Member 
(2011-12) (male) 
Youth Coordination Committee Member 
(male) 
2 Youth Coordination Committee Members 
(2011-12 and 2012-13) (male and female) 
 
Agricultural Workers Coordination Member 
(2012-13) (female) 
Small-Scale Farmer Coordination Committee 
Member (2012-13) (male) 
Latin American Coordination Committee 
Member (2012-13) (female) 
Figure 17: Makeup of the Coordination Committee Advisory Group Members as of September 
2013 (Duncan 2013) 
 
Given the scope and diversity of the Coordination Committee, as well as challenges that span 
linguistics, connectivity, time zones and various levels of engagement, decision-making in the 
CSM have proven challenging. Processes are underway to re-evaluate how this is done. One 
approach which has proved rather successful is the creation of smaller groups tasked with 
specific decisions, such as deciding on which CSO proposals should be selected for the CFS 
side events. While there is widespread acknowledgement that there is more work to be done on 
the operational processes within the Coordination Committee, the CFS has found great success 
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in the coordination and functioning of specific working groups. The CSO Advisory Group 
members, at least in practice, now exert a great deal of influence, because they interact directly 
with the CFS, putting them at the junction of the CFS-CSM interface. Given the reality of 
decision-making, these Advisory Group members at times have to take important decisions 
without time for proper consultation. This may counter the operating principles of the CSM but 
responds to the reality of the way the CFS works. At the same time, the CSM has not lost sight 
of the reality of having to make quick and informed decisions.  
Thematic Policy Working Groups 
To better coordinate civil society efforts in relations to the CFS’s Open-Ended Working Groups 
and Task Teams, the CSM has established Working Groups – building where possible on 
established Working Groups – to organise civil society engagement and inputs into the CFS. 
The role of the CSM Working Groups is to circulate relevant information on specific policy 
issues, provide a space for dialogue and the exchange of views amongst CSOs on the issues 
under consideration, provide a space for CSOs to develop strong and well-articulated civil 
society positions, and to provide inputs back to the CFS.  The thematic policy Working Groups 
of the CSM are open to all interested civil society participants. The aim is to promote dialogue 
and common policy positions amongst CSOs on issues being discussed and worked on in the 
CFS. These Working Groups help to ensure “effective, diverse and expertise-driven civil 
society inputs into the policy discussions and negotiations” (CSM 2012:5).   
In 2013 there were 12 policy Working Groups responding to the CFS work agenda including, 
land tenure, agricultural investment, Global Strategic Framework, gender, nutrition, price 
volatility, protracted crisis and conflict, monitoring and mapping, social protection, climate 
change, biofuels, and, CFS programme of work. In line with “the mandate of the CSM, working 
groups prioritise the participation of, and inputs from small food producers, and other people 
most affected by food insecurity and malnutrition, whilst ensuring civil society participation 
during meetings are representative of a regional, gender and constituency balance” (CSM 
2012:5). The Secretariat of the CSM tracked the number of active members in the working 
groups that operated in 2012. They qualify active as follows:  
For most instances, “active” members of the working groups represent an entire 
network of CSOs, whereby they reach out and collate policy positions from a wider 
range of CSOs. Therefore, it is difficult to accurately account for and quantify the 
hundreds of civil society representatives who provide their expertise and inputs 
into the WGs on a collective basis (CSM 2012:5). 
What is included in the tally is the individual number of people who have requested to 
participate. This does not mean that they necessarily contribute or communicate back to their 
constituents. However, the numbers break down as follows:   Land Tenure: 75 active Working Group members  Global Strategic Framework (GSF): 64 active Working Group members  Responsible Agricultural Investment: 100 active Working Group members 
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 Climate Change: 40 active Working Group members  Social Protection: 16 active Working Group members  Protracted Crises: 94 active Working Group members  Nutrition: 15 active Working Group members 
There is no explicit hierarchy or decision making structure when it comes to the Working 
Groups, which could in part account for their success. Furthermore, the fact that they are issue 
based, rather than process and inwardly focused makes them more appealing to a wider range of 
actors.  
In the working groups, tensions between social movements and NGOs, often prevalent in 
Coordination Committee processes tended to dissolve or at least soften. The Working Groups 
have coordinators and resource people. Normally, the coordinator is from a social movement 
and the resource person from an NGO. In cases where a social movement actors was not found 
to act as coordinator, NGO actors would step in. These NGO facilitators were conscious of the 
political responsibility entrusted to them. One NGO actor coordinating a Working Groups 
noted:  
it is not the role of the NGO, as an NGO person, it shouldn’t be my role and it’s not 
what I wanted to do. But, also, I think that there was sufficient trust between each 
other and there was also kind of, I think a relatively good, how do you say that… 
reporting back and preparation and reporting back what the issues were … I also 
felt that there was sufficient backing in terms of the positions that we defended, so 
it wasn’t really a difficulty. There was kind of a mandate by a broader group. 
(Interview (Representative of a large International NGO), Rome, June 2012). 
One way that some Working Groups have made use of the NGO/social movement divide has 
been to play on the strengths of each group. Not exclusively, but broadly, NGOs provide strong 
technical support and facilitation capacity and social movements provide the political legitimacy 
and grounded rationales when negotiations took turns counter to the approaches favoured by 
CSOs. This strategy was most obvious and effective in negotiations on the Voluntary 
Guidelines for the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the 
Context of National Food Security. While the tensions between NGOs and Social Movements 
will not go away, nor should they necessarily, there is evidence that they are easing. 30F31 A 
representative of a large International NGO active in the CSM since the beginning noted: 
Where I think that the process of the constituencies, initially in 2006, 7, 8, 9, it was 
more a defensive position, by saying that the social movements have their own 
space. I think that we are in another process. For instance, I think the example of 
food price volatility, I think it worked well. So where, there were only NGOs 
present in the room, but the NGOs were really thinking, we are not here for our 
own agendas, but we do things more collectively and we do know, we try to 
incorporate the priorities of the social movements. So I think is a kind of, I am not 
sure for us maybe this is fairly big, but there is a certain, from most NGOs, I think, 
when you go to the regional meetings, it’s very different, but I think most NGOs 
                                                     
 
31
 They are possibly being replaced by regional or geographic tensions (e.g., North versus South, Asia 
versus Latin America). 
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involved in the process of the CSM have built a certain understanding and loyalty 
to the mechanism. You know, they know more or less what their role is, in terms of 
visibility or, you know, things like that. I am not sure it’s a problem anymore. I 
think the CSM has gained a lot of maturity in that sense (Interview (Representative 
of a large International NGO), Rome, June 2012).  
Despite this coming together, there is still concern and resistance on the part of social 
movement actors that NGOs will in some way co-opt the process and the tensions between the 
IPC and the CSM remain prevalent. This is discussed below.  
Funding 31F32 
Funding for the Civil Society Mechanism has been an issue since its inception and is likely to 
remain an issue.  One social movement coordinator noted: 
Financing is always a difficult issue … Governments are usually surprised on how 
we participate with no resources. Oxfam has contributed human resources, how 
does it compare with the inputs of IPC? How far should we go in our contribution? 
Where does it end? ... It is difficult to find finances for the secretariat. Translation 
is another issue that has to be addressed. At this point the secretariat is conceptual 
as they are not funded… It is our collective responsibility for funding. It is 
important for us to dialogue with governments that normally give us money (Field 
Notes, Cordoba, June 2011).  
The difference in funding for social movements and NGO funding has been a central tension. It 
is undeniable that Oxfam has more financial resources than the IPC.  This raises important 
issues with respect to representation and the priorities of the CSM. These concerns were 
captured in the comments of one civil society representative who asked: “If there isn’t sufficient 
funding, what do we do, send the NGO who can self-fund and give legitimacy to a process that 
is being seriously derailed?” (Field Notes, Cordoba, June 2011).  
Eventually, the Civil Society Mechanism secured funds through donations from member states 
handled through a multi-donor trust fund administered the FAO. The CSM has been able to 
operate due to support of NGOs (Oxfam GB in particular) that have advanced funds and 
covered funding gaps in cash flow. Moreover, NGO resources donated to the CSM in 2012 
provided needed reserve while the CSM waited for the release of funds in the multi-donor trust 
fund. The Coordination Committee members made a decision that partnerships with NGOs that 
manage funds should be rotational and that new NGOs should be brought in to help administer 
CSM funds. In 2013, the CSM decided to rely on the Italian NGO Firab for financial and 
administrative support, effectively ending the support received from Oxfam. Because Firab is a 
much smaller NGO, the CSM would not be able to rely on them to advance advancing resources 
and cover funding gaps (CSM 2013). The decision to move away from Oxfam was nothing but 
political with many social movement actors fearing that the international NGO held a 
disproportionate amount of power.  
                                                     
 
32
 Given the political and sensitive nature of finances, a decision has been made to provide only a broad 
summary based on publically available information. 
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The CSM uses its fund to ensure the active participation of CSOs in CFS processes. For 
example, during the first quarter of 2012, the CSM spent 101,449 Euro on four CFS Advisory 
Group meetings (including preparatory teleconferences and meetings in all three languages, as 
well as the translation of briefing notes); CFS open-ended working group on responsible 
investment in agriculture CFS-rai) in January, including a two days preparatory meeting; along 
with other CFS open-ended working groups (i.e., monitoring, programme of work and priorities, 
and finance). The funding also goes to pay for office costs and salaries of the Secretariat (three 
staff people).  
One significant cost to the CSM is translation. In 2012 the CSM spent 21% of its resources on 
interpretation and translation. During the first quarter of 2013 the percentage of these expenses 
rose to 31% of total expenditures (CSM 2013). Interpretation and translation are vital for 
ensuring the full participation of all actors in the CSM and the CFS, especially social 
movements. However, there may be a need for the Coordination Committee to reflect on how 
money is spent as more money spent on translation means less funds available to support direct 
participation in CSM and CFS meetings (CSM 2013).  
6.4. Internal Challenges Facing the CSM  
The CSM presents a radical new mechanism for coordinating the effective participation of a 
diversity of actors in multilateral governance processes, but there have been growing pains. 
Challenges related to establishing structures and processes related to the Coordination 
Committee have been reviewed above. In what follows, key internal challenges faced by the 
CSM in its first two years of operation are presented along with a review of how participants 
have sought to address them. The aim is to illustrate how diverse civil society actors are 
collectively managing their participation in the Committee on World Food Security.  
Time 
The development of the Coordination Committee has taken much longer than expected, and by 
the end of the second year, thirteen seats remained unfilled.32F33 Reasons for this included lack of 
contacts or networks in specific regions and constituencies as well as failure of interested parties 
to undertake an appropriate selection process and to submit these processes for approval. These 
challenges serve to highlight the difficulties of widening participation to include actors who 
previously stood outside of the process or whose current struggles and focus are localised. 
Indeed, key groups that have been marginalised by, or worked outside of and/or against, these 
processes are now faced with the task of determining ways of moving into these circles 
                                                     
 
33 At the time of publication, the following positions remained unfilled: the two seats for the landless are 
not filled, the urban poor has one of two seats unfilled and the small-holder farmers have one of three 
seats empty. North Africa, Central Africa, South Africa, South East Asia, Central Asia, Pacific and 
Oceania are also not filled but some do have focal points that are in the process of undergoing a legitimate 
selection process.  
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(McMichael and Peine, 2005, p. 32). Central to this transitional process from outsiders to 
insiders is the development of trust, networks, new skills as well as working through issues of 
representation and legitimacy. At the same time, in other fora, and especially in local contexts, 
these actors continue to push and resist dominant governance structures, adding another layer of 
complexity.  
Also related to time is the turn around on decision-making. Decisions taken by the Coordination 
Committee require translation, deliberation and consultation, both within the Coordination 
Committee and between the focal points and constituents. However, often the CFS does not 
give adequate time for this process and thus decisions are made without full consultation or 
even participation. There are also Coordination Committee members who despite having agreed 
to play a communication function do not respond to requests for decisions in a timely fashion, if 
at all.  The same time challenges exist for the Working Groups who are often expected to 
provide quick feedback on proposals. CSOs have found ways of addressing this problem by 
building trust amongst participants, trying to maintain open and transparent communication, 
translating all documents where possible and ensuring that requests for feedback are 
accompanied by clear deadlines.  
Participation versus Representation  
One of the main functions of the Coordination Committee is to facilitate the participation of 
people from sub-regions and constituencies in the CFS. The Coordination Committee is not to 
be seen as a committee of people representing the views of their organization. Rather, they play 
a communicative and networking function: they are facilitators. The Final Report of the Civil 
Society Consultation in advance of the 36th session (Duncan and von Anrep 2010:8) explains: 
The Coordination Committee is the backbone of the CSM. One of the Coordination 
Committee’s roles is to work hard to facilitate the participation of those in 
subregions and constituencies. In no way is the CC to be seen as a committee of 
people representing the views of their organization. Rather, they play a 
communicative and networking function. 
However, this is easier said than done. NGO and CSO participants are politically, intellectually 
and emotionally tied to the positions of their organizations and to separate themselves from their 
values, as well as potential opportunities, and the mind set of interest lobbying is a real 
challenge. However, the fact that this conversation has happened within the CSM points to an 
awareness of the roles and responsibilities of civil society as well as potential critics.  
Another important issue to consider is the implications of participation. In order to effectively 
participate in the CFS, civil society actors have had to undergo a process of internalizing not 
only the values of liberalism and neoliberalism (for example through the promotion of right-
based approaches to food security policy) but also the logic of bureaucratization (evident 
through their fluency in UN processes and language). This is not to suggest that CSOs have 
become pawns of the process. Indeed much of their engagement is strategic and well 
deliberated. Furthermore, resistance can emerge from actors putting into question social norms 
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and the identities ascribed to them by way of these norms (i.e., “peasant farmer”; “poor 
African”). Indeed, resistance begins by challenging these socially prescribed identities and by 
choosing to transform their subjectivity. An example of this can be seen in the way in which La 
Via Campesina has effectively challenged the discourse and social construction of the peasant. 
For members of La Via Campesina, peasants are not poor, powerless, antiquated farmers: they 
are a coalition of savvy producers with a great deal of traditional and localized knowledge who 
are not on the fringes of industrial production but in fact make up the dominant food system.   
Within the CFS, civil society and governments from the global South are increasingly aware of 
the power of influence and legitimacy that can be summoned up by drawing on lived experience 
of oppression, poverty and injustice. This presents yet another example of a double-edged 
sword: as global governance discourse moves towards increased participation and new 
definitions of expertise and knowledge, new experts can rise up and claim authority and 
legitimacy based on their lived experience, yet they do so within a governance framework that 
seeks to maintain the influence of the dominant system which created the oppression in the first 
place.  
Consensus versus Maintaining Diversity 
With respect to this, the CSM works to find points of agreement so as to forward united 
positions and statements that conform to the common good as agreed upon by way of 
deliberation and consensus by all participants.  Second, the CSM accepts diversity, difference 
and disagreement. In instances where opinions differ, the various perspectives are presented as 
the CSM position.  At the same time, there is pressure to speak with a united voice. For 
example, at a plenary session of the 37th Session of the CFS (October 2011), the Chair 
encouraged civil society participants to speak with a unified voice. One government delegate 
noted that from his perspective, a united CSO endorsement of a specific recommendation carries 
more weight than that of some member states. While there is recognition of the diversity of 
perspectives across civil society organizations represented at the CFS, there is also awareness of 
the political impact gained through united positions. Hence, CSOs, facilitated through the CSM, 
have worked to develop joint positions wherever possible. Arriving at a point of consensus often 
involves long discussions and processes of compromise on the part of all actors thereby moving 
them away from their original objectives. Chantal Mouffe (2000:17) warns that often this 
process of consensus building can reflect “a temporary result of a provisional hegemony, as a 
stabilization of power” and is a process that “always entails some form of exclusion”. Thus, 
while these processes of deliberation and consensus building form a fundamental part of the 
CSM, and the UN decision-making process more broadly, they also inevitably result in a form 
of social exclusion where the ideas of some actors are left on the cutting room floor.  
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Process 
Coming to consensus has proved challenging not only for lack of shared approaches but also for 
lack of engagement. As noted above, the executive of the Civil Society Mechanism is a 
Coordination Committee with forty-one members.  A committee of that size, spanning the 
world, with varying levels of commitment, connectivity and three working languages has 
proven, not surprisingly, hard to manage, especially for the Secretariat. Getting the 
Coordination Committee to come to consensus (note that in the structure of the CSM, silence is 
not taken as agreement) on issues in a timely fashion has meant frustration, delays and 
sometimes moving ahead without consensus as often the CSM is only given a few days to react 
to documents or prepare for meetings. Here again, the commitment to transparency and the 
development of strong relations of trust are key to the successful operation of the CSM. 
Decision Making 
In an attempt to address decision-making within the CSM, and responding to the challenges 
raised above, there has been a shift of power from the Coordination Committee to the Advisory 
Group members. It is the responsibility of these Advisory Group members to facilitate two-way 
communication between the CSM and the CFS. With the launch of the CSM, it was decided that 
the four CSO Contact Group members, who had represented civil society throughout the CFS 
reform process, would become the interim CSO members on the CFS Advisory Group. These 
original CSO Advisory Group members were three male and one female representative from Le 
Réseau des organizations paysannes et de producteurs de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (ROPPA), the 
International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty (IPC), Oxfam International and the 
Mouvement International de la Jeunesse Agricole et Rurale Catholique (MIJARC). Under this 
arrangement they would serve for one year (2009-2010) and new focal points would be chosen 
from and by the Coordination Committee in 2011, once the Coordination Committee was up 
and running. However, at the Coordination Committee meeting in May 2011, it was decided 
that the CSO Advisory Group members would continue in their roles until October 2011. This 
was, in part, in recognition of their historic role in the process and because it was deemed 
important that the CSO Advisory Group members be able to work with the restrictions of 
limited time and resources, and be highly attuned to the politically sensitive nature of the work 
while maintaining a high degree of knowledge and political fluency. It also reflected challenges 
faced by the CSM in establishing the Coordination Committee. In turn, when the Northern NGO 
constituency Advisory Group member left their NGO to work for the CSM Secretariat the seat 
was filled by the female Southern NGO Coordination Committee member providing more 
gender balance and Southern representation. 
Trust 
Whereas the first CSO Advisory Group members had legitimacy and trust based on their 
historical participation, in October 2011, eight new members were elected by and from the 
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Coordination Committee for a period of two years on a rotational basis; with the 
acknowledgment that the eight CSO Advisory Group members will share responsibility and 
participate in the meetings. The newly elected Advisory Group members have legitimacy based 
on their being elected, however, they lack the historical experience and knowledge of their 
predecessors. They do however represent a far more diverse set of interests (see Figure 16) 
although again, their function is not one of representation but rather facilitation.  
Language 
As noted above, one the largest expenses of the CSM is translation and interpretation. Across 
the CSM, within the Coordination Committee and amongst the CSO Advisory Group Members, 
language is an issue. The linguistic challenges extend beyond spoken language to the ways in 
which different actors speak, and who they are speaking for. There are also differences in how 
people speak that impact communication.  
Consider that in one discussion, a peasant farmer from Argentina spoke about the wisdom of 
potatoes and the importance of listening and learning from potatoes (Field notes, Jokkmokk, 
August 2011). For many, such a statement is immediately interpreted as quaint at best and is 
widely dismissed. However, the meaning behind what was being said relates to specific 
technical knowledge about plant health and changing ecological conditions with important 
implications for the discussion. Because of the narrative way in which the issue is presented, the 
“policy impact” is overlook or missed entirely. This amounts to cross-cultural 
misunderstandings that extend beyond linguistics. It also illuminates the contrast between the 
very engaged and grounded processes undertaken by many social movements through their 
gatherings, and the sterile and bureaucratic nature of the CSM which has to conform to the 
working processes of a UN Committee.  
The Voices of Those Most Affected by Food Security and Nutrition 
The CSM remains committed to ensuring the participation of those most affected by food 
security in the CFS. This is reflected in the makeup of the CSM Coordination Committee and in 
the structure of the Working Groups as well as in the discourse of CSM participants. For 
example, in the 2012 Annual Report (CSM 2012:4) this point is made explicit: “At the core of 
the CSM is the understanding that those most affected must be the agents of their own 
development and change”. Towards this end, there is a widely held view within the CSM that 
NGOs participating in the CFS have a key role to play in supporting social movements.  As key 
actor in the CSM noted:  
Now we have the opportunity, through the CFS reform and the CSM, we have an 
opportunity to make change. We have a process and structure in place to engage 
people. It is important for NGOs to support the CFS process and broad engagement 
by civil society (Field Notes, Rome, October 2010).  
Later, this actor clarified why the NGO they were involved with supported the CSM. 
One, the organising principles that are laid out and the structure of the mechanism: 
inclusiveness, transparency and openness. Two, because there is now a mechanism 
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to ensure that it [participation] is broad, inclusive, etcetera. They [the drafting 
committee] took a look at these principles and tried to reflect these principles. This 
means some of the traditional leaders took a step back and let others move forward 
because this is fundamental if the mechanism is to succeed (Field Notes, Rome, 
October 2010).  
However, tensions do exist between social movement actors (those who fight directly for their 
rights) and NGOs (who work on behalf of others) and have existed from the beginning. At the 
CSO Forum in October 2010 a suggestion was made that a prominent social movement be given 
the responsibility of electing member of the Coordination Committee which would certainly 
give them a disproportionate amount of power.  
The tension was most visible in the selection of CSM Advisory Group members where there 
was a noted desire to keep power with the social movement, and not with NGOs, despite the 
fact that many NGOs work in Rome and have the capacity to function effectively in the role.  
At the first meeting of the Coordination Committee, a key actor in the CSM noted that: 
The IPC Secretariat has vast experience and it is important to draw upon this, but 
the Terms of Reference state that the CSM is to be politically neutral and a 
facilitation mechanism. The IPC remains a facilitation mechanism, but along very 
political lines (Field Notes, Cordoba, May 2011).  
The IPC is a network that brings together organizations of food producers together to mobilise 
in ways that connects local struggle with global debate while broadening opportunities for 
political negotiation within the FAO (International Planning Committee for Food Sovereignty 
2009). By contrast, the CSM has the mandate to facilitate the participation of civil society 
organizations in the work of CFS. The situation is complicated as many of the IPC members are 
active in the CSM and even sit as Focal Points on the Coordination Committee. This tension is 
also acknowledged by actors involved in both processes. As one member of the IPC noted: 
The IPC is a facilitating mechanism. The Main role of the IPC is to start moving 
with the change. The members of the IPC are involved in regions and 
constituencies and as part of the CC. There are IPC members that have been 
elected through the selection process who will work to represent their 
constituencies and sub-regions. IPC has broader work to do and will continue their 
work. This is a broader facilitation task for IPC. The IPC now has to determine 
how it will link to the CSM, and how to disassociate itself from the CSM (Field 
Notes, Cordoba, May 2011).  
Tension remains as the CSM and the International Planning Committee on Food Sovereignty 
clarify their “turf” within multilateral food security processes, especially within the UN system.  
One member of the Coordination Committee from the Global South noted that there was an: 
organic process at work with the IPC and the CSM; they are non-hierarchical 
unlike governmental processes. Where there are elements emerging, then it is the 
responsibility of all of us to work out the responsibilities. Because things are 
emerging without a clear or distinct plan, we must come to a point that those who 
have come before you do not necessarily owe you the answers, it is your 
responsibility to ask questions and inform yourself. The process between the IPC 
and the CSM needs to be made explicit by clarifying the roles and putting it out on 
paper. This is something to celebrate and not get upset about (Field Notes, 
Cordoba, May 2011).  
This tension between NGOs and social movements more broadly permeates civil society 
engagement in food policy at all levels and raises a few key issues. First, NGOs do not need to 
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engage with the CSM to participate in the CFS and could easily avoid engagement all together. 
This would effectively serve to challenge the legitimacy of the CSM as the facilitating 
mechanism for the CFS. The fact that they do engage is illustrative of their commitment to the 
values of the CSM. Second, NGOs have provided important technical support in the 
development of the mechanism and continue to provide support in the Working Groups and in 
the development of political strategies. Third, some financial support for the mechanism has 
been provided by supportive NGOs. For example, Canadian Foodgrains Bank, Oxfam, Action 
Aid and Welthungerhilfe have all supported the CSM financially. Finally, attempts to exclude a 
constituency of the Coordination Committee from positions of power is also cause for concern. 
Yet, it continues to highlight an on-going lack of trust on the part of social movement actors to 
previous formulations of power within the CSM (which relied, at times heavily) on technical 
and methodological support from Western NGOs while firmly entrenching the value of ensuring 
that those most affected by food security are not simply engaged but are leading the process.  
6.5. Engaging with the CFS 
As explained above, the CSM is a facilitation mechanism that supports the engagement and 
participation of CSOs in the activities of the CFS. CSOs participate in Plenary, on the Advisory 
Group, on Task Teams and Open-Ended Working Groups and in consultations. These 
interactions are illustrated in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18: How the CSM engages with the CFS (CSM 2013a) 
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The engagement of Civil Society in the CFS has been positively received. In interviews with 
various delegates the support for civil society engagement was evident: 
As one UK Diplomat noted:  
My last telegram to the rest of the embassies… E-grams… well, there was a sense 
of optimism from the UK to say that the CFS actually is inclusive. We think that 
the management of the CFS needs to be improved, but the principles and the tenets 
of the CFS are sound. What we really valued in 2010 was the inclusion of the Civil 
Society Mechanism. (Interview (UK diplomat), date withheld to protect anonymity, 
Rome). 
When asked about the role of civil society in the CFS, one negotiator from a G20 country 
responded: 
I think it was fundamental because it was the momentum and the push, the voices, 
the voices were clearly articulated and powerful and also getting at the right points. 
That helped move the process along. I think they were vital and I think that lots of 
things would not have turned out the way they did if lots of factors weren’t in place 
at that moment. So it was not taken for granted at all (Interview (Negotiator from a 
G20 country), Rome, October 2011). 
However, the influence and value of actors who were traditionally engaging from the periphery 
extended beyond CSOs. As a representative from a major international NGO based in Rome 
reflected: 
This is the important role of civil society, because civil society is reducing, in a 
sense, power inequalities, because of the openness and transparency of the process. 
In a closed-door thing you can have just the big powerful countries that go and just 
shut out countries, and that’s it. But in something like the CFS, you cannot do that, 
because everything is about agreement and the linkage with food security. You 
show that it is good for food security, and also you can kind of empower Africa, 
because they are the most affected and so they are the ones that know more what 
they need. And this kind of change in power dynamics at the negotiations, and you 
can have even really small countries making a lot of impact (Interview (Major 
international NGO based in Rome), Rome, October 2012).  
This view was shared by the negotiator from a G20 country responded: 
Sometimes the benefit is that we push things that perhaps wouldn’t be pushed for if 
civil society wasn’t there. The other benefit, once you give people an opportunity 
to really engage and be part of the decision-making process – come countries 
object to that — civil society is part of the decision-making process, just not of the 
decision-making itself: The decision-making, yes, not the decision. But if people 
are part of the decision-making process, it’s much more difficult to then just say no 
to everything and to come in with radical positions. You are extending a hand to 
them and inviting them to get in the process and as a result you benefit from much 
more reasonable positions from both sides.  
But also, it would help to moderate and articulate and make more reasonable the 
positions and the views of civil society. Some in civil society would view this as 
co-option … But is it a co-option or is it people getting together to understand the 
reasons behind some proposal and trying to find a way around it and so on and so 
on?  (Interview (Negotiator from a G20 country), Rome, October 2011). 
Yet, civil society actors did not take this for granted and recognised the looming potential for 
things to revert to how they were. This issue is raised as an important tension in the Case Study 
on the Voluntary Guidelines, but it was also reiterated frequently at CSM events. For example, 
at the first meeting of the Coordination Committee, a key actor in the CSM stated: “There is a 
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constant battle to ensure civil society participation. We cannot just sit back and relax” (Field 
Notes, Cordoba, June 2011).  
6.6. External Challenges and Barriers to Effective CSO Engagement 
Participant observation and analysis of the civil society participation in the CFS has identified 
some challenges. These include language, the scope of issues addressed, coherence, power 
politics and limitations inherent to food security as a concept.  
Language 
One obvious challenge relates to language. While there is simultaneous translation into the six 
official languages of the FAO, when the CFS is negotiating text the working language is 
English. Consequently participants who do not read English are disadvantaged and unable to 
effectively participate. This issue extends beyond civil society and impacts many delegations.  
Specifically for CSOs, there is the issue of gaining “fluency” in UN-speak while trying to 
maintain their own language. Beyond the different spoken languages and accents, and the 
technical language, social movements also speak, present and share ideas in a variety of 
different ways. Just as with the example of becoming sensitive to the “wisdom of potatoes”, 
becoming fluent in these modes of communication takes a great deal of time and is challenging 
in formal meeting settings, which often juxtapose the informal, democratic, participatory 
environments more familiar to civil society actors. Through their on-going engagement, CSOs 
have become increasingly fluent in the processes and mode of speech that result in effective 
communication in the UN forum. At the same time, country delegates are increasingly familiar 
and comfortable with words and communication styles put forward my civil society actors.  
CSOs have become away of the different ways they speak, and have started using these 
strategically. For example, in interventions, participants with technical skills (often from NGOs) 
will make technical interventions. If the negotiations appear to be veering away from the desired 
direction, a more political actor (usually a community or social movement leader) will intervene 
with a more impassioned speech, designed to refocus the Plenary and remind them of the grass-
roots implications of the polices.  
Scope 
 A welcomed move towards systems thinking when addressing food security has resulted in an 
expansion of the scope of food security policy. Such expansion is necessary for adequately 
addressing hunger, but a few challenges immediately emerge. First, the opening up brings in a 
broader range of actors and necessarily complicates issues.  Another implication of expansion of 
the scope of food security and the increasing move towards a systems approach is turf wars. 
Through their work, actors enact ‘food security’ in very different ways, resulting in a 
complicated matrix of discursive tropes: food as commodity; food as safety; food as risk; food 
as health; food as politics; food as value(s); food as identity; food as opportunity; food as 
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boundary; food as enabler. The ways in which food security – a complex result of structures, 
concepts, values, objects and subjects – are perceived by actors within the CFS has implications 
for strategies and collaboration. While this diversity is necessary, there is a need of these actors 
to find ways of working together and developing a common language. There is the need to 
compromise on issues, but this process of compromise can present myriad other challenges 
(Mouffe 2000).  
Coherence 
One of the main aims of the CFS is to promote cohesion across food security policy 
internationally, regionally and at the national level and between all levels.  Policies related to 
food security often contradict each other (for example trade policies may conflict with 
environmental policies and agriculture policies may clash with health policies). Food security 
would be well served by enhanced coherence across policies. At the same time, there is 
consensus generally with respect to the framing of issues and solutions. Neoliberal hegemony 
provides a cohesive link across sectors from the national through to the international.  
Challenging this hegemony is possible, but given the nature to which is embedded not only as 
common sense, but also as the most logical and rational ideology to inform policy, contestation 
proves challenging. Indeed, as illustrated in the review of the two policy roundtables, neoliberal 
logic permeates the policy decisions. In one case, the CSOs opted to walk out of the 
proceedings, an action that had little impact and certainly ensured that counter-hegemonic 
threads – contesting neoliberal logic or providing alternatives to it – were less likely to be 
included.  
Power Politics 
As elucidated in the review of the roundtable on Food Price Volatility, a major challenge facing 
the operation of the CFS and to CSO engagement therein stem from challenges of other groups 
seeking leadership in food security at the global level. Since the food price crisis of 2007-8, 
food security has consistently been on the agenda for G8 and G20 leaders’ summits and new 
programmes, initiatives, alliances and frameworks continue to be advanced through processes 
that lack the same level of participation, transparency and engagement. Given the political and 
diplomatic power of G20 countries, and the high-level political engagement in the activities of 
the G20, it is no surprise when negotiators are left advancing the G20 agenda in other contexts: 
the CFS is, after all, striving for policy coherence.  However, the implications of this, as 
illustrated through the review of the policy roundtable on food price volatility are that the 
world’s twenty most powerful nations are dictating the process for the remaining 106 member 
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countries of the CFS: which hardly represents the democratic aspirations of the CFS or the UN 
more broadly. 33F34  
At the same time, many country delegations lack the capacity and time to grapple with the ever 
growing list of tasks required for engagement in the CFS, not to mention all of their other work 
related to the Rome-based food agencies leaving wealthy countries and larger delegations at an 
advantage.  
Limits of Food Security 
One of the most obvious limitations is that the CFS negotiates and seeks to influence food 
security policies. Food security is a politically negotiated concept that reflects consensus of 
FAO member countries. It has evolved discursively and programmatically since its introduction 
in the 1974 World Food Conference in line with a broader international project of neoliberalism. 
However, it is applied as a way of qualifying issues linked to hunger, notably through access to 
food. Indeed, few disagree with the end goal of food security: the eradication of hunger 
however, the framing of the term and the approaches advanced to achieve it are hotly contested. 
However, given the genesis of the term (see Chapter 4), it will be very difficult to move 
discussion of food security policy beyond the productionist assumptions from which it emerged. 
Furthermore, achieving food security requires political engagement but relevant negotiations 
have been and continue to be are dominated by the economic interests of states and while 
ecological and humanitarian aspects are introduced, they are rarely prioritized. As the next two 
case studies will illustrate, CFS processes and other multilateral discussions on food security 
policy are plagued by a lack of political will to reimagine and reform economic and trade 
systems in ways that can ensure the objective of food security. Attempts are being made to 
change or expand the definition of food security (CFS 2012a) however this could be for the 
worse, not better. A stronger definition that fails to achieve the international consensus that the 
1996 World Summit definition currently holds, could serve to further fragment food security 
policy.  
6.7. Successful Strategies for CSO Engagement with the CFS 
A review of the above analysis, coupled with participant observation and interviews with key 
informants has led to the identification of key actions and strategies that have been successful in 
advancing the goals of civil society actors.  
Technical Capacity/Knowledge  
CSOs often have technical staff dedicated to researching key issues that relate to those 
negotiated at the CFS. By contrast, member states are often represented by diplomats skilled in 
                                                     
 
34 This is not to suggest that this is somehow a new phenomenon, but rather to highlight an on-going 
limitation of multilateral negotiations, inside and outside the UN system.  
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negotiation and politics but less knowledgeable on technical issues, and heavily reliant on 
technical civil servants working back in their capitals. CSOs have earned the trust and respect of 
many of the state delegations and the technical staff working with the CSM through their 
knowledgeable contributions. Related to this, and other strategies, was preparedness. Civil 
society actors arrived at meetings well prepared, often sharing their well-researched 
recommendations and thoughts in advance of the meetings. This preparation supported more 
strategic engagement in the roundtables.  
CSOs are also extremely prepared, especially when compared to Member States. They are 
familiar with the texts, they develop priority areas to defend and key issues to introduce. They 
strategize on how to present these to the Plenary and how to lobby governments on the issue. 
The large amount of work that goes into their preparations is illustrative of a high-level of buy-
in into the CFS process but it also ensure consistent, informed and articulate interventions which 
governments repeatedly acknowledge.  
Growing Political Savvy 
With growing experience participating in the CFS, civil society actors are becoming 
increasingly politically savvy in the processes and procedures of the Committee and are, as a 
result, becoming more influential and effective in negotiations. They are also increasingly fluent 
in reading and analysing UN texts,  and following UN procedures. They are also more confident 
about what their rights are with respect to in the work and negotiations of the CFS.  These skills 
are transferable to other multilateral fora where similar procedures are followed. While CSOs 
may not have participant status outside of the CFS, they will certainly have a better 
understanding of how the processes and mechanism are structured as well as the implicit and 
explicit “rules of the game.” Furthermore, the engagement with government representatives 
(e.g., diplomats, technical staff, policy makers  and policy advisers) serves to enhance their 
networks and their lobbying reach on issues within and outside of the CFS.  
Food Sovereignty as an Alternative, Comprehensive Policy Framework 
Food sovereignty is the vehicle of a global social movement: it is a unifying element of a 
growing network of peasants defending their right to food through the right to define and 
control their food systems. However, food sovereignty is also a political framework, developed 
to politicise food security, grounded by the right to food and flexible enough to allow for the 
incorporation and framing of multiple issues. It effectively re-values food, the way it is grown 
and the communities of people that grow, raise, catch or gather it, process it and bring it to table 
and places small-scale food producers as key decision makers for food systems.  
As a political framework, food sovereignty undertakes a rigorous political analysis of 
agricultural policies and programmes with a focus on relations of power and control of 
resources. It proposed solutions based on experiences of food producers and rooted in an 
approach that gives primacy to producer’s rights, community rights, healthy food systems – 
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through the promotion of agro-ecological production – and gender equality through a defence of 
the rights of women. Food Sovereignty seeks out the maximization of local food system but is 
not opposed to trade of exchange that is fair and respects agro-ecological principles and human 
rights. This framework guides the majority of CSO interventions and provides coherence while 
grounding interventions.  
While the term “food sovereignty” is not often incorporated into the outcomes of the CFS, the 
principles have been included as a result of successful CSO lobbying. And while there is no 
consensus on food sovereignty, even amongst actors in the Civil Society Mechanism, the 
principles are overwhelmingly shared and provide an overarching objective and framework 
under which a diversity of actors can come together to develop joint strategies and positions.   
Positive Approach 
Presenting a positive outlook has been important to the success of CSOs in the CFS. Being 
positive can be a strategic political tactic. Barack Obama did not win the 2010 US presidential 
election campaign by declaring “no we can’t”. In late 2012, Oxfam launched an Africa 
Campaign aimed at changing public perceptions of Africa with images of breath-taking scenery 
accompanied by slogans such as “Let’s make Africa famous for its stunning countryside, not 
hunger”. The aim was to highlight improvements to food supply across the continent. Similarly, 
CSOs, through an application of the food sovereignty framework, present positive proposals 
that include practical and actionable solutions. This is another key benefit of the food 
sovereignty approach: it is inherently a positive framework. It is a pathway to achieving the 
world the social movements want.   
This positive approach links to suggesting solutions. As the leader of a European farming social 
movement explained early on in the process, before the CSM had been presented to the CFS:  
This reform only takes on the meaning if we come up with genuine contributions 
and solutions. The reformed CFS is not a space to forward demands but a space to 
but our recommendations on the table and to forward and negotiate our needs and 
move them forward with governments. It is not a list of what is not working. This 
has been done before. We need to push to have solutions we know will work 
forward. We need to forward solutions and makes sure that they are implemented 
and that governments follow through (Field Notes, Rome, October 2010). 
Another notable shift is the increasing interconnection between a Right to Food framework, 
which is a legalistic approach which emerged from a Western perspective, and the food 
sovereignty framework which is grounded in peasant struggle in the global south. In the CFS, 
and beyond, you see these two frameworks increasing informing one another and strong 
alliances and political strategies being built between these actors. 
Linking Back to the CFS’s Mandate and the High Level Panel of Experts 
Despite the limitations and challenges that come from using the term food security, CSOs were 
effective in shifting the terms of debate by linking their recommendations to the CFS’s focus on 
food security and smallholders. This often helped keep negotiations focused on food security 
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and limiting drift towards private investment frames or market solutions. It also helped to ensure 
that the needs of smallholders were more visible in policy recommendations.  Moreover, despite 
the Committee’s attempt to limit the impact of the High Level Panel of Experts’ reports and 
recommendations, CSOs found it useful to reply on the reports to support their arguments.  
Building Alliances 
 CSOs have been developing strong alliances with national representatives who increasingly 
acknowledge the technical knowledge as well as the local knowledge of CSO participants. 
These alliances have also worked in favour of the CSOs, especially when countries support their 
statements (as evidenced above). These alliances were strengthened through the development of 
a side-event and through meetings with country delegates and sharing positions in advance. 
These alliances were strengthened through the development of a side-event and through 
meetings with country delegates and sharing positions in advance. In an interview, one diplomat 
from a G20 country and active in the CFS explained that in his opinion, CSO statements or CSO 
support for positions advanced by governments now hold more weight in negotiations than 
those of some member countries, even though civil society does not vote (Interview (Negotiator 
from a G20 country), March 2012, Rome).   
Legitimacy 
Questions of legitimacy loom large in literature on civil society engagement in policy making, 
notably around issues of the legitimacy of non-elected actors to participate in democratic 
processes (Buchanan and Keohane 2006; Kersbergen and Waarden 2004; Thomassen and 
Schmitt 1999).  However, as will be illustrated in the next two chapters, in CFS negotiations, 
the views of CSOs were often perceived to be legitimate on the basis lived experience as well as 
technical knowledge. Indeed, their legitimacy comes from their ability to speak to the impact of 
the policies from a personal perspective. This is backed up by a transparent participation process 
facilitated by the civil society mechanism. It must be noted however, that in contrast to 
smallholder investment, a policy issue geared towards smallholders, few CSO actors are 
economists and food price volatility, despite having a disproportionate impact on the world’s 
poor, is framed as a matter of trade and economic and thus seen to require economic and trade-
based solutions. Here, CSOs are clearly at a disadvantage and were unsuccessful in their 
attempts to reframe the debate in line with impacts and alternatives to an industrial globalised 
model that increasing integrates agricultural, financial and energy sectors and leads to 
increasingly volatile markets.  CSOs must continue to find ways to reframe the terms of debate 
in terms that support their positions.  
6.8. Reflections on Scaling-up the CSM and CFS Models 
Since the initial success of the CSM, CSOs have been considering whether the experience of the 
reformed CFS and CSM should be duplicated for other multilateral processes (in particular for 
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the UN Framework on Climate Change Convention). Two separate issues require reflection on 
these issues: institutional reform, and civil society mobilisation.  
With respect to the first, the reform of the CFS came about due to a variety of factors that 
proved central to its success. First, there is the long history of civil society engagement in the 
FAO and the CFS. Furthermore, there is a history of civil society organizations working 
towards greater participation in the Committee specifically. This means that there was time for 
these relationships to develop and for the institution to adapt. In line with this, a direct 
challenges to dominant understandings of “expertise” within the Committee have been widely 
accepted, as made evident not only through the engagement of CSOs on the Advisory Group, as 
well as on Task Teams and Open-Ended Working Groups, but also in the structure and 
principles of the CFS’s High-Level Panel of Experts. These factors created a move favourable 
environment for this sort of reform. 
A key point to consider is the importance of individuals. The reform of the CFS was successful 
in part because people involved truly believed in the importance of CSO engagement. The 
Chairs of the CFS have supported the engagement of CSO and now the Director General of the 
FAO is championing civil society engagement. It remains to be seen who at the UNFCCC who 
could be the champion of such a reform. The most obvious contender is the Climate Action 
Network.  
While not the primary impetus for change, the reform of the CFS gained traction as a reaction to 
a major humanitarian crisis: one billion people hungry. The severity of the situation gave the 
reform political urgency. The acuteness of the crisis opened up space for institutional change. 
Another related point is that the CFS remains politically benign: especially as the G8-G20 and 
other “more influential actors” continue to focus on food security. Because the CFS cannot take 
binding decisions, there is little political risk of bringing CSOs to the table. However, this can 
also be seen as an opportunity: keeping the activities below ministerial level means that there is 
more flexibility, less politicking, and more space for creativity. However, it also means that the 
outcomes carry less weight. What has been interesting to watch is the way in which CSOs have 
dealt with this by linking policy recommendations back to international commitments.  
A representative of a large International NGO active in the CSM since the beginning expressed 
further optimism: 
I'd be a more positive on the potential of being politically relevant. I see the CFS 
creating the building blocks, as well as consolidating political processes (with the 
CSM, with intensive consultation processes, with an independent HLPE), that 
eventually will help to deliver politically. It is still a bit early to see how this will 
translate into national changes and international engagements (Correspondence, 
November 2012, email). 
It is true that it is too early to properly assess now CFS policy recommendations and 
processes translate beyond the CFS, but evidence suggests that the CFS is consistently 
being undermined and remains obscure to those not directly involved, including FAO 
employees.  
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The stability of the Committee, which remains based in Rome is also an important and 
distinguishing feature. Unlike the UNFCCC which hosts plenary meetings in different countries, 
despite having the secretariat in Bonn, having the Committee in Rome and attended 
predominantly by Rome-based country representatives means that there are people in one spot, 
working on the issues, in contact with technical staff and each other. This is important for the 
lobbying work of CSOs, for consistency, for networking, and for getting people to the table.  
At the height of the food price crisis the FAO was put on the defensive as they faced the threat 
of a loss of power and authority as new players (e.g., G8, G20, HLTF, World Economic Forum) 
began to seek out more prominent positions within the transnational policy space mediating 
global food security governance. This suggests that a widening of participation across the FAO 
and within the CFS was in part strategic: increasing participation allowed the Committee to tap 
into calls for increased transparency and participation, notably by G77 countries and CSOs. This 
conforms to broader participatory turn in global governance (Duncan and Barling 2012). This is 
also not to be construed as cynical as it also reflects a commitment and recognition of the need 
for meaningful consultation in policy development as well as the variance in what is considered 
expertise. However, in other multilateral policy spaces, there does not appear to be the same 
threat or sense of institutional urgency. This in part also links to the further financialisation of 
food security and development insofar as wealthy countries not only felt the threat of food 
insecurity with the 2007-8 price spikes but also saw opportunity for market expansion. There is 
no notable rush on the part of wealthy countries to tackle climate change (unfortunately). There 
is also the issue of mutual reinforcement between the FAO and the CFS, which can be seen in 
the use of regional FAO conference to address CFS agenda points. 
A final issue comes down to decision-making, which remains the responsibility of member 
states. In the area of food security, there is relative cohesion and consensus around food 
security. This is not the case when it comes to climate change. This level of agreement in turn 
provides space for the voices of civil society. However, when it comes to climate change 
negotiations, the lack of agreement amongst member states makes it harder for them to come 
together and agree to give CSOs a voice, “knowing that it might contribute to shift power 
balances” (Representative of a large International NGO active in the CSM since the beginning 
Correspondence, November 2012, email). 
The second level of analysis must consider the Civil Society Mechanism itself. The CSM 
worked well initially because it had a core group of politically astute and relatively well-paid (or 
at least financially stable, for the most part) people with a history of engagement who could 
dedicate time, on the ground to developing the proposal, conducting a consultation and 
presenting a document that could be endorsed by a broad range of civil society actors. What’s 
more is that they had legitimacy, authority and trust for the most part and this was really 
important at the beginning.  The IPC was clearly central in this (along with Rome-based NGOs). 
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Perhaps the Climate Action Network could fulfil this role for such a mechanism to facilitate 
engagement in the UNFCCC.  
However it is important to note that the success of the CSM is due in large part to the 
recognition of the role of CSOs which came from the facilitation mechanism. As a 
representative of a large International NGO active in the CSM since the beginning noted:  
Before the reform, CSOs participation was not so structured and did not bring a lot 
of added value (especially for the NGOs that had their own ways to lobby 
governments and institutions). This means that if the aim of CAN [Climate Action 
Network] is to reinforce the coordination between CSOs but without institutional 
recognition of that coordination mechanism, I'm afraid it might fail. 
(Correspondence, November 2012, email). 
These comments speak to the value of the CSM as a strong facilitation mechanism. This also 
raises another point: the work of the IPC and others included a broad (although not uniform) 
commitment to a political framework and a positive vision of change (food sovereignty). This 
created a political grounding and a starting point that has served to unify a lot of the actors. Of 
course not everyone subscribes to food sovereignty as an approach or as a label, but there is 
widespread acceptance of the principles (such as human rights, people’s choice, ecological 
principles, gender equality). So while there is a diversity of opinions within the CSM, there are 
few who disagree fundamentally with a food sovereignty approach. This has been fundamental 
to ensuring that infighting amongst CSOs remains limited. A mechanism to address issues such 
as climate change, or biodiversity would benefit from a similar overarching framework, 
grounded in the struggle and realities of those most affected by the issues. There is also the 
issue of who should be engaged in the mechanism. The CSM relied on categories defined by the 
FAO, it is not clear how such categories could be defined in other fora. 
Along these lines, a key strength of the CSM is its commitment to facilitating the inclusion of 
the voices of those most affected by food insecurity. This build on the longer-term experience of 
CSOs working through the IPC.  At the same time, the IPC has had to open up its own 
mechanism to other CSOs working on food security including larger NGOs and nutrition 
groups. This can be seen in the way in which the IPC initially facilitated the CSM process but 
also in the development of IPC+ which brings together the farmers’ organizations and social 
movements active in the IPC as well as NGOs. Reflecting on the UNFCCC process, the 
facilitating network would need to be open to working with civil society actors who do not 
necessarily understand the issues in the same way.    
In summary, while the expansion of civil society engagement in multilateral policy fora should 
be welcomed and encouraged, the political and historic realities that bring about institutional 
change must be carefully considered.  Given this, it may be wise to begin by developing new 
mechanisms, for example a civil society mechanism for climate change, in an open and 
transparent way, following the examples and lessons learned from the CSM. With a strong 
facilitation mechanism in place, that functions to facilitate participation and not to engage in 
politics, work on institutional change can begin. During this process there will need to be 
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widespread commitment from CSOs to follow and participate in the singular process and to 
ensure that the process remains open and transparent.  
6.9. Summary 
The CFS, with its vision of constituting “the foremost inclusive international and 
intergovernmental platform for a broad range of committed stakeholders to work together in a 
coordinated manner and in support of country-led processes towards the elimination of hunger 
and ensuring food security and nutrition for all human beings”, represents a forum with the 
potential to change the way food security policy is framed by changing who defines the topics 
and who participates in the debates. The impact of civil society engagement has been felt and 
has broadened the scope of debate within the CFS and expanded the scope of policies coming 
out of the CFS (see chapters 7 and 8 for concrete examples). Through their engagement in the 
CFS, social movements are translating their struggles into broader political processes. This 
analysis is being fed back into the CSM with the aim of supporting the continuation of effective 
engagement in the activities of the CFS. There are also opportunities to extend the strategies and 
instructive practices to other fora where CSOs are engaging in policy negotiations and 
multilateral processes. However, given the unique nature of the CFS, more research is needed 
into the potential for transferral of instructive practices.  
A summary of instructional or best practices can be summed up as a series of key point. These 
points have been identified through the analysis of the operation of the CSM and include:  
1. Ensuring enough time for meaningful consultation and development: his will be a slow 
process and will take time; 
2. Maintaining communication between CSOs, between the various levels of the 
mechanism (e.g., Coordination Committee, Advisory Group members, wider 
participants, Secretariat); 
3. Reducing language barriers and potential cultural barriers; 
4. Maintaining interest of existing participants; 
5. Attracting new participants and ensuring that the mechanism continues to open up;  
6. Balance participation and representation; 
7. Working towards consensus while respecting diversity;  
8. Establishing clear, transparent decision-making and accountability mechanisms; 
9. Building trust amongst the different constituencies represented;  
10. Ensuring the sustained meaningful engagement of those most affected by food 
insecurity in all processes.  
As noted above, these points relate to the analysis included in this case study but they are by no 
means extensive. They are a set of best practices that build on the challenges and successes of 
the CFS in what is inarguably its infancy. They can however provide a useful starting point for 
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others seeking to develop multi-stakeholder platforms or processes to engage civil society actors 
in multilateral policy making processes.  
When a representative of a large International NGO active in the CSM from the beginning was 
asked why their organization decided to invest in the CFS over all the other things they could be 
doing, they replied: 
I think the most important thing is the CSM as such. To have an international 
platform of … its more than consultation, you know you confront, you try to 
understand, you discuss strategically… and even if everyone has their own 
autonomy. So it’s an important place for us in that the potential short time conflict 
of interest are being overcome so that the road and framework of food sovereignty 
gets much more body related to concrete issues, so that it’s not something abstract 
and that on the one hand, it can be translated into very concrete negotiation 
processes, hopefully that it is relevant also for, that there is a space that remains 
relevant for social movements. If they leave, it means that the CSM is not able to 
translate their own struggles into broader political forces. For me that is also an 
element. So, at the same time, it’s trying to have a direct link back to the struggles 
people are being confronted and on the other hand, consolidating that other vision, 
or that other alternative. In terms of governance maybe, it’s finding, or supporting, 
again from the CSM perspective, seeing if a more inclusive governance system, if 
it works. Give it a chance! (Interview (Representative of a large International NGO 
active in the CSM), Rome, June 2012). 
Willets (1996) explains that one problem posed by the abstract character of social movements 
participating in the UN is that it “cannot relate to civil society as a whole or to social 
movements, because these are general, abstract collectivities”.  With respect to the CSM, the 
opposite is true. The majority of civil society actors, including social movements, come together 
because they recognise the significance of the reformed CFS and, in turn, the CSM. While there 
are significant tensions, the majority of actors in the CFs subscribe to and defend a food 
sovereignty approach. Furthermore, within the working groups there is a move to work toward 
collective goals which then inform CSM interventions and negotiation strategies.  To suggest 
that the UN, which is comprised of member states, somehow cannot comprehend complexity or 
is somehow homogenous is unfair. Instead, the membership of the UN in many ways is also an 
assembly of abstract collectivities.  What’s more is that through their collective struggle, many 
social movements advance a coherent policy framework (i.e., food sovereignty) which 
increasingly guides their analysis and recommendations. Others rely on a Right to Food 
approach. NGOs, at least within the CFS, increasingly understand their role to one of supporting 
social movement (“backing them up”) although outside of the CFS, solidarity between large 
international NGOs and social movements in the global south is certainly weaker. 34F35 
                                                     
 
35 These tensions were evident in the UK from evaluation a by social movement and smaller NGOs that 
strive to work in solidarity with CSOs from the global south of the “If” campaign. This campaign was 
launched in 2012 in the UK by the large international NGOs hoping to take advantage of the “golden 
moment” presented by the UK hosting the Olympics in the summer of 2012 and taking over the 
presidency of the G8 in 2013.  
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Finally, while enhanced participation of CSOs in the CFS is important in so far as it can expand 
the scope of debate and provide alternative approaches to achieving food security, there is a risk 
that the participatory nature can become “overly cognitivist or rationalistic and thus 
insufficiently egalitarian” by favouring the “educated and the dispassionate” and excluding “the 
many ways that many people communicate reasons outside of argumentation and formal debate, 
such as testimony, rhetoric, symbolic disruption, storytelling and cultural- and gender-specific 
styles of communication” (Bohman, 1999:410). These challenges are constantly addressed and 
evaluated within the CSM and attempts are made to build awareness and make space for 
different modes of communication. Where this becomes most problematic is through the 
interaction of the CSM with the CFS: the CFS is an established and formal governance space 
that operates under formal UN procedures. Thus while the CFS is in favour of including those 
most affected by food security, the organization structure, financial mechanisms and the 
political culture have yet to fully adapt to facilitate their involvement. Yet while there is a goal 
to engage those most affected by food insecurity, there is also realism: it will not always be 
possible to engage those most affected, but the priority is getting people who are affected and 
who can speak for themselves, and not to have people speaking on behalf of others: to allow the 
voices from the social movements to be expressed alongside the more established and NGOs 
participants.  
The reform of the CFS and the implementation of the CSM mark a clear shift and expansion in 
understandings of participation and, as shown above, present a whole new set of complexities 
and challenges that are being addressed, through a variety of means, as they present themselves. 
These challenges are facing networks that have been expanded to incorporate actors who have 
predominantly been committed to deconstructing and contesting the logic of embedded 
neoliberalism as it appears in food security policy, most notably through the advancement of a 
food sovereignty framework. The awareness of these social movement actors of their position 
within the framework of embedded neo-liberalism was illustrated by a leader of a farmers’ 
movement in West Africa stated at the 37th Session of the Committee on World Food Security 
(October 2011) at a policy roundtable on food price volatility: 
Instead of responding to the causes of our poverty and of price volatility, we have 
seen whole catalogues of projects and programmes financed in the name of the 
agricultural sector, billions of dollars are mobilized every year, but the truth is that 
more than half of the peasant families in the majority of our countries do not have 
access to money to buy a plough, a couple of oxen, a cart, or a donkey (Coulibaly, 
2011). 
The approach to food security programming and policy critiqued above exemplifies the deep 
entrenchment of neoliberalism within twenty-first century “institutional behaviour, political 
processes and understandings of socio economic ‘realities’” (Cerny 2008:3). As noted above, 
food security programme and agriculture policies have been transformed by and within this 
process. The farmers’ movement leader from West Africa also gave a personal reflection upon 
the process of neo-liberalism and its impact: 
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About thirty years ago I was in school and we were told that it was better to 
produce for external markets...We were then told that the state was inefficient and 
that more space had to be given to the private sector. At the same time, our states 
were forced to go even more into debt in order to re-establish macroeconomic 
equilibrium. We were told that any support to peasant agriculture — deemed to be 
non-performing—had to be cut…Then we were told to become competitive 
according to the criteria of international financial institutions, and that our states 
were not allowed to protect us any longer. All custom tariffs have been dismantled 
and our markets have been liberalized, food products produced elsewhere have 
started dumping into our markets at low prices, making us even more vulnerable to 
price volatility…However, none of these “solutions” that have been imposed on us 
moved us out of poverty. Worse, we became even more vulnerable. It is within this 
context that peasant agriculture is being asked to perform (Coulibaly, 2011). 
Indeed, these farmers and peasants, pastoralists and fisher-folk, are faced with balancing their 
approach, their knowledge and their ideologies not only with other civil society actors, which 
has been the focus of this paper, but with nation states, the private sector, international financial 
institutions and the UN, many of which serve to maintain and strengthen the logic of 
neoliberalism.  
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7. Case Study 2: Voluntary Guidelines for the Responsible Tenure of 
Land, Fisheries and Forests 
7.1. Introduction 
Since its reform, the Committee on World Food Security has placed considerable emphasis on 
issues related to land, with particular focus on tenure and investment. At their 36th Session 
(October 2010), the CFS organised a policy roundtable on land tenure and international 
investment in agriculture. They also requested the High Level Panel of Experts produce a report 
which was later titled “Land tenure and international investment in agriculture” (see High Level 
Panel of Experts 2011a). At that same session, the Committee gave its support to what was then 
called the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land and Other 
Natural Resources, and decided to establish an open-ended working group of the CFS to review 
the first draft of the Guidelines with a view to submitting them for consideration to the  37th 
Session of CFS (October 2011)(CFS 2010a:para 26.i). 
The Guidelines were not submitted to the 37th session for reasons that will become clear below. 
However in May 2012, the CFS did endorse the “Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible 
Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security” 
(VGGT) marking a key moment in the evolution of the reformed CFS. Since the endorsement, 
their implementation has been encouraged by the G20, Rio+20, the Francophone Assembly of 
Parliamentarians, among others.  
On December 21, 2012, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on Agriculture 
Development and Food Security which “[e]ncourages countries to give due consideration to 
implementing the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, 
Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security, as endorsed by the Committee 
on World Food Security on 11 May 2012.” It also “[r]equests the relevant entities of the United 
Nations system, in accordance with their respective mandates and in the most cost-effective 
manner, to ensure the speedy dissemination and promotion of the Guidelines” (UN General 
Assembly 2012a). 
On January 19, 2013, at the Fifth Berlin Agriculture Ministers’ Summit, Ministers from 80 
countries issued a communiqué on responsible investment in food and agriculture that called on 
parties to confirm their intention to implement the “Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible 
Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security” 
in accordance with national priorities, and further called on business enterprises to comply with 
them domestically and abroad.  The VGGTs have also become a priority for the FAO. By 
February 2013, the FAO had supported ten awareness raising workshops, seventeen country-
level workshops had been requested and fifty-three briefings in thirty-three countries had been 
completed (Hilton 2013). 
To say that the VGGTs represent a landmark in the evolution of the reformed Committee on 
World Food Security would not be hyperbole. According to the FAO, they  represent “an 
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unprecedented international agreement on tenure governance” (Hilton 2013). This case study 
focuses on the development and negotiation of the VGGTs, analyses the outcomes and possible 
implications. Given that participant observation was situated within the civil society 
mechanism, there is an added focus on, and insight into, the role and impact of civil society 
actors. 
It is important to reiterate that civil society actors do not necessarily speak with one voice. 
However, the Civil Society Mechanism’s working group on land tenure, aided by a strong 
facilitator, did manage to develop a strong engagement strategy and joint positions while 
making most effective use of the legitimacy and political skills of social movements and the 
technical expertise and capacity of non-governmental organizations. Their participation 
throughout the process strengthened the rationale for their inclusion as official participants in 
the reformed CFS.  
This case study is organised as follows. First the issue of land tenure is introduced. From there, 
the process of negotiating Voluntary Guidelines on the governance of land tenure is presented 
along with the methodology for undertaking consultation on prepared drafts. From there, the 
content of the final version of the VGGTs is presented. This is followed by a review of the 
negotiation process that led from the First Draft to the final text. To provide insight into the 
process of negotiation at the CFS, discussions related to key or contentious paragraphs are 
summarised and analysed. The analysis highlights the fragmented nature of negotiations while 
illustrating how in the case of the VGGTs alliances were forced around issues and not 
necessarily along regional or historic lines. Tensions raised by language and culture are 
highlighted, as are challenges resulting from a disconnect between negotiators and technical 
staff in the national capitals. What is perhaps most apparent is the active role that civil society 
actors played in these negotiations and the way in which their contributions are taken on par 
with those of states and other CFS participants such as the World Bank, highlighting a shift in 
the operation of intergovernmental negotiations. The case study concludes with consideration of 
next steps and possible implications of the VGGTs.  
7.2. Land Tenure and Food Security 
Land is a fundamental resource that secures the livelihoods of many, especially the rural poor 
who often rely on access to and control over natural resources. Land provides food and shelter 
and is a key factor in economic growth (Behrman, Meinzen-Dick, and Quisumbing 2012; Deere 
and Leon 1997; Deininger, K., Jin, S., & Nagaranjan 2007; Sietchiping 2010). While the notion 
of land is generally associated with surface and underground resources, land is also a physical 
object, an asset and the site of emotional, cultural, historic and spiritual practices. Ensuring 
sustainable land use and eradicating food insecurity is dependent upon how people and 
communities gain, maintain and control access to land. However, land is increasingly scarce as 
a result of a growing world population, environmental degradation, breakdown of customary 
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authority and climate change, and is in turn becoming subject to intensified competition 
(Harvey and Pilgrim 2011). This competition has been made visible through the rapid rise in 
land grabbing and large-scale land acquisitions (Borras et al. 2011; GRAIN 2008; Hall 2011; De 
Schutter 2011). 
Access to land and other natural resources is defined and regulated in societies through complex 
systems of tenure. As such, tenure defines who can use which resources, the duration and the 
conditions of use. Tenure constitutes a web of intersecting interests and forms an important part 
of social, political and economic structures at the household, community and national level 
(FAO 2002). In a report on land tenure and rural development, the FAO (2002) defined land 
tenure in the following way:  
3.1 Land tenure is the relationship, whether legally or customarily defined, among 
people, as individuals or groups, with respect to land. (For convenience, “land” is 
used here to include other natural resources such as water and trees.) Land tenure is 
an institution, i.e., rules invented by societies to regulate behaviour. Rules of tenure 
define how property rights to land are to be allocated within societies. They define 
how access is granted to rights to use, control, and transfer land, as well as 
associated responsibilities and restraints. In simple terms, land tenure systems 
determine who can use what resources for how long, and under what conditions. 
3.2 Land tenure is an important part of social, political and economic structures. It 
is multi-dimensional, bringing into play social, technical, economic, institutional, 
legal and political aspects that are often ignored but must be taken into account. 
Land tenure relationships may be well-defined and enforceable in a formal court of 
law or through customary structures in a community. Alternatively, they may be 
relatively poorly defined with ambiguities open to exploitation. 
This definition highlights the political, social and cultural significance of tenure while alluding 
to the diversity of ways in which these social norms are regulated. Tenure systems include 
informal and unwritten customary rights of access and use to land and natural resources as well 
as more “formal” arrangements (e.g., individual tiling, freehold and leasehold) mediated by 
written contracts, policies and laws. There are also secondary rights that include access to 
migratory routes and grazing lands. Formal and customary tenure systems often co-exist but 
customary systems are under threat as land scarcity increases.  Insecure tenure rights enhance 
vulnerability, conflict, food insecurity and poverty and can lead to increased environmental 
degradation and conflict when competing users fight for control over the resources  (FAO 
2012e; Sietchiping 2010). The governance of tenure is a crucial factor in determining rights and 
associated duties to use and control land, fisheries and forests. Many tenure problems arise as a 
result of weak governance which in turn adversely affects social stability, sustainable resource 
use and the economy.  
7.3. Establishing Guidelines for Tenure of Natural Resources 
Cognisant of the centrality of tenure to food security, and in response to specific requests from 
member states for guidance on the governance of tenure, the FAO began a process of 
developing voluntary guidelines on the governance of land tenure in 2006. Voluntary guidelines 
set out principles and internationally accepted standards for responsible practices by providing a 
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framework that States can use when developing their own strategies, policies, legislation and 
programmes. Furthermore, they can be used by all actors to judge whether proposed actions 
(e.g., policies, investments) constitute acceptable practice. The VGGTs follow the format of 
other FAO voluntary instruments such as the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries; 
International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides; Responsible 
Management of Planted Forests: Voluntary Guidelines; and Fire Management Voluntary 
Guidelines: Principles and Strategic Actions.  
The VGGTs also build on and support the Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive 
Realization of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security, adopted by 
the FAO Council at the Hundred and Twenty-seventh Session (November 2004). The VGGTs 
are in fact grounded in a rights-based approach and list the realisation of the right to adequate 
food as a primary goal (FAO 2012k:para 1.1). 
The Right to Food Guidelines make specific reference to access to resources and assets. They 
encourage states to facilitate stable and non-discriminatory access and utilization of resources 
and to protect the rights of individuals with respect to resources. They also encourage States to 
undertake land reforms consistent with their human rights obligations. Guideline 8B, which is 
specifically on the issue of land, states: 
States should take measures to promote and protect the security of land tenure, 
especially with respect to women, and poor and disadvantaged segments of society, 
through legislation that protects the full and equal right to own land and other 
property, including the right to inherit. As appropriate, States should consider 
establishing legal and other policy mechanisms, consistent with their international 
human rights obligations and in accordance with the rule of law, that advance land 
reform to enhance access for the poor and women. Such mechanisms should also 
promote conservation and sustainable use of land. Special consideration should be 
given to the situation of indigenous communities (FAO 2005:para 8.10). 
The VGGTs also build on the discussions and outcomes of the International Conference on 
Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (ICARRD) held in March 2006. ICARRD had 
established several commissions to tackle key issues around agrarian reform and rural 
development. Commission 1 was established to address Agrarian Reform and Access to Land: 
Challenges and Opportunities. The Commission’s report highlighted the need to approach 
agrarian reform with a broad focus that includes participatory approaches to respond to diverse 
national contexts (ICARRD 2006:para 32). The Commission recognised the challenge of 
achieving balance between agro-business, foreign investment and the interest of small famers 
but reiterated that family agriculture should be a competitive enterprise.35F36  
Building on the findings of the Commission’s Report, the ﬁnal declaration of the ICAARD, 
adopted by 92 states, focused on the importance of secure and sustainable access to land, water, 
                                                     
 
36 Reflecting on the process of developing the VGGTs one participant in the negotiation process noted 
“at a later stage in the process, Brazil made it clear that the Voluntary Guidelines had to be understood as 
part of ICARRD follow-up, which was not the case at the beginning of the consultation process” (Seufert 
2013:183). 
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and other natural resources. Specifically, it called for an increase in the participation of 
stakeholders in agrarian reform processes to develop efficient institutions to apply policies, and 
to respect the role of customary practices where they play a positive role in land management, 
especially common property management. The value of titling and registries as instruments for 
transparency and certainty of property were emphasised as was the importance of internal and 
external markets and market mechanisms. They also agreed that issues of land are related to 
conflict and must be addressed with prudence in the context of stakeholder participation. 
Interestingly, no reference was made to the Voluntary Guidelines on the Right to Food, 
although the final report “emphasized that policy-makers should give high importance to issues 
of food sovereignty and a rights-based approach to agrarian reform and rural development” 
(ICARRD 2006:para 59).36F37  
In 2009, the FAO’s Land Tenure and Management Unit issued a Discussion Paper titled 
“Towards Voluntary Guidelines on responsible governance of tenure of land and other natural 
resources” with the aim of seeking views and comments on Voluntary Guidelines on 
responsible governance of tenure of land and other natural resources (FAO 2009f). The paper 
provided examples of what could be included as guidelines, noting that the Guidelines would be 
prepared through a participatory process involving international organizations, governments and 
civil society.  
When the idea for Voluntary Guidelines on land tenure was conceived, it was assumed they 
would be a technical document aimed at policy makers and field workers and that they would 
receive, at most, two hours of review in the CFS, be approved and then become a resource 
applied by the FAO (Interview (FAO expert), March 2012, London). A year after the release of 
the FAO’s discussion paper, at their 36th Session, the CFS 
encouraged the continuation of the inclusive process for the development of the 
Voluntary Guidelines (Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of 
Tenure of Land and Other Natural Resources – VGGT) building on existing 
regional processes with a view to submitting the guidelines for the consideration of 
the 37th session of CFS and decided to establish an open-ended working group of 
the CFS to review the first draft of the voluntary guidelines (CFS 2010a:para 26.i) 
By bringing them into the CFS, the nature of the guidelines shifted from a technical to a 
political nature and their influence and interest increased. A major rationale, especially for 
CSOs, for the negotiation of the Guidelines within the CFS as to add an additional level of 
influence and standing. Many hoped that intergovernmentally negotiated guidelines would 
provide a counter-balance to emerging guidelines and principles on responsible investment, 
most notably the Principles for the Responsible Agriculture Investment. When questioned about 
the shift from a technical process to a political one, an FAO technical staff person suggested that 
                                                     
 
37
 These are not the only guidelines developed to address issues of investment and land tenure. A list of 
principles and guidelines related to investment in agriculture are listed in Appendix 6. 
. 
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the move was viewed positively in so far as it gave the VGGTs far more political weight. It was 
noted that “we were lucky to have a CFS that was looking for something to do” (Field notes, 
Berlin, June 2013).  
7.3.1. Bringing the VGGTs into the CFS  
As mentioned above, at the 36th Session of the CFS there was agreement to establish an open-
ended working group of the CFS to review the first draft of the Voluntary Guidelines. This 
particular decision was the result of a debate principally led by civil society actors who believed 
that beyond a clear need for guidelines on land tenure governance, the CFS needed to undertake 
a process to counter the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respect Rights, 
Livelihoods and Resources (PRAI). CSOs worked hard to block an endorsement of the then 
RAI, now PRAI, which were developed by the World Bank, UNCTAD, FAO and IFAD in 
2009. The reasoning was that the PRAI was developed without proper consultation. The 
principles were not grounded in a rights-based approach and did not give primacy to goal of 
improving food security. Furthermore, PRAI lacked institutional legitimacy insofar as they were 
never submitted for approval by their respective governing bodies. 
Civil society actors agreed that principles to address large-scale land acquisition and foreign 
investment in agriculture were needed, despite concerns that they could be seen as rationalizing 
land grab, and the problematic assumption that investments are not responsible: all investments 
should be responsible. However, civil society actors argued that before such principles could be 
identified, guidelines for the responsible governance of tenure were needed. Theirs was thus a 
chronological argument, with a rationale located in the reform principles of the CFS: promoting 
food security and supporting national governments to achieve the progressive realisation of the 
right to food. These tactics proved to be successful.  
At the 36th Session, the FS held a discussion on land tenure with a view to endorsing the 
VGGTs and the PRAI. As is the procedure in the reformed CFS, there was a discussion between 
member states and participants to arrive at a decision. Figure 17 provides a comparison of the 
draft decisions presented to the CFS by the Secretariat and the final decisions taken by the CFS 
in the form of recommendations.  
Throughout the negotiations on land tenure, he Committee moved away from endorsing the 
Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respect Rights, Livelihoods and 
Resources (PRAI), opting instead to begin an inclusive process to consider them within the CFS 
and in line with the reform principles. This was a victory for civil society actors who had made 
a statement calling on the CFS to: 
not endorse the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment that Respects 
Rights, Livelihoods and Resources (RAI): the RAI is not an adequate instrument to 
regulate private investment; moreover, RAI principles have been formulated 
through an exclusive process without the participation of communities and 
constituencies most affected by agricultural investments, especially private 
investments. What is needed instead are nationally and internationally enforceable 
laws and public regulations on all investments pertaining to land, including 
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provisions on extra-territorial obligations of states to regulate and make private 
companies accountable for their operations abroad (Field notes, Rome, October 
2010). 
 
With respect to the Guidelines, key changes include a deadline for the submission of the 
Guidelines to the CFS and the removal of FAO governing bodies from the approval process. For 
the RAI process, the draft language calling for “endorsement” of their elaboration was 
weakened to “taking note”, after a long negotiation between member states but notably between 
representatives of the World Bank and La Via Campesina that went on past 2:00 am without 
language interpretation. As an aside, this meeting was a turning point for many:  it was evidence 
of the willingness of member states to open up to the implications of participation. States had 
every right to reach consensus and stop the back and forth between the new participants, and 
end the negotiations much earlier. Instead they made a concerted effort to work through the 
differences and to move towards consensus. Many would suggest that perhaps this is further 
evidence of vertical shifts evident across global governance where states pass responsibility 
onto other actors, but those in the room, who engaged until the end, agree that this was much 
more. This was evidence of a concerted effort on part of all actors to enact the reform vision of 
the CFS. 
In the third recommendation, governments replaced the FAO as the key actors to finalise both 
the Voluntary Guidelines and the Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment, along 
with stakeholders. This move highlights an important shift in national involvement and 
illustrates the move from a technical process towards a political process. It is also illustrative of 
the refocusing on state-engagement as part of the roll-forward processes of the Seoul 
Consensus. Unfortunately, specific reference food security and poverty reduction objectives 
were lost but emphasis on consistency and complementary was retained, in line with the overall 
mandate of the CFS. The negotiations resulted in two additional points. The first point was a 
request to the High Level Panel of Experts to undertake a study into land tenure and investment. 
The final point encouraged member state support for capacity building toward effectively 
addressing land governance. 
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Draft Decision Box (August 2010) Final Recommendations of the 36th Session of 
the CFS (October 2010) 
Endorsing the on-going inclusive 
process of development of the Voluntary 
Guidelines on Responsible Governance 
of Tenure of Land and Other Natural 
Resources and requesting FAO to 
submit the Voluntary Guidelines for 
review and approval by CFS and FAO 
governing bodies 
 
Encouraged the continuation of the inclusive 
process for the development of the Voluntary 
Guidelines (Voluntary Guidelines on the 
Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land 
and Other Natural Resources – VGGT) 
building on existing regional processes with a 
view to submitting the guidelines for the 
consideration of the 37th session of CFS and 
decided to establish an open-ended working 
group of the CFS to review the first draft of 
the voluntary guidelines. 
Endorsing the on-going elaboration of 
Principles for Responsible Agricultural 
Investment that Respect Rights, 
Livelihoods and Resources initiated by 
the World Bank, FAO, IFAD and 
UNCTAD and recommending that the 
consultation process be pursued and 
include all relevant stakeholders 
Taking note of the on-going process of 
developing Principles for Responsible 
Agricultural Investments that Respect Rights, 
Livelihoods and Resources (RAI), and, in line 
with its role, decided to start an inclusive 
process of consideration of the principles 
within the CFS 
Urging FAO and the other international 
organizations involved to continue 
ensuring the consistency and 
complementarity between the two 
processes and to keep focus on their 
food security and poverty reduction 
objectives. 
Urged governments and other stakeholders involved 
in the drafting process of both the VGGT and the 
RAI to ensure consistency and complementarity 
between the two processes.  
 
Requested the HLPE to undertake studies, to 
be presented at the 37th Session of the CFS, 
on the following important issues, in 
accordance with the CFS reform document 
agreed in 2009, and the Rules and Procedures 
for the work of the HLPE: the respective roles 
of large-scale plantations and of small-scale 
farming, including economic, social, gender 
and environmental impacts; review of the 
existing tools allowing the mapping of 
available land; comparative analysis of tools to 
align large scale investments with country 
food security strategies. 
 
Encouraged member state support for capacity 
building toward effectively addressing land 
governance. 
Figure 19: Outcomes of the Policy Roundtable on Land Tenure and International Investment in 
Agriculture (CFS 36) (Duncan 2013) 
 
Methodology 
The VGGTs set out principles and internationally accepted standards for responsible practices. 
Voluntary Guidelines are instruments structured as short framework document that can be used 
in the development of strategies, policies, legislation, programmes and other activities. For the 
VGGTs, a range of additional documents (e.g., supplementary guidelines that provide technical 
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details on specific aspects when necessary, training and advocacy materials, and strategies for 
implementation) are developed by the FAO to support uptake and application of the Guidelines 
(FAO 2012c).  
The FAO and the CFS committed to ensuring that the VGGTs were developed in a consultative 
and participatory way and participatory policy making is necessarily a time consuming process. 
That said, the VGGTs managed to undertake widespread, meaningful consultation in a 
reasonable amount of time. The methodology used in the drafting of the Guidelines was 
applauded by all stakeholders for their participatory and consultative effectiveness. In total, ten 
regional, one private sector and four civil society consultation meetings were organized between 
September 2009 and November 2010. The FAO coordinated regional consultations in Brazil, 
Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Jordan, Namibia, Panama, Romania, the Russian Federation, Samoa 
and Viet Nam. Four more regional consultations were held specifically for civil society in 
Africa; Asia; Europe and Central and West Asia; and Latin America. These meetings brought 
together almost 1,000 representatives from government institutions, civil society, private sector, 
academia, and UN agencies from across 130 countries. Each consultation meeting included an 
assessment to identify issues and actions to be included in the Guidelines in the context of 
governance of tenure. Building on the consultations, FAO technical staff developed a Zero Draft 
of the Guidelines. On April 15th 2011, there was a public reading in FAO of the Zero Draft. 
From April 18 - May 1, 2011, an electronic consultation on the Zero Draft was organized. Then, 
from July 12-15, 2011 the CFS hosted intergovernmental negotiations. It is important to 
remember that under the reform of the CFS, these negotiations were open to the participation of 
civil society and private sector actors, among others.  
Following the electronic consultation on the Zero Draft, a First Draft was developed by FAO 
technical staff. It was written so as to be consistent with international and regional instruments 
that address human rights and tenure rights. It was also informed by the broad and inclusive 
process of consultation that took place from 2009-2010. In terms of including the outcomes of 
the consultation into the First Draft, it was noted that:  
Some proposals were not included in this revised draft because they provided a 
greater level of detail than that which can be accommodated in an instrument of 
this nature, and they may be more suited for supporting material that will become 
available later. In other cases, several different views were put forward in ways that 
did not allow them to be reconciled into a single proposed change. The 
reconciliation of such different views will be addressed along with other matters 
during the CFS-led negotiations and open-ended working group meetings which 
are intended to lead to a final text of the Voluntary Guidelines in July 2011 (FAO 
2012c:4). 
The First Draft was submitted to the open-ended working group on June 1, 2011 and comments 
were compiled by the CFS Secretariat. From June 15-17 the open-ended working group tried to 
focus the discussion and prepare for the negotiations. From July 12-15, the Open-Ended 
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Working Group met in Rome to negotiate the text meeting but they were unable to come to 
consensus on all paragraphs and thus did not complete the process. 37F38. A second round of 
negotiations took place the week before the 37th Session. Still the negotiations did not conclude 
and a final session was added for March 2012. Yet despite the extended work plan, there was 
widespread and growing agreement of the value of the process and the potential of the outcome. 
Instead of endorsing the VGGTs, at their 37th Session, the CFS “recognized that additional time 
will be required to complete the process and endorsed its continuation and finalization” while 
also acknowledging that  “substantial progress [had been] gained so far and recommended 
building on the solid base which has been achieved, while concentrating on remaining 
paragraphs and respecting and maintaining the spirit of understanding reached during the July 
and October negotiations” (CFS 2011d:paras 11 & 12).  
The phrase “concentrating on remaining paragraphs and respecting and maintaining the spirit of 
understanding reached” was key. The open-ended working group had deliberated and facilitated 
intergovernmental negotiations that had led to consensus on the majority of the text and there 
was a great deal of concern that re-opening negotiations on specific paragraphs would at best 
slow down, and at worst derail, the process. That said, as the Canadian negotiators endlessly 
reminded the Committee, nothing decided in the Working Groups was final. Final decisions 
could only be taken by the Plenary and every government has the right to raise concerns in 
Plenary thereby blocking consensus. After an extended negotiation in March 2012, the Open-
Ended Working Group reached consensus and an extra-ordinary meeting of the CFS was called 
in May 2012 for the CFS to endorse the VGGTs. The VGGTs were endorsed unanimously by 
96 member countries. 
Review of the First Draft 
As will be shown below, the First Draft failed to adequately recognize the structural problems 
linked to land tenure and assumed weak tenure to be weak management. Furthermore, it failed 
to give sufficient weight to issues related to discrimination (e.g., race, class, ethnicity, wealth, 
and age) and related restrictions to access to land, and recognition of tenure or rights to land. 
However, it is here argued that the transition from Zero Draft to the final Guidelines is evidence 
of the value of meaningful and diverse consultation and participatory negotiations. 
The First Draft contains several weaknesses. First, it started from the assumption that states own 
land and that they have the authority to distribute tenure rights, so long as the actions conform 
to a set of guidelines. Viewed this way, the guidelines are no longer a tool for responsible 
                                                     
 
38 Sections where consensus had been reached include: Preface; Section 1 (Objectives); Section 2 
(Nature and scope); Section 3 (Guiding principles) up to and including 3B.6.; Paragraph 9.8 of Section 9 
(Indigenous peoples and other communities with customary tenure systems); Paragraph 12.5 of Section 
12 (Investments and concessions); Section 13 (Land consolidation and other readjustment approaches); 
Section 14 (Restitution); Section 15 (Redistributive reforms); Section 16 (Expropriation and 
compensation)  
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governance towards but instead a tool for states and/or elite groups to rationalize or legitimise 
control over natural resources. Framing land tenure this way opens the Guidelines up for 
potential tensions over the multiple uses and roles of land across contexts. The First Draft failed 
to live up to claims of being aligned with existing human rights instruments insofar as it did not 
uphold or reinforce existing rights such as those included in the UN Declaration on Indigenous 
Peoples (UNDRIP). CSOs raised concerns that the Guidelines could be used to dilute existing 
rights. As evidence, they pointed to shifts in language from consultation to negotiation between 
the Zero and First Drafts. CSOs reminded the CFS that rights are not negotiable nor should 
people have to negotiate for their land. Talk of negotiation contradicts the UNDIP commitment 
to free, prior and informed consent.  
As another example from the Zero Draft, wording had changed from stating countries should act 
in ways that are “consistent with international and regional human rights obligations” to 
“consistent with their obligations and voluntary commitments to applicable international and 
regional human rights norms and standards”. While the inclusion of voluntary commitments is 
good, the revised sentence is arguably weaker overall. Given the voluntary and thus non-binding 
nature of the Guidelines, it is not likely that they could easily (if at all) undermine a UN 
declaration on rights. However, the fact that states were unwilling to ensure coherence between 
the pre-existing rights defined in UNDRIP and the Guidelines, and that they failed to use the 
Guidelines to strengthen the rights of vulnerable people, including Indigenous peoples, is 
telling.   
The controversial issues of markets and investment remained highly problematic across both 
drafts. On this matter, CSOs consistently argued for the need to recognize that there are other 
types of land-based investment beyond agriculture that impact small-scale food producers (e.g. 
mining, development, military). CSOs also raised concern that the discourse of development 
could be used to rationalize changes in land tenure systems. They cited examples of the 
development of beach resorts for tourism, nothing that such processes often disregard food 
producers and customary uses of, and rights to, these lands and resources. Land rights are also 
restricted by projects undertaken in the name of conservation, where communities are pushed 
off their land or their access to natural resources is restricted so as to protect a specific species 
of animal or biodiversity.  
Some of these concerns were addressed between the First Draft and the final version of the 
VGGTs. Most notably, the final version of the VGGTs ground the VGGTs in a rights-based 
approach: 
4.2 States should ensure that all actions regarding tenure and its governance are 
consistent with their existing obligations under national and international law, and 
with due regard to voluntary commitments under the applicable regional and 
international instruments. 
A rights-based approach strengthen the VGGTs insofar as while they remain voluntary, the 
guidelines build on and take form existing international obligations and commitments. 
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Grounding the VGGTs in a rights-based approach was a direct outcome of strong interventions 
and negotiation by civil society actors and the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, who 
developed a strong strategy and rationale for grounding the document in a rights-based 
approach. Such an approach further strengthens the links between the VGGTs and the CFS 
which is mean to “strive for a world free from hunger where countries implement the voluntary 
guidelines for the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the context of national 
food security” (CFS 2009a:para 4). 
7.4. An overview of the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance 
of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food 
Security 
The purpose of the VGGTs is to “serve as a reference and provide guidance to improve the 
governance of tenure of land fisheries and forests with the overarching goal of achieving food 
security for all and to support the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the 
context of national food security”(FAO 2012k:iv). Towards this end, the VGGTs cover five key 
areas related to the responsible tenure of land, fisheries and forests: Legal recognition and 
allocation of tenure rights and duties, including safeguards, public resources, Indigenous 
Peoples, and informal tenure; transfer and other changes to tenure rights and duties, specifically 
as they relate to markets, investments, land consolidation; restitution; redistributive reform; the 
Administration of tenure including records of tenure rights, valuation, taxation, resolution of 
disputes, and transboundary matters; responses to climate change and emergencies; and the 
promotion, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.  
These areas are all framed by a set of guiding principles of responsible tenure governance as 
well as principles for implementation (Part 3). The former declare that states should recognise 
and respect all legitimate tenure right holders, safeguard legitimate tenure rights and provide 
access to justice to deal with infringement of legitimate tenure rights. Furthermore, non-state 
actors including businesses have a responsibility to respect human rights and legitimate tenure 
rights. Ten principles for implementation are identified: human dignity; non-discrimination; 
equity and justice; gender equity; holistic and sustainable approach; consultation and 
participation; rule of law; transparency; accountability; continuous improvement.  
In the First Draft there were only nine principles with “Gender and social equity, and gender 
and social justice” constituting a single principle which recognised that “equality between 
individuals may require acknowledging differences between individuals, and taking positive 
action, including empowerment, to ensure equitable treatment and outcomes for all, women and 
men, and vulnerable and marginalized people”(FAO 2012c). In the final document, the social 
focus was lost when the principle was split into “Gender equality” and “Equity and justice”. The 
principle of equity and justice recognises “that equality between individuals may require 
acknowledging differences between individuals, and taking positive action, including 
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empowerment, in order to promote equitable tenure rights and access to land, fisheries and 
forests, for all, women and men, youth and vulnerable and traditionally marginalized people, 
within the national context.”  
Section 1.2 outline the objectives of the Guidelines, specifically: 
1.2.4 strengthen the capacities and operations of implementing agencies; judicial 
authorities; local governments; organizations of farmers and small-scale producers, 
of fishers, and of forest users; pastoralists; indigenous peoples and other 
communities; civil society; private sector; academia; and all persons concerned 
with tenure governance as well as to promote the cooperation between the actors 
mentioned (FAO 2012k). 
This paragraph represents a key battle for CSOs who fought for a definition of small-scale 
producers to be included. It is noteworthy that the term “small-scale producers” is used over 
smallholders as the focus is specifically on food producers. Furthermore, in the First Draft, civil 
society came after the private sector in the listing and judicial authorities replaced reference to 
courts thereby increasing relevance across multiple contexts and respecting systems of 
traditional authority.  
To improve on the implementing principle of transparency, a proposal was made by the Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, represented by the Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Food, who sits on the Advisory Group to the CFS. The proposal was to explicitly state 
the need to make information available in formats accessible to all “including women, 
communities in remote areas and persons with disabilities”. The proposal was rejected. The 
final principle reads:  
3B.8 Transparency: clearly defining and widely publicizing policies, laws and 
procedures in applicable languages, and widely publicizing decisions in applicable 
languages and in formats accessible to all”.  
Some delegations argued that rather than have a “bucket list” it was more appropriate to ensure 
accessibility for all. The limitation of this being that a focus on everyone depoliticized or shifts 
focus away from the groups of people who are most often ignore. However, in the spirit of 
language harmonization, and to avoid inevitably leaving groups off the list, throughout the 
document the application of the implementing principles and relevant guidelines apply broadly 
“to all”, with the notable exception of Section 9 which relates specifically to Indigenous peoples 
and other communities with customary tenure systems.  
Tensions related to issues of state sovereignty and definitions were inevitable and 
correspondingly took a prominent position in the negotiations. These tensions are raised 
immediately in paragraph 1.1 where, referring to the objectives of the Guidelines it notes that 
the “Voluntary Guidelines seek to improve governance of tenure of land*, fisheries and forests.” 
The asterix refers to a footnote that states “there is no international definition of land within the 
context of tenure. The meaning of the word may be defined within the national context.” This is 
problematic given that the guidelines are meant to provide guidance on the tenure of land and 
that becomes challenging if land remained defined. Throughout the negotiations countries were 
adamant about maintaining their right to define land within a national context. While this does 
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remain the right of countries, a definition of what “land” is would certainly have strengthened 
the Guidelines. Broad definitions of land do exist and the FAO discussion paper on the 
development of guidelines did provide a definition that could have been used: 
Terminology is problematic in any material of this nature. In order to simplify the 
text, the term “land” is used to include any human-made improvements to the land, 
including housing and other buildings, and infrastructure such as irrigation 
systems. In addition to land, the discussion paper addresses other natural resources 
(such as trees and forests, pastures and other vegetation, water and fisheries) that 
cover the land or are otherwise related to it (FAO 2009f:1–2). 
Building on the theme of state sovereignty, the final version of the Guidelines includes a new 
paragraph (2.5) which states that “These Guidelines should be interpreted and applied in 
accordance with national legal systems and their institutions.” This directive is reiterated in 
3.1.2 with reference to the principles that should be upheld by states. In reference to safeguards, 
language was added to clarify that states should protect tenure rights holders against the 
arbitrary loss of their tenure rights, including forced evictions “that are inconsistent with their 
existing obligations under national and international law.”  In that same section, language 
related to the prevention of corruption was weakened for the final document. The First Draft 
mentioned that states “should prevent opportunities for corruption in all forms, at all levels, 
and in all settings” but this was changed to “should endeavour to prevent corruption”. The 
shift is subtle but important and reflects awareness on the part of governments that they could 
potentially be held to these Guidelines.  
7.5. Negotiating the Voluntary Guidelines: Insight into process and 
participation  
It is important to note that the negotiations VGGTs were technically not negotiations but 
discussions and consultations by the Open-Ended Working Group. Even after the Guidelines 
had been finalised in the Working Group, member states had the right to reopen the text and 
launch negotiations in the CFS Plenary. While the Working Group was only “consulting” on the 
text so that it could present it to the CFS plenary for endorsement, in practice, the Working 
Groups, especially by the March 2012 session, functioned very much like a session of the 
plenary and the participants adopted the language of “negotiation” and worked in a manner that 
was almost indistinguishable from the negotiations that take place during the CFS sessions.  
Furthermore, in promoting the VGGTs, actors including the CFS and the FAO speak about 
them as being the result of intergovernmental negotiations. Because of this, the language used 
herein relates to negotiations as a more adequate reflection of the process and to distinguish the 
efforts of the CFS open-ended working group from the consultations that took place around the 
Zero and First Draft.  
Building buy-in and convincing member states about the relevance and potential of these 
Guidelines took time. This is perhaps not surprising given the politically sensitive nature of land 
tenure and related issues. When the FAO launched the process, it was mainly European 
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countries that supported the process financially. There was hesitation on the part of many 
African countries due to the fact that in 2009 the African Union had adopted a Land Policy 
Framework and were concerns over how the two documents would correlate. That said, the 
Africa Group ended up playing a critical role in the negotiations, often forging political 
alliances with the EU and rejecting claims by other governments that such guidelines were not 
needed by giving concrete examples of why they were needed.  Indeed, the insistence of African 
governments on the potential value of guidelines for the governance of land, fisheries and 
forests provided motivation and legitimacy throughout the negotiation process.  
Asian countries were largely absent from the negotiations. The delegate from Afghanistan was 
the exception and the Chinese delegation followed the negotiation closely and contributed to 
discussions on tenure in the context of state-owned land and markets. That the negotiations on 
the text take place in English can be given as part of the reason. India was completely absent 
from the discussions, which was surprising in part given that India had been active in processes 
linked to the Voluntary Guidelines on the Progressive Realization on the Right to Food, but 
perhaps less surprisingly when one considers that India is involved in 65 land investment 
deals whereof 39 are transnational and 26 domestic (International Land Coalition 2013). The 
land tenure conflict related to Kashmir district could have also limited a desire to enter into 
international discussions on land tenure.  
In what follows five specific paragraphs are reviewed. Focus is on the processes of negotiations 
that took place during the final session of the CFS intergovernmental working group (March 
2013). The process of negotiation unrolled as follows. Working in English with the proposed 
text projected onto a large screen, participants would identify themselves to the chair and then 
the chair would call on them to make suggestions. Scribes noted the suggestions in the working 
document using track changes. This tracked all of the inclusions and deletions. All members of 
the Committee, including civil society, governments and the private sector, had the right to 
make suggestions and all suggestions must be taken into account. Negotiations continued until 
member states reached consensus on the text. 
Proposed text was inserted into the working text and if it was contentious it was put into square 
brackets. Proposed text that had been rejected was crossed out. In the cases where it became 
apparent that the plenary was unlikely to find consensus the problematic paragraphs were sent to 
a “Friends of the Chair” (FOC) group. For this, the Chair identified an agreeably neutral 
“friend” (most often a government representative from a member state with little stake in the 
issue) to facilitate negotiations between interested parties. These groups are in theory open to all 
interested CFS participants. However, often these groups meet simultaneously as the plenary 
negotiations continue. This actively restricts the level of participation as many delegations do 
not have enough people or resources to cover both meetings. Consequently, wealthier countries 
are better represented in these groups. Less well staffed delegations tend to develop regional 
alliances and divide the work amongst themselves. Once the Friends of the Chair reaches 
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consensus, the facilitator reports back to the chair, and often Plenary, with a text that has the 
agreement group and consensus is sought from plenary to approve the language. When 
consensus is reached amongst member states, the changes are accepted and the text is “cleaned” 
(meaning track changes are accepted) and the paragraph is then closed.  
The paragraphs selected for review reflect the most contentious issues dealt with during the 
negotiations: state-owned land; responsible investment; provisions for investment; climate 
change and emergencies; and, implementation. As such, a review of the process sheds light on 
the various tensions that exist within the CFS. At the same time, they provide insight into how 
the CFS navigates these tensions. The overall aim of the review is to highlight the complexity of 
political positions as well as the way in which non-state actors, notably civil society actors, 
influence the final outcome.  In an effort to clarify the analysis, tables have been developed. The 
tables compare the text at the start of the negotiations (March 2012) and the final text and 
provide a summary of changes. Under the tables, descriptions of the negotiation process are 
provided. These outline the chronology and key tensions of negotiations as participants moved 
towards consensus. 
Tenure rights for state owned land (the commons) 
8.2 Recognising legitimate tenure rights where state own or control land, fisheries and 
forests 
March 2012 Final Text Changes of Note 
8.2 Where States own or control 
land, fisheries and forests, they 
should respect existing [holders of 
legitimate tenure rights] [tenure 
right holders] [and their rights]. 
States should [recognise and 
respect, in accordance with 
national law] [provide legal 
recognition], in a non-
discriminatory and gender-
sensitive way, [to] [legitimate] 
tenure rights of individuals and 
communities [with customary 
tenure systems] [,including 
legitimate customary tenure rights, 
that are considered legitimate but 
are not currently protected by law.] 
States should define through 
widely publicized rules the 
categories of [legitimate tenure] 
rights [that are considered 
legitimate.] (proposed in plenary 
discussions)  
OR: [Where States own or control 
land, fisheries and forests they 
should operate in line with 
paragraph 4.5.] (alternative 
version of 8.2 proposed in plenary 
discussions) 
Where States own or 
control land, fisheries and 
forests, the legitimate 
tenure rights of individuals 
and communities, 
including where applicable 
those with customary 
tenure systems, should be 
recognized, respected and 
protected, consistent with 
existing obligations under 
national and international 
law, and with due regard to 
voluntary commitments 
under applicable regional 
and international 
instruments. To this end, 
categories of legitimate 
tenure rights should be 
clearly defined and 
publicized, through a 
transparent process, and in 
accordance with national 
law.  
 
This section refers to 
government owned land, 
fisheries and forests, 
including the commons.  
Respect existing tenure 
rights became recognise 
tenure rights. 
The link to international 
law reinforces the rights-
based approach. 
The need for states to 
develop clear categories of 
legitimate tenure rights is a 
positive addition.  
While the focus on non-
discrimination and gender-
sensitive approaches is lost, 
those aspects have been 
strengthened in the 
principles for 
implementation.  
Inclusion of “where 
applicable those with 
customary tenure systems” 
weakens this paragraph. 
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Part 8 of the VGGTs addresses issues of public land, fisheries and forests. The Chair introduced 
this paragraph by noting that 8.2 and 8.3, which describe state-owned or controlled land, 
fisheries and forests were repetitive of 4.5 (“States should protect legitimate tenure rights, and 
ensure that people are not arbitrarily evicted and that their legitimate tenure rights are not 
otherwise extinguished or infringed”), 3.1.2 (“State should safeguard legitimate tenure rights 
against threats and infringements”), and 3B (the ten principles of implementation). The Chair 
proposed the following to replace 8.2 and 8.3: “Where states own or control land, fisheries and 
forests, the legitimate tenure rights of individuals and communities not currently protected by 
law should be respected. Categories of legitimate tenure rights should be clearly defined and 
publicised.”   
The delegate from Mexico was first to interject. They generally agreed with the change but 
argued that there was a need to talk about legitimate beneficiary rights since the land, fisheries 
and forests remain state property. The delegate provided alternative wording. 
A representative for fish workers spoke next and raised concern with the Chair’s formulation. 
They urged the Committee not to replace 8.3 and to focus efforts on refining 8.2. A key reason 
for this was that strong principles outlined in 8.3 would be lost. At this time, 8.3 stated: 
States  should  establish  up-to-date  tenure  information  on  land,  fisheries  and 
forests   that  they  own  or  control  by  creating  and  maintaining   accessible 
inventories.   Such   inventories   should   record   the   agencies   responsible   for 
administration as well as any legitimate tenure rights held by indigenous peoples 
and other customary communities and the private sector. Where possible, States 
should ensure  that  the  publicly-held  tenure  rights  are recorded  together  with 
tenure rights of indigenous  peoples and other customary communities and the 
private sector in a single recording system, or are linked to them by a common 
framework (FAO 2012c). 
The general sense of 8.3 (which eventually became 8.4) was retained in the final version, 
however it was modified slightly to say that states should “strive” to establish, in lieu of simply 
establishing, tenure information, a successful attempt to weaken the language and again 
evidence of the way states had started to think about the potential responsibilities that could 
come with these guidelines.  
The delegate representing the EU and Switzerland noted that 8.3 was about collectively 
managed resources and questioned the rational for eliminating it. It was noted that at the start of 
the negotiation process reference to “the commons” caused problems but that they had devised a 
grammatical solution with “state owned land”.  The EU did not support the text proposed by 
Mexico on the basis that it contradicted language agreed to in earlier negotiations. The delegate 
from Chile, speaking on behalf of GRULAC (the Latin American and Caribbean Group) spoke 
to support Mexico’s suggestion to change legitimate tenure to beneficiary rights because the 
paragraph discusses land that is owned by the state. At this point the delegate from Mexico 
spoke again and clarified that they were speaking about “user rights” and not “beneficiary”. 
They noted that the confusion was due a translation issue.  
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This illustrates a key challenge of these text-based negotiations.  The text was negotiated in 
English, but many delegations working in other languages. As a result, a great deal of pressure 
was placed on interpreters who at times failed to use the correct term or word. Indeed, 
throughout the process there are several examples of incorrect translations causing temporary 
blocks in the consensus-building process. In this specific case, elucidation came when the 
Resource Person of the civil society working group on land tenure, who was fluent in both 
English and Spanish, and went over to speak directly to the Mexican delegation to seek 
clarification. This example serves to highlight another important role played by civil society 
actors – that of inter-mediator – in these negotiations.  
Once the translation problem had been cleared up, the representative from Canada spoke to 
question the need for the inclusion of “not currently protected by law” and requested that it be 
removed. This was a point they had pushed for in the previous round of discussions and noted 
that on top of a reference to “legitimate” this presented a redundancy.  
This was followed by a request by the representative of the International Indian Treaty Council 
that “indigenous peoples” be inserted ahead of “individuals and communities” in 8.2, in line 
with other treaties and paragraphs (e.g., 8.4). The representative from South Africa then spoke 
on behalf of the Africa Group and called for the inclusion of “transparent process” and 
supported keeping 8.3.  The suggestion was accepted.  
The delegate from Canada took the floor to address the proposal from the International Indian 
Treaty Council and request that “indigenous peoples” not be added. The delegate noted that 
within the Guidelines there is “an entire section on indigenous communities” and asked the 
group “not to add this concept to other sections as this will add a great deal of work to 
paragraphs that have been dealt with in other places.” This rejection was later supported by the 
EU.  
Coming back to the issue of legal versus legitimate, the delegate from Ecuador spoke to 
highlight the difference between the two terms and called the group to keep the language on 
“not currently protected by law”. The Chilean negotiator encouraged Canada to withdraw their 
proposal for deletion, noting that in the Latin American context, legitimacy and legality are two 
different things. The negotiator explained that “tenure is exercised over land by indigenous 
people but they do not have legal status”. The current and historic socio-political relationship 
between the Canadian government and the indigenous people of Canada and on-going political 
negotiations (historic, present and future) around land rights and access to natural resources.  
Following Chile’s intervention, the Chair questioned the Canadian delegation on whether they 
could withdraw their request to delete “not currently protected by law”, and they replied that 
they would need time to consider this. To encourage Canada, the Chair referenced paragraph 
8.4, for which language had been agreed to and that reference to “legitimate tenure rights held 
by indigenous peoples and other customary communities and the private sector”. The Canadian 
delegation turned to the “bucket list” argument noting that if they were to add indigenous people 
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they would also have to include a long list of names, “making the text practically illegible”. The 
Chair supported the argument, noting that it had been a principle “not to add lists because 
frequently people are left out.” The delegate from Canada then referenced paragraph 4.4 which 
was closed (i.e., consensus had been reaches) which notes that states should provide legal 
definitions of legit tenure rights not currently protected.  The delegate from the USA supported 
Canada and called on delegates to delete “not currently protected by law” because as that would 
give states the right to recognise tenure rights whether or not they are recognised by law, 
addressing GRULACs concerns. The American delegate went on to say that they still had 
“trouble understanding how legitimate tenure rights would not be protected by law, but this 
gives states the opportunity to recognise those rights.”  
Contextualising the debate in the context of indigenous rights, the representative of the 
International Indian Treaty Council spoke to explain that their rights are linked to specific 
tenure rights. Indigenous peoples are included in other paragraphs but that Section 9 on 
indigenous peoples does not make reference to state-owned land. The representative noted that 
“many of the indigenous peoples in the U.S. do not have legally recognised tenure rights, 
currently”.  
The speaker from the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues supported the previous 
speaker and called on the Committee to keep the language of “not currently protected.” They 
reiterating that Section 9 does not contain the totality of what should be included. The speaker 
also reminded the Committee that it had been previously agreed that when it comes to issues not 
covered in Section 9, indigenous peoples should be added, “not in all paragraph but in areas 
where appropriate”.  
The EU representative, speaking about the original text, noted similar language had been agreed 
to in other paragraphs and for coherence they supported the original phrasing, and not a 
substitution of user rights. 
The Chilean representative then spoke to address a tension: “there is a certain confrontation 
between the design of the Latino legal system and the Anglo legal system. There is a difference 
in Latin America between legitimacy and legality and legitimacy is not enough for tenure to 
have consequences and there is a need to recognise legality.” They also noted that they 
understood that in “Anglo” law, there is no legitimacy without legality.  
The Friends of the Chair on Language Harmonization spoke in an attempt to resolve the on-
going debate: 
The general clause in 4.4 asks for recognition of tenure rights not currently 
protected by law. 8.2 is only dealing with land owned by the state so we could 
harmonise with language in 4.4. There is a need to respect all recognised tenure 
rights and also when they are not legally protected. We can reiterate the same 
phrase but with state-owned land. 
The Canadian delegate noted that 8.2 is about commonly owned state land whereas 4.4 calls on 
states to look at land, and legally recognise what is legitimate, concluding that “Canada cannot 
go farther on this right now,” as clarification of their inability to back down on their request. 
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At this point the Chair recognised that there was no way to build consensus. At 23:18 the Chair 
sent 8.2 and 8.3 a new Friends of the Chair, Cape Verde.  The next day at the afternoon session 
the FOC wording was presented with the inclusion of a new paragraph. The final text read:  
8.2 Where States own or control land, fisheries and forests, the legitimate tenure 
rights of individuals and communities, including where applicable those with 
customary tenure systems, should be recognized, respected and protected, 
consistent with existing obligations under national and international law, and with 
due regard to voluntary commitments under applicable regional and international 
instruments. To this end, categories of legitimate tenure rights should be clearly 
defined and publicized, through a transparent process, and in accordance with 
national law.  
8.3 Noting that there are publicly-owned land, fisheries and forests that are 
collectively used and managed (in some national contexts referred to as commons), 
States should, where applicable, recognize and protect such publicly-owned land, 
fisheries and forests and their related systems of collective use and management, 
including in processes of allocation by the State. 
8.4 States should strive to establish up-to-date tenure information on land, fisheries 
and forests that they own or control by creating and maintaining accessible 
inventories. Such inventories should record the agencies responsible for 
administration as well as any legitimate tenure rights held by indigenous peoples 
and other communities with customary tenure systems and the private sector. 
Where possible, States should ensure that the publicly-held tenure rights are 
recorded together with tenure rights of indigenous peoples and other communities 
with customary tenure systems and the private sector in a single recording system, 
or are linked to them by a common framework.  
The problem of legal versus legitimate was addressed in the new paragraph 8.3 which called on 
states to recognise and protect the systems of collective use and management on publically-
owned lands. CSOs failed to secure the inclusion of indigenous peoples in 8.2. This is because 
the CFS works towards consensus and the Canadian delegation did not have the authority from 
its Capital to accept the inclusion of indigenous peoples in this section. This example illustrates 
the influence that one country can have and how national-level priorities make their way into 
international negotiations. What is perhaps not as clear in the review above is the political 
pressure placed on the individuals negotiating the positions sent to them by technical experts in 
their capitals. Countries that have been able to effectively veto changes proposed by others are 
the traditionally more powerful and wealthy states. Finally, the discussions reviewed above 
illustrate one of the few times where Western governments explicitly engaged with the VGGTs 
in terms of their potential impact on domestic policy. Through the negotiations, Western 
governments tended to speak in terms of what these guidelines could go for developing 
countries and their role as donor countries, and rarely was there consideration of the influence 
and impact the VGGTs could have in the Global North.  
Responsible Investment and Safeguarding 
When the negotiations turned to Section 12 on Investment, the Chair sarcastically proclaimed 
“and now the fun really begins” suggesting that this section of negotiations would be a great 
challenge. Indeed, the section on investment proved to be the most contentious, mirroring 
growing cleavages between “business as usual” approaches defined by neoliberal policies and 
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the alternatives informed predominantly by food sovereignty frameworks and rights-based 
approaches. 
Section 12 on investment contains fifteen paragraphs. Importantly, 12.2 recognises that 
smallholder producers and their organizations in developing countries provide a major share of 
agricultural investments that contribute significantly to food security, nutrition, poverty 
eradiation and environmental resilience” and that “state should support investments by 
smallholders as well as public and private small-holder-sensitive investment”. This language 
reflects the outcomes of the CFS roundtable on smallholder sensitive investment. Guidelines for 
safeguards are included (e.g., paras 12.4, 12.6) and the principles of consultation and 
transparency are reinforced (e.g., paras 12.3, 12.5). Paragraph 12.12 notes the responsibility of 
investors “to respect national law and legislation and recognize and respect tenure rights of 
others”. The final paragraph provides guidance for states investing or prompting investment 
abroad: “they should ensure that their conduct is consistent with the protection of legitimate 
tenure rights, the promotion of food security and their existing obligations under national and 
international law, and with due regard to voluntary commitments under applicable regional and 
international instruments.”  
The First Draft contained paragraphs related to the development of “independent and voluntary 
quality certification schemes for internationally accepted practices for investment [and 
concessions] in land, fisheries and forests” (FAO 2012c:para 12.14). It was the Chinese delegate 
who questioned  
who will set up the scheme, and who is authorized to do this, and what is the 
content to be included? There are still problems here, ambiguities. If the answers to 
the questions I raised are not there, the paragraph will be meaningless. 
The delegate from Argentina agreed with China and called for the paragraph to be deleted. La 
Via Campesina agreed with Argentina’s proposal to strike the paragraph, noting that  
interesting in the subject is great. For that reasons we are very aware that as soon as 
the Guidelines are adopted by the CFS we will start negotiations on rai [CFS 
principles for responsible agricultural investment]. We see this as somewhat pre-
emptive and call for the elimination. 
In this example interjections from three rather unlikely allies (China, Argentina and La Via 
Campesina) resulted in the deletion of a paragraph.  
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Responsible Investment 
12.4 Responsible Investment 
March 2012 Final Text Changes of Note 
12.4 * Responsible 
investments should do no 
harm, safeguard against 
dispossession of legitimate 
tenure rights holders and 
environmental damage, and 
should respect human rights. 
Such investments should be 
made working in partnership 
with relevant levels of 
government and local land, 
fisheries and forest tenure 
right holders, respecting their 
legitimate tenure rights. * 
They [should further] 
contribute to objectives 
including: poverty alleviation, 
food security and sustainable 
use of land, fisheries and 
forests; support local 
communities, contribute to 
rural development, promote 
[and secure] local food 
production systems, enhance 
social and economic 
development, create 
employment, diversify 
livelihoods, provide benefits to 
the country and its people, 
including the poor and most 
vulnerable and [Such 
investments should] comply 
with [applicable] [national 
[laws] [and international core 
labour standards and ILO 
standards when applicable] 
[and International Labour 
Organization standards.] 
(proposed in plenary 
discussions) 
12.4 Responsible investments 
should do no harm, safeguard 
against dispossession of 
legitimate tenure right holders 
and environmental damage, 
and should respect human 
rights. Such investments 
should be made working in 
partnership with relevant levels 
of government and local 
holders of tenure rights to land, 
fisheries and forests, respecting 
their legitimate tenure rights. 
They should strive to further 
contribute to policy objectives, 
such as poverty eradication; 
food security and sustainable 
use of land, fisheries and 
forests; support local 
communities; contribute to 
rural development; promote 
and secure local food 
production systems; enhance 
social and economic 
sustainable development; 
create employment; diversify 
livelihoods; provide benefits to 
the country and its people, 
including the poor and most 
vulnerable; and comply with 
national laws and international 
core labour standards as well 
as, when applicable, 
obligations related to standards 
of the International Labour 
Organization. 
Weakened language: 
should further contribute 
became “should strive to 
further”. 
The objectives were 
further defined as “policy 
objectives”. 
Poverty alleviation was 
replaced with a stronger 
statement of policy 
eradication, in line with 
the CFS’s reform vision. 
The final version made 
reference to secure local 
food production, an 
improvement over simply 
promoting local food 
production. 
A success for CSOs was 
the inclusion of the final 
reference to states 
upholding, when 
applicable, obligations 
related to standards of the 
International Labour 
Organization. 
 
In March 2012, when attention turned to this paragraph the representative from Ethiopia, 
speaking on behalf of the Africa Group, began the negotiations by focusing on labour standards. 
They argued that there should only be a reference to the ILO standards and recommended that 
the Committee delete the reference to “core labour standards”. The rational was to only have 
one reference to standards. The EU supported this intervention. Russia followed, beginning by 
making reference to a problem related to translation. The representative noted that in the 
Russian translation, language about local communities has disappeared and that there was a 
need to revise the translation. Then, recalling previous discussions, the Russian Federation 
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spoke about the international core labour standards and ILO standards arguing that “if they are 
not classified, it will not have a broader interpretation. ILO conventions are voluntarily ratified 
by states, thus in this proposal there should be a full stop after national laws.” The EU spoke to 
explain that “core labour standards consist of four internationally recognized rights signed by all 
countries. The ILO standards are signed on a voluntary basis”. The EU then suggested the 
following language:  “… comply with national laws and with international core labour 
standards, as well as, when applicable, obligations related to ILO standards.”  The sentence was 
reworked for clarity and language cohesion but the essence remained in the final version.  
The inclusion of labour into negotiations on tenure governance is crucial, especially given 
trends in large-scale land acquisition and claims that such investments benefit countries by 
providing employment. What is also important to note here is the complexity of the debate and 
the breadth of technical and legal expertise that is required to effectively participate in these 
negotiations. Here, civil society has an advantage insofar as it engages a diverse range of 
constituencies that work across multiple policy environments.  
 
Provisions for Investments 
12.8/12.9 Provisions for Investments 
March 2012 Final Text Changes of Note 
12.8 States should ensure that 
proposals for investments 
[and concessions] involving 
the acquisition of tenure 
rights are subject to 
[negotiations] or [active, free, 
effective, meaningful and 
informed consultation] with 
[those affected] or [the 
affected men and women, 
families and communities, 
including indigenous peoples] 
[supported by legal 
professionals where 
necessary]. States and civil 
society should inform 
individuals, families and 
communities of their tenure 
rights, and assist to develop 
their capacity in 
[negotiations] or 
[consultations] and 
implementation, and provide 
professional assistance. 
(proposed by Thematic Group 
3) 
12.9 States should make 
provision for investments 
involving all forms of 
transactions of tenure rights, 
including acquisitions and 
partnership agreements, to be 
consistent with the principles 
of consultation and 
participation of these 
Guidelines, with those whose 
tenure rights, including 
subsidiary rights, might be 
affected. States and other 
relevant parties should 
inform individuals, families 
and communities of their 
tenure rights, and assist to 
develop their capacity in 
consultations and 
participation, including 
providing professional 
assistance as required.  
 
Focus changed from 
investment proposals to 
states taking 
responsibility to make 
provisions for 
investments. 
Inclusion of partnership 
agreements. 
Focus on those whose 
rights might be affected. 
Expansion of 
responsibility of 
informing people of their 
rights beyond the state 
and civil society.  
Failed to extend the CFS 
model of engaging civil 
society actors in 
negotiations. 
Maintained focus on 
consultation and added 
participation. 
 
Still in the section on investment, paragraph 12.8 addresses the development of laws at a 
national level to encourage responsible investment, and ensure the development of agreements 
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outlining the rights and duties of all parties. Discussion on this paragraph began with the 
negotiator from Ecuador requesting clarity as to whether the paragraph referred to public or 
private investment as this would impact the jurisdiction of the state. The technical secretariat 
explained that the paragraph refers to both private and public investment and states can 
determine how they deal with investment. The delegate from Brazil expressed support for the 
paragraph but called to strike the word “negotiations” in the spirit of language harmonization. 
The negotiator from Ecuador spoke again to clarify their concern, noting that the wording of the 
paragraph was focused on proposals and not on investment. The delegate from Canada 
supported Ecuador and noted that states cannot ensure that the private sector proposals follow 
all the steps.  
The representative from the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues argued that in 
paragraph 12.8 focus on the acquisition of tenure rights must be accompanied by free, prior and 
informed consent, especially in the case of indigenous peoples. Because reference to informed 
consent had been removed, the representative requested that the deletion of “including 
indigenous peoples”. They argued, “in any case, that paragraph does not include indigenous 
peoples who have their rights established under different treaties. 9.8 has much stronger 
language and includes free, prior and informed consent.”  
The EU negotiator made a proposal in the spirit of cohesion, to include “involving all forms of 
transactions of tenure rights” and the Mexican delegation requested the addition of “…such as 
acquisition of partnerships”. Civil society actors requested that the paragraph end with “if 
needed states should provide access to recalls for affected people including a provision of legal 
aid or support in fielding complaints.” The representative of the Africa Group proposed “States 
should strive to ensure that…”. They also raised concern that the responsibility of informing 
people about their tenure rights could extend beyond the responsibility of states and civil 
society, and suggested more inclusive wording: “states and other parties”.  
This intervention was followed up by the U.S.A. negotiator: 
The intervention from the Africa Group is helpful. How are other member states 
going to support this directive in the context of private investment? How are states 
going to strive to ensure that a private investment is subject to consultation and 
participation? We are talking about those affected. The final sentence is covered by 
4.9 so it is not necessary here.  
The EU negotiator requested that they keep the language around “states should make provision 
for” and “with those affected.” They also raised a question about the word “partnership”, asking 
if that is a form of transaction of tenure rights. On this point the Chair noted that there has been 
trouble with the terms “partnership” and “association” and it came down to translation from 
Spanish to English. The delegate from Mexico noted that they support the language as it is: 
“partnership, which we call an association”. Another translation issue emerged with consent and 
consultation and it was clarified that consent was “consentimiento” and consultation was best 
translated as “consulta”. 
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With the language issue addressed, the representative from the Africa Group suggested 
“acquisition and partnership agreement” and the Brazilian negotiator prefaced the suggestion 
with “all forms of transactions of tenure rights including acquisitions and partnership 
agreements.” At this point the representative from the U.S.A. raised concern that they were 
creating an impossible standard for states to comply with, and proposed the following:  
States should take the necessary measures to ensure that investments involving all 
forms of transactions of tenure rights, including acquisition and partnership 
agreements are subject to consultation and participation with those whose tenure 
rights might be affected. 
The Mexican delegation asked to change “affected” to “involved”. The EU responded by noting 
that the language used throughout the guidelines is “affected”. 
A new proposal was made:  
States should take the necessary measures to ensure that investments involving all 
forms of transactions of tenure rights, including acquisition and partnership 
agreements are subject to consultation and participation with those who hold rights 
of resources that might be affected. 
The delegate from the U.S.A. argued that “the reference to resources in this context is too broad 
but there has been general agreement it is meant to refer to land tenure rights. In the spirit of 
what the EU has suggested [they proposed]: “with those who hold tenure rights.” Or “those who 
hold tenure rights that might be affected”. 
In rebuttal, the delegate from Brazil stated that the paragraph needs to be broader than “those 
who hold tenure rights” to capture all the stakeholders affected, including those who do not 
have tenure rights (e.g., fishers) and proposed “or whose livelihoods may be affected”.  
The delegate then re-read the proposed text: 
States should take the necessary measures to ensure that investments involving all 
forms of transactions of tenure rights, including acquisition and partnership 
agreements are subject to consultation and participation with those who hold tenure 
rights or whose livelihoods might be affected.  
A representative from La Via Campesina voiced support for Brazil’s suggestion and noted that 
they were concerned about the “disconnection between bureaucratic level and the on-the ground 
reality. We look at a map and we see boundaries but in reality, these lines do not exist. We 
strongly urge members to agree to this language and requests that the US reconsider their 
proposal.” This intervention serves as a good illustration of a CSO strategy. NGOs with 
budgets, time and technical expertise played a key role on technical issues but social movements 
played fundamental role in reinforcing the need for strong guidelines by bringing the debate 
back to what was happening on the ground, in their communities. Because of this symbiotic 
relationship, supported by a strong facilitator, tensions often present between NGOs and social 
movements were less prevalent in this working group.  
After La Via Campesina’s intervention, the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food proposed 
“those whose tenure rights, livelihoods and human rights are affected” as alternative wording. 
Here the EU negotiator interjected. They argued that now this paragraph was trying to provide 
protection for those with tenure rights who may be impacted by a transaction and may lose their 
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tenure rights. “It’s a safeguard for people who may lose tenure rights as result of a transaction” 
they argued, and “now the language goes far beyond that and it does now create an extremely 
high bar without definition.” They proposed instead “…are subject to consultation and 
participation with those who hold tenure rights” noting that “to add extra things is to undermine 
the thrust of the paragraph.”  
The Brazilian delegate noted that the intent of the paragraph was clearly not commonly shared 
by all delegations. The International Planning Committee on Food Sovereignty (IPC) supported 
the position of Brazil and the SRRFT arguing that there were broader rights that could 
potentially be affected and which needed to be taken into account. They suggested to add, after 
those who hold tenure rights, “including those whose tenure rights are not currently protected or 
recognized by law.” 
The private sector representative spoke to concerns that 12.8 was repeating 12.5 (transparent 
rules for allowable transactions in tenure rights) and proposed that this paragraph should ensure 
that investors consult with those who are affected by a transaction. The delegate from Canada 
wanted to qualify that free, prior and informed consent is linked to interpretation at the state 
level and in Canada this is understood as participation and consultation.  They then proposed to 
soften the language about “taking the necessary measures” arguing that the wording was setting 
up a situation that would be impossible for states to comply with.  The Secretariat, trying to get 
everyone back on the same page, reminded the group that the intention of the sentence was that 
the state needs to provide the legal framework.  
A representative from the Africa then spoke:  
As Africa, we would go along with the idea that we need to have safeguards for the 
livelihoods of people but we do not need to include them here. We need to be 
specific on what we can address. We requests that we go back to the original text. 
The statement was supported by Ecuador. In an attempt to strengthen language around 
participation and enhance cohesion, are representative from Oxfam proposed the following:  
States should take the necessary measures to ensure that investments involving all 
forms of transactions of tenure rights, including acquisition and partnership 
agreements in line with provisions included in 3b.6 and in the case of indigenous 
peoples, in 9.8 with those who hold tenure rights.  
However, this was rejected as the representative from the U.S.A. explained there had been an 
effort to avoid cross referencing within the Guidelines:  
The paragraphs speak to specific cases. Let’s rely on the principles that have been 
heavily negotiated. It is referenced elsewhere in the document and then I suggest 
not cross-referencing. 
The delegate from Chile proclaimed that they had the “impression that this is a tower of Babel.” 
They continued: 
We are not understanding the same things with the same words: this [paragraph] 
applies to large tracts of land and on the other hand, it refers to all investment. 
There is a great deal of misunderstanding. What is responsible investment? All 
investment should be responsible.  
The EU representative, trying to accommodate Canada’s earlier request to soften language, 
suggested that the EU could support “make provision for” in the first line, reminding the group 
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that in the context of this paragraph, it is not up to the state to undertake the consultation. They 
also sought compromise on “with those whose tenure rights, including subsidiary rights, might 
be affected”.  
At this point, the paragraph read: 
States should make provision for investments involving all forms of transactions of 
tenure rights including acquisitions and partnership agreements to be subject to 
consultation and participation with those whose tenure rights, including subsidiary 
rights, might be affected.  
The Brazilian delegate stated that the original text spoke about “those affected”. Again the 
paragraph was reviewed: 
States should make provision for investments involving all forms of transactions of 
tenure rights, including acquisitions and partnership agreements to be subject to 
consultation and participation with those whose tenure rights, including subsidiary 
rights, might be affected [or with those affected]. 
At this time, states, with the exception of Brazil, agreed on a text. Brazil was unable to support 
the consensus as they needed time to consult with their Capital. The following day Brazil 
accepted the language of “might be affected”.  
In the endorsed Guidelines, paragraph 12.9 reads: 
States should make provision for investments involving all forms of transactions of 
tenure rights, including acquisitions and partnership agreements, to be consistent 
with the principles of consultation and participation of these Guidelines, with those 
whose tenure rights, including subsidiary rights, might be affected. States and other 
relevant parties should inform individuals, families and communities of their tenure 
rights, and assist to develop their capacity in consultations and participation, 
including providing professional assistance as required (emphasis added).  
The review of the negotiation of this paragraph highlights not only the complexity of the 
negotiations but also the various challenges that arise from issues liked to language and 
translation, country-contexts, and the impact of mandates delivered to negotiators by ministries 
or technical experts who operate not only in different time zones but also are unlike to 
understand the way in which the reformed CFS conducts negotiations. What should also be 
evident from the above review is the engagement of the various participants in the Committee 
and the very important role they play in the debate.  
The final wording of paragraph 12.9 is the result of compromise. The paragraph is valuable 
insofar as it clearly calls on states to create provisions for investments that involve the transfer 
of tenure rights and clarifies the importance of consultation with those who may be affected by 
such investments. This includes people whose livelihoods depend on access to land, fisheries 
and forests.  While across global governance literature there is a critique that the elite maintain a 
monopoly on decision-making, the record of this negotiation shows that things are changing. 
While Canada, the U.S.A. and the EU played influential roles, it was the Brazilian delegation 
that was blocking consensus by the end. Civil society actors managed to delete text they deemed 
to be inappropriate. The Africa Group expanded the language of responsibility of informing 
people about tenure rights to “other relevant parties”.  
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Climate Change and Emergencies 
Part 6: Responses to climate change and emergencies   
March 2012 Final Text Changes of Note 
This part addresses the 
governance of tenure of land, 
fisheries and forests during 
catastrophic events where 
people could be displaced on 
a large scale as a result of 
climate change, natural 
disasters and violent 
conflicts. 
This part addresses the 
governance of tenure of land, 
fisheries and forests in the 
context of climate change, 
natural disasters and conflicts. 
Reference to the 
displacement of people 
was removed. 
Reference to catastrophic 
events was deleted. 
Violent conflict was 
replaced with just 
conflict.  
 
Part 6 of the Guidelines addresses responses to climate change and emergencies. Within Part 6 
there are sections on climate change, natural disaster, and conflict. The Chair rightly predicted 
that it would be challenging for the Committee to negotiate a consensus on the title of the Part – 
Response to climate change and emergencies – and sent it to a Friends of the Chair group. The 
process for negotiating the chapeau (the descriptive text that follows the title of the part and 
preceded the sections) also presented a challenge. The chapeau is meant to provide a summary 
of what is included in each part of the VGGTs and thus frames how the various paragraphs are 
negotiated and understood. A speaker from the civil society working group pushed for the 
inclusion of protracted crisis in the chapeau, in line with outcomes of the CFS’s 
recommendations on the issue from CFS 36, the 2010 State of Food Insecurity (SOFI) report 
which focused on protected crisis. In their proposal they suggested replacing “violent conflict” 
with “situations of violence” which was said to be an internationally agreed upon term. They 
also called for the inclusion of a reference to occupation. Their proposal read: 
 This part addresses the governance of tenure of land, fisheries and forests in the 
context of effects of climate change, disasters and armed conflict and [other 
situations of violence and occupation] during catastrophic events where people 
could be displaced on a large scale as a result of climate change, natural disasters 
and violent conflicts.  
The delegate from Egypt rejected the change to “other situations of violence” claiming that it 
was unclear. The representative from the EU noted that given the sensitivity of the issue, it 
would be wise to consult experts. 
The Chair suggested that the group first negotiate the relevant paragraphs before trying to 
negotiate the chapeau. This proposal was supported by the Mexican delegate who noted that 
because the chapeau refers to the content of the document, it is best to first determine what will 
be in the section. The speaker for Ecuador disagreed and argued for a discussion of the chapeau 
first. The delegate from Jordan spoke to support both Egypt and the CSOs, as did the 
representative from Afghanistan who called on CSOs to propose a paragraph on occupation.  
CSOs replied that there was a need to clarify the use of the term occupation and that the term 
could not be used in isolation of previous negotiations. Finally, after much debate in plenary and 
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deliberation by the Friends of the Chair, the heading to Part 6 remained “Responses to climate 
change and emergencies” and the chapeau read:  
This part addresses the governance of tenure of land, fisheries and forests in the 
context of climate change, natural disasters and conflicts. 
CSOs failed to secure separate parts for conflict and from natural disaster but they did manage 
to secure a statement with reference to occupation in situations of conflicts in respect to tenure 
of land, fisheries and forests: 
25.1: All parties should take steps to prevent and eliminate issues of tenure of land, 
fisheries and forests as a cause of conflict and should ensure that aspects of tenure 
are addressed before, during and after conflict, including in situations of 
occupation where parties should act in accordance with applicable international 
humanitarian law (emphasis added).  
Reference to occupation in paragraph 17.2 (recording systems for tenure rights that are 
appropriate to the particular circumstances, taking particular care to prevent registration of 
competing rights  when it is not possible to record tenure rights such as occupations in informal 
settlements) also remained in the final text. The push for, and successful inclusion of references 
to occupation in the Guidelines highlights the complexity of alliances across these negotiations. 
Jordan and CSOs are not traditional allies but on this issue, they supported each other against 
the U.S.A. delegation and produced a positive result from their perspective. This again 
illustrates the influence and impact of improved participation.  
At the same time, Part 6 of the VGGTs remains somewhat problematic. First, the combination 
of conflict and natural disaster is limiting. While natural disasters can lead to increased conflict, 
these are both important themes requiring focus and attention from policymakers. Another 
problem that was raised by CSOs was the reduction of conflict to tenure rights and the lack of 
reflection on instances where conflict arises with and against the state. 
Implementation 
26.4 Implementation   
March 2012 Final Text Changes of Note 
 
The Committee on World Food Security 
should be the global forum where all 
relevant actors learn from each other’s 
experiences, and assess progress toward the 
implementation of these Guidelines and 
their relevance, effectiveness and impact. 
Therefore, the Secretariat of the Committee 
on World Food Security, in collaboration 
with the Advisory Group, should report to 
the Committee on World Food Security on 
the progress of the implementation of these 
Guidelines, as well as evaluate their impact 
and their contribution to the improvement 
of tenure governance. Such reports should 
be universal and include, inter alia, regional 
experiences, best practices and lessons 
learned. 
 The addition of this 
paragraph was proposed 
by a working group led 
by Egypt for the Africa 
Group.  
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The First Draft was inarguably weak on implementation, monitoring and evaluation. A working 
group, led by delegates from Egypt and the Africa Group was established to address this. They 
proposed the following paragraph to link the Voluntary Guidelines back to the CFS:  
26.4 [States are encouraged to use the CFS as the forum for reporting process on 
the implementation of the VG and their experience on the effectiveness of these 
guidelines.] 
CSO actors then proposed the addition of a sentence to go before the proposed text:  
 [The CFS should be the global forum where all relevant actors learn from each 
other’s experiences, assess progress towards the implementation of the VGs and 
the relevance, effectiveness and impact of the VGs.]  
The delegate from Egypt added to this: 
Therefore, the Secretariat of the Committee of World Food Security, in 
collaboration with the [Bureau and the…]  
The speaker from Brazil rejected the language for the reason that it would mandate countries to 
produce work for the CFS. This point was debated at the 37th CFS and it was decided that 
countries should not have to report back to the CFS. The Brazilian delegate proposed language 
to the effect that “the Advisory Group, [shall]”, arguing that the Advisory Group has the 
authority to instruct the Secretariat. The delegate from the U.S.A. supported Brazil’s proposal 
but requested that [shall] be replaced with [should]. The representative from Ecuador suggested 
including language to reflect that the Secretariat “is invited to periodically” report on progress, 
so as to avoid a strict timeframe or mandate annual reports.  
A discussion ensued over whether the Secretariat in collaboration with the Advisory Group 
should report or review progress:  
[review] report to the CFS on the progress of the implementation of the Voluntary 
Guidelines, as well as evaluate their impact and their contribution to the 
improvement of tenure governance. Such reports should be universal and include, 
inter alia, regional experiences, best practices and lessons learned. 
The group settled on report. 
The civil society working group proposed “[and should be complemented by reports produced 
by other CFS participants.]” This was to ensure that the CFS continued to respect its reform 
commitment to including the voices of those most affected by food insecurity as well as their 
commitment to being the foremost inclusive forum for discussion on food security. Civil society 
actors also proposed that the CFS facilitate the establishment of a global observatory for 
monitoring the evolution of land, fisheries and forests tenure as it relates to food security.  
The representative from Afghanistan argued that  
the role of the state in reporting needs to be introduced before the role of the CFS 
on reporting. The Voluntary Guidelines on the Right to Food, in the second part 
there is a statement: “states may report on a voluntary basis on relevant activities 
and progress achieved on achieving the right to food … to the CFS. We are not at 
the point that the global reporting on this issue, including evaluation, should go to 
the CFS. Does the Secretariat have the resources, the staff, the time, to do this 
work? 
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The points raised by the representative are critical. The issue of the CFS falling victim to its 
own success is worrying as actors try task the Secretariat and the Committee with a growing 
workload without first securing additional resources and staff.   
Following the statement from the Afghan representative, the delegate from Egypt explained that 
in drafting the language the working group took a two-track approach. First they sought to find 
the mechanism for the CFS to assess the impact of the VGGTs, and then they considered how 
States could share experiences. The delegate noted that:  
In the working group, there was fear of reporting fatigue around voluntary 
reporting by states. The CFS would be the best forum for sharing the best practices 
around monitoring and following-up on the guidelines.  
In a move away from discussions on increased monitoring, the Russian delegation suggested the 
CFS needed more time to consider these issues, and the CFS has the responsibility to determine 
who will collect the information. The Secretariat reiterated that they play a technical role to 
support the coordination of the CFS, suggesting that they are not the appropriate body to report 
on progress, a suggestion that was ignored.  
The delegate from Canada presented their position:   
The CFS is certainly the place for a broad discussion on the VGs and we recognise 
the fatigue of national reporting, especially when these are proforma and not used 
to learn lessons. For the CFS to consider the implementation of the guidelines, 
especially to garner lessons learn, they should have some basis for 
recommendations. Canada prefers to see the retention of the Secretariat and AG 
producing a report that would include highlighting regional experience, best 
practices and lessons learned. Of course all actors can add their addition.  
Both Africa and Afghanistan spoke to suggest that CSOs were asking for too much with their 
proposals. However, the mere fact that their proposals were debate to the extent that they were 
illustrates the participatory and innovative nature of CFS negotiations.  
A proposal was made to replace the civil society actors’ proposal:  
States are encouraged to use the CFS as the forum for reporting process on the 
implementation of the VG and their experience on the effectiveness of these 
guidelines. 
This links to the CFS’s second phase of reform sees the CFS promoting accountability and 
sharing best practices at all levels.  
Civil society actors interjected with another proposal, this time to include: “and should be 
complemented by reports produced by other CFS participants”. After more deliberation, the 
Group arrived at compromise:  
The Committee on World Food Security should be the global forum where all 
relevant actors learn from each other’s experiences, and assess progress toward the 
implementation of these Guidelines and their relevance, effectiveness and impact. 
Therefore, the Secretariat of the Committee on World Food Security, in 
collaboration with the Advisory Group, should report to the Committee on World 
Food Security on the progress of the implementation of these Guidelines, as well as 
evaluate their impact and their contribution to the improvement of tenure 
governance. Such reports should be universal and include, inter alia, regional 
experiences, best practices and lessons learned. 
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The lack of reference to the CFS Bureau (the executive arm of the CFS) is problematic and 
suggests that states are diverting responsibility.  
CSOs were disappointed to have lost the fight for the inclusion of “should be complemented by 
reports produced by other CFS participants”. They tried to negotiate for the addition of 26.4bis: 
“All CFS participants should be invited to participate in the process described in the paragraph 
26.4 above” but this was rejected by Mexico and Ecuador as being redundant.  
The final text for this paragraph remains disappointing. That the Committee on World Food 
Security could not declare themselves to be “the” global forum where relevant actors share best 
practices and assess progress towards implementation, but opted instead for “should be” speaks 
to fact that there are member states who do not want the CFS to fulfil its reform vision. At the 
same time, it is admittedly also evidence of the limitations of the CFS insofar as it has no 
capacity for implementation, monitoring or evaluation. What the paragraph offers is that start of 
a much needed conversation about how the Guidelines will be carried forward and what role the 
CFS should and could have towards this end.  
7.6. Analysis of the Final Document 
The selected review of the final negotiations highlights the complexity of the process but also 
the high level of engagement and interaction across participants. What inarguably sets the CFS 
negotiations apart from other intergovernmental negotiations is not simply the inclusion of 
participants in such a meaningful way, but also the level of debate and dialogue amongst 
member state delegates. Within these negotiations, there are prepared positions but no prepared 
statements orated by ministers forwarding grandiose visions but failing to address concrete issue 
or advance the process. The move away from prepared statements makes room for negotiation, 
compromise and eventually consensus.   
That the VGGTs respect and protect human rights in the context of tenure is key not only for 
ensuring coherence with CFS policies and the Voluntary Guidelines on the Right to Food, but 
also insofar as this links the VGGTs to existing international commitments and therefore 
strengthens them from a legal and enforcement perspective.  The emphasis on women, peasant 
farmers, fishing communities, pastoralists and indigenous peoples is valuable as are the 
principles of implementation. CSOs were pleased to have secure the use of the term “small-
scale producers” over the term “small-holder farmer” noting that focus needs to be on those who 
produce food, a category that extends well beyond what is commonly understood to be farming. 
Finally, the importance of the VGGTs extends beyond having an intergovenmentally negotiated 
and endorsed set of best practices for responsible governance of tenure, to evidence of the 
capacity of the CFS to live up to its reform mandate and deliver relevant and useful outcomes.  
That said, there are limitations within the document. First and foremost, there is no definition of 
land, fisheries or forests. While initially a glossary had been proposed, this was later rejected 
because it was evident that member states would be unlikely to reach consensus and that they 
 201 
 
preferred to define the terms within their national context. CSOs wanted a glossary but were 
aware of the potential implications of a glossary containing weak definitions.  
The failure of the VGGTs to address water is perhaps the greatest weakness. Changes in land 
tenure can result in changes to access of fishers to waterways and fishing grounds. Moreover, 
irrigation, water for animals and transport, and rights and access to water stand to be challenged 
with shifts in land tenure. CSOs pushed for this to be recognized in the Guidelines but were not 
successful. Migratory routes were not given adequate consideration in the Guidelines and the 
assumption that large-scale investments in industrial agriculture, fisheries and forests are 
essential for development remains unchallenged within the VGGTs.  
Throughout the negotiations participants were keenly aware of the increasing number of large-
scale land acquisitions taking place, particularly in food insecure countries. For some, this 
contributed to a sense of urgency to complete the Guidelines. While these Guidelines were not 
specifically meant to address land grabbing (Seufert 2013:183), the links between the 
responsible governance of tenure and increasing large-scale acquisitions of land could not be 
avoided. CSOs pushed for an international ban on land grabbing while governments from 
several developing country governments argued in favour of the large-scale acquisition of 
tenure rights as central to fostering national and regional economic development (Seufert 2013). 
In the end, the VGGTs address safeguards to enact with respect to the large-scale acquisition of 
tenure rights and resulting impacts.  
Another limitation of the VGGTs is that they do not prioritise support to small-scale food 
producer groups. Furthermore, they do not consolidated the recognized rights of indigenous 
peoples, as articulated in UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and other 
international instruments. 
As CSOs noted in their analysis, the longer term implications of tenure on youth and future 
generations are also not adequately addressed. Nor is there enough clarification on different 
modes of production. CSOs also noted that not enough emphasis has been placed on 
enforcement and that the document lacked adequate propositions for mechanism of 
enforcement. 
Recent literature on food security debates at the multilateral level and participatory policy-
making spaces (e.g., Holt-Giménez and Altieri 2013; Hospes 2013) has captured the 
participatory shift but has failed to fully capture the complexity and multiple dimensions. This is 
perhaps a reaffirmation of the value of participant observation as it necessitates exploration 
through the various positions and reinforces the view that very few actors can be places into 
ideological boxes. Instead, while their subjectivity, ethics, training and or mandate may suggest 
a predisposition to specific approach, the complexity and scope of discussion, the diversity of 
perspectives and the consensus model make ideological inflexibility not only difficult, but 
politically disadvantageous at times insofar as those actors opted out of the give and take – the 
compromise – that is politics.   
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The VGGTs are an excellent example of the value of consultation and inclusive negotiation 
processes. CSOs participated at all stages of development, and they were effective in raising 
awareness throughout the discussions about to the real-life issues facing them and their 
communities. Their engagement extended to the development and advancement of concrete 
proposals, many of which were incorporated into the final text. 
7.7. Implications and Next Steps 
As their name suggests the Voluntary Guidelines are voluntary. In practice they are an 
instrument of international soft law and do not replace existing national or international laws, 
treaties, or agreements. Not enforceable, the Guidelines represent global consensus on accepted 
principles and standards for responsible land tenure governance practices. Importantly, “they 
explicitly refer to existing binding international human rights obligations related to land and 
natural resources and provide interpretation and guidance on how to implement these 
obligations” (Seufert 2013:182). The question of why bother if the end result is a set of non-
enforceable, voluntary guidelines needs to be addressed. First and foremost, the VGGTs 
respond to a need expressed by several states: applicable guidance for good governance of 
tenure.  Second, the VGGTs are an entry point to begin to talk about land governance and to 
foster public engagement. Third, the VGGTs can be effectively used at the national level to 
evaluate existing land tenure and easily identify gaps in policy. Fourth, the rights-based 
approach is important as it shifts focus of land tenure to the most vulnerable populations. Fifth, 
the VGGTs are a useful tool for assessing and monitoring the actions of governments and non-
governmental investors.  
The final document represents what one leading UN expert on food security declared to be a 
“contribution to those struggling to address power relations” (Field notes, Berlin, June 2013). 
While an initial reading of these comments suggests that this is a rather positive statement, it is 
important to note the focus is not on the responsibility of states but rather it is placed on CSOs. 
This is a trend that must be monitored. To frame the VGGTs as a success for those struggling 
against stronger powers is not incorrect but the VGGTs are not to be seen as limited to CSOs. 
For the VGGTs to be most effective and to fulfil their purpose, they must be taken up at the 
national level, in national laws and policies. The move towards strong national or regional 
policies around the governance of land fisheries and forests is not something that will come 
about overnight. Furthermore, it is a process that must be undertaken carefully and with 
sensitivity. At the same time, there is urgency not least due to the links between tenure of 
natural resources and food security. While moving forward cautiously, there are several issues 
that remain to be addressed, notably communication, implementation and monitoring.  
In terms of next steps, a lot of focus has been placed on communication and awareness building.  
This is of course of a fundamental step but there are potential implications which must be taken 
into consideration.  For example, the issue of language must be addressed. The VGGTs are not 
 203 
 
available in all languages and furthermore, the language used therein is quite technical. There 
are efforts underway to translate the document into other languages and to make the content 
more accessible. However, as the review of the negotiations highlights, the language within the 
VGGT is highly negotiated and must be interpreted with upmost caution.  
Beyond efforts to disperse the VGGTs and build awareness, there is a need for capacity 
building, for example in cases where states do not have surveyors or records of tenure or 
documentation. Also, governments must be prepared to develop complaints mechanisms and 
clear processes address grievances in line with the Guidelines. This is something that to date has 
been inadequately considered.   
Implementation of the VGGTs is not simply a technical issue; it is also a highly political issue 
that will require a great deal of political will. Since their endorsement there has been an 
assumption about the goodwill to implement, but in actuality, implementing guidelines on such 
a contentious issue will likely be avoided by most governments. In order to address this is 
challenge, focus could be scaled-up to the regional level and regional groupings of countries 
could work towards implementation of relevant aspects employing regional pressure and 
resources. The point on relevance is important. The VGGT are not to be seen as a one-size-fits-
all solution that should be incorporated as is into national law and policy. Instead, the VGGT 
seek to provide best practices on a range of tenure-related issues allowing governments and 
policy makers to pick and choose what is needed given their specific context.  
Another way of supporting implementation would be to build on the links to existing human 
rights obligations. Here it could be advantageous for the FAO to work closely with interested 
countries and with countries that have a strong human rights record to begin to implement 
sections of the VGGTs into the national context and to then use their experiences to help 
motivate of guide other countries.  
Across civil society organizations there is growing tension around leadership and authority with 
respect to monitoring and implementation with the IPC (International Planning Committee for 
Food Sovereignty) and IPC+ (which includes select NGOs) forging ahead to develop CSO 
guidelines, but excluding actors keen to participate. The IPC, which liaises with FAO, has also 
made it clear that the CFS has no capacity to implement and therefore by extension the CSM 
does not have a mandate to work on implementation. The CSM is only a facilitation mechanism 
but its members are able to work on whatever projects they deem appropriate. The rising 
tensions between the IPC and CSM are politically sensitive and illustrate the factions and turf 
wars that emerge within these international fora.  
With respect to implementation accountability needs to be at the fore, which in turn requires 
monitoring. Monitoring is as technical as it is political. The purpose of the VGGTs is to provide 
guidance to improve the governance of tenure of land, fisheries and forests with the goal of 
achieving food security for all. CSOs have proposed two possibilities for monitoring. First is the 
establishment of an independent body to review progress made towards improved governance 
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of tenure, using the VGGTs as a baseline. Alternatively, a process could be identified by states 
report on their progress in implementing the Voluntary Guidelines. This process would be peer-
reviewed by other states, CSOs, and other CFS participants (Seufert 2013). While innovative 
and forward looking, these proposals are unlikely to see any traction. With respect to the first 
suggestion, the question of who and how need to be addressed. Also it remains to be seen how 
such a body would be funded and how they would select to countries to be monitored. With 
respect to the second proposal, member states have been explicitly clear in their rejection of 
mandatory reporting or paperwork in the reformed CFS.  
Despite the limitations of the CSO proposals, the fact remains that monitoring is key to 
achieving the objectives of the VGGTs. The FAO has a role to play in supporting countries and 
building capacity but their role in monitoring is less clear. While there is agreement that the 
CFS is not an implementing body, there is arguably a role for the CFS in monitoring. The 
Global Strategic Framework of the CFS (2012c:para 101) notes that  
In line with the CFS mandate, some way should be found to monitor the state of 
implementation of the Committee’s own decisions and recommendations, so as to 
allow for the reinforcement of the coordination and policy convergence roles of the 
CFS. To this end, the Secretariat was tasked with reporting, in collaboration with 
the Advisory Group, on the state of implementation of numerous CFS decisions 
and recommendations, including the VGGT. 
The CFS has also launched a open-ended working group on monitoring chaired by the 
representative from Zimbabwe.   
The open-ended working group on monitoring, established by the CFS Bureau, has 
decided to focus its first efforts on this component, and will further debate possible 
options, modalities and required resources for the follow-up of the state of 
implementation of CFS recommendations by the Secretariat, according to the role 
of CFS to promote accountability as defined in the Reform Document. The GSF, 
by providing a consolidated body of CFS outputs, will, in conjunction with the 
VGGT and future similar instruments, contribute to the task of knowing what 
recommendations to monitor (CFS 2012c:para 102).   
Moving forward, the OEWG has decided to focus on the monitoring of the VGGTs and will 
present select case studies to CFS 40 (October 2013). They aim to share best practices, 
advancing the objectives of the CFS’s phased reforms. Case studies provide a review of the 
context and provide a sense of where things stand. However, careful attention must be paid to 
the method used to select case studies. The method should ensure that case studies are collected 
from a variety of actors (e.g., government, private sector, social movements, NGOs, research 
institutes) to ensure that multiple perspectives are reflected.  
While case studies provide a useful starting point, indicators are needed to begin to assess 
impact and implication. For the VGGTs, both qualitative and quantitative indicators would be 
advisable. The CFS’s Global Strategic Framework contains suggestions for developing 
indicators in a gender-sensitive approach and within a human-rights based framework. Given 
the complexity of land governance and the importance of location and context, indicators will 
need to be considered and designed to suit specific cases.  
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Multistakeholder platforms will also be central to effective monitoring, while supporting the 
principles of the VGGT and the CFS. These need to meaningfully involve all actors, and be 
multi-sectoral. Correspondingly, a clear methodology for establishing the multi-sectoral 
platforms and ensuring transparency. It is also important to note that with respect to monitoring 
and indicators, the question of attribution must be addressed: how can change be attributed to 
the VGGTs or related actions? This is something that has received inadequate attention and 
requires further research.  
7.8. Summary 
The successful negotiation of the VGGTs is evidence of the value of the reformed CFS as well 
as participatory policy making at the global level. This case study began by reviewing land 
tenure and highlighting the importance of good governance of land tenure to the eradication of 
hunger. The methology employed in the development of the VGGTs was presented and 
followed by a review of the negotiations. The interactive and participatory nature of the CFS 
was illustrated through a review of the negotiations of the Voluntary Guidelines, and social 
dynamics were elucidated. The analysis alluded to a strengthening relationship – based on 
ideology as well as successful lobbying – between the Right to Food and food sovereignty. The 
Right to Food approach provides legally binding obligations which serve to reinforce the 
experiential legitimacy derived from the global peasant movement. While there are limitations 
with the VGGTs there is also growing interest and discussion about next steps. Strategies for 
implementation and monitoring at the national and regional level are being considered along 
with extraterritorial obligations suggesting that the VGGTs could have an important impact on 
policy.  
The analysis of the negotiations illustrates the important role that consultation and participation 
of a wider-range of stakeholders can have on policy outcomes. The process of negotiating the 
VGGT also provides insight into key tensions in participatory policy making that can inform 
wider scholarship and practice. Notably, issues of language, state sovereignty, legitimacy, 
geopolitics, capacity and alliances were identified as challenges and their complexity elucidated, 
at least in part, by identifying how they arose out of the VGGTs negotiation process and how 
they were address.  
Further lessons can be learnt from this case study. For example, the value of consultation is 
made evident through the analysis but what is perhaps not as well captured is the role of 
resources: not only financial resources (which were significant), but also less tangible resources 
such as time, expertise, trust and patience. The case study also raises important questions to be 
addressed through future research: that is, what are the implications for policy when a technical 
process becomes co-opted by a political process, albeit a consultative and participatory political 
process? Questions of expertise and the implications of consensus building require more 
consideration. Finally, the VGGTs map out an important relationship between the FAO and the 
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CFS in so far as the FAO initiated the process in response to requests by member states, the 
CFS took over the process, expanded consultations and secured intergovernmental agreement 
on the document, and now the FAO is taking the lead on developing tools to effectively 
operationalise the Guidelines. The reinforcing nature of the CFS process and FAO work is 
another area that requires further investigation and questions of who is being included, who is 
being left out, and who is making use of the resources developed by the FAO need to be 
answered.  
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8. Case Study 3: Global Strategic Framework 
8.1. Introduction 
One of the main tasks of the reformed Committee on World Food Security (CFS) was to launch 
a consultative process with the aim of developing a Global Strategic Framework for Food 
Security and Nutrition (GSF) by October 2012. Specifically, the Reform Document (CFS 
2009a:B.6.iii) states that the CFS would:  
Develop a Global Strategic Framework for food security and nutrition in order to 
improve coordination and guide synchronized action by a wide range of 
stakeholders. The Global Strategic Framework will be flexible so that it can be 
adjusted as priorities change. It will build upon existing frameworks such as the 
UN’s Comprehensive Framework for Action (CFA), the Comprehensive Africa 
Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), and the Voluntary Guidelines to 
Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context 
of National Food Security. 
The process of developing a Global Strategic Framework was tasked to an open-ended working 
group, led by representatives from Brazil. In line with the reform values of consultation and 
participation, the Working Group managed to complete the document and have a first version 
adopted the 39th Session (October 2012).  At this time, the plenary “noted that the main added 
value of the GSF is to provide an overarching framework and a single reference document with 
practical guidance on core recommendations for food security and nutrition strategies, policies 
and actions validated by the wide ownership, participation and consultation afforded by CFS, 
and noted that the GSF is not a legally binding document” (CFS 2012b:para 18c). The GSF 
provides an overarching framework and acts as a single reference document with practical 
guidance on core recommendations for food security and nutrition strategies, policies and 
actions validated by the wide ownership, participation and consultation afforded by the CFS 
(2012c:para 7). 
8.2. Developing a Global Strategic Framework 
The GSF is a single, living document with an aim to improve coordination and guide 
synchronized action by a wide range of stakeholders. As a living document, the GSF will 
incorporate new policy decisions endorsed by the CFS. This will ensure the on-going relevance 
and utility of the GSF moving forward. This “living” nature is one aspect that sets the GSF apart 
from the other policy frameworks: it seeks to build on best practices and has developed 
mechanisms to ensure continuity. This is certainly the best way of ensuring policy coherence 
over the medium to long-term. Furthermore, insofar as the GSF is a living document, it is 
flexible so that it can be adjusted as priorities change.  
One of the main initial tasks of the reformed Committee on World Food Security (CFS) was to 
launch a consultative process with the aim of developing a Global Strategic Framework for 
Food Security and Nutrition (GSF) by October 2012. The CFS agreed that the Bureau, with the 
assistance of the Secretariat and in close collaboration with the Advisory Group, should launch 
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a consultative and inclusive process to be conducted to develop the first version of the Global 
Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutrition (GSF). 
At the 36th Session (October 2010), a concept note for a Global Strategic Framework for Food 
Security and Nutrition, developed by the CFS Secretariat, was presented to the Committee. The 
concept note highlighted six key objectives: improving coordination and synergy among all 
stakeholders; strengthening coherence and convergence among policies and programs; bringing 
together knowledge (HLPE) and field experience (Joint Secretariat); catalysing country-level 
capacity building; improving communication and information exchange; and, creating an 
atmosphere of trust and shared responsibility. 
At the Session, the CFS agreed that the first step of this inclusive consultation process was to 
establish agreement on purposes, basic principles and structure of the GSF while taking into 
account existing frameworks. Prior to the 36th Session, civil society actors had developed a 
series of key messages that were shared during the Session. Their key issues responded to the 
concept note and raised concern about the absence of reference to fundamental rights, including 
an absence of reference to the Universal Right of all human beings to adequate, affordable food. 
They also highlighted lack for engagement with broader rights-based frameworks such as the 
ILO Conventions. The CSOs provided a clear list of references to be included into the GSF, 
including the resolution of the International Labour Conference’s (2008) Committee on Rural 
Employment for Poverty Reduction; the Memorandum of Understanding between the ILO and 
FAO signed in September 2004; and, the reform of the Food Aid Convention. CSOs reinforced 
the sovereign rights and responsibilities of states but highlighted the importance of elaborating 
the GSF through a broad and participatory process.  
The civil society members of the AG raised concerns that the role of the CSM was not explicitly 
recognized in the online GSF consultation process and it was argued that by not coordinating 
CSO consultation through the CSM, the CSM was effectively being undermined. It is important 
to remember that the CSM has principles and processes in place to ensure that the voices of 
those most affected by food insecurity are prioritised and there was concern that an open 
consultation could be usurped by large NGOs that do not share the same values. CSOs are also 
raised concerns about the limitations of an electronic consultation, noting that those most 
affected by hunger and malnutrition would be unable to participate meaningfully and that 
therefore the consultation was inadequate.  As one leader of a European farming social 
movement explained: 
Electronic space should not constitute a participatory space. We need money to 
find more innovative ways to bring stories forward. How can we use existing CFS 
structures to elaborate and deepen discussions but how this feeds into the GSF is 
key. We need to get out of the tight box of electronic consultation. 
In the spirit of action and engagement, CSOs decided that the CSM, led by the Working Group 
on the GSF, needed to coordinate an autonomous consultation to feed into the CFS consultation 
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process. The outcome of this process fed into two CSO Working Document (September 2011 
and December 2011).  
Within these documents, CSOs articulated their vision for the GSF. They expressed the view 
that the GSF should set criteria for policy makers, for civil society, for financial institutions, for 
UN agencies and all other actors. It was fundamental that the GSF be built around the aim to 
improve food and nutrition security and work towards the realization of the right to food and 
food sovereignty. Therefore, the GSF must create and enable an environment for States to take 
up their responsibilities for the realization of the right to food.  There was also emphasis on 
focus on engaging states. Speaking of the GSF as a political battle, a central strategy for CSOs 
was to 
politicize the debate towards the national level and towards governments.  [We 
need to] explain to national parliaments what is happening at the CFS around the 
global governance of CFS. Don´t leave it to the bureaucrats. This a way to 
politicize the debate through the issues and through the process (International 
Farmer Social Movement Leader, Rome, May 2011). 
These sentiments were echoed by one EU-based food security analyst: 
We need to start lobbying and invest in engaging national governments on why the 
GSF is a useful tool. Because there is no money for consultation, we have to start 
planning now to take full advantage of the FAO regional conferences that will take 
place next year. The regional consultations are a stepping stone to the CFS process, 
they are meant to be part of the CFS (Rome, May 2011). 
CSOs were aware of the importance of making the links between the Global Strategic 
Framework and national-level policy processes explicit. They recognised that the GSF will have 
no significance if it remains at global level and noted that the process of “nationalizing” the 
GSF is crucial. They argued that the ultimate goal of the GSF is for it to achieve national 
ownership (understood as democratic ownership). CSOs proposed that the GSF could articulate 
a strategy on how to operationalize the GSF at the national level.  It should clarify the kinds of 
policies that must be adopted to strengthen small-scale food producers and their respective areas 
of concern, including cooperation with the private sector. On a related point, the GSF should 
provide strategies for revitalizing the role of the public sector and of the State in really 
addressing the causes of hunger and malnutrition. To be most meaningful, the GSF must 
challenge assumptions of current models of consumption and production, as well as public-
private for profit partnerships and their inconsistencies, and denounce unequal trade relations as 
a factor contributing to malnutrition. As CSOs continued to work on their position, under the 
leadership of representatives from FIAN and La Via Campesina, their positions became 
increasingly sophisticated, especially with respect to the integration of a rights-based approach. 
The ideas developed in the Working Document informed many of the CSO interventions in the 
consultation as well as CSO interventions in the negotiations.  
Following the consultation, the open-ended working group came to agreement on the nature, 
purpose and principles of the GSF. Here, there was agreement that the structure and content of 
the GSF should be consistent with the vision, roles and guiding principles of the CFS and that 
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the content should be taken form CFS outcomes, country-level experience, existing best-
practices, stakeholder dialogues and evidence-based knowledge.  The broad issues to be 
addressed by the GSF was also outlined, including identifying challenges and opportunities for 
food security and nutrition, identifying priorities for action, promoting convergence, 
recommending and describing options for governance mechanisms, and consolidating macro-
level warnings about challenges related to food security and nutrition. They also agreed to 
describe and recommend strategies that could be adopted by stakeholders at different levels, to 
encourage the adoption of national strategies following a twin-track approach, and to identify 
areas across policy and practice that could benefit from future consensus building and 
convergence. Unfortunately, when time came to identify the issues for which there was no 
international consensus, the CFS failed to come to consensus and the section was dropped in 
favour of completing the negotiations.  
An annotated outline was then developed and two versions were presented (April and June 
2011). There was a tight timeline for comment on the Annotated Outline. CSO, facilitated 
through the CSM, attempted to come to a consolidated position but this proved impossible and 
they thus submitted one document with three sets of comments developed by different coalitions 
of actors. This action reinforced the principle of diversity and the commitment of CSOs working 
through the CSM to respect diversity. At this point, they acknowledged that there was strength 
in submitting a unified proposal but the importance of diversity over-rode the desire for a strong 
political statement. This sheds light on when and where and how CSO actors negotiate their 
positions amongst themselves and when they are willing to compromise and perhaps more 
interestingly, when they are not. It further illustrates the challenge of arriving at compromise 
when issues are highly political and response time is limited.  This limited time frame also 
impacted the responses received by member states. As one leading human rights campaigner 
reflected: “Only 19 countries manifested comments on the annotated outline and most of them 
were negative, which caused countries like Canada and the US to claim that the process isn’t 
working, no one is buying in (Rome, May 2011)”.   
Indeed, government buy-in and engagement in the GSF negotiations were low in comparison to 
the negotiations on the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of 
Land, Fisheries and Forests in the context of national food security (VGGTs). For example, 
discussions on Section V:  Uniting and organizing to fight hunger involved a smaller number of 
delegates. Observation at the time noted that those present included Switzerland, France, 
Finland, Denmark, US, Mexico, Argentina, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Angola and China along 
with FIAN, La Via Campesina, Indigenous Caucus, International Union of Food Workers, 
World Alliance of Fisherfolk and an NGO working on protracted crisis and food security. When 
questioned about the low attendance, many felt that this was due in part to CFS-overload 
brought about by an engaged and lengthy negotiation on the VGGTs. Others felt that active 
participation on a document that aimed to bring together issues upon which there was already 
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international consensus was not the best use of time and resources. However the Chair of the 
open-ended working group was committed to completing the process.  This led one EU-based 
food security analyst to declare that “[i]t is clear that the strategy of Brazil, who have been 
carrying this process, is to take people by surprise to ensure it is not clear what the significant of 
it is until it is too late to shut it down” (Rome, May 2011). This strategy seemingly employed by 
the Brazilian Chair was one echoed by CSOs: notably, to take advantage of limited buy-in and 
engagement to advance more progressive solutions. Indeed one network of NGOs working in 
Europe deliberated at length as to whether or not they should lobby their national government 
on issues related to the CFS. The concern was that too much engagement and awareness on the 
part of civil servants and politicians could backfire insofar as they could potentially get 
increasingly engaged and then restrict the trajectory of more progressive policy making 
processes and policy recommendations. In the end, this network opted not to lobby at the 
national level, recognizing that their government participated in the negotiations as part of the 
European Union who were generally considered to arrive at favourable positions and were seen 
as allies by the many of the civil society actors working through the CSM.  
At the 37th session of the CFS the Committee acknowledged the CFS Bureau-led consultative 
and inclusive process that resulted in the purposes, basic principles, structure and process of the 
GSF as well electronic consultation on the Annotated Outline. The Committee also underlined 
the critical role of planned consultations on the GSF and the role of the GSF as a dynamic 
instrument which reflects and consolidates the on-going policy convergence work of CFS, 
noting that recommendations of the CFS should be incorporated in the final draft of the GSF. 
Following the 37th Session, a first draft of the CFS was developed and included in the official 
agenda of each 2012 FAO Regional Conference as well as on the agendas of the CSO Regional 
Consultations. Based on the regional consultations and electronic inputs, a second draft of the 
GSF was released, and was the basis for negotiations during an Open Ended Working Group 
Meeting that took place in Rome at the FAO between June 27-29, 2012. At this meeting, 
agreement was reached by the plenary of the CFS intergovernmental working group on the first 
five chapters of the First Version of the Global Strategic Framework on Food Security and 
Nutrition. After that meeting, a further meeting was scheduled for July 19, 2012 to finalise 
chapter six, the so-called “gap” section which was meant to list key issues upon which there was 
not yet international consensus. Then the document was submitted for editorial review and the 
inclusion of case studies and a final version was sent for translation into all FAO official 
languages and then presented for submission to the 39th Session of the CFS in October 2012.  
8.3. Negotiating the Global Strategic Framework 
During the June meeting, as with other CFS negotiations, contentious sections that blocked 
consensus were sent to the Friends of the Chair (FOC). In this case, the FOC was an open group 
and coordinated (voluntarily) by a representative from the Swiss government. Originally, the 
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Chair recommended that the FOC run parallel to the Plenary, but this was rejected as it 
restricted the participation of smaller delegations. Examples of issues that were sent to the FOC 
include discussion on paragraph 30, the Chapeau of section IV Policy, Programme and Other 
Recommendations. The Second Draft text read: 
30. Based on the foundation of the right to adequate food, and in the context of the 
overarching frameworks described above, there is broad international consensus on 
the appropriate policy response to the underlying causes of hunger and malnutrition 
in a number of areas. The recommendations in this section represent a consensus 
reached in the CFS. The list is not comprehensive and will develop over time as the 
GSF is regularly updated to take account of decisions of the CFS. 
Recommendations resulting from the discussions and endorsed by CFS will be 
included in future versions of the GSF.  
Delegates from Canada and the U.S.A. wanted to delete reference to the right to adequate food.  
The final text reads: 
28. Taking into account the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in 
the context of national food security and in the context of the overarching 
frameworks described in Chapter III, there is broad international consensus on 
appropriate policy responses to the underlying causes of hunger and malnutrition in 
a number of areas. The recommendations in this chapter are drawn from decisions 
reached in the CFS with the exception of sections E and F, where the 
recommendations come from other sources. The list is not comprehensive and will 
develop over time as the GSF is regularly updated to take account of decisions of 
the CFS. Recommendations resulting from the discussions and endorsed by CFS 
will be included in future versions of the GSF. 
The shift from being based on the foundation of the right to food, to taking into account the 
progressive realization of the right to food was a clear set-back for actors promoting a rights-
based approach. Given that the CFS reform document gives primacy to achieving the right to 
food, this edit can also be seen as a set-back for the CFS. The focus on national context again 
points to the push for national sovereignty but simultaneously reflects an effort to restrict the 
influence of the document. The shift from highlighting that included recommendations 
representing consensus reached in the CFS, to simply reflecting decisions reached in the CFS, is 
another example of how the language was weakened.  
In a negotiation on the text related to gender, CSOs had some success. In Section D: Addressing 
gender issues in food security and nutrition, CSOs secured language in paragraph 47 that 
recognised that women “are often subjected to structural violence”.  They also managed to 
include the key role women play in securing nutrition into this paragraph so that the first 
sentence of paragraph 47 reads “Women make vital contributions to the food security and 
nutrition of developing countries, but they consistently enjoy less access than men to the 
resources and opportunities for being more productive farmers”.  
After the year long process of developing and negotiating the GSF within the intergovernmental 
open-ended working group, the first version of the GSF was finalised and endorsed by the CFS 
at their 39th Session. At this point the Committee also agreed that “the GSF should be updated 
regularly to reflect the outcomes and recommendations of CFS in a manner consistent with 
multilateral principles, agreements and mandates.” 
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8.4. Assessing the Global Strategic Framework 
Given the mandate and authority of the CFS, the GSF is not a legally binding instrument. Like 
all CFS documents, guidelines and recommendations are meant to be interpreted and applied in 
accordance with national policies, legal systems and institutions. This focus on the national-
level not only reinforced the theme of country-led plans, but it also suggests recognition that 
food security is a national responsibility. It also alludes to broader themes of state sovereignty 
and the role of the state in global governance. What the GSF does offer are “guidelines and 
recommendations for catalysing coherent action at the global, regional and country levels by the 
full range of stakeholders, while emphasizing the primary responsibility of governments and the 
central role of country ownership of programmes to combat food insecurity and malnutrition” 
(CFS 2012c:para 8). 
In line with its reform rationale and reinforcing one of the key policy themes, the GSF places 
emphasis on policy coherence designed to target decision and policy-makers responsible for 
policy areas with a direct or indirect impact on food security and nutrition. This is another factor 
that separates the GSF from the other policy framework insofar as it moves beyond high-level 
rhetoric and focuses on the practice of policy making at the national level.   
The breadth and technical capacity of the negotiators and related technical staff is also 
important. The negotiators representing countries are, for the most part, permanent 
representatives to the FAO or the Rome-Based Food Agencies and thus, if not experts, they are 
at least well versed and certainly immersed in issues related to food, agriculture and nutrition. 
This comes through not only in the negotiations but also in the breadth of recommendations. 
Comparing for example the way in which the CFS addresses the importance of a gender-
sensitive approach, with recognition of the key role of women as food and nutrition providers 
and producers as well as the structural barriers they face, to the way in which the other policy 
documents, at best, recognise that gender is an issue to be addressed in food security, it becomes 
clear that CFS recommendations take a systems approach and are more useful in terms of 
informing and supporting positive policy change to work towards the eradication of hunger. The 
mechanisms for participation and inclusivity was key to the development of a useful and 
applicable one-stop policy shop document like the GSF and the CSF is showing that it has 
processes in place to make this happen. 
It is informative to compare key policy documents selected for further examination with the 
overarching frameworks on food security and nutrition identified by the Committee on World 
Food Security. The intended “value added” of the Global Strategic Framework is that it 
provides “an overarching framework and a single reference document with practical guidance 
on core recommendations for food security and nutrition strategies, policies and actions 
validated by the wide ownership, participation and consultation afforded by the CFS” (CFS 
2012:para 7). The GSF identifies six primary frameworks that are important due to their 
particular connection to food security and nutrition (see Figure 18).  
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It is interesting that the Millennium Development Goals are listed first. The Goals provide a 
political and operational framework for development and provide measurements of human 
development that are based on more than income. The MDGs have a target of reducing hunger 
but fail to address agriculture or food security. They do not include a focus on participation and 
fail to emphasise sustainability. Some of the goals lack measurements, meaning assessment and 
monitoring is limited at best. Furthermore, while each of the goals have specifically stated 
targets and dates for achieving those targets, there are no clear guidelines on how they can or 
should be achieved. They are not used as a policy tool as much as an aspirational framework. 
When they are referenced in a post-2008 context, it is predominantly in the context that they are 
unlikely to be met, or that new goals are being developed with a sustainability focus for post-
2015. 
Frameworks 
1. The Millennium Development Goals 
2. The Voluntary Guidelines to support the progressive realization of the right to adequate 
food in the context of national food security  
3. The Five Rome Principles for Sustainable Global Food Security 
4. The Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, 
5. Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security 
6. High-Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness 
7. United Nations Updated Comprehensive Framework for Action (UCFA) 
8. Other frameworks and documents:  
• The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
• The 1981 International Code of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes 
• The 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) 
• The 1993 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW) 
• The 1995 Beijing Platform for Action ensure women’s rights 
• ILO Conventions 87, 98 and 169 
• The International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology 
for Development (IAASTD) 
• The final Declaration of the International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural 
Development (ICARRD) 
• The UN Declaration on Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP) 
• The Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) Framework and Roadmap 
Figure 20: Overarching Frameworks identified in the Global Strategic Framework for Food 
Security and Nutrition (CFS 2012c).  
 
The Voluntary Guidelines to support the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in 
the context of national food security are a useful addition to the Global Strategic Framework as 
they provide an overall framework for achieving food security and nutrition objectives. They 
call for the right to adequate food to be the main objective of food security policies, 
programmes, strategies and legislation; that human rights principles (participation, 
accountability, non-discrimination, transparency, human dignity, empowerment and rule of law) 
should guide activities designed to improve food security; and that policies, programmes, 
strategies and legislation need to enhance the empowerment of rights-holders and the 
 215 
 
accountability of duty-bearers, thus reinforcing the notions of rights and obligations as opposed 
to charity and benevolence. 
A right to food approach has been central to the reform of the Committee on World Food 
Security, arguably for a few key reasons. The first is based on the broad recognition of the work 
of the current Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, who has 
consistently presented strong, legally-grounded arguments promoting the value of a right to 
food approach to achieving food security in a sustainable and appropriate way. Efforts of the 
Special Rapporteur have ensured that more actors are aware of the importance of a right to food 
approach. An obvious example of this was the public exchange between Pascal Lamy, Director 
of the World Trade Organization and Oliver De Schutter (World Trade Organization 2011) 
relating to the impact of the World Trade Organization on the progressive realisation of the 
Right to Food. Second, civil society actors involved in the Committee on World Food Security 
have consistently pushed for, and negotiated the inclusion of, language linked to a rights-based 
approach. For them, a rights based approach is very much aligned with a food sovereignty 
approach and moreover provides a framework for holding states accountable. Finally,  the 
reform document of the Committee on World Food Security clearly expresses that the “CFS 
will strive for a world free from hunger where countries implement the voluntary guidelines for 
the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security” 
(CFS 2009:para 4). 
While a rights-based approach has been widely accepted by the Committee on World Food 
Security,  a right to adequate food normative and analytical framework has yet to permeate 
policy fora outside the FAO, and even within the FAO and the UN there is ample work to be 
done (de Schutter 2013). Because there has been such limited uptake of a right to adequate food 
normative and analytical framework beyond the FAO and because the Voluntary Guidelines to 
support the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the context of national food 
security were developed pre-2007, they are not included in the mapping of key frameworks 
informing the architecture of global food security governance. This is not however to suggest 
that they do not have an important role to play as illustrated throughout the case studies.  
The Five Rome Principles for Sustainable Global Food Security are discussed below and while 
the High-Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness is not explicitly reviewed, links to the Rome 
Principles are considered.  The Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure 
of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security were initiated before 
the food price crisis.  
8.5. Summary 
When compared to the other key policy documents that have been developed multilaterally to 
address food security in the wake of the food price spikes of 2007-8 (e.g., the UN HLTF’s 
Updated Comprehensive Framework for Action; World Bank’s Agriculture Action Plan: 
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FY2010-1; the G8’s L’Aquila Joint Statement on Food Security; the Global Agriculture and 
Food Security Program Framework; the Declaration of the World Summit on Food Security; 
and the G20’s Multi-Year Action Plan on Development) it becomes clear that while the GSF 
has perhaps the lowest level of recognition, it is by far the most comprehensive, useful and fit-
for-purpose. When reviewing the First Version of the GSF, one thing that stands out, especially 
in comparison to the other policy frameworks reviewed above, are the end notes (a total of one 
hundred) referencing statements to existing documents. There are important implications and 
insights to be gained from this. First, the CFS has made a deliberate effort to ground the 
recommendations and policies in the GSF in existing commitments and best practices as 
negotiated or promoted by other multilateral fora. Second, and this came out clearly in the 
negotiations, the open-ended working group was pressured into defending and rationalising 
what was included in the GSF to appease less-friendly governments. Third, the references 
strengthen the potential application and uptake of the policies therein insofar as policy makers 
will have not only the negotiated GSF text but can also easily access the origins of the 
recommendation which can arguably strengthen the rationale for their implementation.  
What is important to recognise is that the legitimacy and authority of the CFS, as limited as it is, 
is consistently being undermined by these other multilateral actors. Non-CFS actors have failed 
to produce meaningful, consultative, inclusive, grounded policy recommendations built on 
existing international commitments but forward looking and grounded in a broad knowledge 
base. The CFS is proving to be fastidious when it comes to detail because of the internal and 
external pressure that it faces. It is also motivated by the energy of the participants, notably 
those from civil society, who are consistent in their engagement and commitment.  
The question about usefulness versus influence remains unaddressed however. Given that 
competing policy frameworks (e.g., CFA, L’Aquila (see chapter 4) reviewed above have been 
developed with country leaders, and given how little influence and notoriety the CFS has, 
influence and uptake remain a challenge. To begin to assess the impact and usefulness of the 
GSF, future research must consider the ways in which the GSF is being used by policy makers 
in the development of food security policies, as well as civil society organizations looking to 
hold governments to account.  
  
 217 
 
9. Assessment of and Conclusions on the Reformed CFS: 2010-2013 
9.1. Introduction  
This research identified the reformed CFS  as important to the changing architecture of global 
food security governance and asked: To what extent is the reformed CFS realising its objectives 
(RQ1)? The question was answered through a detailed examination of three key reform 
objectives: the expansion of participation; applicable policies and guidelines; and policy 
coordination and coherence. Each of these aspects of the reform were explored, respectively, 
through case studies on the Civil Society Mechanism, the Voluntary Guidelines for the 
Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National 
Food Security, and the Global Strategic Framework.  
This first case study on the CSM (Chapter 6) providence evidence of the history of engagement 
and effort that went into securing enhanced and autonomous participation of civil society actors 
within the CFS. Strategies for ensuring that the “voice of those most affected by food 
insecurity” were heard – a principle aligned with a key CFS reform principle – were reviewed. 
Also reviewed were the opportunities, challenges and strategies developed and employed by 
civil society actors in their relations within the CSM and between the CSM and the CFS. The 
case study highlighted how civil society has organised itself to engage effectively with the CFS 
while being keenly aware of issues linked to representation, power dynamics, political strategy, 
consensus and diversity. 
Chapter 7 reviewed the intergovernmental negotiations around the Voluntary Guidelines on the 
Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National 
Food Security (VGGT). The VGGT represent the most important output of the reformed CFS 
and were frequently referred to as a “make or break” issue for the Committee. Many of the 
themes and tensions outlined in the policy roundtables were revisited in this case study, 
including the complexity of alliances. The analysis provided insight into the functioning of the 
reformed CFS, including how the inclusion of new actors works in practice. Analysis of the 
negotiations reinforced the value of civil society engagement in the work of the Committee and 
depicted a maturation of the negotiation strategies of CSOs. The case study highlighted how 
alliances are being built between states and non-state actors around issues and not necessarily 
along historic or regional lines. The review also served to illustrate how national and regional 
politics are taken up in global-level processes. The analysis also stressed the value of such 
guidelines,  noting several positive and progressive guidelines. Finally, the review pointed to 
limitations in the outcomes and challenges moving forward.  
Chapter 8 presented a review of the development of the Global Strategic Framework. The 
analysis reinforced many of the conclusions drawn from the first two case studies with respect 
to participation and engagement in policy processes. This case study also mapped out how the 
CFS was moving forward with its reform objectives as well as its efforts to develop tools that 
 218 
 
serve to not just improve policy cohesion but also support the development of better policies.  
These three case studies help answer the primary research question. However, in order for the 
CFS to achieve its reform objectives in any sustainable way, strong mechanisms for policy-
uptake, monitoring and evaluation are needed. Correspondingly, in this chapter, an  assessment 
of the CFS’s Results-Based Framework is presented. Following from this, a final assessment of 
the progress made by the CFS on its reform objectives  is provided. The chapter concludes with 
a summary and reflections on the CFS.  
9.2. Considering the Results-Based Framework 
At the 39th Session (October 2012), the CFS updated its multi-year programme of work and 
prioritization of activities for the CFS and proposed a Results-Based Framework,  (CFS 2012f). 
The Framework outlines an approach to reviewing the overall objective of the CFS – to 
contribute to reducing hunger and malnutrition and ensuring food security and nutrition for all 
human beings – as well as specific outcomes, including: the VGGT; principles for responsible 
agricultural investment (CFS-rai); Global Strategic Framework; policy roundtables based on 
HLPE studies; addressing food security and undernutrition in protracted crisis; food security 
and nutrition terminology; mapping food security and nutrition; and, communications. Of 
interest here is the process selected by the CSM for assessing achievement of their objective.  
The Framework as presented to the 39th Session of the CFS remained in draft form, to be refined 
by the Open-Ended Working Group on Monitoring. Three outcomes were identified in Results-
Based Framework: Enhanced global coordination; improved policy convergence on key food 
and nutrition issues; and, strengthened national and regional food security and nutrition actions. 
These outcomes are considered here to show the possible direction that the CFS could pursue in 
terms of monitoring and evaluation.  
Outcome 1: Enhanced Global Coordination 
Regarding the first outcome of “enhanced global coordination on food security and nutrition 
questions”, four indicators were identified. The first indicator asked “are CFS members and 
participants satisfied with its coordination role? Are all CFS stakeholders categories equally 
satisfied?” Similarly, the third indicator sought to capture “how many high-level events 
(including side-events to international or regional conferences) does the CFS organise per 
year?” Participant perception and CFS activities are important, but these indicators do little to 
provide insight into the CFS’s role in global coordination. The second indicator is more useful 
for assessing the outcome: “does CFS collaborate with other key international and regional 
initiatives (e.g. ECOSOC, G20, G8, Rio+20, UN General Assembly, MDG / SDG process, 
UNFCCC, AU, CAADP and other regional partnerships, etc.)?”. A clear definition of 
collaboration is necessary. For example, does a speech by the Chair of the CFS at a G20 event 
count as collaboration? This indicator could be helped by the CFS’s efforts on mapping actions 
for food security, which were initiated as a demo-website in 2012 but has since gone off-line.  
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The final indicator measures whether a CFS-like model to discuss food security and nutrition 
issues (multistakeholder and cross-sectoral) is replicated in other fora, especially at country 
level. The uptake of the CFS-model is an interesting issue and one addressed in part in Chapter 
6 on the CSM. The implementation of a CFS model at the country-level would suggest a 
national-level commitment to multistakeholder, consultative and participatory processes that 
take a rights-based approach and place food security at the centre of policy objectives. This 
national-level action is fundamental to ensuring that the CFS achieves its objectives, as states 
are ultimately responsible for food security.  
The assumptions and risks matched to this first outcome are telling. First, the CFS 
acknowledged that they are working on the assumption that food security and nutrition issues 
remain high in the international political agenda. To address this, as a risk indictor, they 
proposed a review of final reports of key international meetings and conferences. As a 
mitigating strategy they propose evidence-based communication and advocacy along with 
demonstration of linkages with other key areas.  
Second, within the Results –Based Framework there is acknowledgement of the assumption that 
CFS members and participants remain committed to sharing lessons and expertise and 
coordinating their actions for food security and nutrition within the CFS framework. Indeed, this 
is the biggest challenge and relates to the critique of the first and third indicator for assessing the 
outcomes. The associated risk indicator then becomes a lack of participation in CFS meetings 
and negotiation sessions and/or a lack of representation of some categories of stakeholders. The 
mitigating strategy involves ensuring that all CFS participants have the possibility to voice their 
ideas and that all proposals are welcomed by the CFS. In this respect, the review of the CFS and 
the accompanying case studies suggests that overall, the CFS is making progress on this 
outcome and thereby advancing its reform objectives. However, the assumption extends farther 
than is suggested in the Results-Based Framework. For example, while CFS members and 
participants may work to share the lessons and try to ensure policy cohesion, political priorities 
may result in their efforts being ignored or pushed aside.   
The final assumption for this outcome was that the “CFS has a good reputation and is 
recognised by international actors as the main international body for dealing with food security 
and nutrition issues. The international community remains ostensibly committed to providing 
resources according to needs identified and planned activities incorporated in the CFS work 
programme” (CFS 2010c). The CFS remains relatively unknown to many policy makers and 
practitioners, as well as country leaders. While this is slowly changing, there is much work to be 
done in terms of communication and awareness building. This extends beyond simple name 
recognition to include the operating principles of the CFS. As a risk indicator, the Results-Based 
Framework identified measuring decreased interest in the CFS model and activities among the 
international community and donors along with a lack of visibility and legitimacy of CFS. They 
also noted key issues related to food security and nutrition are dealt with by other actors/fora, 
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with no collaboration, consultation or reporting to CFS as another risk indicator. Furthermore, 
the inability to implement CFS-planned activities due to a lack of funding is also an indicator of 
risk. As a mitigating strategy the CFS proposed to undertake systematic networking, 
communication, fund-raising and advocacy efforts towards the donor community. Fundraising 
and communications are not adequate. If the CFS is targeting only donors, there is increased 
likelihood of better funding and importantly, more country-level buy-in. However, these 
strategies must extend to all stakeholders, not simply donors if the CFS is to maintain 
engagement of all participants.  
Outcome 2: Improved Policy Convergence on Key Food and Nutrition Issues 
The second outcome identified for accessing CFS progress towards its objective related to 
improved policy convergence on food and nutrition issues. For this, three indicators were 
identified. The first indicator again linked to communication and consisted of measuring 
whether CFS achievements and recommendations were communicated and advocated 
efficiently. While this sets out the necessary groundwork for improving policy convergence, the 
indicator fails to provide insight into whether the policy recommendations are in fact taken up 
or advocated for. The second indicator build on the first and focuses on how CFS members and 
participants have integrated CFS policy recommendations in their strategies and actions. 
Concrete data collected on this indicator would be most valuable to further understanding the 
influence of the CFS in supporting policy convergence.  The third indicator focuses on how 
CFS policy recommendations have been integrated in national and regional policies, strategies 
and programmes for food security and nutrition. Again, this is a valuable indicator that can 
support analyses into the effectiveness of the CFS in performing its reform goals.  
The CFS recognised the assumption that achievements and successes are well communicated 
among a large audience. Here, it becomes important to  identify key stakeholders in the food 
security and nutrition area who are not aware of the activities. The corresponding mitigating 
strategy is then systematic networking, communication and advocacy efforts on CFS 
achievements and successes among a large audience. 
The second assumption is that the topics of the HLPE reports and related policy discussions are 
in line with priorities on the international agenda and timely and comprehensively treated. The 
identified risk indicator was a lack of high-level participation in HLPE consultation processes 
and roundtables where reports are presented, to be mitigated by ensuring that selected subjects 
for HLPE reports have been identified as key priorities in other international fora and result 
from a consensus of all CFS stakeholders. This flags an important tension: the CFS needs to 
remain topical and must address emerging and pressing issues that come up. At the same time, 
the diversity across the Committee can help to ensure that the CFS does not fall victim to 
chasing the latest “hot” topic at the expense of continuing to challenge the main structural 
causes of food insecurity, malnutrition and violations of the right to food.  
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The final assumption regarding improved policy convergence in relation to stakeholders was 
that CFS stakeholders are engaged towards taking into account CFS recommendations and 
ensuring the use of its methodology, tools and frameworks. The risk indicator was a loss of 
momentum after the adoption/endorsement of CFS recommendations and tools and the delay of 
implementation or follow-up activities. The mitigating strategy included presenting the 
implementation of CFS recommendations to the CFS. This is very similar to the second 
assumption of the first outcome: CFS members and participants remain committed to sharing 
lessons and expertise and coordinating their actions for food security and nutrition within the 
CFS framework. It again comes down to communication. Not simply the capacity of actors to 
communicate effectively, but also the willingness of others to engage on the subject. Interviews 
and conversation conducted during fieldwork revealed that many civil servants and technical 
staff working on issues of food security and nutrition are being told to focus attention on other 
initiatives such as those advanced by the World Economic Forum, the G8 and the G20, leaving 
little time for meaningful exchange between CFS negotiators and decision-makers in the 
Capitals.  
Outcome 3: Strengthened National and Regional Food Security and Nutrition Actions 
The final outcome for assessing the CFS’s progress towards its overall objective is strengthened 
national and regional food security and nutrition actions. As noted above, the overall and long-
term success of the CFS is tied to the meaningful uptake of CFS recommendations and advice at 
the national level. This links back to the responsibility of states to ensure food security and to 
their role as decision-makers within the Committee. It also enhances the legitimacy and value of 
the CFS. The uptake of CFS policy recommendations at the regional and national-levels will be 
slow. That said, there has been progress, especially through collaboration with the FAO, and the 
CFS has included this as a key role and key outcome in the reform process.  
Three indicators were proposed to measure this outcome. The first indicator measures if the 
CFS is often sought after by countries and regions for facilitating support to the design and 
implementation of their food security and nutrition plans, programmes and strategies. This 
raises important questions because the CFS is a committee of member-states and stakeholder 
participants who are not technical experts, nor are the majority likely to have applied experience 
in developing such plans. Furthermore, unlike other planning initiatives (including the G20’s 
Global Agriculture and Food Security Program, or the G8’s New Alliance for Food Security and 
Nutrition, or even the Scaling-Up Nutrition Movement), the CFS does not have the capacity to 
fund the plans. This indicator comes from the Reform Document, which identified support for 
country-led plans as a key role of the CFS. However, it remains to be seen how the CFS would 
accomplish this role and why countries would choose the CFS over other initiatives that include 
a finance component. 
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The second indicator reviews if CFS members and participants have strengthened their food 
security and nutrition actions in the field (including for monitoring and evaluation) and have 
increased related resources, as a result of CFS activities. It is assumed that the annual State of 
Food Security reports will be used to inform this indicator, however, there are important 
questions of attribution that need to be addressed if the CFS is going to start claiming that 
improvements in food security are directly linked to CFS policies.  
The final indicator considers if national and regional stakeholders are satisfied with the use and 
impacts of CFS methodology, tools and frameworks. This indicator again seeks to make the link 
between CFS actions and local uptake. While a focus on satisfaction versus evidence of 
effectiveness, is questionable, the indicator could usefully illustrate which tools are being used 
with perceived success and which are not.  
With respect to assumptions, the first to be noted was that countries and regions remain 
committed to tackle food security and nutrition issues, not too far from the above mentioned 
assumption that food security and nutrition issues remain high on the international political 
agenda. As a risk indicator, the CFS proposed a lack of interest for CFS methodology and tools 
and limited willingness of countries to provide resources and take responsibility for follow-up 
actions. As a mitigating strategy the CFS considered ensuring early involvement and 
endorsement from governments on CFS recommendations and tools, while also ensuring a clear 
demonstration of benefits. 
The second assumption was that countries and regions monitor the actions resulting from the 
implementation of CFS recommendations, tools and frameworks and share related results, 
directly or indirectly, with CFS. Indeed, it is known that many countries engaged in the CFS do 
not have the capacity to monitor food security at the country-level, let alone actions related to 
the implementation of policies. Despite the challenges with respect to capacity, the assumption 
itself is important, especially with respect to feedback. CFS member-states have been very clear 
that there is no desire for increased reporting. There is however a commitment to sharing best 
practices. The related risk indicator was identified as a lack of reporting on the implementation 
of CFS recommendations, tools and frameworks at national and regional levels. The 
corresponding mitigation strategy was to encourage the use of already existing monitoring 
frameworks and include elements for guiding monitoring in all CFS recommendations, tools 
and frameworks.  This is a strong strategy and potentially the best way to start to ensure CFS 
strategies are effectively integrated into national and regional-level food security policies and 
actions.  
The final assumption relates to the provision of resources to implement CFS recommendations 
in countries and regions in a coordinated manner. Again, the CFS has been weak on financing 
and is challenged by other actors with a distinct financial mandate. As a result, funding from 
donors to ensure the uptake of CFS policies at the national level will be fundamental to the 
success of the CFS. The related risk indicator was identified as national and regional 
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stakeholders having limited capacity and funding to implement CFS recommendations, tools 
and frameworks as well as a lack of coordination to implement CFS recommendations at 
country- or regional level. To mitigate this, it was suggested to increase donor coordination in 
the support to countries and regions, pooling of resources as appropriate and increasing high-
level dialogue with concerned governments and stakeholders. The CFS could also host regular 
meetings held with partners to check on progress and evolution of the situation.  
The fact that the CFS has launched an Open-Ended Working Group on Monitoring and has 
approved a relatively comprehensive Results-Based Framework, complete with outcomes, 
indicators, assumptions, risk indicators and mitigating strategies, suggests that concerns about 
the monitoring and evaluative capacity of the CFS may be tempered as the CFS progresses.  
This section has mapped out the concrete and observable steps that the CFS is taking with 
respect to what is arguably one of the most difficult aspects of multilateral governance 
processes: monitoring and evaluation. The process of reflection and awareness of geopolitical 
tensions come through in the assumptions and potential risks and the mitigating strategies, on 
the whole, suggest realistic strategies for addressing such risks. The CFS continues to refine and 
update their Results-Based Framework and the Open-Ended Working Group on Monitoring and 
Evaluation is working towards their October 2014 deadline. That the CFS has developed such 
processes is evidence of transparency, long-term thinking and accountability. Importantly, these 
processes can also be used in the future to defend the legitimacy and value of the CFS against 
competing processes.  
9.3.  Achieving the Reform Mandate 
The CFS has managed to accomplish many of the tasks it assigned for itself but that there are 
certain roles which remain weak or inappropriate for the CFS to take on. To assess the CFS on 
the basis of the reform objectives, progress on the six roles identified for the CFS in the reform 
document are reviewed.  
Coordination at Global Level  
The first role identified for the reformed CFS was to “[p]rovide a platform for discussion and 
coordination to strengthen collaborative action among governments, regional organizations, 
international organizations and agencies, NGOs, CSOs, food producers’ organizations, private 
sector organizations, philanthropic organizations, and other relevant stakeholders, in a manner 
that is in alignment with each country’s specific context and needs”(CFS 2009a). Through the 
reform process, and alongside the efforts of new participants, the CFS has managed to provide a 
platform for strengthened collaboration amongst relevant stakeholders. Beyond collaboration, 
the inclusion of new participants – including UN agencies, the Special Rapporteur on the Right 
to Food, the Office of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, WHO, UNICEF, UNDP, 
Standing Committee on Nutrition, civil society organizations and their networks, international 
agricultural research systems, international and regional Financial Institutions, representatives 
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of private sector associations and, private philanthropic foundations – and the active 
engagement of these participants suggests that the CFS is providing space for stakeholders to 
have a voice and influence intergovernmental negotiations. To ensure that this continues, the 
Civil Society Mechanism will require more funds and the right to remain autonomous. CSM 
leaders, notably the Coordination Committee members, aided by the Secretariat, must work to 
expand their reach and find effective means for two-way communication on CFS issues. There 
are more issues to address here, especially related to accountability and decision-making, but 
these are limited to the CSM and not the CFS. For the CFS to ensure that all stakeholders are 
not simply given a voice, but are able to speak, member states must continue to support the 
CSM and the CFS as a whole must continue to respect processes to ensure that their voices are 
heard.  
With respect to creating links to country-specific contexts, the CFS remain weak although they 
have been working closely with the FAO, and have begun to make clear links to national and 
regional processes (e.g., through support with the VGGTs and CFS sessions at the FAO regional 
conferences). Indeed, moving forward the CFS must find a way of supporting the uptake of CFS 
policy recommendations at the national level. This must be accompanied by careful monitoring 
and evaluation so as to allow for the full assessment of the policy impact on national-level food 
security. The tensions between CFS policies and other initiatives will also remain a challenge. 
In some instances efforts are being made to enhance cohesion (e.g., VGGT and the African 
Land Policy Initiative). In other cases, actors are moving ahead with disregard for CFS 
processes (e.g., PRAI and the G8’s New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition).  
Policy Convergence 
The second role identified in the reform document was for the CFS to promote greater policy 
convergence and coordination. This raises two points. First, how can the CFS achieve this if it is 
being undermined by other actors? Secondly, which policies are to be cohered to? The CFS has 
shown that in the few years following its reform it has managed to produce evidence-based 
policies informed by wide-spread consultation and inclusive negotiations. The results are 
negotiated intergovernmentally and endorse policy proposals that have proven to be 
comprehensive and progressive in terms of seriously addressing food security. That said, given 
that food security has developed in line with a wider neoliberal agenda, and the CFS itself 
operates within a context of embedded neoliberalism, advancing policies that stray from the 
dominant model is not only difficult but also challenges cohesion. Furthermore, given the nature 
of CFS decision-making, it is argued that it is the responsibility of all actors to cohere to CFS 
decisions and not to use the CFS as a stamp of approval for initiatives and policies that were 
developed through non-transparent, non-participatory processes (e.g. AMIS, PRAI).  
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National-Level Support 
The third role of the CFS was to support and provide advice to countries and regions in the 
development, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of their nationally and regionally 
owned plans of action for the elimination of hunger based on the principles of participation, 
transparency and accountability. The CFS has produced policy recommendations, often with 
clear links to existing international commitments, and compiled them in the Global Strategic 
Framework to facilitate access and use. The CFS does not have the authority or the capacity to 
advise countries on national level strategies. The CFS is an intergovernmental body and not a 
technical body. It is the role of the FAO to support countries in the implementation of such 
plans and programmes. Where the CFS can help is by providing space for countries to share 
best practices and to raise issues so that the CFS can then request HLPE reports and develop 
policy recommendations.  
Coordination at National and Regional Levels 
The fourth role identified for the CFS was for it to “serve as a platform to promote greater 
coordination and alignment of actions in the field, encourage more efficient use of resources and 
identify resource gaps”. To date, the CFS has not addressed field-level coordination or 
alignment. This is outside the reach and mandate of the CFS. The CFS is accountable to 
member states and the outputs of the CFS are inter-governmentally negotiated policy 
recommendations for implementation at the national level. These in turn should be taken up, as 
appropriate, at the national level. However it is not the role of the CFS to coordinate action at 
the field-level. It can encourage efficient use of resources and identify resource gaps, but it then 
has no way of ensuring these gaps are closed or that more efficient practices are put into place.   
Promote Accountability and Share Best Practices at All Levels 
Developing accountability measures within the CFS would be complicated insofar as it would 
mean governments developing mechanisms to hold themselves accountable. The CFS should, as 
appropriate, help countries and regions assess whether their objectives are being achieved and 
how food insecurity and malnutrition can be reduced more quickly and effectively. This will 
entail developing an innovative mechanism, including the definition of common indicators, to 
monitor progress towards these agreed upon objectives and actions taking into account lessons 
learned from previous CFS and other monitoring attempts. Comments by all CFS stakeholders 
will have to be taken into account and new mechanisms built on existing structures. In terms of 
sharing best practices the CFs has been quite successful. It has endorsed the VGGTs and the 
GSF and is working towards the adoption of principles for responsible agricultural investment.  
Develop a Global Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutrition  
The final role identified in the reform document was the development of a Global Strategic 
Framework to improve coordination and guide synchronized action by a wide range of 
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stakeholders. As described in Chapter 8, the CFS designed the GSF and finalised it in a 
consultative and participatory way. To strengthen the policy recommendations therein, efforts 
were made provide references to existing international commitments. This both strengthens the 
policy recommendations and helps policy makers ensure coherence.  
9.4. Reflections on the CFS 
The assessment of the six roles identified for the CFS in the reform document confirms that in 
just a few years the CFS has implemented and operationalized an innovative approach to 
participatory policy making at the global level. The expansion of participation in the CFS has 
resulted in changes to policies that demonstrate stronger support for smallholders and prioritise 
food security. This is noteworthy and valuable.  
When the CFS adopted the reform document it was setting out into unchartered territory both in 
terms of process and challenges. Conclusions drawn from the analysis show that the CFS has 
overcome its previous incarnation’s history of inactivity to emerge as a leading 
intergovernmental body that develops comprehensive food security policies through 
participatory processes. The CFS has the legitimate function of acting as the forum in the 
United Nations’ System for review and follow-up of food security policies. This legitimacy is 
based on agreement reached by the Committee’s 123 member countries on reforms that would 
position the CFS as the foremost international and intergovernmental forum for food security 
and nutrition. It is further reinforced by participatory and transparent functioning of the CFS as 
well as the policy outputs.  Importantly, this legitimacy extends beyond the Committee. The G8 
stated its support for the “fundamental” reform process in the “‘L’Aquila’ Joint Statement on 
Global Food Security”. The Declaration from the first meeting of G20 Agriculture Ministers 
expressed a commitment to work closely with the CFS to promote greater policy convergence 
and strengthen policy linkages at the global level (G20 2011). Even the UN General Assembly 
recognised “the important role and inclusive nature of the Committee on World Food 
Security as a key organ in addressing the issue of global food security, including in the context 
of the global partnership for food security” (UN General Assembly 2012a:para 26). The reform 
of the CFS has proven successful insofar as it has managed to achieve the bulk of its reform 
mandates, develop a strong consultative, scientific and participatory process for policy making.  
These conclusions were informed and backed up by the case studies. 
Civil Society Mechanism 
Establishing a mechanism that can represent a broad range of regions and constituencies and can 
effectively operate so as to have an impact on policy processes is no small task. The CSM 
continues to work through growing pains and given the political nature of its members, it is 
likely that the CSM will exist in a continuous state of tension and flux. While potentially 
exhausting for the Secretariat and executive, such tensions are not only unavoidable but also can 
also ensure the on-going development and progress of the mechanism.  
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The largest challenge facing the CSM is similar to that facing the CFS: the potential to be 
undermined by other actors. For the CSM to work, there must be clarity with respect to its 
jurisdiction and scope and so long as the CSM continues to operate in a transparent and 
accessible way, this should be respected by all civil society actors as well as donors.  
The CSM provides two clear additions to the global architecture of food security governance. 
First, it provides a model that functions relatively well, that is broadly participatory and that can 
be replicated.  Second, the experiences of CSO actors working within the CSM to engage with 
the CFS are also valuable sites where knowledge about participatory policy making can be 
enhanced. Finally, the ultimate success of the CSM can be measured in the impact CSOs have 
had on policies. Chapter 7 on the Voluntary Guidelines provided ample evidence of not only the 
impact but more importantly, the value of civil society contributions to the negotiation process 
and outcomes. Furthermore, throughout this thesis examples of cow CSOs have opened up 
debate and challenged status quo have been presented. As such, the operation of the CSM 
within the CFS provides a challenge to theories of transnational neopluralism (described in 
Chapter 2) which suggest that the actors that possess the most transnationally interconnected 
resources, power and influence will be most effective at shaping policy. While this certainly 
applies to relations between the CFS and other initiatives, within the CFS, experiential 
knowledge and geopolitical realities have been shown to have an important impact on securing 
specific policy wants. CSOs and the governments of developing countries successfully 
negotiated terms based on legitimacy informed by experience and need. Correspondingly, future 
research should reflect on the value of transnational neopluralism within the CFS, seeking out 
indicators to identify resources that result in policy change.   
Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Tenure of Land 
As made clear in Chapter 7, the VGGTs mark a landmark in the evolution of the CFS. The 
value of the VGGTs comes from both the process and the outcome. The process of consultation 
and negotiation provide a model for meaningful participatory policy making. It also provides 
insight into some of the requirements to ensure the success of such a process, including 
financial resources, time, trust building, along with varied and translatable forms of expertise. 
Alongside insights into the broader methodology, Chapter 7 highlighted key tensions that arose 
during negotiations, especially with respect to language, state sovereignty, political priorities, 
and the capacity of different actors to engage. Lessons learned from these negotiations can 
usefully inform proceeding CFS negotiations as well as similar processes in other fora.   
The analysis of the negotiations of the VGGTs support the conclusions of Chapter 6 insofar as 
they highlight important role played by CSOs.  More broadly, the growing awareness about the 
VGGTs has helped to build awareness about the CFS.   
Finally, the shift from technical processes to political processes requires further investigations. 
What are the implications of bringing issues as complex and politically sensitive into a non-
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expert, political forum? How do the technical experts then take up the political document and 
translate it back into applicable and practical policy tools?  
Global Strategic Framework 
Chapter 8 reviewed the development of the Global Strategic Framework. Through the review 
and analysis it argued that the CFS has not only managed to develop a document that can 
support coordination and coherence of food security policies, but analysis also showed how the 
CFS is producing the most comprehensive policies recommendations at the global level.  
However, despite the potential value of the document, and its practical and intellectual worth, it 
has low political gravitas. For the GSF to fulfil its function, it needs to become a tool used by 
policy makers and at all levels, but especially at the national level. Efforts to establish 
procedures of monitoring and evaluation will eventually enable the CFS to assess the usefulness 
and impact of the GSF. At this stage,  the GSF serves as another example of consultative and 
participatory negotiations. The negotiations themselves highlighted resistance and apprehension 
on the part of specific governments. The apprehension is most visible in moments where the 
CFS is challenging status quo. As the review of the GSF negotiations illustrate, at times, these 
challenges succeed and the boundaries of the neoliberal project are extended, weakened, and 
even reimagined.  
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10. Conclusions: Implications for food security and global governance 
10.1. Reflections on the research questions 
This thesis provides a window onto the reorganization of a UN Committee during a watershed 
period. It is particularly focused on the dynamics that took place within specific arrangements: 
the internal and external dynamics of the CFS. Specifically, this research set out to answer four 
research questions: 
RQ1: To what extent is the reformed CFS realising its reform objectives? 
RQ2. Who are the main actors and what are the dominant initiatives within the 
changing architecture of food security governance? 
RQ3. How does the CFS relate to the changing architecture of global food security 
governance and what are the impacts? 
RQ4. How do these findings contribute to the literature on, and understandings of, 
global governance and global food security governance? 
With respect to RQ1, drawing on data and analysis presented throughout this thesis, it is argued 
that the CFS has managed to achieve the bulk of its reform objectives but that challenges and 
obstacles remain. Importantly, the CFS is now an innovative, participatory and consultative 
body with the capacity to address challenges as they arise while also producing progressive food 
security policies that move beyond business as usual and make a start at addressing root causes 
of food insecurity. As such, the reformed CFS is the most legitimate and appropriate body to 
lead efforts towards improved global cohesion and best practices in food security policy.  
As it moves forward, the Committee must refrain from overloading itself: a real risk as interest 
in the CFS grows. Already the CFS is receiving requests related to monitoring and evaluation of 
external programmes. This type of work is beyond the scope and capacity of the Committee, at 
least at this time. The CFS should continue to reflect on its work plan and tackle issues within 
its mandate. Other challenges facing the CFS include awareness and recognition; monitoring 
and evaluation; influence in terms of being able to achieve its mandate as the foremost 
international and intergovernmental platform; and the ability to address interconnected crises 
and associated challenges of depleting natural resources and climate change. 
It is important when assessing the CFS to remember that the vision of the reformed CFS was 
defined within the emerging new architecture of global food security governance and as a key 
part of an emerging Global Partnership for Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition (CFS 
2009b:para 4). This relates to RQ2: Who are the main actors and what are the dominant 
initiatives within the changing architecture of food security governance? Key multilateral actors 
have been identified as the G8, G20, World Bank and HLTF. While all have expressed their 
support for the CFS, they have also pursued food security policy programmes outside of the 
CFS. As illustrated throughout this thesis, the development of the initiatives present threats to 
the mandate and legitimacy of the CFS. Furthermore, the initiatives often contradict policy 
recommendations developed and negotiated through the CFS.  
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In answering RQ2, the answer to RQ3 (How does the CFS relate to the changing architecture of 
global food security governance and what are the impacts?) emerged. In this research the CFS 
has been identified as a key player that is pushing for recognition and to maintain legitimacy as 
the central (“the foremost”) actor in global food security policy discussions and policy 
development. At the same time, the Committee remains at the periphery of influence. It has 
been illustrated and argued in this thesis that this position is not inherently negative as it allows 
for, at times, greater freedom and flexibility with respect to policy processes and outcomes. The 
challenge becomes ensuring the uptake of the Committee’s policy proposals. It is also 
acknowledged that it remains too early in the reform process to conclude on the impact of the 
CFS. 
What can be concluded at this stage is that despite its legitimacy, increasing recognition, 
deliberative mechanisms, and wide rhetorical support, the CFS continues to be undermined by 
powerful economically-driven actors and therefore any good policies and processes emerging 
from the CFS are in danger of being compromised by decisions made in competing international 
institutions and forums, as the CFS holds less (although perhaps increasing) political weight. 
This is reinforced by the fact that the CFS has no implementation or financial capacity and has 
yet to finalise processes for monitoring and evaluation.  
Theoretical assumptions of transnational neopluralism (defined in Chapter 2) would suggest that 
within the architecture of global food security governance the ability of the CFS to fulfil its 
mandate is likely to remain limited. The CFS simply does not have the resources, power and 
influence of actors like the G8 and G20. Furthermore, while it remains too early to assess the 
policy impacts of the CFS, the advancement of competing visions for the future of food security 
continue to move ahead while internally, the CFS is faced with the possibility of experiencing 
more challenges as it gains prominence and attracts actors who are not versed in the rules of 
operation or who are resistant to such processes.  
At the same time, to suggest that the G20 and G8 countries will disengage, or that they even 
should, also fails to recognise the important role these actors could play. First, wealthy countries 
face pressing food security and nutrition challenges at the national level, notably related to 
issues of (over-) consumption and malnutrition. Second, they have the responsibility of 
reforming financial and trade systems which currently negatively impact on food security. Not 
only do the G8 and G20 have technical capacity in this area, they also have a great deal of 
legitimacy in terms of regulating markets across the multilateral system.   
Sophia Murphy (2013:4) has proposed important contributions the G20 could make towards 
global food security, all of which can also be applied to the G8:  
by reforming certain problematic domestic policies (for instance, the minimum-use 
biofuels mandates of the European Union [EU] and the United States); by 
accepting greater transparency and predictability in the level and use of grain 
stocks; by accepting disciplines on the use of export restrictions and working with 
net-food importing developing countries to restore their confidence in international 
trade; and by improving the regulation of speculation and increasing transparency 
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on commodity-futures markets; by making significant progress toward shifting 
their agricultural production systems toward less-polluting models.  
In taking on such tasks, and “getting their houses in order” the G8 and G20 must avoid 
encroaching on wider intergovernmental processes wherein all countries participate, and 
especially processes where the voices of those most affected by food insecurity are given 
priority. It seems unlikely at this point that the G8 and G20 will step back and they appear 
increasingly committed to strengthening a neoliberal agenda that supports trade liberalization 
and strengthens the role of the private sector. Consider for example that Prime Minister David 
Cameron declared that the G8’s 2013 Lough Erne Summit: “will be focused on three ways in 
which we can support the development of open economies, open governments and open 
societies to unleash the power of the private sector” (Cameron 2012). The G8’s New Alliance 
appears to be doing just that in Africa, despite mounting evidence that these types of neoliberal 
policies have negative impacts on food security and the most vulnerable (Ben-David, 
Nordström, and Winters 1999; FAO 2000, 2012j; Madeley 2000; Panda and Ganesh-Kumar 
2009; de Schutter 2013; Tyler and Dixie 2012; Wise 2009). 
This thesis has also illustrated that with a context of embedded neoliberalism, and amidst the 
competition for leadership, space has been made for manoeuvring. In practice this means the 
CFS has initiated discussions and processes to tackle some of the more pressing and structural 
issues impacting food insecurity and malnutrition. Reviews of these processes further illustrates 
that this is due in large part to active civil society participation. As such, the CFS does represent 
a step away from “business as usual”, addressing an increasing number of calls to do so 
(IAASTD 2009; UNCTAD 2013; UNEP 2012).  
Along these lines, this research has described how the CFS has begun to meaningfully include a 
wider range of actors and how these actors are opening up policy debates and influencing 
intergovernmental policies. However, it can also be concluded that so long as policy discussions 
revolve around food security, fundamental structural changes – non-hegemonic change – will 
remain impossible. As noted earlier in this thesis, non-hegemonic action stands in contrast to 
counter-hegemonic action. A hegemonic arrangement is achieved when a population comes to 
be dominated partly through its own consent. However, hegemony is relational insofar as the 
processes of organizing consent may also create opportunities for constructing counter-
hegemonic movements and resistance (Carroll 1990:393). Simplified: counter-hegemonic action 
potentially exists in relation to hegemony. When considered in the context of embedded 
neoliberalism, it is theorized that such counter-actions serve to stretch boundaries but not 
deconstruct or rebuild them. As described in this thesis, such actions remain vulnerable to co-
option.  Thus, counter-hegemony may present itself as transformative, but it remains tied to the 
agenda of the dominant hegemonic actors (Carroll 2007; Hall 1988). By contrast, anti-
hegemonic action seeks to remove itself from the terrain of hegemony by moving beyond 
counter-hegemonic promotion of fragmentation and politics of difference and seeking solutions 
outside of the logic of embedded neoliberalism. Following from this, it is theorized that while 
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the CFS presents opportunities for counter-hegemonic change, it skirts the possibility of anti-
hegemonic change in so far as it remains tied to UN processes and the language of food security 
(see Chapter 4).    
10.2. Implications for Food Security 
The complexity and the way in which the discourse of food security is taken up across global 
food security governance raises more questions than it answers. Throughout this research the 
limitations of food security as a discourse and as a policy frame were consistently reinforced. 
First, food security employs a technocratic definition and approach: it has been highly 
negotiated and therefore does not necessarily reflect the best definition of the situation, but 
rather international consensus arrived at by diplomatic compromise. Food security is apolitical 
insofar as it fails to accept the political processes that contribute to food insecurity. Food 
security is constructed as disembodied, non-located, absent from political economic and 
sociocultural context. At the same time, food insecurity is constructed as embodied (normally a 
woman (mother)), it is located (usually in Africa), and framed within a specific socio-cultural 
context at the local or national scale. There is thus a disconnect between the way in which the 
end goal (food security) and the problem (food insecurity) are understood and framed. Food 
security as an approach, as a frame, as discourse, and as a policy programme, remains worthy of 
critique and scrutiny. At issue in this thesis however was not the relevance or usefulness of the 
term, but rather the ways in which it is being redefined in a post-food price spike policy context. 
The amount of focus and attention being paid to food security at this moment illustrates the 
need for on-going critical academic inquiry.  
Food security, as a key policy frame, is an example of what James Ferguson (1994) calls an 
anti-political device. It turns a symptom of poverty into the ends of policy. Instead,  hunger, and 
by extension poverty, must be situated within specific economic systems of production, 
modalities of representation and regimes of power (George 1984). Dominant discourses 
informing food security policy are marked by a reluctance to acknowledge hunger and 
malnutrition as a political problem linked to relations of power. Given the relationship between 
food security policy at the global level and broader neoliberal project it is not surprising that 
international actors chose food security over trade or financial markets as the discourse to frame 
the fallout of the food price spikes. Food security allowed actors to bypass difficult policy 
problems that make up the structural causes of hunger and malnutrition. In turn, governments 
can be seen to engage in seemingly urgent and earnest deliberations about food security with 
little threat to the status quo. In the global food security policy domain there is room for 
counter- and non-hegemonic actors to push for change (Holt Giménez and Shattuck 2011), but 
all policy debates framed through food security will have a hard time escaping the history and 
trajectory of the term. 
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Does this mean that the term should be done away with? Despite the clear limitations and 
problems outlined above, at this moment, as the battle for leadership over the problem and 
solutions continues, the answer is, hesitatingly, no. This is in part because academic ponderings 
on discourses of food security remain removed from the fact that food security describes a very 
real, very troubling problem. Indeed there is a disconnect between policy and practice that 
demands stronger analysis and reflection. From this perspective, however flawed, food security 
provides a common language that governments, policy makers, field staff, NGOs, the private 
sector and social movements understand and, at least partly, agree on. They certainly do not 
agree on the adequacy of the definition. There is also no agreement on the path to achieving 
food security. Yet, importantly, there is clarity in what is meant by food security in international 
circles. This agreement is valuable. To begin to reimagine and reopen negotiations on another 
term to describe the same problem – a lack of adequate access and availability of appropriate 
foods to lead a healthy life – could take years and could shift attention away from the pressing 
issue: almost one sixth of the planet is hungry and industrial food production models are not 
sustainable. Attempts by the CFS to expand the term to “food and nutrition security” (CFS 
2012a) are illustrative of the challenges and tensions involved in reformulating terms in 
intergovernmental fora. At the same time, pushing to incorporate or embed language that 
provide a strategic critique of food security (i.e., food sovereignty) into these fora is also 
dangerous as critical aspects of these approaches are likely to be tempered through passive 
revolution (Gramsci 1971).  
While the term remains useful (at least for now), food security programmes and policies need to 
be reimagined and an alternative future developed in line with ecological principles that tackle 
distribution, consumption, injustice and that are effectively integrated at the local, national and 
regional (and global, if appropriate) level in accordance with local realities. It is acknowledged a 
catch-22 situation emerges when this statement is considered in the context of embedded 
neoliberalism. As a result, it is also recognised that change will need to extend far beyond food 
security to the core of systems of global governance. Until then, food security at the global level 
will continue to exist as a policy framework that claims to work towards the eradication of a 
structural problem without addressing the structural issues. As noted above, this approach 
simultaneously provides a way for governments to feign action without having to address 
difficult political decisions related to financial systems, justice and natural resources. This is the 
conundrum of late capitalism and extends across the key challenges of this century. Thinking 
ahead, a food policy approach (Lang et al. 2009), food sovereignty (Holt-Giménez and Altieri 
2013; McMichael 2006; Mousseau and Mittal 2006) and emerging literature on resilience 
(Alinovi et al. 2010; De Schutter 2008) could prove useful in imaginations of a post-food 
security policy era. 
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10.3. Implications for Global Governance 
In this thesis, global governance literature provided a way of understanding complexity at 
multiple levels. The literature also raised questions that were reflected back in the processes 
being observed throughout the data collection process. As such, analysis of the application of 
global governance theory to the CFS provides an opportunity to reflect on implications for 
global governance studies more broadly, specifically with respect to addressing key challenges 
and limitations as identified across the literature. What follows is summary of ways in which the 
analysis of the CFS contributes to the existing literature on global governance.  
Observable Phenomenon 
With respect to global governance as observable phenomenon, the CFS as it is positioned within 
the broader architecture of global food security governance reflects the intersectional processes 
between the political, economic and sociocultural pillar described by Muldoon (2004). 
However, in contrast to processes of multipolarity of power and decentralisation of authority 
often associated with global governance, the CFS is recentralising power in the hands of nation 
states. At the same time, it is developing and supporting mechanisms to ensure that multiple 
stakeholders are involved in the processes. In this way, decision-making processes are 
pluralistic and decision-making remains the authority of nations.  With respect to the variable 
geometry of political significance and regulatory capacity across systems of global governance, 
within and beyond the CFS, a shift in significance is evident. The CFS maintains limited 
regulatory capacity. Actors have sought to address this, in part, by rooting policy 
recommendations in existing intergovernmental agreements – notably the right to food – and by 
starting work on monitoring and evaluation of their own policy proposals. These changes, 
alongside the consistent output of the Committee, have led to increased political significance. 
As noted in the thesis, this comes at a potential risk insofar as the CFS has managed to advance 
comparatively progressive policies because the people negotiating them tend to fall below the 
ministerial level and hold diplomatic posts as permanent representatives to the Rome-based 
food agencies. Should the CFS become increasingly politically significant, it is likely that 
ministerial participation will increase. This will undoubtedly add a higher political dimension 
that has been relatively absent from the CFS thus far, but it could threaten existing procedures 
and flexibility that are in fact the strength and added-value of the reformed CFS. 
Global governance requires institutions to function as intermediaries to tie together different 
components of socio-political and economic systems. The CFS has been restructured to play 
such a role, and not only to bring components together but also to ensure that where they meet 
there is an interface space that constitutes “important terrains for confrontations between social 
movements and the defenders of the neoliberal agenda” (McKeon 2009:48).   
Muldoon (2004:9) argues that “governance structures only survive if they promote stability in 
the system”. As a participatory and inclusive platform for discussion, the CFS is in many ways 
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addressing the issue of stability, in line with a broader participatory turn. Ignoring civil society 
in an era of networks and social media is increasingly challenging and problematic. Creating 
this interface space serves to focus and align actors who are often on opposing sides. While 
there are implications for resistance and the capacity for counter versus non-hegemonic action 
(Holt Giménez and Shattuck 2011), that the confrontations take place within established 
parameters provides a level of enhanced stability. Where the CFS continues to struggle is in 
gaining authority to address political issues intimately tied to food security but addressed by 
other actors. Two key examples are trade and climate change.  
With respect to shifts taking place at the level of global governance, the CFS exhibits an upward 
shift in authority as it seeks to coordinate national-level policies and ensure policy cohesion. 
Similarly, a downward shift is evident insofar as civil society participants have taken on a great 
deal of work in terms of research, coordination, planning and research. This is not perceived 
however as the CFS unloading work and responsibilities to the civil society sector, instead, this 
is perceived as a meaningful opportunity for civil society actors to influence policy processes.  
With respect to network governance, the development of the Civil Society Mechanism and their 
unique blend of formal and informal governance structures is an important example of how 
global networks can address challenges related to language, time, representation and legitimacy. 
As a network, the CSM represents an effective organizing model for food social movements 
engaging in global governance processes; it is a politicizing, engaging and connecting 
mechanism. It actively seeks out and supports the engagement of those “most affected by food 
security” and provides opportunities to hear alternative voices perhaps more connected to the 
realities on the ground. Its structure can also be replicated at various levels to support regional, 
national, local engagement and across sectors. 
As noted in Chapter 2, shifts in governance lead to a rise in the popularity and usage of 
information comparison, such as benchmarking and best practices (van Kersbergen and 
Waarden 2004:55). The CFS reflects this trend but it is also acknowledged that such approaches 
are promoted within the CFS due to a lack of capacity to fund projects or to implement policies.  
Finally, as illustrated through the case studies, within the CFS, networks and alliances are being 
made and re-made along key issues and not necessarily along ideological or historic ties. 
Political Project 
Global governance as political project is taken up in several ways including: global governance 
as a way of solving the world’s collective problems; global governance to re-democratise in the 
face of globalization; and, global governance as advancement of a neoliberal project.  Each of 
these forms of enactment can be seen in the reform of the CFS. The issue of coming together to 
solve a collective problem stems from the origins of the idea of food security and has continued 
to rationalise actions around food security as exemplified in part through the policy theme of 
relief. With respect to re-democratisation in the face of globalisation, the CFS has relied on 
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transparency, participation and applicability of policy outcomes to secure greater legitimacy in 
the fight for authority over food security policy. At the same time, the CFS continues to 
promote the advancement of a neoliberal project. Here, the understanding of embedded 
neoliberalism helps to make sense of why this is and how it functions. As Chapter 4 illustrated, 
the concept of food security in global policy debates has developed as part of a wider neoliberal 
project and as such debates about food security necessarily take place within the boundaries of 
embedded neoliberalism. The neoliberal discourse is further strengthened by the CFS’s 
principle of one country-one vote which is arguably democratic but fails to address inequalities 
in power, wealth and capacity. Furthermore, during CFS negotiations it is apparent that 
countries with greater power and influence – most notably G8 countries – are better positioned 
and better able to block consensus than less powerful countries, but not always.    
The political and social playing field – the transnational space – within which the CFS operates 
is defined by embedded neoliberalism. The embedded nature of neoliberalism establishes the 
main boundaries of logic and operation, but the theory forwards that neoliberal hegemony is 
ever-changing, always contested and thus in a constant state of flux. It thus represents a hard – 
but not impassable – barrier for actors seeking to challenge its logic. Whether previously 
“outside” actors prove more successful in their pursuits to change the system from the inside, as 
they continue to also work on the outside, remains to be seen. However, the research has also 
shown that there is room for real democratic processes to emerge. Indeed, while the CFS has 
emerged as but one process among others, the real value of the reformed Committee is that it is 
an international forum that engages with the more difficult, even structural, issues and it is 
helped to do so through the participation of multiple actors seeking to push it in that direction. 
Those actors are not only CSOs, but as this research has shown, many governments (represented 
through their delegations) also moved this way during the negotiations.   
In this respect, the reformed CFS, as an actor in global governance, serves as a means to deal 
more effectively with the crisis-prone consequences of neoliberal social processes. As explained 
in Chapter 2, the prevailing neoliberal logic steering policy processes beyond the state are 
deeply embedded in a broader political trend towards reregulation of the world economy in 
ways that obscure the negative tendencies of late capitalism. However, the logic of embedded 
neoliberalism, informed by neo-Gramscian understandings of hegemony, suggest that this is 
inevitable. Related theories of change suggest that short of revolution, neoliberal hegemony will 
continue to be contested and in turn concessions will be granted to maintain relations of power 
in a slightly altered form. As such, while the CFS presents a space for confrontations between 
social movements and the defenders of the neoliberal agenda (McKeon 2009:48) the 
organizational structures within which it is embedded ensure that critical voices – the voices of 
those most affected by food insecurity – are engaged in counter-hegemonic action instead of 
non-hegemonic action. It is equally important not to ignore the capacity of powerful forces in 
this analysis, and their efforts to survive. This research has illustrated that across the CFS actors 
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are pushing, shoving, strategizing and compromising for something better, and their efforts are 
being at least partially rewarded. The implications in terms of change in the food system 
remains to be seen, but the key dynamic that has been uncovered is the policy clarification 
offered in the face of a complex and messy reality.  
10.4. Addressing Limitations of Global Governance 
Beyond the ideological barriers of embedded neoliberalism, global governance faces several 
challenges and critiques, notably with respect to questions of participation, accountability and 
legitimacy (see Chapter 2). These issues are now revisited with a view towards illustrating the 
way in they arise and are addressed within the CFS so as to contribute to the growing literature 
on global governance and global food security policy. First however, it is important address the 
three weaknesses of global governance as raised by Overbeek (in Overbeek et al. 2010). First, 
the critique that analyses relying on global governance tend to be ahistorical has been addressed 
by providing a review of the evolution of the discourse of food security policy in relation to 
wider political processes. With respect to the challenge that analyses are necessarily pluralist in 
so far as they tend to take the plurality of actors, interests and structures as essential, it is here 
argued that this is indeed a strength of the research. Of interest is how actors work together to 
achieve the reform objectives of the CFS and also so the CFS interacts with other actors within 
a changing architecture of global food security governance and at a specific moment of crisis. 
Finally, the critique argues that inquiries into processes of global governance are apolitical in so 
much as power is often removed from analyses are addressed by careful observation and 
reflection on relations of power within the CFS and outside, notably as they relate to language, 
capacity and perceived legitimacy.  
Participation 
Through its recent reform process, the CFS has supported new mechanisms and structures that 
are reshaping the way food security policy is debated and developed by changing who is 
engaged in the debate (Duncan and Barling, 2012). By including civil society actors as official 
participants on the Committee, the CFS is championing a model of enhanced participation at the 
level of international policy-making and finding new ways to engage actors who have 
previously sat at the margins of official food security debates.  
By opening up participation on the CFS to civil society actors, new opportunities to challenge 
the logic of embedded neoliberalism are being created. While this has the potential to expand 
the terms of debate, understandings of the problems and the scope of solutions, which are here 
deemed to be positive, the challenge for the CSM, moving forward, will be finding a way to 
balance insider status with outsider objectives (Duncan and Barling 2012). 
How well the reformed CFS is able to put into practice the values and mechanisms it has 
developed and supported is an important test not only of the value of the Committee, but also of 
civil society participation in global policy-making processes, and global governance more 
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broadly. Notably, how the CFS incorporates and manages the participation of civil society, and 
how civil society organization manage their participation and retain a meaningful sense of 
agency, will be a litmus test for claims of legitimacy in the face of challenges from donor-based 
and wealthy-country led initiatives that seek to maintain neoliberal hegemony and continue to 
forward agro-industrial solutions. 
Within the CFS, participation from research bodies, philanthropic foundations and to a lesser 
extent, the private sector, remains limited. The enthusiasm and diligent engagement of CSOs 
had helped propel the reformed Committee through its post-reform learning curve, but to 
increase the impact and influence of the CFS and to ensure that it upholds its mandate of 
inclusivity, it will need to find a way of engaging other participant groups in more meaningful 
ways. At the same time, greater participation from these actors could quickly shift the balance 
of power and strain the CFS’s commitment to ensuring that the voices of those most affected by 
food security are heard. More research into ways of balancing increased buy-in without 
impacting the growing influence and engagement of civil society actors within the CFS would 
be valuable.  
Accountability 
As noted in Chapter 2, in response to new forms of governance that render traditional 
mechanisms for checks and balances less effective, or even obsolete, new understandings and 
mechanisms for accountability are emerging.  One of the major limitations to emerge from the 
review of multilateral policy processes is the lack of accountability. The lack of mechanisms to 
ensure accountability and follow-through of actors leads to unfulfilled commitments and a form 
of global-level policy amnesia wherein political leaders make declarations and commitments 
that are quickly forgotten or substituted for another policy deemed more appealing.  
In terms of policy making at the global level, states are being asked to monitor their own 
progress and to prioritise development. States continue to predominantly prioritise economic 
values: food security becomes framed as an outcome of strong economy. It is a form of morality 
within the political economy but it fails to address over-consumption or obesity and fails to 
break down structural causes. Such an approach fails to make appropriate links to, or recognise, 
obesity or, perhaps more importantly, the impact of western or wealthy consumption patterns on 
food security worldwide.  
Of the policy initiatives reviewed in Chapter 4, explicit discussion of accountability is notably 
absent in most. By contrast, the CFS’s Global Strategic Framework dedicates a section to 
monitoring and follow-up of food security policies and right to food approached at various 
levels. The CFS has been very clear on the issue of accountability: while the CFS’s work and 
negotiations are participatory, states are accountable for decision making. What the CFS lacks is 
the capacity to enforce the uptake of policy recommendations. The issue of which participants 
are accountable and who they are accountable to has been raised in the context of CSO 
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engagement (Chapter 6). Finding effective and appropriate mechanisms to ensure accountability 
to a global network of civil society actors is an impossible task. The CSM model is far from 
perfect but they are taking steps towards enhancing their accountability and decision-making 
structure, recruiting new actors and sharing leadership roles all the while remaining highly 
sensitive to issues of representation, social struggle and legitimacy.  
Legitimacy 
The legitimacy of CFS member states is assumed. When the CFS adopted the reform document, 
123 countries agreed that it was the legitimate forum for discussions on food security at the 
global level. Despite this, actors are undermining this legitimacy by coordinating actions and 
policies on food security outside of the CFS. This illustrates the challenges of legitimacy at the 
multilateral level, especially when the most legitimate organization operates at a level below 
minister or heads of state.  
The CFS’s reform document defines which groups of actors are legitimate participants. With 
respect to CSO participants, legitimacy can be gauged in two ways. First, there is the argument 
that CSO actors are legitimate because of their lived experience and insofar as they have been 
selected to engage in the CFS through the Civil Society Mechanism (autonomously defined 
legitimacy). On the other hand, there are important questions related to the legitimacy of non-
elected actors and the implications of their engagement in intergovernmental processes. 
Answers to the second point depend a great deal on the structure of the first: that is, legitimate 
processes for selection and engagement within the CSM are a prerequisite for their legitimate 
engagement in the Committee.  
The CSM is continuously reflecting on and refining their selection processes. The autonomous 
nature of the mechanism means that each constituent and sub-region is responsible for designing 
and following through with a process deemed legitimate to a range of actors. This is an example 
of output legitimacy (Thomassen and Schmitt 1999:255). CSO leaders (or focal points) must be 
seen to be legitimate (as well as accountable) to their constituents. If they are not, actors may 
raise complaints and undermine the broader participatory process. In line with the academic 
literature, legitimacy is not understood to be a stable condition but something fluid that must be 
repeatedly created and recreated (Boström and Hallström 2010:15).  
Importantly, within the CSM, legitimacy comes from working in an area related to food security 
and having access to networks. With respect to the influence of CSOs in the CFS, as the case 
studies show, they have actively earned their legitimacy through strategic and valuable 
interventions.  
10.5. Reflections on Methods 
 
More specific to this project, and as noted in Chapter 3, the fieldwork began just as the research 
project began and therefore the literature review and project planning ran parallel to the data 
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collection. This meant that the process and objectives were developed as the fieldwork 
progressed and were in turn heavily influenced by fieldwork. This is not necessarily negative as 
it meant that the research questions emerged out of the tensions observed in the field. At the 
same time, the research was often disjointed and fragmented at the beginning. The skill of 
taking field notes developed over the three years of participant observation. The focus of the 
field notes also became more targeted and more useful as the research questions emerged. By 
the final stint of fieldwork the process had become systematic.  
Related to this, more effort or a different approach could have been employed to secure a 
broader and more representative range of interviews, especially with government 
representatives. Personality and confidence played a role here as it was rather uncomfortable to 
continuously ask individuals for interviews. Interviews may have benefitted from more structure 
(i.e. a defined interview schedule) to allow for more comparable results, although the overall 
aim of the purposive sample was to get insight into specific issues. A survey of participants and 
member states would have provided insight into perceptions of success and satisfaction with the 
reform. This is something that should be pursued in the future, perhaps in partnership with the 
CFS Secretariat. A similar survey should also be conducted within the CSM.38F39  
Access to the field was gained through the Civil Society Mechanism and as a result there is a 
bias towards the positions and perspectives of civil society organizations. Part of this is 
validated through solidarity research and through a commitment to exploring social movements’ 
interactions as important and often neglected sites of knowledge making. Indeed, by exploring 
the interactions and strategies of civil society actors, this research has shed light on the 
complexities, challenges and opportunities that come from moving from the periphery into the 
centre of intergovernmental policy processes. In doing so, the thesis has been able to politicise 
what is often de-politicised in the literature: that is, processes of strategy, prioritisation and 
compromise that inform the public positions. There were of course drawbacks of being so 
closely aligned with civil society actors. The association could have impeded access to 
diplomats and technicians weary of close association with CSOs, although no such examples 
were obvious in the research process. By being an outsider – academic – in a very insider 
location, extra effort had to be made to establish and maintain trust. This in turn influenced 
which meetings were observed, which events were appropriate to write about, and the level of 
critique that could be developed against the CSM. Furthermore, friendships developed through 
the close working relationships raising ethical questions. These were resolved by carefully 
differentiating between “on the record” and “off the record” conversations which were often 
mixed, and by discussing the use of observations and other related data with relevant 
                                                     
 
39
 Following up with this conclusion, I worked with a group of CSM Coordination Committee Members 
to develop a short survey assessing the CSM’s performance over its first three years of operation. The 
survey was carried out during the October 2013 CSM Forum.  
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participants. Awareness of the challenges of a close relationship to the CSM contributed to a 
change of research focus early in the process to place less emphasis on the CSM and more on 
the evolution and capacity of the CFS.  
The research project focused on the engagement of CSOs in the CFS process in lieu of other 
participants. This was in part because the engagement of CSOs was what was so novel about the 
CFS reform and also because the CSM proved much more complex, intricate and advanced than 
the other mechanisms and modes of participation. Understanding how a mechanism could start 
to reflect the diversity of the civil societies of the world was nothing if not daunting and 
intriguing.  However, a major weakness of the research is that it does not reflect adequately on 
the role of the private sector or philanthropic both within the CFS and outside. This is 
problematic given the growing influence of philanthropic foundations on food security 
programmes and policies.  Another limitation was the lack of consideration paid to discourses of 
nutrition within and outside of the CFS. Many actors are now talking about “food and nutrition” 
security and there are important political and legal implications as well as a range of 
motivations advancing this terminology that require careful analysis.  
During the negotiations and analysis, it would have also been useful to identify the geographical 
alliances between governments – especially pan-African and Latin American groupings – to 
better capture and understand the role of regional initiatives in the post-food price spikes 
architecture of food security policy. Such an analysis may also shed light on changing 
geopolitical arrangements of power.  
10.6. Reflections on Broader Application of Methodology 
As Pascal Lamy (2012:721) notes, “part of the difficulty in thinking global governance lies in 
the gap between theory and practice.” The theoretical framework described and applied 
throughout this thesis, in conjunction with data collected through participant observation, helps 
to shrink this gap. Global governance theory, as it has been presented in this thesis, recognizes 
fundamental political, economic, technological, and cultural dynamics that engage social and 
political theory while also moving beyond conventional international relations theory (Muldoon 
2004). The approach provides conceptual and analytical tools to critically assess the rapidly 
changing terrain of global politics and the interactions of the various actors as they respond to 
shifts in politics, culture, the environment and the economy. The theory provides explanations 
for the evolution and impact of emerging modes of governance and, as has been argued in this 
thesis, can be applied to the governance of wicked problems.  
Importantly, within a context of globalization, the approach allows researchers to identify key 
shifts in the transformation of the state, the role of international institutions, multilateral 
arrangements, private governance, the globalisation of civil society, and the myriad related 
interactions.   
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The global governance literature supports theorizing about the organization of actors a 
multilateral environment while also providing guidance for grouping the range of actions taken 
by these actors across different geo-political contexts. This serves to highlight issues likely to 
emerge in studies of multi-stakeholder governance processes. As such, the theoretical 
framework provides not only guidance but also a baseline against which emerging global 
processes can be understood and assed. More broadly, a framework drawing from global 
governance theory has the scope to explore social relations from the level of the individual 
through to the global. However, it is also acknowledged that insofar as it is far-reaching, it fails 
to identify clear boundaries within which to frame and limit the scope of study.  
As such, it is shown in this thesis that the analytic notion of embedded neoliberalism can be 
used to frame inquiries into global governance processes. Such an approach valuably theorises 
how formulations and enactments of the “neoliberal” come to form a boundary of sorts – rigid 
but not impermeable – within the context of a transnational neoplural space (Cerny 2008). This 
space is understood to be organised in ways that facilitate the objectives of economic actors. 
Yet, importantly, the approach makes space for the agency of actors, including those who resist 
and act against neoliberalism and push its boundaries from within and from outside. The 
approach is applicable to inquiries into multilateral and global governance processes, especially 
the governance of complex problems like food security.  
While the strength of the framework is that it provides space for capturing social processes and 
related dynamics, and boundaries to frame the inquiry, actually identifying these can be 
challenging as they are actively written out of reporting processes. For this reason, there is great 
value in coupling the theoretical framework with participant observation.  
Participation involves doing things – working alongside people, building trust, making yourself 
available, assuming new and different roles, and learning how to act in different contexts. By 
successfully doing participant observation researchers gain access to the everyday: to the sites 
where struggles, victories and the seemingly mundane emerge, play out and get resolved. Such 
an approach effectively shifts the emphasis from mainstream outcome-oriented policy 
scholarship towards an assessment of the processes that lead to outcomes. This serves to 
unmask and politicise the policy-making process and provides more nuanced insight into the 
organization of relations of power. Furthermore, it serves to foregrounds the meanings and 
diverse worldviews that actors bring with them, develop, and reconstruct through their 
interactions in policy processes.    
In practice, participant observation involves a great deal of uncertainty and effectively shapes 
the research plan as the researcher processes through the fieldwork. In the context of this 
research, access to particular sites, unwillingness of research subjects to discuss specific topics, 
protecting participants, and unpredicted events provided unforeseen but often insightful and 
compelling windows onto key processes. Yet, gaining access to the group requires patience and 
earning the trust of key actors.  
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10.7. Opportunities for future research 
There is more work to be done examining the use and implication of global governance and 
food security governance. As noted above, literature on global governance was used to frame 
the research project. However, global governance is also being enacted by policy makers and 
other actors to refer to processes of food security governance. The language of global food 
security governance is increasing in line with the G8 and G20’s interest in the subject. As such 
there is a potential for reification between academic examinations of multilateral food security 
policies and a “real-world” discursive shift that more effectively aligns food security initiatives 
with the objectives and language of powerful economic actors.   
There is also a need for more research into the relationship between the FAO and the CFS. It 
appears that the FAO is keen to take up CFS endorsed policies and to shift normally technical 
processes into political ones. The VGGTs is a prime example of this. Research into whether this 
is an increasing trend, and if so, what the implications are for the FAO work plan is important.  
In this thesis policy cohesion is assumed to be desirable. This is another potential limitation. 
Indeed, as discussed throughout, cohesion exists in the form of neoliberal hegemony. The CFS 
reformed to facilitate this cohesion but its authority is often undermined and its policies often 
continue to hold fast to a neoliberal trajectory. Questions of whose policies are to be cohered to 
are addressed but require further theoretical and analytic attention alongside the question of 
whether cohesion around global food security – in all its complexity and scope –is even 
desirable.   
Opportunities for further research into global food security governance are varied, however it is 
essential that researchers ensure that in responding to calls for increased research are not used as 
a stalling tactic to avoid having to make difficult policy decisions. That said, given the growing 
complexity of systems of global governance and the problems they seek to regulate, on-going 
research into the ordering of global food security governance is needed, especially with respect 
to the roles, responsibilities and influence of the private sector and philanthropic foundations, as 
noted above. To better understand the impact of the CFS, careful mapping of the 
implementation and impact of CFS policies at the country level is needed. Here, energy must 
also be directed at developing rigorous methods to account for attribution of policy changes. 
Research is needed to identify ways in which the CFS model of participation and the CSM 
approach to facilitation can be transferred to other policy and negotiation spaces. At the same 
time, more attention needs to be paid to the implications of having social activists move from 
the periphery to the centre.  
Within the CSM there is a push by many social movement actors to engage in discussion and 
debate on food sovereignty. Deep reflection on the implications of allowing the CFS to 
potentially define a critical resistance discourse is warranted to ensure that a potentially non-
hegemonic discourse does not mutate into a counter-hegemonic discourse or become co-opted 
and redefined through multilateral negotiations.  
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Finally, there is a need to continue to map inconsistencies between research and policy. For 
example, calls for greater investment remain prominent and largely unchallenged within 
multilateral fora, especially outside of the CFS, yet research undertaken by the FAO (2012j:7) 
argues that “investors are targeting countries with weak land tenure security” and that investors 
tend to focus on the “poorest countries, and those that are also less involved in world food 
exchanges”. At a CFS side event hosted by the Inter-Agency Working Group discussing the 
impacts of investment and PRAI on developing country agriculture, the World Bank’s 
Agribusiness Unit Team Leader presented “a historical review of 179 agribusiness investments 
in developing countries” and noted that there was very little incentive to invest in food crops 
when investing in agriculture, and that most investors will opt for crops that provide high 
returns, such as palm oil or rubber. 
The world is a messy place, overloaded with wicked problems. The interconnected nature of 
global food systems, the growing interconnectedness of food, fuel and financial markets and 
increasing competition for natural resources suggests that there is a need for meaningful global 
cooperation and cohesion so as to eradicate hunger and ensure the human right to adequate food. 
Despite the many challenges and limitations, the reformed CFS has emerged as the most 
legitimate and hopeful actor to lead this next phase of global food security governance.   
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Assessment of key meetings in a post-2008 food crisis architecture of 
global food security governance 
 
This table lists the key policy frameworks developed by multilateral actors in reaction to the 
food price spikes of 2007-8.  The criteria used for selecting the documents to focus on for 
analysis are listed across the top of the matrix. The ‘X’ denotes that the document meets the 
selection criteria. Bold font is used to clearly identify cases where a document conforms to all 
five criteria. The document chosen focus on throughout this analysis are highlighted in grey. 
There is some overlap across organizations. In these cases the most relevant document 
according to the selection criteria was chosen for analysis (e.g., CFA and UCFA, in this case, 
the updated Framework is analysed, and the GSF is used for the CFS).  
 
Actor Policy/Framework Multila-
teral 
 
Food 
security 
focussed  
Policy 
focused 
Respon-
se to the 
food 
crisis  
Influent-
ial  
 
 
World Bank Group World Development 
Report on 
Agriculture for 
Development 
X    X 
World Economic 
Forum 
Annual Forum X X  X X 
International 
Assessment of 
Agricultural 
Knowledge, 
Science and 
Technology for 
Development (IAA
STD) 
Results and 
conclusions ratified 
during the 
Intergovernmental 
Plenary Meeting 
X  X  X 
UN High-Level Task 
Force on the Global 
Food Security 
Crisis- 
Comprehensive 
Framework for 
Action 
X X X X X 
UN Economic and 
Social Council 
Special Meeting on 
the Global Food 
Crisis 
X X X X  
FAO High-Level 
Conference on Food 
Security and the 
Challenges of Bio-
energy 
X X X X  
G8 Leaders Statement 
on Global Food 
Security 
X X X X X 
World Bank Group Global Food Crisis 
Response Program 
X X  X  
UN High Level Meeting X X X X  
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on Food Security for 
All 
World Bank 
Group 
Implementing 
Agriculture for 
Development, 
World Bank Group 
Agriculture Action 
Plan: FY2010-1 
X X X X X 
G8 L’Aquila Joint 
Statement on Food 
Security 
X X X X X 
Rome-based Food 
Agencies 
Joint Food Security 
Strategy 
 X X X  
G20 Pittsburgh Summit: 
proposal for 
GAFSP 
X X X X X 
UN + USA Partnering for Food 
Security  
X X X X  
FAO High-Level Expert 
Forum, How to Feed 
the World in 2050 
X X  X  
Committee on 
World Food 
Security 
35th Session: 
Agreement to reform 
X X  X X 
People’s Food 
Sovereignty Forum 
Mobilization around 
CFS reform and civil 
society mechanism 
 X  X  
FAO World Summit on 
Food Security 
X X X X X 
FAO Summit of World’s 
Regions on Food 
Security 
X X X   
FAO, IFAD, 
UNCTAD, World 
Bank 
Principles for 
Responsible 
Agricultural 
Investment that 
Respects Rights, 
Livelihoods and 
Resources 
X  X X X 
Global Forum for 
Agricultural 
Research 
First Global 
Conference on 
Agricultural 
Research for 
Development 
  X X  
Scaling-Up 
Nutrition 
Framework for 
Action to Scale Up 
Nutrition 
X  X X X 
High-Level Task 
Force 
Updated 
Comprehensive 
Framework for 
Action 
X X X X X 
High Level Plenary 
Meeting of the UN 
General Assembly  
Outcome Document 
promoting national 
food security 
strategies 
 X X X  
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Scaling-Up 
Nutrition (SUN) 
Movement 
A Road Map for 
Scaling-Up 
Nutrition (SUN)  
X X X X X 
CSO Forum for the 
CSM 
Approval of the Civil 
Society Mechanism 
 X X  X 
Committee on 
World Food 
Security 
36th Session, first of 
the reformed CFS 
X X X X X 
APEC Ministerial Meeting 
on Food Security 
X X X X  
G20 Multi-Year Action 
Plan on 
Development 
X X X X X 
Special Rapporteur 
on the Right to 
Food 
Agroecology and the 
right to food 
 X X X X 
G20 Agriculture 
Ministers 
Action Plan on 
Food Price 
Volatility 
X X X X X 
Chinese Academy 
of Agricultural 
Sciences and 
the International 
Food Policy 
Research Institute  
International 
Conference on 
Climate Change and 
Food Security 
 X    
FAO Regional 
Conferences 
X X    
Committee on 
World Food 
Security 
Extraordinary 38th 
Session to endorse 
the Voluntary 
guidelines on the 
responsible 
governance of tenure 
of land, fisheries and 
forests in the context 
of national food 
security.  
     
G8 New Alliance for 
Food Security and 
Nutrition 
X X   X 
United Nations 
Department of 
Economic and 
Social Affairs 
UN Conference on 
Sustainable 
Development 
X    X 
FAO High level forum on 
food insecurity in 
protracted crisis 
X X X  X 
Committee on 
World Food 
Security 
39th Session, 
adoption of the 
First Version of the 
Global Strategic 
Framework for 
Food Security and 
Nutrition 
X X X X X 
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Appendix 2: Reflections on Participant Observation 
What is 
happening?39F40  
There is a shift in the ordering of food security policy and governance at 
the global level, spurred on by a food price crisis, a global economic crisis, 
restricted resources and climate change.  
Who is involved?  States remain a key player but previously tertiary actors have moved into 
the periphery: BRICS countries and civil society actors have claimed 
political space and power, both officially (e.g. G20, CSM) and unofficially.  
What counts as 
competency?  
Capacity to comment on or react to a changing policy environment; 
experience (lived experience of developing countries; donor experience) 
Who are the 
experts?  
This is changing but it shifts depending on the context. Within the CSM, 
experts are leaders who have been involved in the process. With the CFS, 
the HLPE is mean to be the expert voice but it is often undermined.  
Who is excluded 
from action and 
why?  
This again depends on the context. 
How is the 
boundary on 
participation 
maintained?  
This boundary is flexible. At times I am observing, at other times I am 
participating to a degree where the capacity for observation and time for 
adequate reflection and analysis is lost. What is gained however is greater 
trust and consequently access.  
Who contests what 
counts as 
participation and 
what is the 
consequence of 
resistance?  
Supporting the work of the mechanism and participating in meetings 
counts as participation. Throughout my field work I have been very 
deliberate in not contributing to dialogue, decision making processes and 
other public meetings. I work (note take, report writing, interpretation) and 
sit in on meetings but I do not participate in the official debates. A large 
part of this is legitimacy: I do not represent a constituency and therefore 
have no authority to speak.  
Who are the 
novices?  
The people who attend just one meeting, who lack the knowledge and 
experience to actively participate. They are generally quickly identified by 
their outsider actions (not conforming to the working style that has 
developed within the CFS) or by asking questions that have become 
common sense to other participants.  
What are the spatial-
temporal 
arrangements/limits 
of the interactions? 
These are varied depending on the context. With a shift towards greater 
focus on inter-sessional activities, the CFS is meeting more frequently. 
Meetings happen in Rome (there were regional FAO meetings but I did not 
attend) and they are usually very busy. There are opportunities to meet 
with people and conduct formal and informal interviews. Given that the 
meetings often take place over meal times they tend to be more informal, 
semi-structured, purposive and not recorded. I do not have access to the 
majority of the interactions that take place in and around the CFS (e.g., 
Bureau and Advisory Group, meetings between country representatives, 
friends of the chair meetings).  The other challenge is finding time to meet 
with people. The meetings often take place during meal times or breaks 
and are consequently rather informal in nature (questions over coffee, or 
walking from one meeting room to another). Due to my funding, I was 
usually able to attend the relevant in-person meetings of the CFS. 
Within the CSM, communication happens mostly asynchronously, through 
email correspondence and usually in the three languages of the CSM. Most 
of the documents are posted at www.csm4cfs.org or are passed to me by 
participants. I have access to all CSM meetings and working groups but 
when the Coordination Committee meets in camera, as they did in advance 
of the 37th Session, I do not have access. 
                                                     
 
40 These questions have been adapted from Evans 2012. 
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How are social 
relations organized 
and structured 
through this 
practice?  
The CFS is formed of a rather small group of active people. Over the last 
two years, the relationships have strengthened as trust has been built. 
However, social relations between myself and NGOs, social movements, 
technicians, diplomats and ambassadors differ greatly. In all contexts, 
issues of ideology, language, class, race, age, and gender all come into 
play, just in different, often opposite ways.  
Positive social relations with social movements and NGOs have been 
cultivated slowly. There is sometimes apprehension about having a 
researcher in the midst. A social hierarchy exists within the CSM and while 
those who can be labelled leaders of the CSM see me as a researcher, many 
others see me as part of the secretariat, or as part of the CSM more broadly. 
I am generally accepted as “part of the CSM” and am included in their 
meals and social events, as well as in planning and strategy sessions.  
To date, relations with technicians have been formal. They are the experts 
and I am a researcher interested in answers.  
The diplomats have all been receptive and supportive of my research. With 
some, cordial relations have developed and they have included me in social 
activities, such as meals.  They seem to be very happy that someone is 
interested in the work they do, especially from a policy perspective. These 
interviews tend to begin formally but shift quickly to rather informal 
interviews, especially in cases where follow-up interviews take place. 
Some countries were not receptive.  
What cultural 
values and ethical 
dispositions emerge 
from the practice?  
The cultural values vary greatly. Indeed it has proved easier fostering 
relations on geographic lines than along actor categories. The values that 
inform the research are my own and the ethics are made up, in part, by the 
proposal that was approved by the Ethics Committee, but codes of ethics 
that the people I engage with expect and uphold divers greatly. This can be 
a challenge to navigate.  
What are the 
tensions and 
conflicts?  
Many, including gender, class, race, age, lack of trust, language barriers.  
How can I take 
part? 
In various ways. To date, my participation has ranged from sitting and 
listening, to note taking, report writing, facilitating, translating, 
interpreting, running errands, organizing, interviewing for a short film, and 
providing technical support on specific issues. 
 
  
 250 
 
Appendix 3: Participant Profiles 
Summary of interviews by region and role  
The following tables breaks down the interviews by region and by the type of actor. In total 15 
interviews were conducted. While each was included in the analysis, only nine were specifically 
referenced in the text.  
 
Region Type 
EU 6 CSO 3 
BRIC 2 Negotiator/ diplomat 10 
Asia 1 Technical 1 
Latin America 2 Financial Institutions 1 
North America 1  
Africa 2 
Global  1  
Titles attributed to research participants 
 
Reference in Thesis 
African famers’ leader Leading human rights campaigner 
Coordination Committee member from the Global 
South 
Member for the IPC  
Constituent focal point on the CSM Coordination 
Committee  
Member of the HLPE Steering Committee 
EU delegate  Negotiator from a G20 country 
EU-based food security analyst  Participant from a prominent rural network 
FAO expert Representative from a major international 
NGO based in Rome 
FAO representative Representative of a large International NGO 
active in the CSM since the beginning 
FAO technical staff person Representative of an African-based NGO 
French civil servant Social movement actor involved in the CSM  
International Farmers’ Social Movement Leader Social movement coordinator 
Key actor in the CSM  UK diplomat 
Leader of a European farming social movement  UN expert on food security 
In total, attributable quotations were taken from 24 individuals: nine that participated in 
interviews and 13 selected from field work notes.  
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Breakdown of positions held by informants used in the thesis (n = 24) 
 
 
Regional breakdown of informants used in the thesis (n =24) 
 
 
 
Gender breakdown of informants used in thesis (n = 24) 
 
 
 
Series1, CSO, 17, 
71% 
Series1, FAO/UN, 
4, 17% 
Series1, 
Government, 3, 
12% 
Series1, Africa, 
3, 12% 
Series1, Asia, 3, 
13% 
Series1, EU & 
North America, 17, 
71% 
Series1, Latin 
America, 1, 4% 
Series1, Women, 9, 
37% 
Series1, Men, 15, 
63% 
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Appendix 4: Participant Information Form 
 
 
Jessica Duncan 
Research Student 
                                                                             Centre for Food Policy (Room C 307) 
                                                                    School of Community and Health Sciences 
                                                                                                   City University London 
                                                                                                        Northampton Square 
                                                                                                          London EC1V 0HB 
jessicabrownduncan@gmail.com    
 
 
I am writing to invite you to take part in an interview for a study entitled Civil Society 
Participation in Global Food Security Governance, carried out by Jessica Duncan as part of her 
PhD Research at City University’s Centre for Food Policy.  
 
Project Title: Civil Society Participation in Global Food Security Governance: Tensions, 
challenges and opportunities 
 
Principal Investigators: Ms Jessica Duncan, Dr David Barling 
 
Why are you being asked for an interview? 
We are asking to interview you because we are interested in discussing with stakeholders issues 
relating to civil society engagement in global food security governance.  
 
Purpose of the interview 
As part of my PhD research, I am interested in exploring the role of civil society organizations 
and NGOs in the reformed architecture of global food security policy in the wake of the 2007-8 
food price crisis.  
Procedure 
If you agree please reply to this letter by sending an email to Jessica Duncan. She will follow up 
to arrange an interview. Interviews can take place face-to-face or by telephone or Skype. 
Interviews will be arranged at a time that is suitable for you. It is likely that the interview will 
take no longer than one hour and it will be recorded. Your participation is entirely voluntary and 
you may withdraw at any time should you change your mind.   
 
Potential Benefits  
This will be an opportunity for you to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the current 
structure of global food security governance and world food security policy more specifically, 
and to share your concerns, ideas, insights and best practices.  
 
Confidentiality 
Every effort will be made to ensure confidentiality.  No information that discloses your identity 
will be used in any project outputs (reports, articles, presentations) and all comments made in 
the interview will be anonymous.  The recorded data will be stored as an mp3 file and will be 
transcribed by the researcher.  We will hold the audio data for ten years after which the 
transcribed data will be destroyed.  Once interviews are transcribed they will be anonymous, as 
all identifiable information will be removed.   
University Complaints Procedure 
If there is an aspect of the interview that concerns you, you may make a complaint.  City 
University has established a complaints procedure via the Secretary to the Research Ethics 
Committee. To complain about the study, you need to phone 020 7040 3040.  You can then ask 
to speak to the Secretary of the Ethics Committee and inform them that the name of the project 
is: Civil Society Participation in Global Food Security Governance.  
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You could also write to the Secretary at:  
Anna Ramberg 
Secretary to Senate Ethical Committee  
CRIDO E214 
City University, Northampton Square  
London, EC1V 0HB                                   
Email: anna.ramberg.1@city.ac.uk  
If you have any questions about the interview or the evaluation in general, please contact 
Jessica Duncan at jessicabrownduncan@gmail.com or +44 (0) 75 86 26 23 29 
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Appendix 5: Participant Consent Form 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Title: Civil Society Participation in Global Food Security Governance: Tensions, 
challenges and opportunities 
 
Principal Investigators: Ms Jessica Duncan, Dr David Barling 
 ฀ I agree to take part in the above City University research project.  I have read 
the Information Sheet and my questions have been answered to my satisfaction.   
 ฀ I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary, and that I can choose 
not to participate in part or all of the project and can withdraw at any stage without 
being penalised or disadvantaged in any way. 
 
I understand that agreeing to take part means that I am willing to: ฀  Be interviewed by the researcher     ฀  Allow the interview to be audio taped  
Data Protection  
This information will be held and processed only for the purposes of the project. 
I understand that any information I provide is confidential.  I agree for the interview to 
be tape recorded and I agree for verbatim quotations from the interview to be used in 
presentations, reports and other publications on the understanding that no information 
that could identify me will be presented or published in any reports on the project, or 
to any other party.   
 
I have received a copy of this consent form for my own records.   
________________          __________________ __________________ 
Name of Participant  Signature   Date 
 
________________        ___________________     __________________ 
Name of Interviewer  Signature   Date 
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Appendix 6: Principles and guidelines related to investment in agriculture 
Name When Who What Link 
6 Basic Principles on 
the Purchase and 
Leasing of Large 
Areas of Land in 
Developing Countries  
August 
2009 
 
German 
Government 
(BMZ) 
To make use of the possible opportunities and potential, it is 
important when framing and implementing investments in land 
to adhere to the following six basic principles: 
1. Participation and transparency in negotiations 
2. Recognition of existing rights 
3. Compensation 
4. Fair sharing in the benefits of the investment 
5. Sustainability 
6. The human right to food 
http://www.bmz.d
e/en/publications/t
ype_of_publicatio
n/strategies/diskur
s015en.pdf 
5 Elements for a code 
of conduct for foreign 
land acquisition 
April 2009 International 
Food Policy 
Research Institute  
(Joachim von 
Braun and Ruth 
Meinzen-Dick) 
Key elements of a code of conduct for foreign land acquisition 
include the following: 
1. Transparency in negotiations 
2. Respect for existing land rights 
3. Sharing of benefits 
4. Environmental sustainability 
5. Adherence to national trade policies 
http://www.ifpri.o
rg/sites/default/fil
es/publications/bp
013all.pdf 
 
 
Equator Principles 
(III) 
2012 76 adopting 
financial 
institutions (73 
Equator 
Principles 
Financial 
Institutions and 3 
Associates) 
Required impact assessments on any investment project beyond 
10 million USD by participating financial institutions in advance 
of project. Financial industry benchmark for determining, 
assessing and managing social & environmental risk in project 
financing. While the Equator Principles are not intended to be 
applied retroactively, EPFIs will apply them to the expansion or 
upgrade of an existing Project where changes in scale or scope 
may create significant environmental and/or social impacts, or 
significantly change the nature or degree of an existing impact. 
Principle 1: Review and Categorisation  
Principle 2: Environmental and Social Assessment  
Principle 3: Applicable Environmental and Social 
http://www.equat
or-principles.com/ 
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Standards  
Principle 4: Environmental and Social Management 
System and Action Plan  
Principle 5: Stakeholder Engagement  
Principle 6: Grievance Mechanism 
Principle 7: Independent Review  
Principle 8: Covenants  
Principle 9: Independent Monitoring and Reporting  
Principle 10: Reporting and Transparency 
Extractive Industry 
Transparency 
Initiative Principles 
 
Since 2003 Extractive 
Industry 
Transparency 
Initiative 
 
A global standard ensuring transparency of payments from 
natural resources The EITI Principles provide the cornerstone of 
the initiative. They are: 
1. We share a belief that the prudent use of natural 
resource wealth should be an important engine for 
sustainable economic growth that contributes to 
sustainable development and poverty reduction, but if 
not managed properly, can create negative economic 
and social impacts. 
2. We affirm that management of natural resource wealth 
for the benefit of a country’s citizens is in the domain 
of sovereign governments to be exercised in the 
interests of their national development. 
3. We recognise that the benefits of resource extraction 
occur as revenue streams over many years and can be 
highly price dependent. 
4. We recognise that a public understanding of 
government revenues and expenditure over time could 
help public debate and inform choice of appropriate and 
realistic options for sustainable development. 
5. We underline the importance of transparency by 
governments and companies in the extractive industries 
and the need to enhance public financial management 
http://eiti.org/eiti/
principles 
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and accountability. 
6. We recognise that achievement of greater transparency 
must be set in the context of respect for contracts and 
laws. 
7. We recognise the enhanced environment for domestic 
and foreign direct investment that financial 
transparency may bring. 
8. We believe in the principle and practice of 
accountability by government to all citizens for the 
stewardship of revenue streams and public expenditure. 
9. We are committed to encouraging high standards of 
transparency and accountability in public life, 
government operations and in business, 
10. We believe that a broadly consistent and workable 
approach to the disclosure of payments and revenues is 
required, which is simple to undertake and to use. 
11. We believe that payments’ disclosure in a given country 
should involve all extractive industry companies 
operating in that country. 
12. In seeking solutions, we believe that all stakeholders 
have important and relevant contributions to make – 
including governments and their agencies, extractive 
industry companies, service companies, multilateral 
organizations, financial organizations, investors, and 
non-governmental organizations. 
Large-Scale Land 
Acquisition and 
Responsible 
Agricultural 
Investment: For an 
approach respecting 
Human Rights, Food 
Security and 
June 2010 Government of 
France 
France strongly believes that the main stake is to optimise the 
contribution of land investments to the achievement of 
food security, secured land tenure, jobs preservation and creation 
and sustainable development. 
It is governed by 2 principles: 
1.  respecting land users rights, formal or informal 
(customary or traditional), individual or collective, is a 
prerequisite for any investment; and 
http://www.agter.
asso.fr/IMG/pdf/f
rench-position-
paper.pdf 
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Sustainable 
Development 
2. ensuring that private use is compatible with general 
interests, insofar as food security shall be considered as 
a global public good. 
These basic principles apply throughout the 3 pillars of the 
Global Partnership for Agriculture, Food Security and Nutrition: 
knowledge and expertise; governance and policy coherence; 
funding and implementation. 
Minimum Human 
Rights 
Principles Applicable 
to Large-Scale Land 
Acquisitions or Lease 
June 2009 Special 
Rapporteur on the 
Right to Food 
(Olivier De 
Schutter) 
1. The negotiations leading to investment agreements 
should be conducted in full transparency, and with the 
participation of the local communities whose access to 
land and other productive resources may be affected as 
a result of the arrival of an investor. 
2. Any shifts in land use can only take place with the free, 
prior and informed consent of the local communities 
concerned. 
3. States should adopt legislation protecting these and 
specifying in detail the conditions according to which 
shifts in land use, or evictions, may take place, as well 
as the procedure to be followed. 
4. Investment agreement revenues should be used for the 
benefit of the local population. 
5. Host States and investors should establish and promote 
farming systems that are sufficiently labour intensive to 
contribute to employment creation. 
6. Host States and investors should cooperate in 
identifying ways to ensure that the modes of 
agricultural production shall respect the environment, 
and shall not accelerate climate change, soil depletion, 
and the exhaustion of freshwater reserves. 
7. The obligations of the investor be defined in clear 
terms, and that these obligations are enforceable, for 
instance by the inclusion of pre-defined sanctions in 
cases of non-compliance. 
http://www2.ohch
r.org/english/issue
s/food/docs/Briefi
ngNotelandgrab.p
df  
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8. Investment agreements should include a clause 
providing that a certain minimum percentage of the 
crops produced shall be sold on local markets, and that 
this percentage may increase, in proportions to be 
agreed in advance, if the prices of food commodities on 
international markets reach certain levels. 
9. Impact assessments should be conducted prior to the 
completion of the negotiations, in order to highlight the 
consequences of the investment on the enjoyment of the 
right to food. 
10. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the 
indigenous peoples concerned in order to obtain their 
free and informed consent prior to the approval of any 
project affecting their lands or territories and other 
resources, particularly in connection with the 
development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, 
water or other resources. 
11. Agricultural waged workers should be provided with 
adequate protection and their fundamental human and 
labour rights should be stipulated in legislation and 
enforced in practice, consistent with the applicable ILO 
instruments 
Principles for 
Responsible 
Agricultural 
Investment that 
Respect Rights, 
Livelihoods and 
Resources (PRAI) 
January 
2010 
 
Inter-Agency 
Working Group: 
FAO, IFAD, 
UNCTAD and the 
World Bank 
The seven Principles cover all types of investment in agriculture, 
including between principal investors and contract farmers.  
Principle 1: Existing rights to land and associated natural 
resources are recognized and respected. 
Principle 2: Investments do not jeopardize food security but 
rather strengthen it. 
Principle 3: Processes relating to investment in agriculture are 
transparent, monitored, and ensure accountability by all 
stakeholders, within a proper business, legal, and regulatory 
environment. 
Principle 4: All those materially affected are consulted, and 
http://unctad.org/e
n/Pages/DIAE/G-
20/PRAI.aspx 
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agreements from consultations are recorded and enforced. 
Principle 5: Investors ensure that projects respect the rule of 
law, reflect industry best practice, are viable economically, and 
result in durable shared value. 
Principle 6: Investments generate desirable social and 
distributional impacts and do not increase vulnerability. 
Principle 7: Environmental impacts of a project are quantified 
and measures taken to encourage sustainable resource use, while 
minimizing the risk/magnitude of negative impacts and 
mitigating them. 
Promoting responsible 
international 
investment in 
agriculture 
September 
2009 
Japanese 
government 
(Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs): 
Promoting 
Responsible 
International 
Investment in 
Agriculture: Roun
dtable concurrent 
with the 64th 
United Nations 
General 
Assembly 
 
Participants discussed the following key tenets and reached a 
broad agreement that they could be a basis for the principles 
around which the international framework is designed. The 
overwhelming view was that the principles should be legally 
non-binding but have a flexible mechanism for monitoring, 
taking into account country-specific circumstances. 
1. Land and Resource Rights 
2. Food Security 
3. Transparency, Good Governance and Enabling 
Environment  Consultation and Participation 
4. Economic viability and responsible agro-enterprise 
investing 
5. Social Sustainability 
6. Environmental Sustainability 
http://www.mofa.
go.jp/policy/econ
omy/fishery/agric
ulture/summary09
09.pdf 
 
 
 
 
Santiago Principles 
(Generally Accepted 
Principles and 
Practices)  
October 
2008 
International 
Working Group 
of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds 
Set of 24 voluntary guidelines that assign "best practices" for the 
operations of Sovereign Wealth Funds 
http://www.iwg-
swf.org/pubs/gap
plist.htm 
Voluntary Guidelines 
to Support the 
Progressive 
Realisation of the 
November 
2004 
FAO 1. Democracy, good governance, human rights and the 
rule of law 
2. Economic development policies  
3. Strategies  
http://www.fao.or
g/docrep/meeting/
009/y9825e/y982
5e00.htm 
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Right to Adequate 
Food in the Context of 
National Food 
Security 
4. Market systems  
5. Institutions  
6. Stakeholders 
7.  Legal framework  
8. Access to resources and assets  
9. Food safety and consumer protection  
10.  Nutrition  
11.  Education and awareness raising  
12. National financial resources  
13. Support for vulnerable groups  
14. Safety nets  
15. International food aid  
16. Natural and human-made disasters  
17. Monitoring, indicators and benchmarks  
18.  National human rights institutions  
19. International dimension 
 
 
 
Voluntary s for 
Responsible 
Governance of Tenure 
of Land, Fisheries and 
Forests in the context 
of national food 
security 
May 2012 CFS The Voluntary s on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of 
Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food 
Security promote secure tenure rights and equitable access to 
land, fisheries and forests as a means of eradicating hunger and 
poverty, supporting sustainable development and enhancing the 
environment. 
http://www.fao.or
g/fileadmin/templ
ates/cfs/Docs1112
/VG/VG_Final_E
N_May_2012.pdf 
Principles for 
Responsible 
Agricultural 
Investments 
on-going CFS CFS has approved an inclusive consultation process to develop 
and ensure broad ownership of principles for responsible 
agricultural investments. The expected outcome is a set of 
principles to promote investments in agriculture that contribute 
to food security and nutrition and to support the progressive 
realization of the right to adequate food in the context of national 
food security. 
http://www.fao.or
g/cfs/cfs-
home/resaginv/en/ 
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